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CHARACTERS AND EVENTS

POPULAR ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

BY JOHN DEWEY

EDITED BY JOSEPH RATNER

VOLUME II

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BOOK THREE

AMERICA

We are no longer a colony of any European nation nor of them all collectively. We are a new body and a new spirit in the world.

JOHN DEWEY.

1. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER[1]

There are myths and myths. Some are inspiriting; some are benumbing. Nature myths, at least in their first form, inspire because they are spontaneous responses of imagination to the scene that confronts it. Myths of literary criticism and historic interpretation are deadening. They do not enliven; they force subject-matter into ready-made patterns and thus dull sensitivity of perception. Such myths grow up in interpretations of past philosophies and always tend to overlay and conceal the realities of past reflection. They flourish in those literary versions by which the ideas of philosophers reach the public—for philosophers themselves are usually too much preoccupied with the technique, the professional rules, of their calling to have a public—except one another. Even such new movements as pragmatism and instrumentalism already have their accretion of myths which stand in place of the ideas themselves. Probably the unfortunate names themselves invite the creation and encourage the spread of these myths. The names account alike for some of the vogue of the doctrines and for some of the condemnation they receive.

One reading of the myth is embodied in the words which form the caption of what I am writing. They are borrowed from Lewis Mumford's *The Golden Day;* they sum up his essential criticism. "William James," he says, "gave this attitude of compromise and acquiescence a name: he called it pragmatism." Not content with this epithet, he headlines the idea of acquiescence; "the pragmatism that followed it was a paralysis." And again, "pragmatism was a blessed anæsthetic." What is denoted by "this attitude"? And in what did James acquiesce? The America of his own time, according to Mr. Mumford, the America of the Gilded Age that followed the Civil War. More concerned with making clear his pattern than he is with William James he goes as far as to say, "James was only warming over again in philosophy the hash of everyday experience in the Gilded Age." And this of William James, the arch-heretic of his day, the intellectual nonconformist, the constant protester against everything institutionalized in action and belief, the valiant fighter for causes which if not lost were unpopular and conventionally ignored! Such are the exigencies and dangers of a myth. If one were to apply Mr. Mumford's method to his own treatment, one might regard him as the acquiescent prophet of the Slogan Age of the 1920's.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Jan. 5, 1927; published under the title *The Pragmatic Acquiescence.*

For some reason, Mr. Mumford is fairer to me than he is to William James. But to bring me into line with his formula he has to attribute to me ideas of democracy and of "adjustment" which I not only have never held, but against which I have consistently, if vainly, taught and written. As evidence of a willing surrender on my part to industrial utilitarianism, he cites the following passage from my writings: "Fine art, consciously undertaken as such, is peculiarly instrumental in quality. It is a device in experimentation carried on for the sake of education. It exists for the sake of a specialized use, use being a training of new modes of perception," etc. The reader of the passage would inevitably infer what Mr. Mumford intends him to infer, that the passage represents my view of fine art, namely, that it is merely instrumental in character. But the entire chapter from which it is extracted is a statement that all art which is really fine exhibits experience when it attains completion or a "final," consummatory character, and, while it is urged that such art is also contributory, that to which it is held to be auxiliary is "renewal of spirit," not, it would seem, a base end, and certainly not a utilitarian one. The passage cited is directed against those views of fine art which treat it as an experience apart and for the few, an esoteric experience, instead of as a perfecting of the potentialities of any and all experience. This reference is implied in the quoted phrase "consciously undertaken as such"; it is explicitly stated in words which immediately precede what is cited, namely "seclusive æstheticians," the point being that fine art conceived in *their* sense is "instrumental," so that while all value is not denied to it, its value consists in opening "new objects to be observed and enjoyed." The next sentence after those which Mr. Mumford quotes, reads as follows: "This is a genuine service, but only an age of combined confusion and conceit will arrogate to works that perform this special utility the exclusive name of fine art." My literary style must indeed be "fuzzy and formless," as Mr. Mumford calls it, to have led him to assign to me a definition of fine art which I assert indicates combined confusion and conceit.

William James, however, hardly needs defense, certainly not against shaping him to a pattern which inverts his whole spirit and thought, and I do not think that a few more misconceptions of my own ideas are of such importance as to justify writing the present article. What has been said is introductory to an issue which is of genuine significance.

What is the relation of criticism to the social life criticized? What, more particularly, is the relation of philosophy to its social medium and generation? I doubt if any competent student of the history of thought would say that there has existed any philosophy which amounted to anything which was merely a formulated acquiescence in the immediately predominating traits of its day. Such things need no formulation, not even an apologetics; they dominate and that is enough for them. Yet there is probably also no historic philosophy which is not in some measure a reflection, an idealization, a justification of some of the tendencies of its own age. Yet what makes it a work of reflection and criticism is that the elements and values selected are set in opposition to other factors, and those perhaps the ones most in evidence, the most clamorous, the most insistent: which is to say that all serious thinking combines in some proportion and perspective the actual and the possible, where actuality supplies contact and solidity while possibility furnishes the ideal upon which criticism rests and from which creative effort springs. The question whether the possibility appealed to is a possibility of the actual, or is externally imported and applied, is crucial.

There is a sense, then, in which pragmatic philosophy is a report of actual social life; in the same sense it is true of any philosophy that is not a private and quickly forgotten intellectual excrescence. Not that philosophers set out to frame such reports. They are usually too much preoccupied with the special traditions within which their work is done to permit the assumption of any such task. They are concerned with doing the best they can with problems and issues which come to them from the conflict of their professional traditions, which, therefore, are specialized and technical, and through which they see the affairs of the contemporary scene only indirectly and, alas, darkly. Nevertheless being human they may retain enough humanity to be, subconsciously at least, sensitive to the non-technical, non-professional, tendencies and issues of their own civilizations, and to find in the peculiar characteristics of this civilization subjects for inquiry and analysis. In any case, it is as necessary as it is legitimate that their methods and results should, in their leading features, be translated out of their proper technical context and set in a freer and more public landscape. The product of the dislocation may surprise no one more than the author of the technical doctrines. But without it the ulterior and significant meaning of the doctrines is neither liberated nor tested.

The office of the literary and social critic in dealing with the broader human relationship of specialized philosophical thinking is, accordingly, to be cherished. But the office is a difficult one to perform, more difficult to do well than that of technical philosophizing itself, just as any truly liberal human work is harder to achieve than is a technical task. Preconceptions, fixed patterns, too urgent desire to point a moral, are almost fatal. A pattern is implied in such critical interpretation, but it must be tridimensional and flowing, not linear and tight.

What, then, is to be said of pragmatism and of instrumentalism when they are viewed as reflective reports of the American scene? More specifically, admitting a certain connection between the thought of James and the pioneer phase of American life and between instrumentalism and our industrialism, how is that connection to be understood? Mr. Mumford recognizes that the reflection by James of pioneer life is genuine and significant as far as it goes. But, he says, [illegible] "valuable philosophy must take into account a greater range of experience than the dominating ones of a single generation." Doubtless: nevertheless the dominating tendencies of two or three centuries may reveal to [illegible] genial mind something of vast significance for all generations. Their very exaggeration may disclose something hitherto concealed, while the lack of that something may have introduced such distortion and thinness into the earlier intellectual picture that its disclosure operates as a transformation. Mr. Mumford says that James lacked a *Weltanschauung*. No sentence he could have uttered affords such a measure of his competency to state the relation which the thought of James bore to pioneerdom. The idea of a universe which is not all closed and settled, which is still in some respects indeterminate and in the making, which is adventurous and which implicates all who share in it, whether by acting or believing, in its own perils, may appear to Mr. Mumford a commonplace, and not to be reckoned as a *Weltanschauung*. But one who has not studied James patiently enough to learn how this idea is wrought into his treatment of all special topics, from the will to believe to his pluralism, from his radical empiricism to his moral and religious ideas, has not got far in knowledge of James. That the controlling *Weltanschauung* does not appear in formal and pompous logical parade in discussion of special topics may not make the task of the would-be critic easy. But the style shows how genuinely and spontaneously the leading idea pervades his thinking. No other mode of literary presentation could have been so faithful to the central thought.

Perhaps one has to be old enough to recall, with some fullness of impression, the intellectual atmosphere in which James' work was carried on to realize that James brought with him not only [illegible] *Weltanschauung* but a revolutionary one. His professional contemporaries did not even trouble to criticize his philosophy; it was enough to laugh. Was it not self-evidently a more or less delightful whimsy of a tyro in philosophy who happened at the same time to be temperamentally something of a genius in psychology?

Not until James gathered together the ideas which long previously he had profusely scattered in his other writings under the rather unfortunate title of pragmatism did he receive serious attention. And long after "pragmatism" in any sense save as an application of his *Weltanschauung* shall have passed into a not unhappy oblivion, the fundamental idea of an open universe in which uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, novelties and possibilities are naturalized will remain associated with the name of James; the more he is studied in his historic setting the more original and daring will the idea appear. And if perchance the future historian associates the generation of the idea with a pioneer America—in which James had no personal share—that historian may be trusted to see that such an idea is removed as far as pole from pole from the temper of an age whose occupation is acquisition, whose concern is with security, and whose creed is that the established economic régime is peculiarly "natural" and hence immutable in principle.

But America is now industrial and technological, not pioneering. Perhaps the later form of pragmatism called instrumentalism is the anodyne to reconcile the imagination and desire of man to the brutalities and perversions of this aspect of our life? Well, natural science and the technology which has issued from it are dominant tendencies of present culture, more conspicuously prominent in the United States than elsewhere, but everywhere all but universal in scope. That preoccupation with them should, whether consciously or subconsciously, have played a part in generating "instrumentalism" is a not unreasonable hypothesis.

What then? If one confronts this phenomenon and does not withdraw for consolation to the "pillaging" of other climes and epochs, what is to be done with it? It needs criticism, not acquiescence: granted. But there is no criticism without understanding. And no matter how much one may draw upon contrasting phases of life, Greek and Indian with Mr. Santayana, or the Golden Day of Emerson, Thoreau and Whitman with Mr. Mumford, for aid in this understanding, it is also true that without an understanding of natural science and technology in their own terms, understanding is external, arbitrary, and criticism is "transcendent" and ultimately of one's own private conceit.

Words, especially epithets, in philosophy are far from self-explaining. But the term "instrumentalism" might suggest to a mind not too precommitted, that natural science and technology are conceived as instruments, and that the logical intellect of mind which finds its congenial materials in these subjects is also instrumental—that is to say, not final, not complete, not the truth or reality of the world and life. Instruments imply, I should suppose, ends to which they are put, purposes that are not instruments which control them, values for which tools and agencies are to be used. The record of philosophy doubtless presents instances of almost utter self-contradiction and self-stultification. But it would require a mind unusually devoid both of sense of logic and a sense of humor—if there be any difference between them—to try to universalize instrumentalism, to set up a doctrine of tools which are not tools for anything except for more tools. The counterpart of "instrumentalism" is precisely that the values by which Mr. Mumford sets such store are the ends for the attainment of which natural science and all technologies and industries and industriousnesses are intrinsically, not externally and transcendentally, or by way of exhortation, contributory.

The essential and immanent criticism of existing industrialism and of the dead weight of science is that instruments are made into ends, that they are deflected from their intrinsic quality and thereby corrupted. The implied idealization of science and technology is not by way of acquiescence. It is by way of appreciation that the ideal values which dignify and give meaning to human life have themselves in the past been precarious in possession, arbitrary, accidental and monopolized in distribution, because of lack of means of control; by lack, in other words, of those agencies and instrumentalities with which natural science through technologies equips mankind. Not all who say *Ideals, Ideals,* shall enter the kingdom of the ideal, but only those shall enter who know and who respect the roads that conduct to the kingdom.

2. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW WORLD[1]

Were I a poet, this should be, even at the dangerous risk of comparisons invited, an ode. But, alas, the passion as well as the art is lacking. I can but set down a blurred perception of immense masses stirring across great spaces. There is not even the assurance that the fogged outlines mark a thing beheld. They may be only felt, and felt with too much of an observing curiosity to find out what they mean to permit them to kindle into passion.

It is likely that our national hesitation will outwardly have been swallowed up in act before these words appear upon the printed page. But if I read the hesitation aright such a resolution of uncertainty will be but partial. We shall have decided a small thing, what to do, but the great thing, the thing so great as to cause and perpetuate our hesitation, may remain. We may still be uncertain as to our will to be. In the course of doing, we may, it is true, learn something of what we would be. But also it may turn out that even while doing deeds which are imperatively demanded of us our hesitation may grow into a greater doubt. For the hesitation which I see is that of a nation which knows that its time has not come, its hour not struck. The ripening forces have not yet matured, and like all vital processes they are not to be forced. The time of national hesitation is the time of slow and certain growth to an end which is not to be anticipated nor prevented. The day of fate tarries and not till it arrives will the authentic direction be spoken. Meantime suspense.

This is not the usual rendering of our course. The most vocal among us tell us that our hesitation is at best the provincialism of ignorance and at worst a slothful cowardice bred of mammon-serving peace; that we hesitate from inner division and distraction; because we are not a nation, but a boarding-house of aliens; because we have been corrupted by overmuch prosperity and a sentimentally humanitarian pacifism. Our fiber is gone: we are spineless. We have been told that we are justly the objects of universal scorn and contempt, that our national hesitation is a national humiliation. When a fellow-citizen said, after the dismissal of the German ambassador, that now for the first time in two years could he stand straight and look others in the eye, he only said what the more vocal elements have been reiterating day after day, week after week. Such has been the obvious, not to say clamorous, explanation of our prolonged and penetrating hesitation.

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[1] From *The Seven Arts*, May, 1917; published under the title *In a Time of National Hesitation.*

Such statements are not material for argument or disproof. One only sees what one sees, and it is hard to tell even that. But these accounts prove too much. We are told that the nation pauses for lack of leadership, when heaven knows our ears have ached from the roarings of those who have told us what to do and who have exhausted the fishwives' vocabulary in scolding us because we have not done it. We have bowed our heads, and allowed the tempest of words to pass over. We have waited listening for something, just what we have not known, but assuredly for something else than what platform and press are dinning into us. Hordes and aggregates of accident do not wait and hesitate in this fashion. They respond with a stampede. The strident tone of our critics in its increasing shrillness is evidence that the inertia, the solidity of a people was there; for only those who are fused into a single being can wait enduringly in the midst of such clamor and world stir. We have continued to be uncertain just because we were certain that our destiny had not declared itself. Those who have offered themselves as prophets have shown that they were rather historians, reminiscent of a colonial age out of which the people, the masses, had slowly grown. Those who lamented the lack of leadership proclaimed by their laments that a fused people had assumed its own leadership and was waiting in silence to issue its directions. Never has the American people so little required apologizing for, because never before has it been in such possession of its senses.

If there has been such impressive unification, why the prolonged hesitation? Because though we have become a single body—hence the inertia which the unknowing have taken to be apathy—and are in possession of our senses, we have not yet found a national mind, a will as to what to be. It is easy to be stampeded; it is easy to be told what one's mind is, and humbly to accept on trust a mind thus made up. It is not easy to make up the mind, for the mind is made up only as the world takes on form. We have hesitated in making up our mind just because we would make it up not arbitrarily but in the light of the confronting situation. And that situation is dark, not light.

This is itself proof that a New World is at last a fact, and not a geographical designation. We no longer can be spoken to in the language of the Old World and respond. We must be spoken to in our own terms. I do not say this in a complacent or congratulatory mood, but record it as a fact. It is a disagreeable fact to many, and especially disagreeable to those with whom we feel most friendly. It cannot fail to be in some measure disagreeable to ourselves that we should have attained a state which is bound to be intellectually and morally unpleasant to those who are our near spiritual kin and who have, as against anybody but ourselves, our warm sympathies and best wishes. That the gallant fight for democracy and civilization fought on the soil of France is not our fight is a thing not to be realized without pangs and qualms. But it is a fact which has slowly disclosed itself as these last long years have disclosed us to ourselves. It was not ours, because for better or for worse we are committed to a fight for another democracy and another civilization. Their nature is not clear to us: all that is sure is that they are different. This is the fact of a New World. The Declaration of Independence is no longer a merely dynastic and political declaration.

For this reason I hold that a termination of hesitation so far as to engage in overt war against Germany will not be of itself a conclusion of our hesitation. There is such a thing as interests being affected vitally without a vital interest being affected. As I write, we seem to be on the point of arriving at the conclusion that we cannot aid, by means of a passive compliance, the triumph of a nation that regards its triumph as the one thing so necessary that all means whatsoever that lead to that triumph are not only legitimate but sacred. Such a future neighbor we do not wish to be developed, certainly not by our aid as passive accomplices. So far our hesitation gives way to action, because so far the situation has declared itself. We but meet a clearly proffered challenge.

But it is vain to suppose that thereby our deeper hesitation is concluded; that on this account we join with full heart and soul even though we join with unreserved energy. Not until the almost impossible happens, not until the Allies are fighting on our terms for our democracy and civilization, will that happen. And so we shall still hesitate, for the huge slow-moving body does not see its goal and path. When the President spoke his words as to the conditions under which the American people would voluntarily coöperate in fixing the terms of future international relationships, something stirred within, but the whole bulk did not respond, not even though the appeal was couched in that combination of legal and sentimental phraseology which is our cherished political dialect. At the Russian revolution there was a more obvious thrill. Perhaps through some convulsion, some rearrangement still to come, there will be a revelation of the conditions under which the world's future may be wrought out in patient labor and fraternal comity, a disclosure so authoritative that in it we shall see and know ourselves and recognize our will. More likely there will be partial events and partial conclusions. But one thing has already happened. The war has shown that we are no longer a colony of any European nation nor of them all collectively. We are a new body and a new spirit in the world. Such at least is the impression which has been forming in me, unbidden and unforeseen, concerning the time of our national hesitation.

3. THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL FRONTIER [1]

The campaign of William Jennings Bryan against science and in favor of obscurantism and intolerance is worthy of serious study. It demands more than the mingled amusement and irritation which it directly evokes. In its success (and it is meeting with success) it raises fundamental questions about the quality of our democracy. It helps us understand the absence of intellectual radicalism in the United States and the present eclipse of social and political liberalism. It aids, abets and gives comfort to the thoroughgoing critics of any democracy. It gives point to the assertion of our Menckens that democracy by nature puts a premium on mediocrity, the very thing in human nature that least stands in need of any extraneous assistance.

For Mr. Bryan is a typical democratic figure. There is no gainsaying that proposition. Economically and politically he has stood for and with the masses, not radically but "progressively." The most ordinary justice to him demands that his usefulness in revolt against privilege and his rôle as a leader in the late progressive movement—late in every sense of the word, including deceased—be recognized. His leadership in antagonism to free scientific research and to popular dissemination of its results cannot therefore be laughed away as a personal idiosyncrasy. There is a genuine and effective connection between the political and the doctrinal directions of his activity, and between the popular responses they call out.

What we call the middle classes are for the most part the church-going classes, those who have come under the influence of evangelical Christianity. These persons form the backbone of philanthropic social interest, of social reform through political action, of pacifism, of popular education. They embody and express the spirit of kindly goodwill toward classes which are at an economic disadvantage and toward other nations, especially when the latter show any disposition toward a republican form of government. The "Middle West," the prairie country, has been the centre of active social philanthropies and political progressivism because it is the chief home of this folk. Fairly well to do, enough so at least to be ambitious and to be sensitive to restrictions imposed by railway and financial corporations, believing in education and better opportunities for its own children, mildly interested in "culture," it has formed the solid element in our diffuse national life and heterogeneous populations. It has been the element responsive to appeals for the square deal and more nearly equal opportunities for all, as it has understood equality of opportunity. It followed Lincoln in the abolition of slavery, and it followed Roosevelt in his denunciation of "bad" corporations and aggregations of wealth. It also followed Roosevelt or led him in its distinctions between "on the one hand and on the other hand." It has been the middle in every sense of the word and in every movement. Like every mean it has held things together and given unity and stability of movement.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, May 10, 1922.

It has never had an interest in ideas as ideas, nor in science and art for what they may do in liberating and elevating the human spirit. Science and art as far as they refine and polish life, afford "culture," mark stations on an upward social road, and have direct useful social applications, yes: but as emancipations, as radical guides to life, no. There is nothing recondite or mysterious or sinister or adverse to a reputable estimate of human nature in the causes of this state of mind. Historians of thought point out the difference between the fortunes of the new ideas of science and philosophy in the eighteenth century in England and France. In the former, they were accommodated, partially absorbed; they permeated far enough to lose their own inherent quality. Institutions were more or less liberalized, but the ideas were lost in the process. In France, the opposition was entrenched in powerful and inelastic institutions. The ideas were clarified and stripped to fighting weight. They had to fight to live, and they became weapons. What happened in England happened in America only on a larger scale and to greater depths. The net result is social and political liberalism combined with intellectual illiberality. Of the result Mr. Bryan is an outstanding symbol.

The fathers of our country belonged to an intellectual aristocracy; they shared in the intellectual enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Franklin, Jefferson, John Adams, in their beliefs and ideas were men of the world, especially of the contemporary French world. Their free-thinking ideas did not prevent their being leaders. A generation later and it is doubtful if one of them could have been elected town selectman, much less have become a powerful political figure. When Mr. Taft was a candidate for President, a professor of modern languages in a southern college was dismissed from his position because he remarked to a friend in private conversation that he did not think that the fact that Mr. Taft was a Unitarian necessarily disqualified him for service as President. The incident is typical of the change wrought in a century, a change which became effective, however, quite early in the century. There are histories of the United States written from almost every point of view; but the social and political consequences of the popular evangelical movement which began in the early years of the nineteenth century do not seem to have received the attention they deserve. A large part of what is attacked under the name of Puritanism has next to nothing to do with historic Puritanism and almost everything to do with that second "Great Awakening" which began in the border, southern and western frontier states in the first decade of the last century.

It is not without significance that Andrew Jackson, the first "church-going" President, was also the first political representative of the democratic frontier, the man who marks the change of the earlier aristocratic republic into a democratic republic. The dislike of privilege extended itself to fear of the highly educated and the expert. The tradition of higher education for the clergy was surrendered in the popular denominations. Religion was popularized, and thought, especially free-thought which impinged adversely upon popular moral conceptions, became unpopular, too unpopular to consist with political success. It was almost an accident that even Lincoln could be elected President. Nominal tribute, at least, has had to be paid to the beliefs of the masses. When popular education was extended and colleges and "universities" were scattered towards the frontier, denominational agencies alone had sufficient social zeal to take part. When state universities were founded they were open to the suspicion of ungodliness; and generally protected themselves by some degree of conformity to the expectations imposed by the intellectual prejudices of the masses. They could go much further than denominational colleges, but they could not go so far as to cultivate the free spirit. There were reserves, reticences and accommodations.

The churches performed an inestimable social function in frontier expansion. They were the rallying points not only of respectability but of decency and order in the midst of a rough and turbulent population. They were the representatives of social neighborliness and all the higher interests of the communities. The tradition persisted after the incoming of better schools, libraries, clubs, musical organizations and the other agencies of "culture." There are still thousands of communities throughout the country where the church building is the natural meeting-house for every gathering except a "show." The intensity of evangelical life toned down, and the asperities of dogmatic creeds softened. But the association of the church with the moral and the more elevated social interests of the community remained. The indirect power of the church over thought and expression increased as its direct power waned. The more people stopped going to church, the more important it became to maintain the standards for which the church stood. As the frontier ceased to be a menace to orderly life, it persisted as a limit beyond which it was dangerous and unrespectable for thought to travel.

What the frontier was to western expansion, slavery was for the South. After a period of genuine liberalism among the southern clergy, the church became largely a bulwark of support to the peculiar institution, especially as the battle took a sectional form. The gentry became at least nominally attached to the church in the degree in which clericalism attached itself to the support of slavery. The church was a natural outlet and consolation for the poor whites. It was upon the whole the most democratic institution within their horizon. It is notorious that the most reactionary theological tendencies have their home in the South. The churches there can thank God that they at least have not contaminated their theology with dangerous concessions to modern thought. In the South the movements to withhold public funds from public educational institutions which permit the teaching of evolution have their greatest success.

Mr. Bryan can have at best only a temporary triumph, a *succés d'estime,* in his efforts to hold back biological inquiry and teaching. It is not in this particular field that he is significant. But his appeals and his endeavors are a symptom and a symbol of the forces which are most powerful in holding down the intellectual level of American life. He does not represent the frontier democracy of Jackson's day. But he represents it toned down and cultivated as it exists in fairly prosperous villages and small towns that have inherited the fear of whatever threatens the security and order of a precariously attained civilization, along with pioneer impulses to neighborliness and decency. Attachment to stability and homogeneity of thought and belief seem essential in the midst of practical heterogeneity, rush and unsettlement. We are not Puritans in our intellectual heritage, but we are evangelical because of our fear of ourselves and of our latent frontier disorderliness. The depressing effect upon the free life of inquiry and criticism is the greater because of the element of soundness in frontier fear, and because of the impulses of good will and social aspiration which have become entangled with its creeds. The forces which are embodied in the present crusade would not be so dangerous were they not bound up with so much that is necessary and good. We have been so taught to respect the beliefs of our neighbors that few will respect the beliefs of a neighbor when they depart from forms which have become associated with aspiration for a decent neighborly life. This is the illiberalism which is deep-rooted in our liberalism. No account of the decay of the idealism of the progressive movement in politics or of the failure to develop an intelligent and enduring idealism out of the emotional fervor of the war, is adequate unless it reckons with this fixed limit to thought. No future liberal movement, when active liberalism revives, will be permanent unless it goes deep enough to affect it. Otherwise we shall have in the future what we have had in the past, revivalists like Bryan, Roosevelt and Wilson, movements which embody moral emotions rather than the insight and policy of intelligence.

4. FUNDAMENTALS[1]

It is an old story that the right name is half the battle in moral and social disputes. With the fundamentalists, their key-word, whether or no it turn out to be half the battle, is nine-tenths of their case, perhaps ninety-nine one-hundredths. The craving of human beings for something solid and unshakable upon which to rest is ultimate and unappeasable. Many philosophers have made the search for a principle of certitude their chief quest. They sought certainty, however, not because they were philosophers but because they were human. Certainty merely happened to be the name given to the object of their particular human desire for a harbor that cannot be troubled, a support that cannot be weakened. Fundamentals are the answer to man's cry for security, living as he does a life of uncertainty in a world that is always on the move.

Just what is taken to be so fixed and final that man may repose upon it, differs with race, clime, epoch and temperament. Looking at the variety of philosophic and religious ideas of the basic and ultimate which history displays, it seems hopeless to try to define fundamentals except in a circular manner. They are whatever afford a considerable group of men living amid troubles and vicissitudes a sense of stability, safety, peace. There have even been those who carried doubt to such a point that it ceased to be a torturing perplexity, a harassing of the soul. To them skepticism became an ultimate exercise, something so certain that nothing could affect it. The mere act of doubting became a sacred rite; the performance of it afforded the requisite sense of the solid and unshakable.

Two things are equally inept. One is to forget that human nature must have something upon which to rest; the other is to fancy that one's own preferred foundation-stones are the only things that will bring stability and security to others.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Feb. 6, 1924.

As far as names go, the fundamentalists have shrewdly stolen a march on their foes in the title they have given themselves. In putting their opponents in the light of having incidentals instead of fundamentals, they have shifted the issue. Instead of raising the question, what truths and beliefs are likely at the present day to provide needed foundations, they have created a presumption that theirs is the only brand of fundamentals. One can hear them reiterating on every hand: Take ours, or go entirely without.

Between fundamentalism and modernism as tendencies within ecclesiastical denominations, this seizure of strategic ground by one party is of no great interest to outsiders; the war is civil, domestic. But it is always of public interest that issues should not be confused; there should be at least intellectual clarity as to what is at stake. And the very names under which contending parties are now ranked is proof that the issue has not been clarified; there is no real joining of issues. In consequence, a controversy which has tremendously caught the popular imagination and aroused public interest—conceive religion on the first page!—is likely to produce too much heat and smoke where light is needed.

Obviously there is no inherent conflict between fundamentalism and modernism. Modernism joins issue with traditionalism. The respective claims over human life of traditions and of novel discoveries is a matter which is unsettled and which is of immense import for the conduct of life. There is much to be said on both sides. Yet it has hardly begun to be faced as an intellectual question. Such consideration of it as has been undertaken is entangled in questions of the merits of some particular tradition and some particular discovery—such as the Mosaic tradition of the world's creation against the discovery of the principle of evolution. If the issue had taken the form of literalism versus symbolism, controversy would have been enlightening as well as important. There are doubtless some matters which have to be taken with a certain literalness or not taken at all; brute matters of fact, for instance. There are other matters which lend themselves naturally to poetry, and where a vesture of emotion and imagination is favorable to the apprehension of the meanings involved. Honesty demands that things of the first kind be taken literally. Only crude, illiterate Philistinism will insist upon translating poetic symbolism into the prose of the first reader. But just where is the division line to be drawn in religious beliefs at present?

Just what in religion to-day, in the Christian religion in particular, is matter of fact to be accepted as such? Just what is symbolism, of value as far as it fulfills the functions of ready conveyance of moral truths and of inspiriting men to their observation in life? If existing controversy were definitely devoted to clearing up such questions as these it would get somewhere over and above a victory of one faction over another. Yet while those who follow the discussion find this issue touched upon here and there, they do not find it, it seems to me, clearly faced. The presentation of the issue as between fundamentalism and modernism tends to create only obscuration.

Again, one finds involved in the discussion the issue of the claims of institutional authority versus personal liberty of judgment. This issue is probably one in which the average person is most interested; the one in which he understands the controversy now raging in the churches. For this is an issue with which most men are already familiar; they have met it in politics. They have become used to thinking of a struggle between institutional authoritarianism and personal libertarianism as the fundamental thing in political history. But it may be doubted whether the issue is being clearly joined in the existing controversy. If one wants to find an uncompromising expression of the claims of the institution over the individual, one has to go beyond the High Church party in the Episcopal Church, to the Roman Catholic Church. And if one wants to find an unqualified assertion of liberty of personal belief, one has for the most part to travel outside the bounds of even liberal Protestant churches. Hence compromise, ambiguity of statement, vague qualifying clauses, hang like a fog over the discussion within the Protestant churches.

The traditionalist and literalist—I cannot strain my conscience to the point of calling him a fundamentalist—asserts an inerrant written authoritative truth—the scriptures. But no written document interprets itself, least of all such a collection of documents spread over a long period of history as the Bible. Where is the inerrant interpreter in Protestantism to correspond with the inerrant document? If it is the redeemed soul, enlightened in the very fact of its redemption, how is it that the testimony of the saints varies so much? And if it is the authority of church conferences, synods, presbyteries and conventicles in the past, why should power of interpretation have departed? Why do not their successors yearly, yes weekly, employ newly gained knowledge to issue pronunciamentos as to the right interpretation of the inerrant scriptures? And, since such a course implies training and information, why are not inquiry and discussion encouraged to the uttermost?—not in the name of liberalism, but in the name of the supreme importance of a correct understanding of the one ultimate inerrant authority bequeathed to man.

These questions are intended to suggest the impenetrable confusion which surrounds the thinking of the traditionalist party when one takes their own standpoint. Denying infallibility in man and to any body of men, in effect they proclaim the infallibility of men who lived many centuries ago in periods of widespread ignorance, of unscientific methods of inquiry, of intolerance and persecuting animosity, when demonstrably the object in many cases was not so much to find truth as to down an opponent.

On the other hand, it is almost impossible to find from the side of the liberal a clear statement of just what method and criterion he holds to and is willing to see carried through to the end. He is identified with some church. Therefore he obviously believes in the value for religion of corporate tradition and organization. It is surprising to find so many persons carried away by the argument that if a clergyman does not accept the faith of his ecclesiastic institution in the sense in which it is understood by the majority, or by those in chief authority, he should "get out." Just because such a one is devoted to his corporate organization and finds himself at one with it in spirit, he clings to the fact that it is *his* church, that he belongs there, and feels assured that it will move toward fuller light. Such persons may perhaps be reproached with too great hopefulness or emotionality, but hardly with disloyalty; perhaps they suffer from too great loyalty. In any case, the question that the liberal element needs to answer in order to clarify the situation, is how they conceive the church. To what extent is it a doctrinal institution? To what extent a social-moral institution? Or if the answer is that it exists for spiritual purposes, surely there is demanded some idea of what "spiritual" means, less vague than that current in liberal circles, and a more definite conception of the relation of organized institutions to spirituality.

If the nature and office of organized association for religious ends is one "fundamental" in the existing situation, another, equally important, is the method of ascertaining and testing truth. Those traditionalists and literalists who have arrogated to themselves the title of fundamentalists recognize of course no mean between their dogmas and blank, dark, hopeless uncertainty and unsettlement. Until they have been reborn into the life of intelligence, they will not be aware that there are a steadily increasing number of persons who find security in *methods* of inquiry, of observation, experiment, of forming and following working hypotheses. Such persons are not unsettled by the upsetting of any special belief, because they retain security of procedure. They can say, borrowing language from another context, though this method slay my most cherished belief, yet will I trust it. The growth of this sense, even if only half-consciously, is the cause of the increased indifference of large numbers of persons to organized religion. It is not that they are especially excited about this or that doctrine, but that the guardianship of truth seems to them to have passed over to the *method* of attaining and testing beliefs. In this latter fundamental they rest in intellectual and emotional peace.

Just where does the modernist group in the church stand as to this particular fundamental? What do they conceive to be the ultimate source and authority, the criterion, for belief? With the best will in the world to side with them as against literal traditionalists, one may find it hard to secure from them anything but a cloudy answer to this question. Looking at the present controversy from the outside, one may believe that it is thoroughly wholesome, humane and emancipating in effect, that it will make for tolerance and open-mindedness, greater sincerity and directness of experience and statement. And yet one may believe that it will not accomplish anything fundamental, until the liberal protesting elements have cleared up their minds on at least just these two points: What is the relation of a specially organized community and institution like the church, whatever be the church, to religious experience? What is the place of belief in religion and by what methods is true belief achieved and tested?

5. SCIENCE, BELIEF AND THE PUBLIC[1]

The old issue between science and religion, or as many preferred to call it between science and theology, has slowly but surely changed its aspect. The operation of four rather than two forces is clearly evident in the current fundamentalist controversy. Instead of an alignment of two opposing tendencies, there is now a quadrilateral situation. The "people" have been called in, so that public opinion and sentiment are a power to be reckoned with; because of this fact the state of general education is a new and decisive factor in shaping the course and outcome of the old struggle.

When a glance is cast upon the earlier conflict between the new science of nature and traditional dogmas, the mass of the people is seen to be indifferent and unconcerned; they are hardly even spectators of the combat. On one side there are a few scientific inquirers, men like Galileo, who in the course of their scientific investigations reach results, especially about astronomical matters and the place of the earth in the scheme of things, directly contrary to those contained in the official doctrines of the church. On the other hand, there are the official representatives of the church, aggrieved and insulted by the challenge of a few scientific heretics. Outside of these limited circles, few knew or cared about what was going on. But the printing press, cheap newspapers, mails and telegraph and the extension of schooling have changed all that.

Even in the few years since Darwin published his *Origin of Species* affairs have moved rapidly. The rise of Protestantism and the increased active participation of laymen in matters of religious beliefs had indeed aroused a much wider public concern about the new views regarding the development of life and a naturalistic interpretation of the Descent of Man, than had the older scientific heresies. The issue was no longer wholly between scientific men on one side and established official authorities of the church on the other. Hot debate took place in widely circulated books and magazines, and large numbers were stirred to passionate adherence and more passionate denunciations. But I should guess that the number of daily newspapers was small that concerned themselves with the issue beyond reviews in their literary columns; it would be, I fancy, a safe wager that the controversy did not make the first page of newspapers, with glaring headlines, nor cause anything approaching the stir excited to-day by a single sermon by a well-known clergyman. Certain it is that bills were not introduced in legislatures and parliaments. For geology and biology not being at that time regular parts of even higher schooling, except perhaps for a few, there was nothing for statutes to regulate, unless the state was to emulate the Inquisition in regulating the diffusion of all scientific notions about the world.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* April 2, 1924.

These considerations help explain, it seems to me, a fact which has puzzled so many. For a long time it looked as if the conception of continuity of organic development had, in some version or other, become about as firmly entrenched in science and as accepted from science by the public mind as Copernican astronomy. Many of us imagined that a serious attack upon evolutionary views with a revival of pre-Darwinian biology was as improbable as an attack upon the astronomy of Galileo, or a widespread and influential campaign in behalf of the Ptolemaic system. Certainly, from the specialized scientific point of view, the anti-evolutionary campaign comes about three centuries too late. If it were to affect seriously the course of scientific inquiries, a number of persons should have been strangled in their cradles some three hundred years ago. Nevertheless, the issue is for the public actual and vital to-day, in spite of the elapse of a generation in which we prided ourselves—just as we prided ourselves that a great war was henceforth impossible—upon the advance of the scientific spirit, and the accommodation of the public mind to the conclusions of scientific inquiries.

The moral is inevitable. The public, the popular mass that the enlightened could once refer to as canaille, has taken an active part; but the conditions which have enabled the public actively to intervene have failed in providing an education which would enable the public to discriminate, with respect to the matters upon which it is most given to vehement expression, between opinions untouched by scientific method and attitude and the weight of evidence.

This to my mind is the salient aspect of the present situation. In the large, the controversy between science and dogma in the old sense is over and done with. There are many individuals, believers and others, to whom the question of adjusting their religious conceptions to the conclusions of science is still a vital one. But as a technical and professional cause, science has won its freedom. Scientists in the field and the laboratory may be discommoded at times, individual inquirers and teachers may lose their jobs. But the scientific revolution is nevertheless accomplished; and it is one of the revolutions that do not turn backwards. Inquirers will go on inquiring, and the results of their inquiries will be disseminated at least among their fellow-workers, and will make their way—even if they are as revolutionary as are the discoveries of the last thirty years regarding the constitution of matter and energy, ideas more upsetting of older conceptions in many ways than were those of the intellectual pioneers of the seventeenth century. The real issue is not here. It concerns the growing influence of the general public in matters of thought and belief, and the comparative failure of schooling up to the present time to instil even the rudiments of the scientific attitude in vast numbers of persons, so as to enable them to distinguish between matters of mere opinion and argument and those of fact and ascertainment of fact.

Americans who have been abroad tell of the amused incredulity of educated Europeans over reports of the state of scientific and theological controversy in this country; the reports seem incredible except upon the basis of an almost barbaric state of culture. Yet it may be doubted whether if numbers alone were taken into account, there would not be a larger proportion of persons in this country who could give an intelligent statement of the scientific conceptions involved than in most European countries. The difference is that in those countries those who could not give an intelligent exposition hardly count at all. Here, owing to the spread of democracy in social relations and in education, they count for a great deal. They feel themselves concerned and have channels through which they can make their influence felt.

Naturally such a situation is sport for those hostile to democracy and to universal schooling. They are entitled to chuckle and to make the most of it in their indictments. But, after all, it is a condition and not a theory that confronts us. Defences of democracy are about as much out of place in any scheme of action as are attacks. No social creed produced the present situation. The consequences of the industrialization of affairs in such things as change of population from rural to urban, quick and easy transportation of persons and goods, cheap communications and the rise of cheap printing-matter, have created that state of society which we call democratic, and the democratic creed. Unless the movement of forces is radically altered, attacks upon democracy are about as effective as shooting paper-wads at a battle-ship—an occupation that may also conceivably relieve the feelings under certain conditions.

The realities of the situation centre about what can be done to ally the forces which create the democratizing of society with the mental and moral attitudes of science. The worst of the predicament is a tendency toward a vicious circle. The forces that compel some degree of general schooling also make for a loose, scrappy and talkative education, and this education in turn reënforces the bad features of the underlying forces. But it is some gain to know where the issue actually lies; to be compelled to face the fact that while schooling has been extended and scientific subjects have found their way into the regular course of studies, little has been accomplished as yet in converting prejudiced and emotional habits of mind into scientific interest and capacity.

This generic diagnosis of the disease may be specified in two particulars. There is a considerable class of influential persons, enlightened and liberal in technical, scientific and religious matters, who are only too ready to make use of appeal to authority, prejudice, emotion and ignorance to serve their purposes in political and economic affairs. Having done whatever they can do to debauch the habit of the public mind in these respects, they then sit back in amazed sorrow when this same habit of mind displays itself violently with regard, say, to the use of established methods of historic and literary interpretations of the scriptures or with regard to the animal origin of man. "Fundamentalism" might have been revived even if the Great War had not occurred. But it is reasonable to suppose that it would have not assumed such an intolerant and vituperative form, if so many educated men, in positions of leadership, had not deliberately cultivated resort to bitter intolerance and to coercive suppression of disliked opinions during the war.

Again, a man may be thoroughly convinced that the spread of certain economic ideas is dangerous to society; but if he encourages, even by passivity, recourse to coercion and intimidation in order to resist the holding and teaching of these ideas, he should not be surprised if others fail to draw the line of persecution and intolerance just where he personally would draw it. The statement that as we sow, so shall we reap, is trite. But there is no field of life in which it applies so aptly and fully as in that of belief and the methods employed to affect belief. Until highly respectable and cultivated classes of men cease to suppose that in economic and political matters the importance of the end of social stability and security justifies the use of means other than those of reason, the intellectual habit of the public will continue to be corrupted at the root, and by those from whom enlightenment should be expected.

The other point concerns the kind of education given in the schools, as that is affected by the temper of actual and professed pillars of society. There are at the best plenty of obstacles in the way of thinking in general, and in particular of using school instruction so as to further discriminating and circumspect thought. The weight of authority, custom, imitation, pressure of time, large numbers, the need of "covering the ground," of securing mechanical skill, of uniformity in administrative matters, of sparing taxpayers, all conspire to depress thinking. These extraneous obstacles are consolidated and held together by the fear entertained by many "best minds" lest the schools promote habits of independent thinking. Fundamentally, fear of the consequences of thought underlies most professions of reverence for culture, respect for quantity of information and emphasis upon discipline. The fundamental defect in the present state of democracy is the assumption that political and economic freedom can be achieved without first freeing the mind. Freedom of mind is not something that spontaneously happens. It is not achieved by the mere absence of obvious restraints. It is a product of constant, unremitting nurture of right habits of observation and reflection. Until the taboos that hedge social topics from contact with thought are removed, scientific method and results in subjects far removed from social themes will make little impression upon the public mind. Prejudice, fervor of emotion, bunkum, opinion and irrelevant argument will weigh as heavily as fact and knowledge. Intellectual confusion will continue to encourage the men who are intolerant and who fake their beliefs in the interests of their feelings and fancies.

6. UNIVERSAL SERVICE AS EDUCATION[1]

I

It is our American habit if we find the foundations of our educational structure unsatisfactory to add another story or a wing. We find it easier to add a new study or course or kind of school than to reorganize existing conditions so as to meet the need. Manual training schools, trade schools, vocational schools and courses, now prevocational schools—and next year perhaps pre-prevocational and post-vocational—testify how we manage when it is seen that our system does not conform to the demands of present life. Just now we have discovered new defects and are having another addition to our educational scheme urged upon us. The defects are that our educational measures do not assimilate the foreign born and that they do not develop public-mindedness, a sense of public service and responsibility. Some persons might think that the remedy is to improve our existing educational agencies and to make our existing public institutions—including government—more serviceable to the people so that they would arouse greater devotion. But no: let everything else be as it is, and let us add a new agency devised *ad hoc.* Let us have the school of universal and compulsory military service, and the trick is done.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge that there is an awakening to the presence in our country of large immigrant masses who may remain as much aliens as if they never entered our gateways. It is questionable, however, if there is much gain in passing at one bound from seeing nothing to seeing red. Having formerly lulled ourselves to sleep with the word "melting-pot" we have now turned to the word "hyphenate" as denoting the last thing in scares with a thrill. Casting about for some magic, universal military service is to replace the schoolhouse as the melting and brewing pot. In the words of Major General Wood, "Great portions of our population develop in racial areas, reading a dialect press and controlled in the intervening years by dialect interests. Some sort of community of service must be established in order to develop a proper and necessary appreciation of the duties and obligations of American citizenship. I believe that the best method is by some sort of a systematized military training of a universal character." Is it then axiomatic that nothing socializes the mind and enables it to think in public terms so much as a service rendered under military auspices, with the accustomed environment of military paraphernalia and by the traditional rules of military command and obedience?

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[1] From *The New Republic;* April 22 and 29, 1916.

A speech of Major General Wood as reported in a Philadelphia newspaper puts the matter more vividly. "It is a pretty dangerous situation to turn loose in this country all kinds of humanity seen on the docks at Ellis Island, to turn them loose with no sense of responsibility to their new land. They come in racial groups, drift through our schools in racial groups and are controlled by a dialect press. We are doing absolutely nothing to make these people understand that they are Americans, at least in the making." Then with swift intuition comes the remedy. "There is nothing like compulsory military service to accomplish this." I will not ask how much ignorance, and how much of the snobbery of those who, having been longer in the country, look with contempt and suspicion upon newcomers there may be in this view, though I suspect that it is safer to idealize with Mary Antin's "Promised Land" than it is to take after-dinner long-distance surveys of Ellis Island hordes. I will not even inquire whether inter-racialism is not a truer definition of America than that provided by even the most cultivated New England provincialism, or whether the melting-pot metaphor is not itself traitorous to the American ideal. It is enough that there is a genuine intellectual and moral problem in connection with the heterogeneously diversified factors in our population.

But the problem is not to reduce them to an anonymous and drilled homogeneity, but to see to it that all get from one another the best that each strain has to offer from its own tradition and culture. If authentic America is not to be a cross-fertilization of our various strains, it had better be a juxtaposition of alien elements than an amalgam of the barracks, an amalgam whose uniformity would hardly go deeper than the uniforms of the soldiers. Admit everything which can be said in favor of the European system of military service, admit that we ought to turn from our previous wholesale condemnation to an equally wholesale glorification, and there is yet something childishly undisciplined in supposing that we could reduplicate its merits by establishing compulsory system on American soil. We forget how largely its efficacy there is due to the prior existence of just the uniformity of tradition and outlook whose absence is the reason urged in support of it here. We forget how real and how constant in the mind of every continental European is the sense of an enemy just over the border, and how largely the sense of cohesion is a common sense of enmity. Shall we deliberately proceed to cultivate a sense of the danger of aggression, shall we conjure up enemies, in order to get this stimulus to unity among ourselves? The tendency of the upholders of the plan of enforced universal service to resort to this appeal, unconsciously gives away their case. To stir up fear and dislike of home countries as a means of securing love of an adopted country does not seem a promising procedure.

But it is not necessary to bring accusations against the policy of military service. The real point is that we find it so much easier to cry up this policy than to remedy those defects in our existing system which produce the evils in question. Any truly educative system must precede and prevent instead of following after and palliating and undoing. Until we have at least made a beginning in nationalizing our system of education, it is premature to appeal to the army, to marching and to sleeping in barrack cots as the best way to remedy the evils of a lack of national mindedness. When Mr. Lippmann suggested nationalizing our means of transportation and communication as a method of securing an integrated and coherent America, some of his critics intimated that his project was too materialistic. Well, the district schoolhouse of some portions of the United States—often those very portions which most deplore the foreign invasion—with its independent district control is a symptom of a spiritual localism which defies a unified America quite as much as does any racial area and dialect press. We might at least try the experiment of making our Federal Bureau of Education at Washington something more than a book-keeping and essay-writing department before we conclude that military service is the only way of effecting a common mind. When Mr. Roosevelt writes with as much vehemence about national aid to vocational education, national aid to wipe out illiteracy, and national aid for evening and continuation schools for our immigrants, as he now writes in behalf of military service, I for one shall take him more seriously as an authority on the educational advantages of setting-up exercises, firing guns and living in the camp.

I can see a vision of a national government which takes an interest at once paternal and scientific in our alien visitors, which has a definite policy about their reception, and about their distribution, which guards them even more jealously than its own sons against industrial exploitation, and which offers them at every turn educational facilities under its own charge. If every foreign illiterate had compulsory educational service to perform, if he had not only the opportunity but the obligation to learn the English language, if he found conditions of labor safeguarded in the interest of his health and his integrity as an economic agent, and if he learned to associate these things in whatever part of the country he found himself with the United States and not with the district, township or state, it would not be long before compulsory service, if it had to be discussed at all, would be discussed as a military proposition and not as an educational one. Until we have developed an independent and integral educational policy, the tendency to assume that military service will be an efficient tool of public education indicates a deplorable self-deception. I sometimes think the worst of the evils connected with militarism, in fact and in idea, is its power to create such illusions. Military service is the remedy of despair—despair of the power of intelligence.

II

The argument for universal military service for educational purposes is much stronger when put upon general grounds than when the needs of the immigrant are conspicuous in the plea. Rear Admiral Goodrich has said: "The average American boy is neither obedient, helpful nor well-mannered. We have learned that these things cannot be taught in the homes. Something is needed and that is universal training." The indictment of the native-born and of his home life is so sweeping as to undo itself; let it pass. Statements from a broader social point of view set forth the need of training which will develop a more extensive and vital sense of responsibility than is now found. Speaking roughly, our youth of the more favored class have much done for them, and little is expected in return; there is little to foster public-mindedness. Politically they are spoiled children. The less favored youth are so preoccupied with the practical demands of the moment and the relaxations of sparse moments of relief, that the state is for them also a remote and pallid entity. Our easygoing disposition, our comfort, our size, our congested towns, the invitations of the passing hour, combine with our individualistic tradition to depress from view the claims of organized society. We are overstimulated in matters of personal success and enjoyment; we have little that teaches subordination to the public good or that secures effective capacity to work coöperatively in its behalf. No two persons would draw up the statement in quite the same terms, but a family likeness would show through any number of different statements.

Enforced military training is urged as a remedy, not with military preparedness as its main end, but as an agency of a socializing education. As in the case of the Americanization of the immigrant, I feel that the arguments for compulsory service are more effective in depicting an evil than in setting forth a remedy. There is a temptation to digress, and ask whether the emotions aroused by the war are not the real cause of idealization of the moral possibilities of military training. For a dominant emotional mood always idealizes irrespective of facts. A heroic mood is a fine mood in which to face the urgencies of imminent action, but the indicative mood is a safer mood in which to think clearly. I have an impression that many persons, stirred to an intensified loyalty, imagine that the spirit which is their voluntary attitude will somehow accrue in others as a result of compulsory training. Surely this is belief in social magic.

It is only grudgingly, then, that I yield to the tendency to pass over details, to neglect as irrelevant to our own case the various evils which have in the past accompanied universal service, and to dwell only upon its socializing possibilities. The argument seems to be born of the feelings rather than of the intelligence. But after all this is not the main point. My recognition of the need of agencies for creating a potent sense of a national ideal and of achieving habits which will make this sense a controlling power in action is not ungrudging. But the primary question is what is the national ideal, and to what kind of universal service does it stand related?

We need a new and more political Emerson to warn us against intellectual and moral imitativeness. Under the guise of a more effective Americanization of the members of our social body, we are called upon to introduce aims and methods profoundly hostile to those habitual endeavors and social relationships which alone will ever constitute us a distinctive nation in any but a territorial sense—which is always an exclusive and timid sense. If our premise is the need for that kind of universal service which will have military preparedness only as a by-product, and whose primary aim is to create devotion to the great society which bore us and which sustains us, and yet our conclusion is borrowing a system of service based upon mutual fear and the necessity of defense, our intelligence is not even hyphenated Americanism. It is unalloyed Europeanism.

We are not deeply attached to our consciously inherited social philosophy; many of us are consciously weaned from it. For the philosophy appears to be a legalistic individualism used to sanction economic inequality and industrial disorganization. Moreover, it is not indigenous; it is borrowed from a foreign tradition. But this is no adequate ground for abandoning it so as hurriedly to snatch at the methods of an opposed tradition which is equally alien to our own strivings. We need a social ideal which is truly national; one which will unify our thoughts and focus our emotions. Our consciously accepted ideal does not effect this. We may in the end well be grateful for the uneasiness and apparent disintegration of the present time if it makes us realize these facts. But only an ideal which is the conscious articulation of forces already unconsciously operating can ever be the object of unforced and intelligent service. To assume that our actual tendencies are as individualistic as is the traditional philosophy animating our legal and business codes, and then to seek correction in an ideal which has no connection with the alleged realities of the case, is to admit defeat in advance.

But nobody really believes that the case is quite so desperate. In spite of distress at the revelation of unsuspected divergencies, everybody knows that vital integrative forces are at work. We have the material for a genuinely unified ideal, much as that material requires focusing and articulation. The suggestion of some form of universal service, so far as it is not based upon fear and the cowardliness inhering in every policy of mere defense, is in fact an endeavor to forward its conscious perception. Why not eliminate, then, from the center of attention the borrowed military aspects of the case? Why not ask what form of universal service would connect with our positive capacities and endeavors so as to reinforce and consolidate our other educational instrumentalities? Why assume that universal service is required because these agencies must fail, or why just turn our backs upon our existing educational system in behalf of an added disconnected factor?

The only answer which I have heard to such questions is that beginnings always have to be made under the cover of something with which men's minds are already familiar; that the idea of compulsory military service is a sort of screen behind which may be built up a constructive social discipline. In view of the temper of the American people towards everything military, I doubt the practical wisdom of the policy. The votes in Congress regarding our army give it little support. But the serious objection is that it evinces indisposition to think out the actualities of our social life. The American people seem to be in an unusually self-deprecatory mood at present. But we are directing our scoldings in a way which itself indicates little inclination to face our real deficiency. We are castigating ourselves for lack of courage, of energy, of ability to venture and to do. But these things are our excellences—and our vices by excess. Unwillingness to sit still, to think, restiveness at critical discrimination as wasting time which might be spent in "doing something," desire to lay hold of short cuts to results—these are our weaknesses. Why urge a scheme of universal service which exemplifies rather than remedies these defects? For such any plan does which does not express an imaginative vision of our own actualities, which copies with minor modifications some piece of foreign machinery, which is not anchored in an attempt to organize the social possibilities of our existing system of public education.

There is enough sense of reality in the American nation and there is enough achieved unity of purpose to respond to any plan of universal service which should express its own ideal: the meaning of its existing social practise and aspiration. Such a plan must, however, embody more, not less, sense of reality and unity of social trend than already inchoately exist. Apart from some military emergency, any other plan for universal service will, I am sure, leave the American people in a state of profound and unruffled inertness. If I am asked what is the nature of the plan to which the nation might respond, I can only say that ability to answer the question would signify that one had already penetrated to the depths of our unconscious practical endeavors and perceived their direction. But I am quite sure that such a plan will aim at education rather than training; that it will be directed toward industrial conquest of nature rather than to military conquest of man, and that it will be aggressive and inclusive rather than defensive. I can, for example, imagine the American people arming universally to put an end to war. I cannot imagine them doing it to defend themselves against a possible and remote danger. The American people is more idealistic and more high-spirited than its critics.

7. THE SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL PREPAREDNESS[1]

In the previous articles in which I have set down some thoughts on our educational situation as it appears in the light of the war, I have said little or nothing about the specific work of the schools. Yet it is back to the schools, to the teachers, the text-books, the courses of study, the school-room methods of teaching and discipline, that education comes, and with education the larger part of the conscious direction of our social affairs. The public school is the willing pack-horse of our social system; it is the true hero of the refrain: Let George do it. Whenever any earnest group of people want something which is threatened preserved or something which is stable altered, they unite to demand that some thing or other be taught in the public schools, from "temperance hygiene" to kindness to animals, and from catechetical instruction on the Constitution as a means of saving the Republic from subversion, to the biographies of classical painters as a means of diffusing artistic taste.

A few years from now our state legislatures may be besieged by ardent advocates of international peace who will guarantee the future amity of the world if all children can have a fourteen weeks' course of lessons in "peace." Just now, however, the clamorers for preparedness have the speaker's eye, and two or three hours a week of drill exercise is to be made compulsory in high schools. Those who are in favor of new burdens are organized and clamorous; the pupils, being pupils, are discreetly dumb. The mass of the public is inert, or at least inactive, and gets in its work only by an ultimate passive resistance which first moderates and then smothers in execution the schemes legislated into existence. All of this mechanical confidence in the mechanics of school programs is an ironic tribute to our national faith in the efficacy of education. Meantime it is hard on the schools. One might think it would have occurred to those interested in military preparedness that the youth between fourteen and nineteen who have left school are just those who most need physically—and in every other way—the training it is proposed to give, and that to train those who have given up school work would not put a premium on leaving school—especially as such a policy is suggested by the German method. But no; I honestly think most good Americans would shrink from the very thought as indicating a traitorous lack of faith in the public school. Consequently, overburdened schools with congested curricula, distracted teachers and pupils stand a good chance of being offered up a sacrifice on the altar of "act first and think afterwards."

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[1] From *The New Republic,* May 6, 1916.

I should mourn the prospect more than I do if experience had not shown that a few years' time will suffice to divert, and, then, as I have intimated, to submerge any addition which is unwelcome to both teachers and pupils. There is, fortunately, an anarchy of absorption and deglutition as well as of rebellion. But all this showy and clamorous externalism of preparedness has a more enduring evil consequence. It arrests attention; it satisfies conscience; it puts effectual blinders on inquiring eyes. The significant relationships of the school to the entire question of our international policy and to the question of internal cohesion in connection with it, become salved over and hidden from sight. If long years of peace should by good chance succeed to our present conscientiously maintained nervousness, we should relapse in our school teaching into the same sentimental seclusion from the world's affairs which dominates present instruction in history and social subjects.

An earlier generation received some seepings from biblical lore. There was some intimation of a world-history prior to its real commencement in 1492; there was at least a consciousness of a blank dimly dotted with Greeks and Romans and vague "Europeans" between the end of Jewish and the beginning of American history. To-day the pupil who leaves (and most of them do) before reaching the high school can only wonder at the odd selection of 1492 as the numeral for the year one, and can proceed through his course of American history with no suspicion of Europe save as a place from which discoverers set sail and colonists departed, and as the abode of men whose evil plans got good Americans into wars, and whose affairs and governments in general are such that the less Americans have to do with them the better.

As I reread what I have written I suspect myself of exaggeration. But I am still in a condition of wonder at the unconscious untruthfulness of many of my fellow Americans who hold President Wilson responsible for the moral aloofness of the United States in the present struggle. Is it possible, I ask myself, that they do not know that he has correctly reflected not only the political tradition of "no entangling alliances," but also that isolation of all thought of American history and destiny from European affairs which is even more deeply grounded in our education? A statistically minded sociologist might block off on squared paper the decreasing interest in the war, as one travels from the American seaboard, on the basis of the space alloted to it in the newspapers. We are a pacific people and in the main a kindly disposed one; we regret the loss of life, the flames of hatred in Europe. We do not, as a people, see that it is any especial affair of ours—save as something to keep out of. I have heard this state of mind attributed to sheer cowardliness, to decay of our pristine vigor, to commercialism—usually referred to, in this connection, as a canker—to deliberate selfishness, etc.

I do not believe in any of these explanations. To speak dogmatically, I know better. It is the natural fruit of our educational system. I confess that there is something in this vast provincialism which is not altogether unpleasing. There is a certain vegetative health in this self-sufficiency. But nevertheless it is dangerous. Facts have changed. In actuality we are part of the same world as that in which Europe exists and into which Asia is coming. Industry and commerce have interwoven our destinies. To maintain our older state of mind is to cultivate a dangerous illusion. A different way of teaching American history is an infinitely greater factor in national preparedness than a few hours of perfunctory drill by boys whose minds are on their hour of release. It must be taught for what it is: largely a reflection of European movements and problems—as is seen for example, in each wave of immigration—and as a gradual development of native interests and problems which are still affected by every change in the life of Europe, and which correspond to what is going on all over the world because of the operation of world-wide forces. A generation educated in the facts of American history instead of in an American mythology would not be at a loss to find and express a unified mind in a crisis like the present, should one recur.

Professor Beard has recently denominated our school books in civics "as colorless as chalk." This tepid characterlessness is not confined to text-books in civics. It permeates the atmosphere of the school wherever any social topic comes up. Our own past history appears as a drama between the angels of light and the demons of darkness, between forces of freedom and enslavement, where victory has ever been on the side of the right. Our constitutions and institutions generally are the embodiment of the achieved and final victory of good. If children ever suspect that any evil still exists, outside of their own as yet not wholly virtuous characters, such evil has no institutional or social embodiment. It is personal, like their own faults. The whitewash of indiscriminate eulogistic language covers the things which make social life difficult, uncertain—and interesting.

We do not need courses in social slumming, but we do need some way of making intellectually clear that there never was a struggle between pure good and pure evil; and that there is now, as there always has been, a struggle between interests entrenched in law, institutions and social convention, and the requirements of further enlightenment and emancipation. A nation habituated to *think* in terms of problems and of the struggle to remedy them before it is actually in the grip of the forces which create the problems, would have an equipment for public life such as has not characterized any people.

The connection of this intellectual habit with coherent thinking in matters of foreign relations is not far to seek. We have condemned the method of taking docile direction from our rulers; we have set up as judges on our own account. Shall we then expect something called democracy in the abstract to work miracles in our behalf? Shall we always drift without a definite policy, relieving our nerves in critical periods, as we are now doing, by treating mutual recriminations as if they were a substitute for a policy? Is there any meaning in the phrase "democratic control" of social affairs save as men have been educated into an intellectual familiarity with the weak places, the dark places, the unsettled difficulties of our society before they are overwhelmed by them practically?

Our universities must indeed lead the way. But unless the methods of critical discrimination which they foster extend into our secondary schools and thence, indirectly at least, into the elementary schools, we shall find democratic control tied to a course of inert drift alternating with periods of excited explosion. To make our schools the home of serious thought on social difficulties and conflicts is the real question of academic freedom, in comparison with which the topic which we have hitherto dealt with under that head is indeed academic.

8. MEDIOCRITY AND INDIVIDUALITY[1]

Individualism is about the most ambiguous word in the entire list of labels in ordinary use. It means anything from egoistically centred conduct to distinction and uniqueness. It is possible to say that excessive individualism is an outstanding curse of American civilization, and that absence of individualism is our marked deficiency. When the former remark is made, economic and legal conditions are in mind; when the latter, intellectual life is in question. Individuality is a surer word; it carries with it a connotation of uniqueness of quality, or at least of distinctiveness. It suggests a freedom which is not legal, comparative and external but which is intrinsic and constructive. Our forebears who permitted the growth of legal and economic arrangements at least supposed, however mistakenly, that the institutions they favored would develop personal and moral individuality. It was reserved for our own day to combine under the name of individualism, laudation of selfish energy in industrial accomplishment with insistence upon uniformity and conformity in mind.

Now that we have reached the point of reverence for mediocrity, for submergence of individuality in mass ideals and creeds, it is perhaps not surprising that after boasting for a long time that we had no classes we now boast that we have discovered a scientific way of dividing our population into definite classes. Just as Aristotle rationalized slavery by showing how natural it was for those superior by nature to constitute the ends for others who were only tools, so we, while marveling perhaps at the callousness of the Greek philosopher, rationalize the inequities of our social order by appealing to innate and unalterable psychological strata in the population.

Thus Mr. George B. Cutten in his inaugural address as president of Colgate University recently informed us that it is now "discovered" that "only fifteen percent of the people have sufficient intelligence to get through college. From this "discovery" he draws the conclusion that as we have never had a real democracy, so "the low level of the intelligence of the people will not permit of our having one." He not only makes the undeniable statement that we are ruled by an aristocracy in industry, commerce, professions and government, but he terms this aristocracy an *intellectual* aristocracy! The adjective seems incredible. But President Cutten thinks there is the same scientific warrant for assuming that conspicuous success under present conditions is a sign of innate intellectual superiority as for saying that twenty-five percent of the population are mentally subnormal and that only fifteen percent are capable of higher education.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Dec. 6. 1922.

Mr. Cutten begins his presidential career with a startling view of the social stratification which is to be the ultimate outcome of an educational classification based on intellectual classifications by means of mental testing. We are to arrive at a caste system like that of India, "but on a just and rational basis." For "when the tests for vocational guidance are completed and developed, each boy and girl in school will be assigned to the vocation for which he is fitted." There will be no difficulty about filling the ranks of unskilled labor and mechanical operators, for Mr. Cutten implicitly believes the yarn that the army tests have shown that the "average mentality" of the population is slightly over thirteen years. Considering only the energy and unspoiled curiosity of the average thirteen-year-old in comparison with the dulled observation and blunted vigor of the average adult one might hope that this statement were true. It would be most encouraging. But it is more to the point to remark that, as Mr. Lippmann has so clearly shown, the statement interpreted as Mr. Cutten means it, is like saying that perhaps sixty-five percent of the population rank below the lowest fifty percent; it takes absolutely what is only a comparative statement, thereby rendering it literally senseless. What makes this performance more than a mere individual mistake is that it affords striking evidence of the habit of ignoring specific individualities, of thinking in terms of fixed classes, intellectual and social.

There is no need to re-traverse the ground so admirably covered by Mr. Lippmann. But why has it been so generally assumed among our cultivated leaders that a purely classificatory formula gives information about individual intelligence in its individuality? To say that Johnnie Jones who was born in 1913 has in 1922 a mental age of eight or of ten years only means that he belongs, on the basis of his performance of certain exercises, to a class of persons at least over a million in number, who were born in 1912 or 1914 respectively. Why then is it so frequently supposed that the individual mentality of John Jones has been definitely determined? To say that one belongs in a class which is a million or so large, with respect to which one is accelerated or retarded by a year in comparison with another class of a million, does not, after all, throw much light on the intrinsic capacities of a given individual.

The assumption seems to indicate one thing. We are irretrievably accustomed to thinking in standardized averages. Our economic and political environment leads us to think in terms of classes, aggregates and submerged membership in them. In spite of all our talk about individuality and individualism we have no habit of thinking in terms of distinctive, much less uniquely individualized, qualities. The inference to be drawn from the popular reception of mental testings concerns the acquired habits of intellectual spokesmen, rather than the inherent intellectuality of the populace. This fact is indeed significant for the prospects of democracy. But the reason it is ominous for democracy is radically different from that often assigned. For it reflects not upon the innate mentality of the mass but upon the acquired intelligence of men in high positions. It shows how their education, that given by their surroundings as well as by their schools, has fixed in them the disposition to judge by classification instead of by discrimination, and by classifications which represent the average of massed numbers, mediocrities instead of individualities.

We may be thought to ignore the interest which many testers have shown in pupils of superior abilities. For some of the testers tell us that one of the chief beneficial consequences of testing is that it enables us to pick out the superior tenth, to rescue the saving remnant from the ruck in which they are now submerged. But the seeming exception proves the rule. The idea of classification still fatally pursues and dominates. "Superior" is still a classificatory word. The size of the class is reduced, say from a million to a hundred thousand. But what kind of superiority marks a particular individual is still unrevealed to us.

The practical educational use to which testers propose that the results of testing should be put strengthens the proposition that even cultivated minds are dominated by the concept of quantitative classes—so much so that the quality of individuality escapes them. For many of them are now telling us that the chief use of the results of the tests is to secure a more accurate ranking or grading of pupils. Instead of mixing up together a lot of pupils of different abilities we can divide them into a superior, a middle and an inferior section, so that each can go its own gait without being kept back or unduly forced by others. An individual is not conceived as an individual with his own distinctive perplexities, methods and rates of operation. The classificatory submergence of individuals in averaged aggregates is perpetuated: it is standardized and rendered more efficient. It may turn out that the net result will be to postpone the day of a reform of education which will get us away from inferior, mean and superior mediocrities so as to deal with individualized mind and character. The movement is on a par with the movements to make instruction more efficient while retaining that notion of teaching which emphasizes the receptively docile mind instead of an inquiring and pioneering purpose.

These remarks are in no sense a hostile criticism of the scientific procedure of mental testing. They are an attempt to suggest its proper goal and to indicate the stage which has now been reached in moving toward that goal. The goal is a method of discrimination, of analysis of human beings, of diagnosis of persons, which is intrinsic and absolute, not comparative and common. Before this goal can be reached it is necessary that certain average statistical norms should be determined. But their function is scientific, not practical either for schooling or for the conduct of democracy. They are of value in working out a system of tests to be used ultimately in analysis of an individual. You cannot be sure, for example, that you have a good test for mechanical ingenuity in a particular person until you have seen how large numbers react to different exercises. The pity is that a scheme for testing tests which are ultimately to be employed in diagnosing individuality has been treated as if it already provided means of testing individuals.

Life insurance is impossible, for example, without extensive statistical investigations, establishing quantitative mean norms. Individuals are graded as to their degree of insurable risk on the basis of these norms. But no one supposes that the result determines the fate of any particular person. If to be accepted as a good risk were a guarantee of long life, clearly no one after being accepted would insure himself. And similarly to a sensible person rejection is not a fatalistic sign of sure death. It is a warning to have a thorough individual examination made, and to undertake individualized remedial measures on the basis of this individual diagnosis. An I.Q. as at present determined is at most an indication of certain risks and probabilities. Its practical value lies in the stimulus it gives to more intimate and intensive inquiry into individualized abilities and disabilities.

As a matter of fact, President Cutten's educational outlook in the concrete is much more intelligent and humane than is indicated by his credulous use of the army tests. He saves himself by losing his logic. He says that education is conservative as compared with theology and philosophy; he declares that if we are teaching the wrong subjects, the better the teaching the more disastrous the results; his conviction that we are largely teaching the wrong subjects is perhaps indicated by his statement that our curricula have not changed much in the last millennium. He points out that the whole system is strong on its receptive side and weak on the creative side; and that the consequence is the comparative scarcity of creative artists and thinkers among us. Students who merely pass in college and who are conspicuous for breaches of discipline become later in life leaders and executives.

Is it possible to admit these facts and not also admit that as a practical measure we should devote ourselves to changes in education which are within our control rather than worry about innate differences which are not within our control? If there prevailed from the elementary school up the kind of inquiring and creative education which President Cutten desires for the college, perhaps democracy, in spite of native inequalities and inferiorities, would not be in such a parlous condition. Until we have tried the educational experiment, we simply do not know and shall not know what individual capacities and limits really are. For it is not just the quantity of our education which is confessedly at fault; it is its quality, its spirit, method and aim.

A change from a receptive education to a creative one, to one which as President Cutten well says would result in "ability to meet a unique situation," obviously implies studying and treating individuals in their distinctive and unique qualities. It involves getting away from that class and averaged education to which the current interpretation of the results of mental testing the more rigidly commits us. One appeals with unusual pleasure from President Cutten dealing with a subject matter of a science in which he is a somewhat credulous non-expert to the field of education in which he is a wise expert. From an *ad hominem* point of view, the difference of attitude in the two fields indicates how much what is termed intelligence is an acquired matter, due to opportunity and experience. No matter how much innate qualities may set limits, they are not active forces. Experience, that is to say education, is still the mother of wisdom. And we shall never have any light upon what are the limits to intelligence set by innate qualities till we have immensely modified our scheme of getting and giving experience, of education. Barring complete imbecility, it is safe to say that the most limited number of the populace has potentialities which do not now reveal themselves and which will not reveal themselves till we convert education by and for mediocrity into an education by and for individuality.

9. INDIVIDUALITY, EQUALITY AND SUPERIORITY[1]

In *Mediocrity and Individuality* I pointed out that the current reception of the results of mental testing proves the extent to which we are given to judging and treating individuals not as individuals but as creatures of a class, a quantitative class which covers up truly individualized traits. Our mechanical, industrialized civilization is concerned with averages, with percents. The mental habit which reflects this social scene subordinates education and social arrangements to stratifications based on averaged gross inferiorities and superiorities. We accept standards of judging individuals which are based on the qualities of mind and character which win under existing social conditions conspicuous success. The "inferior" is the one who isn't calculated to "get on" in a society such as now exists. "Equals" are those who belong to a class formed by like chances of attaining recognition, position and wealth in present society.

This intellectual acceptance of standards for valuing individuals of a society which every candid mind admits to be lopsided and disordered gives occasion for a reexamination of the fundamental ideas of superiority and equality. What do these words means? Professors have one measure of superior ability; captains of industry another. One class esteems aptitude for learning academic subjects; the other class appraises in terms of power in execution. Suppose that investigators and artists were so socially dominant that they were effectively articulate. Should we not then employ quite other standards of measurement? At present superior races are superior on the basis of their own conspicuous achievements. Inferior races are inferior because their successes lie in different directions, though possibly more artistic and civilized than our own.

[1] From *The New Republic*, Dec. 13, 1922.

Superiority and inferiority are meaningless words taken by themselves. They refer to some specific outcome. No one should use the words until he has asked himself and is ready to tell others: Superior and inferior in *what?* Is a student inferior for purposes of reciting lessons, of fitting into a school administration, of influencing companions, of "student activities" or what? Is an adult superior in money-making, in music, in chicanery and intrigue, in being a wise parent or good neighbor, as a homemaker, a chauffeur or a librarian, a congenial companion, a confidence man, an investigator of higher mathematics, an expert accountant, a tractable worker or a revolutionist, in writing acceptable movie scenarios or in research in the laboratory?

There are as many modes of superiority and inferiority as there are consequences to be attained and works to be accomplished. And until society becomes static new modes of activity are continually developing, each of which permits and exacts its own specific inferiorities and superiorities. There is doubtless some degree of correlation between traits which promote superiority in more than one direction. But the idea of abstract, universal superiority and inferiority is an absurdity. The current loose use of these conceptions suggests overcompensation on the part of those who assume that they belong to a superior class. It appears like an attempt to escape from the limitations and incapacities which we all know, subconsciously at least, that we possess.

When classifications are rigid, the quantitative, the more or less, phase of superiority is inevitably conspicuous. Castes are ranks or grades of superiority; within each caste the hierarchical order of higher and lower is repeated. The endeavor to discover abstract degrees of mental superiority which fit for "leadership" in the abstract is evidence of the hold upon us still exercised by feudal arrangements. Our new feudalism of the industrial life which ranks from the great financier through the captain of industry down to the unskilled laborer, revives and re-enforces the feudal disposition to ignore individual capacity displayed in free or individualized pursuits.

Sometimes in theory we conceive of every form of useful activity as on a level with every other as long as it really marks the performance of needed service. In these moments we also recognize in idea at least that there are an infinite number of forms of significant action. But these ideas are usually restricted to religiously accented moments. When it comes to "practical" matters, the very person who in his religious moods asserts the uniqueness of individuality and of opportunity for service falls back upon a restricted number of conventionally formulated and esteemed occupations and is content to grade persons in a quantitative comparative scale.

It was once supposed, at least by some, that the purpose of education, along with equipping students with some indispensable tools, was to discover and release individualized capacities so that they might make their own way with whatever of social change is involved in their operation. But now we welcome a procedure which under the title of science sinks the individual in a numerical class; judges him with reference to capacity to fit into a limited number of vocations ranked according to present business standards; assigns him to a predestined niche and thereby does whatever education can do to perpetuate the present order. The motto concerning genuinely individual distinctions is that of the tank corps. "Treat 'em rough"—except as they give promise of success in this or that established social classification. Otherwise, the person might grow up to be a conscientious objector or a social innovator, or be inclined to demand social recognition for activity in free scientific inquiry or in art or some other luxurious and ornamental calling.

The irony of the situation is that this course is usually taken in the name of aristocracy, even of intellectual aristocracy, and as part of an attack upon the tendencies of democracy to ignore individuality. It may be that the word democracy has become so intimately associated with a particular political order, that of general suffrage and elective officials, which does not work very satisfactorily, that it is impossible to recover its basic moral and ideal meaning. But the meaning remains whatever name is given it. It denotes faith in individuality, in uniquely distinctive qualities in each normal human being; faith in corresponding unique modes of activity that create new ends, with willing acceptance of the modifications of the established order entailed by the release of individualized capacities.

Democracy in this sense denotes, one may say, aristocracy carried to its limit. It is a claim that every human being as an individual may be the best for some particular purpose and hence be the most fitted to rule, to lead, in that specific respect. The habit of fixed and numerically limited classifications is the enemy alike of true aristocracy and true democracy. It is because our professed aristocrats surrender so gladly to the habit of quantitative or comparative classifications that it is easy to detect snobbery of greater or less refinement beneath their professed desire for a régime of distinction. For only the individual is ultimately distinctive; the rest is a matter of common qualities differing merely in degree. Even in the crudest pioneer democracy there was something more distinctive, more aristocratic, than in that smoothed-off communal worship of qualities belonging to certain classes which is characteristic of present-day critics of democracy.

The most ardent of the early advocates of equality never fell into the stupidity of alleging that all persons are qualitatively alike. Rousseau was one of the first to insist upon natural differences, psychological and physical. It was his profound conviction of the intensity and scope of these differences which made him so insistent upon political, legal and, within certain limits, economic equality. Otherwise some form of native superior energy would result in the enslavement of the masses, adding artificial enfeeblement to their natural deficiencies, while corrupting those of superior ability by giving them an artificial mastery over others and a cruel, contemptuous disregard for their welfare.

In our own earlier history, John Adams is perhaps the chief proponent of the unavoidable necessity of recognizing the aristocratic principle in politics because of inequality of natural endowments. But Adams was a realist. He did not assume that superiority of gifts meant intellectual superiority or that aristocracy in practice means the rule of the mentally and morally superior. He saw that the native superiorities which were bound in any political system to find outlet and to warp institutions to their ends are of indefinitely many kinds—power, power to command and influence the action of others, being their only common divisor. In his own realistic words: "Any aristocrat is any man who can command two votes, one besides his own." And this superior influence may be due, he points out, to virtue, talent or intrigue and debauchery; to loquacity or taciturnity, to frankness or reserve, to goodfellowship or fraud, violence and treachery, to deism or atheism. Powerful is as powerful does. Adams never fell into that mealy-mouthed sentimentalism of contemporary defenders of aristocracy who assume that native superiorities are all in the direction of talent and virtue, and inferiorities all in the opposite direction.

Thomas Jefferson is associated with the democratic school. But he writes to John Adams: "I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. . . . The natural aristocracy of virtue and talents is the most precious gift of nature. . . . That government is best which provides the most effectively for selection of these natural aristocrats into the offices of government." And he proceeds to state that the differences between Adams and himself concern the means which are best calculated to secure this result. Adams thought that some express and definite institution was necessary; Jefferson thought that such explicit recognition would encourage the "tinsel" aristocracy of wealth and birth at the expense of natural aristocracy; for the wealthy will manage to protect themselves anyway and need no artificial protection against the feebleness of the poor. Both agreed that equality is moral, a matter of justice socially secured, not of physical or psychological endowment.

No intelligent defender of democratic equality has ever believed anything else. To-day he is not as sure as men were a century ago that any legal and political system can of itself prevent the untoward working of native differences of power. He sees very clearly that a régime of economic anarchy like the present overstimulates many of the least desirable forms of superior native power, and that the result overrides the legal and political bulwarks of moral equality. In consequence he sees that moral equality cannot be conceived on the basis of legal, political and economic arrangements. For all of these are bound to be classificatory; to be concerned with uniformities and statistical averages. Moral equality means incommensurability, the inapplicability of common and quantitative standards. It means intrinsic qualities which require unique opportunities and differential manifestation; superiority in finding a specific work to do, not in power for attaining ends common to a class of competitors, which is bound to result in putting a premium on mastery over others. Our best, almost our only, models of this kind of activity are found in art and science. There are indeed minor poets and painters and musicians. But the real standard of art is not comparative, but qualitative. Art is not greater and less, it is good or bad, sincere or spurious. Not many intellectual workers are called to be Aristotles or Newtons or Pasteurs or Einsteins. But every honest piece of inquiry is distinctive, individualized; it has its own incommensurable quality and performs its own unique service.

Upon reflection, however, it is apparent that there is something academic in confining the models of moral equality to art and intellectual pursuits. Direct personal relationships, the affections and services of human companionship are its most widespread and available manifestations. The snobbery of the snobbish, who call themselves aristocrats, is nowhere as evident as in their neglect of the superior gifts and attainments of the humble of the earth in these respects. No contact of this human sort is replaceable; with reference to it all are equal because all are incommensurable, infinite. Democracy will not be democracy until education makes it its chief concern to release distinctive aptitudes in art, thought and companionship. At present the intellectual obstacle in the way is the habit of classification and quantitative comparisons. Our pseudo-aristocrats with their flourishing of abstract and uniform superiority and inferiority are now the main defendants of a concept of classes which means only the mass divided into smaller portions. The democrat with his faith in moral equality is the representative of aristocracy made universal. His equality is that of distinction made universal.

10. OUR EDUCATIONAL IDEAL[1]

Externally viewed, the most obvious fact about our educational system is its inconsistency. We have repaired, patched and extended freely under the pressure of circumstance and immediate demand. Our conscious philosophy has, however, remained timid and traditional. Even when practical urgencies have made big breaches, we have done our best to conceal from ourselves the meaning of what we have done. We have stretched the intellectual mantle of tradition till it has covered the breaches from view, and have settled back to enjoy the consolations of the orthodox catchwords of culture and discipline. Man is a creature of instinct and habit. Action, overt action, is always easier than thought—a laboriously acquired art in which man is still far from at home. I would suggest to those who feel the tension of enforced inaction when all the rest of the world is hard at it, that their energies might better be directed to intellectual scrutiny and construction than to pleas for direct action—which would be hardly more than discharge of and relief from nervous strain. And in the problem of moral and intellectual examination, the business of national education stands first.

When we look at the enlarged picture of English and German education which the war has thrown upon the screen, the lesson regarding our own educational aims appears plain. The strong and weak points revealed supplement each other, and they define our own needs. Germany has succeeded in scientific and specialized education, England, at least relatively speaking, in general and humanistic. We have worked sporadically at both, and often with so little definite intent that we have done just enough in one direction to undo our accomplishments in the other. Yet there is a sound instinct in our refusal to commit ourselves exclusively to either one or the other.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* April 15, 1916; published under the title *Our Educational Ideal in Wartime.*

Every one who recalls the war of 1870 knows how tritely universal became the remark that the victory was the victory of the German schoolmaster. The intellectual prestige of Germany dates largely from that victory. Its meed of success in the present war is the success of technical education, an education which is everywhere technical and professional no matter what the label of the school giving it. A writer has said that while the Germans have talked much twaddle about culture, there is no doubt about their supremacy in that form of culture known as agri-culture. The same might be said about almost any one of the arts of industry. The consistent application of trained intellect to special practical problems in order to develop and employ a skilled technique has given Germany her efficiency. Her boasted idealism, so far as it has not been sentimental and romantic, has been the idealism of faith in intellect—in scientific method applied to detail, bit by bit, to what has to be done. It is silly to confine the Prussianization of Germany to the inculcation of militarism, and not recognize the educational phase of the work Prussia has done for Germany. Prussia disciplined Germany in specialization of science applied to the conduct of affairs. Let us give her credit along with the debit account.

For the two things belong together. It is impossible to train for highly specialized divisions of labor without creating an almost machine-like social automatism. Everything must fit into everything else, or hopeless confusion at once results. In the early days of the war no remark was commoner than that the Germans, trained as they were to obedience, would break down when the demand came for initiative. The remark did not take into account that their training was an intellectual training dependent upon scientific division of labor, not upon mere mechanical habituations. Only when the whole is thrown out of gear will the parts cease to work. That degree of strain has not been reached; it may not be reached in this war. But the habit of mind thus formed is as incompatible with democracy as is sheer militarism; indeed, a persistently effective militarism is hardly possible without this scientifically organized division of labor in which each part takes its cue from the working of the other parts. For us to take such a system as our exclusive model would indicate that we had already ceased to be ourselves.

What would be our weakness because an attempt at the impossible has been Germany's strength; at least up to a certain point. Beyond that point it has been a weakness for Germany itself. One does not need to be competent in diplomacy to know that Germany has failed miserably in judging other peoples, whether belligerents or neutrals. Her White Book was an obvious success at home; the mental temper of those to whom it was directly addressed was gauged marvellously. But I doubt if a single outsider who had previously refrained from committing himself as to the justice of the cause did not conclude that if that was all that Germany had to say for herself, bad indeed must be her cause. The documents issued by the intellectuals for the express purpose of impressing neutral opinion were eloquent in the same sense. Memories are short in these days when events tread so rapidly on one another's heels. But I doubt if any one can reread, say, the Address to the Civilized World, without being again overcome by those old sensations of incredulity and amazement. Was it possible that men to whom we had been trained to look up could lend their names, even in a moment of patriotic fervor, to such a farrago?

It were rash to generalize from a few instances. But in the main the failure of Germany wherever the general and broadly human factor counted most has been as marked as her achievements wherever it was a question of specialized efficiency. One may be wrong about this or that item. The neutral world can hardly be wrong about the cumulative sum of evidence as to the inability of the German people to judge either themselves or others. And I do not see how this blindness can be explained save upon the basis of a failure in their national education. To develop a generalized social sense is supposedly the object of a humanistic education. So judged, German education has not been humanistic.

English education has been German education upside down. Imagine a German minister gravely announcing that since it had been *recently* discovered that glycerine could be derived from soap fats, the latter would henceforth be contraband—after their importation into Germany had been permitted for months! There are surely cases where the warning not to generalize from a single instance breaks down—even in social matters. England has paid—Belgium and the world have paid—a high price for England's devotion to a literary education. To suppose that any amount of enforced military service would have given England an adequate preparedness under such conditions is to snatch at superficialities. On the other hand, in her foreign affairs England has for a long time been a citizen of the world. Even those who accuse her statesmen of a truly diabolic cunning cannot deny to them the maintenance of the externals of civilization. In connection with her long world-wide responsibilities, the humanistic education of England has accomplished something which we look for in vain in Germany's exhibition of herself to the world.

I do not know how we are to effect in this country a combination of a scientific and a humanistic education. I doubt if any one knows. But that there lies our problem, I thoroughly believe. We must frankly recognize that the measure of a humanistic education is its results—its production of a social and socialized sense. We must surrender that superstitious tradition which identifies humanism with the interests of literary training, and which in our country, whatever it may have accomplished elsewhere, produces only a feebly pretentious snobbishness of culture. But we must employ science for flexible resourcefulness of adaptation, not for framing social organization into rigid divisions of labor. Surely there must be something behind our tendencies toward smattering and miscellaneous generalities. Were it all the smattering and superficiality and nothing else which it sometimes seems to be, we should be infinitely incompetent. There is some power in the instinct which keeps us, with our alleged worship of efficiency and our materialism, from going in for systematized specialization. That something, I think, is the habit of mind formed by our wide and free range of human contacts. When we learn how to interpenetrate this human sense of one another with thorough training in scientific method and knowledge we shall have found ourselves educationally.

11. AMERICAN EDUCATION AND CULTURE[1]

One can foretell the derision which will be awakened in certain quarters by a statement that the central theme of the current meeting of the National Educational Association is cultural education. What has culture to do with the quotidian tasks of millions of harassed pupils and teachers preoccupied with the routine of alphabetic combinations and figuring? What bond is there between culture and barren outlines of history and literature? So far the scene may be called pathetic rather than an occasion for satire. But one foresees the critics, the self-elected saving remnant, passing on to indignant condemnation of the voluntary surrender of our educational system to utilitarian ends, its prostitution to the demands of the passing moment and the cry for the practical. Or possibly the selection of cultural education as a theme of discourse will be welcome as a sign of belated repentance, while superior critics sorrowingly wonder whether the return to the good old paths is sought out too late.

To those who are in closer contact with the opinions which hold conscious sway in the minds of the great mass of teachers and educational leaders there is something humorous in the assumption that they are given over to worship of the vocational and industrial. The annual pilgrimage of the teachers of the country to European cathedral and art gallery is the authentic indication of the conscious estimate of the older ideal of culture. Nothing gets a hand so quickly in any gathering of teachers as precisely the sort of talk in which the critics engage. The shibboleths and the sentimentalities are held in common by critic and the workers criticized. "Culture and discipline" serve as emblems of a superiority hoped for or attained, and as catchwords to save the trouble of personal thought. Behind there appears a sense of some deficiency in our self-conscious devotion to retrospective culture. We protest too much. Our gestures betray the awkwardness of a pose maintained laboriously against odds. In contrast there is grace in the spontaneous uncouthness of barbarians whole-heartedly abandoned in their barbarism.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, July 1, 1916.

While the critics are all wrong about the conscious attitude and intent of those who manage our educational system, they are right about the powerful educational currents of the day. These cannot be called cultural:—not when measured by any standard drawn from the past. For these standards concern the past—what *has* been said and thought—while what is alive and compelling in our education moves toward some undiscovered future. From this contrast between our conscious ideals and our tendencies in action spring our confusion and our blind uncertainties. We think we think one thing while our deeds require us to give attention to a radically different set of considerations. This intellectual constraint is the real foe to our culture. The beginning of culture would be to cease plaintive eulogies of a past culture, eulogies which carry only a few yards before they are drowned in the noise of the day, and essay an imaginative insight into the possibilities of what is going on so assuredly although so blindly and crudely.

The disparity between actual tendency and backward-looking loyalty carries within itself the whole issue of cultural education. Measured in other terms than that of some as yet unachieved possibility of just the forces from which sequestered culture shrinks in horror, the cause of culture is doomed so far as public education is concerned. Indeed, it hardly exists anywhere outside the pages of Mr. Paul Elmer More, and his heirs and assigns. The serious question is whether we may assist the vital forces into new forms of thought and sensation. It would be cruel were it not so impotent to assess stumbling educational efforts of the day by ideas of archaic origin when the need is for an idealized interpretation of facts which will reveal mind in those concerns which the older culture thought of as purely material, and perceive human and moral issues in what seem to be the purely physical forces of industry.

The beginning of a culture stripped of egoistic illusions is the perception that we have as yet no culture: that our culture is something to achieve, to create. This perception gives the national assembly of teachers representative dignity. Our school men and women are seen as adventuring for that which is not but which may be brought to be. They are not in fact engaged in protecting a secluded culture against the fierce forays of materialistic and utilitarian America. They are endeavoring, so far as they are not rehearsing phrases whose meaning is forgot, to turn these very forces into thought and sentiment. The enterprise is of heroic dimensions. To set up as protector of a shrinking classicism requires only the accidents of a learned education, the possession of leisure and a reasonably apt memory for some phrases, and a facile pen for others. To transmute a society built on an industry which is not yet humanized into a society which wields its knowledge and its industrial power in behalf of a democratic culture requires the courage of an inspired imagination.

I am one of those who think that the only test and justification of any form of political and economic society is its contribution to art and science—to what may roundly be called culture. That America has not yet so justified itself is too obvious for even lament. The explanation that the physical conquest of a continent had first to be completed is an inversion. To settle a continent is to put it in order, and this is a work which comes after, not before, great intelligence and great art. The accomplishment of the justification is then hugely difficult. For it means nothing less than the discovery and application of a method of subduing and settling nature in the interests of a democracy, that is to say of masses who shall form a community of directed thought and emotion in spite of being the masses. That this has not yet been effected goes without saying. It has never even been attempted before. Hence the puny irrelevancy that measures our strivings with yard sticks handed down from class cultures of the past.

That the achievement is immensely difficult means that it may fail. There is no inevitable predestined success. But the failure, if it comes, will be the theme of tragedy and not of complacent lamentation nor wilful satire. For while success is not predestined, there are forces at work which are like destiny in their independence of conscious choice or wish. Not conscious intent, either perverse or wise, is forcing the realistic, the practical, the industrial, into education. Not conscious deliberation causes college presidents who devote commencement day to singing the praises of pure culture to spend their working days in arranging for technical and professional schools. It is not conscious preference which leads school superintendents who deliver orations at teachers' meetings upon the blessings of old-fashioned discipline and culture to demand from their boards new equipment, new courses and studies of a more "practical" and appealing kind. Political and economic forces quite beyond their control are compelling these things. And they will remain beyond the control of any of us save as men honestly face the actualities and busy themselves with inquiring what education they impart and what culture may issue from *their* cultivation.

It is as elements in this heroic undertaking that current tendencies in American education can be appraised. Since we can neither beg nor borrow a culture without betraying both it and ourselves, nothing remains save to produce one. Those who are too feeble or too finicky to engage in the enterprise will continue their search for asylums and hospitals which they idealize into palaces. Others will either go their way still caught in the meshes of a mechanical industrialism, or will subdue the industrial machinery to human ends until the nation is endowed with soul.

Certain commonplaces must be reiterated till their import is acknowledged. The industrial revolution was born of the new science of nature. Any democracy which is more than an imitation of some archaic republican government must issue from the womb of our chaotic industrialism. Science makes democracy possible because it brings relief from depending upon massed human labor, because of the substitution it makes possible of inanimate forces for human muscular energy, and because of the resources for excess production and easy distribution which it effects. The old culture is doomed for us because it was built upon an alliance of political and spiritual powers, an equilibrium of governing and leisure classes, which no longer exists. Those who deplore the crudities and superficialities of thought and sensation which mark our day are rarely inhuman enough to wish the old régime back. They are merely unintelligent enough to want a result without the conditions which produced it, and in the face of conditions making the result no longer possible.

In short, our culture must be consonant with realistic science and with machine industry, instead of a refuge from them. And while there is no guaranty that an education which uses science and employs the controlled processes of industry as a regular part of its equipment will succeed, there is every assurance that an educational practice which sets science and industry in opposition to its ideal of culture will fail. Natural science has in its applications to economic production and exchange brought an industry and a society where quantity alone seems to count. It is for education to bring the light of science and the power of work to the aid of every soul that it may discover its quality. For in a spiritually democratic society every individual would realize distinction. Culture would then be for the first time in human history an individual achievement and not a class possession. An education fit for our ideal uses is a matter of actual forces not of opinions.

Our public education is the potential means for effecting the transfiguration of the mechanics of modern life into sentiment and imagination. We may, I repeat, never get beyond the mechanics. We may remain burly, merely vigorous, expending energy riotously in making money, seeking pleasure and winning temporary victories over one another. Even such an estate has a virility lacking to a culture whose method is reminiscence, and whose triumph is finding a place of refuge. But it is not enough to justify a democracy as against the best of past aristocracies even though return to them is forever impossible. To bring to the consciousness of the coming generation something of the potential significance of the life of to-day, to transmute it from outward fact into intelligent perception, is the first step in the creation of a culture. The teachers who are facing this fact and who are trying to use the vital unspiritualized agencies of to-day as means of effecting the perception of a human meaning yet to be realized are sharing in the act of creation. To perpetuate in the name of culture the tradition of aloofness from realistic science and compelling industry is to give them free course in their most unenlightened form. Not chiding but the sympathy and direction of understanding is what the harsh utilitarian and prosaic tendencies of present education require.

12. RELIGION AND OUR SCHOOLS[1]

I

A learned and self-conscious generation has fittingly discovered religion to be a universal tendency of human nature. Through its learning, anthropology, psychology, and comparative religion have been summoned to give this testimony. But because of its self-consciousness the generation is uneasy. As it surveys itself it is fearful lest, solitary among the ages, it should not be religious. The self-same learning which has made it aware that other times have had their life permeated with religious faith is part of the conditions which have rendered the religions of those periods impossible. The dilemma is striking and perplexing. Shall the very circumstances which convince us that religion is necessary also make it impossible? Shall the evidence that it is a universal tendency make those who are aware of this tendency the flagrant exception to its universality? We have learned so much about religious "instincts": shall we therefore lose them?

It indeed seems hard that a generation which has accumulated not only material wealth, but intellectual riches, to the extent that it is compelled to pull down its barns—its systems of philosophy and doctrine—and build greater, should be lacking in just that grace and sanction of life which ignorant and poor people have possessed as matter of course. But our learnedly self-conscious generation is also mechanical. It has a tool for everything, and almost everything has become for it a tool. Why, then, should we longer suffer from deficiency of religion? We have discovered our lack: let us set the machinery in motion which will supply it. We have mastered the elements of physical well-being; we can make light and heat to order, and can command the means of transportation. Let us now put a similar energy, goodwill, and thoughtfulness into the control of the things of the spiritual life. Having got so far as to search for proper machinery, the next step is easy. Education is the modern universal purveyor, and upon the schools shall rest the responsibility for seeing to it that we recover our threatened religious heritage.

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[1] From *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1908.

I cannot expect that those who are now especially concerned with the maintenance and the spread of conscious and explicit religious instruction (for the time being one must use this question-begging epithet) will recognise their attitude or intention in what I have just said. And it has no application to those who are already committed to special dogmas of religion which are the monopoly of special ecclesiastic institutions. With respect to them, the fight for special agencies and peculiar materials and methods of education in religion is a natural part of their business: just as, however, it is the business of those who do not believe that religion is a monopoly or a protected industry to contend, in the interest both of education and of religion, for keeping the schools free from what they must regard as a false bias. Those who believe that human nature without special divine assistance is lost, who believe that they have in their charge the special channels through which the needed assistance is conveyed, must, naturally, be strenuous in keeping open these channels to the minds of men. But when the arguments for special religious education at special times and places by special means proceed from philosophic sources—from those whose primary premiss is denial of any breach between man and the world and God, then a sense of unreality comes over me. The arguments perforce translate themselves ironically. They seem to say that, since religion is a universal function of life, we must particularly safeguard it lest it disappear; that since religion is the consciousness of the spiritual import of experience, we must find mechanical appliances for developing it.

Those who approach religion and education from the side of unconstrained reflection, not from the side of tradition, are of necessity aware of the tremendous transformation of intellectual attitude effected by the systematic denial of the supernatural; they are aware of the changes it imports not merely in special dogma and rites, but in the interpretation of the world, and in the projection of social, and, hence, moral life. It testifies to the current unreality of philosophy (itself probably a product of that forced idealism in which modern thought has taken refuge) that philosophers should seem to think that great intellectual generalisations may be, as it were, plastered over life to label its contents, and not imply profound practical alterations within life itself. In no other way is it easy to account for the attitude of those who are convinced of the final departure of the supernatural interpretation of the world and of man, and who yet think that agencies like the church and the school must not be thoroughly reconstructed before they can be fit organs for nurturing types of religious feeling and thought which are consistent with modern democracy and modern science.

That science has the same spiritual import as supernaturalism; that democracy translates into the same religious attitude as did feudalism; that it is only a matter of slight changes of phraseology, a development of old symbolisms into new shades of meaning—such beliefs testify to that torpor of imagination which is the uniform effect of dogmatic belief. The reconstruction of the Church is a matter which concerns, indeed, the whole community so far as its outcome is concerned; while the responsibility for its initiation belongs primarily to those within the churches. The burden of conducting the development, the reconstruction, of other educational agencies belongs, however, primarily to the community as a whole. With respect to its intellectual aspect, its philosophy, it belongs especially to those who, having become conscious in some degree of the modern ideas of nature, of man and society, are best able to forecast the direction which social changes are taking. It is lucidity, sincerity, and the sense of reality which demand that, until the non-supernatural view is more completely elaborated in all its implications and is more completely in possession of the machinery of education, the schools shall keep hands off and shall do as little as possible. This is indeed a *laissez-faire* policy. It is frankly, avowedly so. And, doubtless, *laissez-faire* policies are not in favour in self-conscious and mechanical days. One of the further ironies of our time is that, having discovered the part played by unconscious, organic, collective forces in the processes of human development, we are possessed by a great eagerness, a great uneasiness, consciously to foster and to guide these forces.

We need, however, to accept the responsibilities of living in an age marked by the greatest intellectual readjustment history records. There is undoubted loss of joy, of consolation, of some types of strength, and of some sources of inspiration in the change. There is a manifest increase of uncertainty; there is some paralysis of energy, and much excessive application of energy in materialistic directions. Yet nothing is gained by deliberate effort to return to ideas which have become incredible, and to symbols which have been emptied of their content of obvious meaning. Nothing can be gained by moves which will increase confusion and obscurity, which tend to an emotional hypocrisy and to a phrasemongering or formulæ which seem to mean one thing and really import the opposite. Bearing the losses and inconveniences of our time as best we may, it is the part of men to labour persistently and patiently for the clarification and development of the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and in science, and to work for the transformation of all practical instrumentalities of education till they are in harmony with these ideas. Till these ends are further along than we can honestly claim them to be at present, it is better that our schools should do nothing than that they should do wrong things. It is better for them to confine themselves to their obviously urgent tasks than that they should, under the name of spiritual culture, form habits of mind which are at war with the habits of mind congruous with democracy and with science. It is not laziness nor cynicism which calls for the *laissez-faire* policy; it is honesty, courage, sobriety, and faith.

If one inquires why the American tradition is so strong against any connection of State and Church, why it dreads even the rudiments of religious teaching in state-maintained schools, the immediate and superficial answer is not far to seek. The cause was not, mainly, religious indifference, much less hostility to Christianity, although the eighteenth century deism played an important rôle. The cause lay largely in the diversity and vitality of the various denominations, each fairly sure that, with a fair field and no favour, it could make its own way; and each animated by a jealous fear that, if any connection of State and Church were permitted, some rival denomination would get an unfair advantage. But there was a deeper and by no means wholly unconscious influence at work. The United States became a nation late enough in the history of the world to profit by the growth of that modern (although Greek) thing—the state consciousness. This nation was born under conditions which enabled it to share in and to appropriate the idea that the state life, the vitality of the social whole, is of more importance than the flourishing of any segment or class. So far as church institutions were concerned, the doctrine of popular sovereignty was a reality, not a literary or legal fiction. Upon the economic side, the nation was born too soon to learn the full force of the state idea as against the class idea. Our fathers naïvely dreamed of the continuation of pioneer conditions and the free opportunity of every individual, and took none of the precautions to maintain the supremacy of the state over that of the class which newer commonwealths are taking. For that lack of foresight we are paying dearly, and are like to pay more dearly. But the lesson of the two and a half centuries lying between the Protestant revolt and the formation of the nation was well learned as respected the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the state as against all divisive ecclesiastical divisions. Doubtless many of our ancestors would have been somewhat shocked to realise the full logic of their own attitude with respect to the subordination of churches to the state (falsely termed the *separation* of Church and State); but the state idea was inherently of such vitality and constructive force as to carry the practical result, with or without conscious perception of its philosophy. And any general agitation in the United States of the question of religious instruction in the schools could have but one explanation. It would mean that, from economic segregation and unassimilated immigration, the state-consciousness of the country had been sapped by the growth of social factions. I write, then, from the standpoint of that country with whose traditions and tendencies I am directly acquainted. But so far as it is true that circumstances have permitted the United States merely to travel a certain course more rapidly than other contemporary nations (save France), what is based upon American conditions must apply, in its measure, to the conditions of education in other countries.

II

As I recall, some of the Platonic dialogues discuss the question whether virtue can be taught, and all of them contain overtones or reminiscences of the topic. For the discussion led a long way. What is virtue? That is not an altogether easy question; and since to answer it we must know virtue and not merely have opinions about it, it will be well to find out what knowledge is. Moreover, teaching implies learning, and learning is coming to know, or knowledge in process of learning. What, then, is the connection of the becoming of knowledge with the being of knowledge? And since the teaching of virtue means, not getting knowledge "about" virtue, but the conversion of character to the good, what, after all, is the relation between becoming good and that becoming wise which is the result of learning?

Somehow, I am more aware that Plato discusses all these questions than I am certain of any final answer to the question whether virtue may be taught. Yet I seem to recall some hypothetical suggestions for an answer. If, as we have reason to believe, the soul of man is naturally akin to good—if, indeed, it truly *is* only through participation in the good—then may various objects, also in their measure expressions of good, serve to remind the soul of its own or original nature. If these various reminders may be organised into a comprehensive scheme, continuous and continual in operation—if, in other words, there may be found a state organised in righteousness—then may the soul be finally brought to the apprehension of its own being or good; and this coming to know and to be we may term learning. But, if I remember rightly, Plato always classed endeavours to teach virtue apart from an accompanying thorough reorganisation of social life and of science as a piece of confused and self-contradictory thinking—as a case, that is, of sophistic.

Have we any reason for taking the present problem of teaching religion to be simpler in conception or easier in execution? The contemporary problem appears, indeed, to be more intricate and difficult. Varied and conflicting as were the views of Plato's Greek contemporaries as to what things should be included and taught under the head of virtues, the question of just what concretely comes under the caption of religion to-day is as much harder to decide as our social life is more heterogeneous in origin and composition than was the Athenian. We certainly cannot teach religion as an abstract essence. We have got to teach *something* as religion, and that means practically *some* religion. Which? In America, at least, the answer cannot be summarily given even as Christianity in general. Our Jewish fellow-citizens not only have the same "hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions" as the Christians, but, like them, they pay taxes, vote, and serve on school boards. But we should not be very much better off even if it were a question of Christianity alone. *Which* Christianity? Oriental in its origin, it has been since Latinised and Germanised, and there are even those who have dreamed of humanising it.

The problem of to-day is more complex as respects also the process of learning, of coming to know. In the day of Plato, art and science, skilled practice and theory, were only beginning to be separated. Just as a man learned shoemaking in process of becoming a shoemaker, so might a man learn virtue in becoming a member of a good state—if such a thing could be found. To-day knowledge is something specialised, and learning does not consist in intelligent mastery of an activity, but in acquiring a diversity of information about things, and control over technical methods for instituting symbolic references to things. Knowledge to Plato was the sort of thing that the forefathers of some of us called "getting religion." It was a personal experiencing and a vital realisation. But what shall knowledge of religion as an outcome of instruction mean to-day? Shall it mean the conversion of character into spirituality? Shall it mean the accumulation of information *about* religion? Or are there those who still believe in some magic power resident in memorised words, phrases, and facts of transmuting themselves into personal insight, the development of fundamental mood and the formation of permanent attitudes towards experience?

When we consider knowledge from the side of its method and from the standpoint of what it takes to get something really worthy to be called knowledge, the problem increases in difficulty. As yet, the standpoint of science, its spirit, has not of course leavened very adequately our methods of teaching. From the standpoint of those methods of inquiry and testing which we call science, much, perhaps most, of what passes for knowledge is in reality what Plato called opinion. Our science is still an outward garb more or less awkwardly worn rather than a habit of mind. But none the less the scientific norm of mental activity presses daily closer upon life and upon the schools. We are getting daily further away from the conditions in which one subject more or less taught by dogmatic, catechetical and memoriter methods was of slight consequence. We are becoming aware of the absurdity implied in calling things which happen to be studied and learned in school "knowledge," when they have been acquired by methods frequently at odds with those necessary to give science. Can those who take the philosophic and historic view of religion as a flower and fruition of the human spirit in a congenial atmosphere tolerate the incongruity involved in "teaching" such an intimate and originally vital matter by external and formal methods? And can those who hold that true religion is something externally imported tolerate any other methods? Is it not confusion to seek a reconciliation of two such disparate ideas?

Already the spirit of our schooling is permeated with the feeling that every subject, every topic, every fact, every professed truth must submit to a certain publicity and impartiality. All proffered samples of learning must go to the same assay-room and be subjected to common tests. It is the essence of all dogmatic faiths to hold that any such "show-down" is sacrilegious and perverse. The characteristic of religion, from their point of view, is that it is—intellectually—secret, not public; peculiarly revealed, not generally known; authoritatively declared, not communicated and tested in ordinary ways. What is to be done about this increasing antinomy between the standard for coming to know in other subjects of the school, and coming to know in religious matters? I am far from saying that the antinomy is an inherent one, or that the day may not come when religion will be so thoroughly naturalised in the hearts and minds of men that it can be considered publicly, openly, and by common tests, even among religious people. But it is pertinent to point out that, as long as religion is conceived as it now is conceived by the great majority of professed religionists, there is something self-contradictory in speaking of education in religion in the same sense in which we speak of education in topics where the method of free inquiry has made its way. The "religious" would be the last to be willing that either the history or the content of religion should be taught in this spirit; while those to whom the scientific standpoint is not a merely technical device, but is the embodiment of integrity of mind, must protest against its being taught in any other spirit.

As Plato brought out with reference to the teaching of virtue, there is one other factor in coming to know—the teachers. Plato was quite sure that, whether or no virtue might be taught, it might not be taught by its professed teachers—the sophists. I express my appreciation of Plato rather than my lack of appreciation of the professional teachers of our own day, when I say that if Plato were to return to take part in the current discussion, he would raise questions about those who were to teach religion analogous to those he brought up about the teachers of his own time. It is not that those into whose hands the giving of instruction would fall are so irreligious or so non-religious as to be unfitted for the task. The sophists were doubtless superior rather than inferior in personal virtues to their average neighbor. It is one thing to be fairly or even exceptionally virtuous; it is another thing to command the conditions and the qualifications for successful importation of virtue to others. Where are the experts in religion? and where are the authoritative teachers? There are theologians: do we want theology taught? There are historians, but I fear the day has not come when the history of religion can be taught as history. Here precisely is one of those fields of clarification and criticism where much labour needs to be done, and where the professional religionist is one of the most serious obstacles to reckon with, since a wider and deeper historic knowledge would overthrow his traditional basis.

There are preachers and catechists, but, unless we are committed to some peculiar faith or institution, it is not exhortation or discipline of this sort that constitutes religious instruction. There are psychologists: but is introspection our aim? There remains, indeed, the corps of faithful, more or less well-prepared, hard-working and hard-worked teachers. This brings us to the crux of the whole matter. Is religion a thing so specialised, so technical, so "informational" that, like geography or history or grammar, it may be taught at special hours, times, and places by those who have properly "got it up," and who have been approved as persons of fit character and adequate professional training?

This question of the mode, time, and stuff of specific instruction trenches indeed upon a question in which national temper and tradition count for much. I am quite aware that upon this subject it is almost impossible for an Englishman and an

American whose actual intellectual attitude in general is very much the same to understand each other. Nothing, I think, struck the American who followed the debates on the last English Educational Bill with more emphasis than the fact that even the more radical upon the Liberal side disclaimed, almost with horror, any intention of bringing about the state of things which we, upon this side, precisely take for granted as normal —all of us except Lutherans and Roman Catholics. I have no right to suppose that these protests and disclaimers were discreet concessions to political expediency. We must assume a profound difference of attitude and conviction. Consequently what I have now to say is conceived so definitely from the American point of view that it may not be intelligible in a different situation. But we do not find it feasible or desirable to put upon the regular teachers the burden of teaching a subject which has the nature of religion. The alternative plan of parcelling out pupils among religious teachers drawn from their respective churches and denominations brings us up against exactly the matter which has done most to discredit the churches, and to discredit the cause, not perhaps of religion, but of organised and institutional religion: the multiplication of rival and competing religious bodies, each with its private inspiration and outlook. Our schools, in bringing together those of different nationalities, languages, traditions, and creeds, in assimilating them together upon the basis of what is common and public in endeavour and achievement, are performing an infinitely significant religious work. They are promoting the social unity out of which in the end genuine religious unity must grow. Shall we interfere with this work? shall we run the risk of undoing it by introducing into education a subject which can be taught only by segregating pupils and turning them over at special hours to separate representatives of rival faiths? This would be deliberately to adopt a scheme which is predicated upon the maintenance of social divisions in just the matter, religion, which is empty and futile save as it expresses the basic unities of life. An acute English critic has recently called us, with much truth, a "nation of villagers."

But in this matter of education at least we have no intention or desire of letting go our hard-won state-consciousness in order to relapse into divisive provinciality. We are far, indeed, from having attained an explicit and articulated consciousness of the religious significance of democracy in education, and of education in democracy. But some underlying convictions get ingrained in unconscious habit and find expression in obscure intimation and intense labour, long before they receive consistent theoretic formulation. In such dim, blind, but effective way the American people is conscious that its schools serve best the cause of religion in serving the cause of social unification; and that under certain conditions schools are more religious in substance and in promise without any of the conventional badges and machinery of religious instruction than they could be in cultivating these forms at the expense of a state-consciousness.

We may indeed question whether it is true that in any relative sense this is a peculiarly irreligious age. Absolutely speaking, it doubtless is so; but have superficiality, flippancy, and externality of life been such uniformly absent traits of past ages? Our historic imagination is at best slightly developed. We generalise and idealise the past egregiously. We set up little toys to stand as symbols for long centuries and the complicated lives of countless individuals. And we are still, even those who have nominally surrendered supernatural dogma, largely under the dominion of the ideas of those who have succeeded in identifying religion with the rites, symbols, and emotions associated with these dogmatic beliefs. As we see the latter disappearing, we think we are growing irreligious. For all we know, the integrity of mind which is loosening the hold of these things is potentially much more religious than all that it is displacing. It is increased knowledge of nature which has made supra-nature incredible, or at least difficult of belief. We measure the change from the standpoint of the supranatural and we call it irreligious. Possibly if we measured it from the standpoint of the natural piety it is fostering, the sense of the permanent and inevitable implication of nature and man in a common career and destiny, it would appear as the growth of religion. We take note of the decay of cohesion and influence among the religiously organized bodies of the familiar historic type, and again we conventionally judge religion to be on the decrease. But it may be that their decadence is the fruit of a broader and more catholic principle of human intercourse and association which is too religious to tolerate these pretensions to monopolize truth and to make private possessions of spiritual insight and aspiration.

It may be so; it may be that the symptoms of religious ebb as conventionally interpreted are symptoms of the coming of a fuller and deeper religion. I do not claim to know. But of one thing I am quite sure: our ordinary opinions about the rise and falling off of religion are highly conventional, based mostly upon the acceptance of a standard of religion which is the product of just those things in historic religions which are ceasing to be credible. So far as education is concerned, those who believe in religion as a natural expression of human experience must devote themselves to the development of the ideas of life which lie implicit in our still new science and our still newer democracy. They must interest themselves in the transformation of those institutions which still bear the dogmatic and the feudal stamp (and which do not?) till they are in accord with these ideas. In performing this service, it is their business to do what they can to prevent all public educational agencies from being employed in ways which inevitably impede the recognition of the spiritual import of science and of democracy, and hence of that type of religion which will be the fine flower of the modern spirit's achievement.

13. PROPAGANDA [1]

The vast scale upon which affairs go on once seemed enough to make men despair of the possibility of their orderly control. They seemed too big to be got in hand. Men felt dwarfed, shrivelled in the face of the vastness of economic and political conditions. The war put the immensity of things in a new light. It became evident that the very size of things had brought with it a centralization already inchoate in private hands, so that about all that was required to consolidate the centralized control was to give it explicit governmental sanction. The economists and business men called to the industrial front accomplished more in a few months to demonstrate the practicable possibilities of governmental regulation of private business than professional Socialists had effected in a generation. They proved that a few fortresses in our day absolutely command the whole industrial field. When they were taken possession of, public direction of industry followed almost automatically. Production could be controlled by taking over the agencies of shipping and transportation, foreign and domestic; by regulating the giving of credit and the issuing of securities; by administering the labor market, through the government becoming itself a wholesale bidder and conscriptor of men. The centralized mechanisms of industrial and economic control built up in modern business are so definite that when these three things were taken over by the government, public control was shown to be almost ridiculously easy. With sufficient experience to make methods of taxation scientific enough to control profiteering, the simplicity of some form of state capitalism (generally called state socialism) would have been demonstrated.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Dec. 21, 1918; published under the title *The New Paternalism.*

Reaction against the paternalism of this control now that the war is over is prompt, widespread and highly organized. There are too many interests concerned with maintaining a private paternalistic regulation of other men's affairs, known as personal initiative, to permit this state of things to go unchallenged. But strangely enough there is one form of paternalism stimulated by the war for the continuation of which these same interests are anxiously eager, namely, intellectual paternalism.

The censorship will be relaxed; officially it will be abandoned. Letters will not be so freely opened. Secret service agents of our own and a foreign government will not be so generously encouraged to exercise a kindly supervision of telegraph and telephone lines. The lapse of the Espionage Act will make it less easy for governmental officials, big and petty, to regulate the press by threatening its mailing privileges. The still more efficacious domination of the agencies of discussion by the Pulp and Paper Division of the War Industries Board will presumably be relaxed. But one thing will not be forgotten. There has been a remarkable demonstration of the possibilities of guidance of the news upon which the formation of public opinion depends. There has been an equally convincing demonstration of the effect upon collective action of opinion when directed systematically along certain channels. One almost wonders whether the word "news" is not destined to be replaced by the word "propaganda"—though of course words linger after things have been transformed.

The world has come to a curious juncture of events. The development of political democracy has made necessary the semblance at least of consultation of public opinion. The beliefs of the masses cannot be openly ignored. The immense size of a democracy like our own would make the development of community of sentiment and persuasian impossible unless there were definite and centralized agencies for communication and propagation of facts and ideas. Consequently just at the time when shaping public opinion has become an essential industry, there also exist the instrumentalities for news gathering and distributing on a large scale. Not only so, but business conditions almost automatically force these agencies into highly concentrated forms easily manageable from the centre. The small operator in news and "facts" can hardly exist. Comprehensive undertakings with large capital are required. Capital in one form is naturally friendly to capital in other forms. Aside from conscious and unconscious affiliations and combinations, there is the always influential fact that reflecting the views of the powers that be gives access to important sources of information, while lack of subserviency shuts off such access. And in the background unremittingly works the fact that democracies are controlled through their opinions, that opinions are formed by the material upon which they feed, and that propaganda disguised as the distribution of news is the cheapest and most effective way of developing the required tone of public sentiment.

The governmental control demanded by the exigencies of war has in part merely revealed the scope of influential forces previously operative in private hands. But the war has also increased the prior centralization, and created an atmosphere favorable to feeding the people with just those things and only those things which the authorities believe that it is good for them to know. The tensions of uncertainty and fear produced by the war have developed an extraordinary sensitiveness which works toward strengthening this benevolent paternalism. On the day when the armistice was signed, an article written by a university professor was published in a daily paper solemnly warning the American people that the reports which stated that the Germans were in revolt and were sincerely seeking peace were in all probability more instances of clever German propaganda designed to undermine American morale. The only thing unusual about this warning was the fact that it happened to be printed a few hours after the revolt and the establishment of peace were accomplished facts. When a few scattering and timid voices were raised in this country in behalf of tempering justice with mercy in the case of the economic conditions of the armistice which had to do with feeding Germany, a semi-official warning was sent out from Washington against the new activities of German agents in this country. One's only embarrassment would be in selecting from the multitude of instances of this sort. When the belief of Germans as supermen in other respects began to wane, the persuasion that they were supermen in propaganda only increased.

Most of the persons who shared such beliefs were neither stupid nor sinister. The dread of the enemy provoked by war tends like all emotions to spread like a cloud and envelop everything in any way associated with the foe. There was enough obnoxious German propaganda to create legitimate fear. Gradually it covered everything, and men saw facts like the collapse of Germany through the fog of fear of German propaganda. Students of human nature also tell us that one may judge of a man's own activities by the charges which he most repeatedly brings against others. Accusations blend with unconscious confessions. It is quite conceivable that some of the reiterated charges of propaganda covered another propaganda; and that, for example, Lord Northcliffe or the advocates of Siberian intervention had little to learn from Germany about the technique of creating opinion.

But in any event there has been stirred up a vast anxiety about the kind of facts and opinions which are brought to public attention. There is uneasiness and solicitude about what men hear and learn. This paternalistic care for the sources of men's beliefs, once generated by war, carries over into the troubles of peace. What we do not see in the news cables from Europe is even more significant than what we do see. Who knows just what is happening in Europe? Have the revolutionary Socialists in Italy been calmed into absolute quiet by the revolutionary occurrences all about them? What are the old minority Socialists in France, who became the majority, doing and saying? Nothing? Compare the scanty amount of news received even about the British Labor party with the amount that reaches us concerning Lloyd George, Carson, Milner, et al., and one might almost think that Americans had a vote to help decide the election. The most striking example of course is the surveillance of what issues as to Russian happenings.

No one can well say how much of this new paternalism is a designedly sinister thing and how much is due to a sincere fear that men's minds will be corrupted by hearing of social changes abroad. The fact which stands out is that the war has generated an atmosphere of safety first regarding all facts knowledge of which stimulates social change. No one can tell just how disturbing here an explicit unbiased report of foreign disturbances may be. The times are still troubled. Let us take no chances. Let the masses be benevolently protected against a knowledge which might not be good for them nor for society. The social and economic woods are full of traps; let us walk gingerly and keep out of harm and risk. This is the psychological factor which cooperates with the physical centralization of the agencies of news gathering and distribution to develop the new paternalistic solicitude for the masses who cannot yet be trusted to think for themselves. Let us make democracy safe for the world by a careful editing and expurgation of the facts upon which it bases the opinions which in the end decide social action. The men most active in urging that state paternalism be surrendered in exchange for private initiative in transportation, banking, investments and manufacturing (barring of course benevolence to the poor working man through a protective tariff) will be most vigorous in solicitude to safeguard against private initiative in belief. Heresy is proverbially a contagious disease. To learn anything about the Bolsheviki except their excesses would corrupt an otherwise staid and respectable America. Consequently men who sincerely wonder how, say, the Roman Emperors could have been so cruel and stupid as to try to prevent the spread of Christianity by oppressive means are sincerely anxious to prevent men's minds and morals from being undermined to-day by the spread of knowledge of heretical social activities. And it must be admitted that the means formerly at command were clumsy and brutal in comparison with those now available.

14. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND WORK[1]

An American liberal, a man of wealth, has recently conceded that existing industrial institutions are to a considerable extent unjust. This injustice he admits to be one great cause in the existing unrest of the world. The remedy is a more equitable distribution of the material products of industry. Yet in fundamental directions he thinks something like the present system is permanently necessary to get the work of the world done. Such a position is inevitable in times of transition. Practically it is to be welcomed as a step forward. It seems ungenerous to criticize.

Yet the step forward will be awkwardly taken and, quite probably, futile in its avowed object of dealing with unrest unless it is frankly recognized that it is only a step. Its significance is that it will make easier a further and much more far-reaching movement. If not taken with a more distant object in view it may easily intensify class hostility. It will strengthen the power of wage-earners to make demands for a still larger share in material products, without creating among them a feeling of responsibility for industry itself. It will increase the bitterness of employers regarding the unreasonable, unintelligent and ungrateful disposition of labor, its willingness in its own selfish interest to throw a monkey-wrench into the entire industrial machine. As a "solution," the proposed remedy not only does not go to the root of the matter, but it tends away from it.

Would Mr. Hoover, to whom this point of view is attributed, be contented under the charge that the animating spring of his own activities had been the material products of his work? Men of large wealth are justly contemptuous of the idea that they have been dollar-chasers, or that acquisitiveness or security has been their moving principle even in collecting securities. It is a mischievous mistake to suppose that wage earners are differently made. Not idealism but human psychology proclaims the fact that man does not live by wages alone. What men need is an outlet for what is human in them. Not for any long period can they be bribed to be quite lacking such an outlet. At present, the period is almost zero. For the workers realize that increase in wages is now a testimony to their power; and an awakened sense of power is just what demands opportunity for exercise. And this means a responsible share in the management of activities.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, May 5, 1920.

In every new crisis it seems to be forgotten that the demand for freedom means a reaching out for mental activity, for greater scope of thought. This is the reason why the battle for freedom is never won, and why its ancient guarantees always fail in a crisis. They are outworn for conservative and radical alike. The former sees them used for purposes which he is sure were never intended, and the latter is interested in something deeper.

Apply this statement to the present situation as to freedom of speech. The old legal guarantees of freedom of speech and publication are, of course, sacred, thinks the reactionary, but they have no bearing upon the existing situation. The authors of the bills of rights had no experience with the contemporary labor situation, and never contemplated the existence and spread of Sovietism. Hence the ease with which civil rights, complacently supposed to be settled, are trampled upon. And if the masses take attacks upon these rights with less resentment than we would have thought possible, it is because after all they have an instinctive feeling that the center of the present struggle for freedom of mind lies somewhere else.

The hang-over of a war psychology of suspicion and fear is, of course, a large factor in the campaign for intimidation of free social thinking. The desire of a ruling class to utilize this hang-over to create a psychological reign of terror which will infect the timid among sympathizers with liberty and which will invade the courts is a large factor. But the existing situation cannot be explained by these factors alone. They need something else to give them full operative force. And this something else is the fact that freedom of mind no longer finds an adequate expression in political action, or in speech and writing. Large numbers of men have reached the point where they feel, and are beginning to see, that they can get true freedom of mind only when they can exercise their minds in connection with their daily occupations. Executives, managers, scientific men, artists have such freedom. Why not the others? This is the consciousness which cannot be bought off with an increased share of the material products of industry. And it also accounts for the thinness of the old guarantees of freedom of speech, publication and political agitation.

This is a new struggle. It cannot be cramped within the limits of old law. The conservatives are the first to learn this lesson, and it is they who are teaching it to others who, without their teaching, would probably have remained inert for a much longer time. By the nature of the case it is always the conservative who is most sensitive to the meaning of any new tendency, and it is he who by his attacks upon the new movement, instructs the masses as to its real significance. What he is now shouting at the top of a frenzied voice is that freedom of mind can be achieved only with the exercise of control over one's work, and that in comparison with this, freedom of speech and the right to vote are of superficial importance.

Like other advocates of freedom of speech, the writer has upon occasion used the safety-valve argument. A social crisis, a social turning point, gives the argument an ironic turn. That is just what a great new force should not want—a cheap safety-valve. Steam is needed to overcome obstacles, and it should not be wasted in talk that merely blows it off. Shooting off the mouth is an easy way in which to dissipate force. The reactionary with his predestined assistance to the radical, can be trusted, when any matter is really important, to prevent this cheap and easy road from being taken. He makes it necessary for men to seek for the reality of freedom instead of being contented with an inflated sense that it is attained when talk is unconfined.

Because liberty is essentially mental, a matter of thought, and because thought is free only as it can manifest itself in act, every struggle for liberty has to be re-enacted on a different plane. The old struggle for liberty of speech, assemblage and publication was significant because it was part of a struggle for liberty of worship, and security of property. It is stupid to suppose that the older fight is cheapened when the presence of economic motives is pointed out. Men who had won their property by honest industry and enterprise wanted security against other men who had won their property by conquest and who wished to continue their predatory career. Their fight demands respect, not disparagement or denial. But it is equally stupid to suppose that thought and effort will always circulate in the channels then marked out.

Freedom of speech and of the franchise is now significant because it is part of the struggle for freedom of mind in industry, freedom to participate in its planning and conduct. Were not republics proverbially ungrateful, it would be safe to predict the erection of future monuments to Mr. Palmer, Mr. Sweet and others who have taken such seemingly gratuitous pains to make this fact clear to masses of people who otherwise would hardly have seen this fact for a long time to come. For we may be sure that the old guarantees of civil liberty would not have cracked so easily, even with the assistance of a war psychology of fear and excitement, unless something vital was going on underneath the shell. While the reactionary thinks he is shackling a dangerous foe, he is really demonstrating how superficial is a freedom of thought that can manifest itself only in speech and not in work.

15. PSYCHOLOGY AND JUSTICE[1]

Sacco and Vanzetti are dead. No discussion of their innocence or guilt can restore them to life. That issue is now merged in a larger one, that of our methods of ensuring justice, one which in turn is merged in the comprehensive issue of the tone and temper of American public opinion and sentiment, as they affect judgment and action in any social question wherein racial divisions and class interests are involved. These larger issues did not pass with the execution of these men. Their death did not, indeed, first raise these momentous questions. They have been with us for a long time and in increasing measure since the War. But the condemnation and death of two obscure Italians opened a new chapter in the book of history. Certain phases of our life have been thrown into the highest of high lights. They cannot henceforth be forgotten or ignored. They lie heavy on the conscience of many, and they will rise in multitudes of unexpected ways to trouble the emotions and stir the thoughts of the most thoughtless and conventional.

I have no intention of entering into a discussion at large of the many things which are revealed in this new chapter. There is one point to which I confine myself, not, seemingly, very large in itself, but momentous in its bearings: the psychology of the dominant cultivated class of the country as revealed in the report of the Fuller advisory committee. Without disrespect to the important activities which are identified with the names of the men who formed the committee, it is no exaggeration to say that their place in the historic memory of mankind will be settled by the document they have written. And in justice to them, the future will recognize that the document is something more than a personal expression;

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Nov. 23, 1927.

that it is typical and symbolic, a representation of the state of mind that must be widespread in the educated leaders of the American public in the third decade of the twentieth century. Because my purpose is limited, I make no attempt to go outside the record, much less to discuss the innocence or guilt of Sacco and Vanzetti. These matters have been dealt with by more competent hands than mine. The attitude, the mental disposition, of the authors of the report, as exhibited in their report, is my theme.

In discussing this matter, the statement of the method followed by the committee in finding the condemned men guilty gives the base-line. They say: "As with the Bertillon measurements or with finger-prints, no one measure or line has by itself much significance, yet together they may produce a perfect identification; so a number of circumstances—no one of them conclusive—may together make a proof beyond reasonable doubt." In deciding the men guilty, it is not each item by itself in isolation which counts, but the cumulative effect of all in their mutual bearing. I cite this fact, not to question their statement nor to raise the old controversy regarding circumstantial evidence, but because of its significance in connection with the standard adopted and the method pursued by the committee in dealing with other questions. For these other matters are segregated, both at large and in detail; every item and every topic is treated as an isolated thing, to be disposed of by itself without regard to anything else. The cumulative principle is not only disregarded; it is deliberately departed from. Why? Men, especially men of disciplined and cultivated minds, do not reverse their criterion and procedure without a cause.

The evidence for the sweeping statement just made is found, first, in the plan of treatment adopted in general, the framework of the report; second, in the way in which the considerations falling within the first two divisions are broken up and isolated, and third, in the manner of dealing with a fundamentally important question.

The framework of the report is indicated by the following:

"The inquiry you have asked the committee to undertake seems to consist of answering the three following questions: (1) In their opinion was the trial fairly conducted? (2) Was the subsequently discovered evidence such that in their opinion a new trial ought to have been granted? (3) Are they, or are they not, convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Sacco and Vanzetti were guilty of the murder?" That the first two of these questions were *elements* in the issue with which the committee had to deal, no one will question. Opinions will differ as to whether or not they were called upon to act as a jury and determine and state their own opinion as to the men's guilt or innocence. This difference will depend upon whether, in the light of the world-wide interest in the trial and conviction, men think that the original question of innocence or guilt had or had not in the course of events become, *for the time being,* secondary to the question of administration of justice.

In any event, the segregation of the first two questions, the treatment of the matters of a fair trial and of newly discovered evidence not as *elements* in the issue, but as independent and isolated issues, accounts for the fact that the main issue, as it stands before the world, is not faced. It is not even mentioned. For that issue is whether, taking *all considerations together,* there was or was not reasonable ground for doubt as to a miscarriage of justice in case of the men's immediate execution. The separate treatment of the questions whether the trial already had was fair and whether the newly presented evidence was of value flatly contradicts the cumulative principle accepted and proclaimed in pronouncing the accused guilty. The method fails to face the fact that the two questions have a common and integral bearing upon the main issue, namely, that a miscarriage of justice was reasonably possible if the sentence of death were put into effect forthwith.

The entire procedure was extra-judicial; the very existence of the committee is proof of widely held belief that justice had not, beyond a peradventure, been done; that, irrespective of whether the men were guilty or innocent, there were many circumstances attending the case which indicated that they had not been *proved* guilty. Moreover, any action the committee might recommend, any advice they might give, any conclusions at which they might arrive, were extra-judicial. The governor holds an executive office; he is no part of the judicial system. The appointment of the committee was extra-judicial, and its function was as extra-judicial as its appointment. The governor is entrusted with the task of protecting condemned men against a reasonable degree of a possibility of miscarriage of justice. His is the power to exercise clemency either by pardon or commutation of sentence, not to decide guilt or reverse the action of courts. The office of the committee was to guide the conscience of the governor in the exercise of that function. Why was it, then, that they acted as a jury and as a court, and in so doing adopted strictly legalistic methods of reasoning, even to the point of virtually throwing upon the defense the burden of showing that there was a certainty, not a reasonable possibility, of a miscarriage of justice if the condemned men were at once executed?

Whatever be the answer to this question, the answer to the question as to how they avoided facing the issue is sure. It was done by splitting the issue up into separate questions and disposing of each without any reference to its connection with the others. For, with respect to miscarriage of justice, the question of the old trial and the question of refusal of a new trial in the light of new evidence are, most conspicuously, of a cumulative character. Their net effect, when viewed together, in relation to each other, defined the issue. Why, then, were they treated in complete isolation? The answer can be found only in the attitude with which the issue was approached.

While that attitude is apparent in the framework of the report, with its division into three separate questions, the full force of the isolation in determining the procedure is manifest only when we take up details under the first two heads. By the statement of the report itself, there are six points under each. Are the six points treated as having a force such that, while each by itself is "inconclusive," when taken together they have a probative force as to a reasonable doubt? Such a treatment is not even hinted at. Systematically, each is kept apart from every other, so that the question of cumulative effect may not even arise. The six considerations bearing on the conduct of the original trial include such important points as the bias of the judge, the conduct of the prosecuting attorney in dwelling on the radicalism of the accused, the atmosphere of the court-room, the alleged intervention of federal officials. But each one of these things is taken up as an isolated item, and disposed of in its isolation.

The contrast with the cumulative method used in declaring the men guilty becomes more glaring, the more the details of the two procedures are noted. Under the cumulative procedure, weight is given to the fact that the "general appearance" of Sacco is admittedly "like" that of one of the actual murderers; that his cap bore "a *resemblance* in color and general appearance" to one which he admittedly owned; and that, when arrested, he had in his possession a pistol of the "*kind*" with which the murder was admittedly committed; that, while experts were opposed as to whether the bullet must have been fired from his pistol, the committee are "*inclined* to believe" those who testify it must have been, etc. Try a simple intellectual experiment. What would have become of these separate considerations if the committee had dealt with them by the method of segregation followed in the case of the six considerations adduced to indicate an unfair trial?

There are also six points with respect to the bearing of new evidence upon granting a new trial. One of them was the evidence (not given at the trial), of a bystander, Gould, that the accused men were not the murderers he saw—he being so close to the scene that a bullet passed through his coat lapel. It is also a matter of record that his evidence was not known to the defense at the time of trial. He was known by the prosecution to have been present at the scene of murder, and yet was not called. The committee labor to exculpate the prosecution from the charge of suppression of evidence unfavorable to their case. The method pursued is typical: a highly legalistic argument to whittle down the significance of the admitted facts. Contrast their procedure on this point with that in dealing with a new witness who gave testimony tending to break down Sacco's alibi. Here they remark: "The woman is eccentric, not unimpeachable in conduct; but the committee believes that in *her* case, her testimony is *well worth* consideration." (The italics, naturally, are not in the original text.) But more significant is their comment that Gould's evidence is "merely cumulative," other eye-witnesses having also testified that the murderers were not Sacco and Vanzetti! [1] They do not stop here. They go on to volunteer the remark that "there seems to be no reason to think that the statement of Gould would have any effect in changing the mind of the jury"! Since they can hardly be supposed to mean that the mind of the jury was impervious to evidence, this assumption of the rôle of jurors is indicative of the committee's own attitude, all the more so because the remark about a *former* jury is made in the course of discussion of granting a *new* trial!

But this is but one of the six points adduced. Some of the others were the assertion of Madeiros that he was with another gang when it committed the murder; evidence purporting to show marked prejudice on the part of the foreman of the old jury, under two counts; the testimony of one of the experts for the prosecution that, after he had positively refused to say that the fatal bullet was fired from Sacco's pistol, the prosecuting attorney arranged to have him testify that it was "consistent" with having been so fired. The report itself is the most convincing evidence that can be found of the adoption of the non-cumulative method, as well as of the whittling down of each point, in its isolation, to a minimum, together with magnifying to the utmost all new evidence which fell on the other side. Thus the evidence that the rent in the cap which had been employed as part of its identification with Sacco's is disposed of by saying that it is "so trifling a matter in the evidence in the case that it seems to the committee by no means a ground for a new trial"—as if it had been argued that, taken by itself alone, it did afford such a ground. This "trifling" matter ceases to be trifling when taken as evidence of the rejection of any recognition of the cumulative principle. Again, when two new experts testified that the fatal bullet was not fired from Sacco's pistol, and two new ones testified that it was, the committee say that, after examining the photographs, they are led to the conclusion "that the latter present the more convincing evidence." In other words, although the question at issue is whether there was ground for a new trial, with a new jury, the committee themselves assume the function of a jury in dealing with new evidence so as to deny the new trial.

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[1] If it is urged that a court will not grant a retrial on the basis of new evidence that is merely cumulative, the reply hardly helps the case. Since the whole procedure was extra-legal, what is the significance of adoption of a purely legal standpoint?—J. D.

The third phase of self-revelation regarding the antecedent attitude of the committee is found in their method of dealing with the radicalism of the condemned men in its alleged effect upon the jury and judge, a radicalism the more heinous because those who professed it were also foreigners. This is the aspect of the case which loomed largest in public attention and interest—it is the basic cause of the committee's existence. In accepting appointment on Governor Fuller's committee, Messrs. Lowell, Stratton and Grant accepted also a responsibility to a public found in every country of the globe. Their own record manifests the way in which they discharged this responsibility. They admit the radicalism; they admit its prejudicial effect in causing illegal arrests and deportations. But they employ these admitted facts only in order to justify the action of the prosecuting attorney! For he had subjected Sacco to a cross-examination "on the subject of his social and political views [which] seems at first unnecessarily harsh and designed rather to prejudice the jury than for the legitimate purpose of testing the sincerity of his statements thereon." In excusing him, they deny that the proof of radicalism did influence the jury! They also admit the bias of the judge on the basis of "indiscreet" conversations out of court, but assert that his bias was not a factor in the conduct of the trial. And the bearing of radicalism upon the conduct of the accused when arrested is ignored. It is next to a psychological commonplace that men, especially men of trained minds, reason in such an inverted fashion only when influenced by some covert factor.

Here are the facts as written in the report. There is no doubt left of the committee's knowledge of the state of public sentiment at the time of the trial and of their knowledge of its actual (not merely possible) effect in bringing about unjust and illegal action. "There were wholesale arrests of Reds—fortunately stopped by Judge Anderson of the United States Circuit Court—in southeastern Massachusetts." They would hardly have been stopped by the judge and their stoppage have been fortunate, unless they were illegal. Again, "at that time of abnormal fear and credulity, little evidence was required to prove that any one was a dangerous radical. Harmless professors and students in our colleges were accused of dangerous opinions." The hysteria was so widespread as to extend beyond foreigners and ignorant laborers to college men, teachers and students. And the cross-examination of the prosecuting attorney was of the seemingly harsh and prejudicial character just cited. And it affects the men of the committee as such after a lapse of years in which public opinion has calmed, men who are highly trained, not just the average man such as serves on a jury. Nevertheless, the committee hold that it did not influence the jury living in the midst of the period of fear and credulity, when little evidence was required to convict an accused person of being a Red, and although, instead of little evidence, these jurymen had the fact of radicalism clearly proved, and although they were average men, not trained minds capable of detecting bias and thus, presumably, discounting it!

How is this remarkable result obtained? By two methods, one direct, the other indirect, shifting the issue. The direct procedure lay in questioning the jurors (the ten of them who were accessible) on the subject, and accepting their assurance that they were not influenced by the attitude of the judge and the mode of conduct of the trial. "Each felt sure that the fact that the accused were foreigners and radicals had no effect upon his opinion." These men, in other words, are now sure, an assurance which the committee fully accepts in the most important phase of the trial, that *they* were immune to the prevailing contagion of "fear and credulity," and immune although they had not "little evidence" but convincing proof of "dangerous opinions." Believe it he who can. And disbelief does not involve doubt as to the good faith of any juror in making the statement he made. If, in such an atmosphere, they had been aware of the influence of this force upon their beliefs, they would have been extraordinary men, even more unusual than the members of the committee. If they had been aware of the influence working upon them, they would have been in a position to discount it. Moreover, their statement is made after a period of years, during which their conduct has been the subject of ardent controversy and themselves the object of bitter criticism, so that all their defense mechanisms have been called into action. But the committee accepts their assurance at full value! The committee's belief that the admitted bias of the judge outside the court-room was dropped by him in the court-room, as he might shed an overcoat when he donned judicial robes, evinces an equal disregard of elementary psychological factors.

More self-revealing still is the committee's procedure with reference to the "consciousness of guilt" alleged by the prosecution to be proved by the false statements the prisoners made when arrested. The defense contended their false statements were due to consciousness that they were radicals and foreigners and were due to fear of arrest and deportation. The committee first excuses the seemingly harsh and prejudicial examination of the prosecuting attorney, on the ground that it was necessary for him to test the sincerity of their professed radicalism as explaining their behavior upon arrest. Then not only are the committee certain that the proof the defendants sincerely held these views had no weight with the jury's opinion, but they turn the proof, not to support the men's own explanation of their conduct, but as consistent with, if not actual evidence of, consciousness of guilt! The method by which this is done is perhaps the most extraordinary thing in an extraordinary document.

The argument goes: It was the defendants themselves, when on trial, who made clear their radical views. When they were arrested, there was "in the case of Sacco, no certainty that he held any such views. The United States authorities who were hunting for Reds had found nothing that would justify deportation or any other proceedings against these men." Although there were wholesale arrests, "these men had not been arrested."

Hence the justification of the prosecuting attorney in a seemingly harsh and prejudicial manner of prosecution—which, nevertheless, did not prejudice men at a time of fear and credulity. Moreover, while establishment of the fact that they were radicals, and were arrested at a time of wholesale illegal arrests and deportations, justifies the prosecuting attorney, it has no weight in contravention of the theory of "consciousness of guilt" as displayed upon arrest. The implication is that, instead of acting upon their own knowledge that they were obnoxious radicals, they should have acted upon the lack of certain knowledge on the part of the authorities!

In comparison with the force of elementary psychological considerations, it may seem to weaken the case to refer to another incidental fact. The committee's sole reference to the conduct of Mr. Thompson is that, upon occasion, his conduct indicated that "the case of the defense must be rather desperate" for him to resort to the tactics attributed to him. Well, events, in which the committee had their share, indicate that the plight of the defendants was indeed desperate; and Mr. Thompson, above all others, had occasion to realize how tragically desperate. But, quite apart from the committee's own conviction of the guilt of the accused, it was known to them that Mr. Thompson was equally convinced of their innocence; that he was conservative in his social and political views; that, at great sacrifice of time, of social and professional standing, he had made a gallant fight for the accused out of jealous zeal for the repute of his own state for even-handed justice. Yet their sole reference to him is by way of a slur. I see but one explanation of such lack of simple and seemingly imperative generosity of mind.

One is profoundly humiliated at the revelation of an attitude which, it is submitted, the record amply sets forth, the record placed before the bar of history. The sense of humiliation is akin to that of guilt, as if for a share in permitting such a state of mind as is exhibited in the record to develop in a country that professes respect for justice and devotion to equality and fraternity.

16. AMERICANISM AND LOCALISM[1]

When one is living quite on the other side of the world, the United States tend to merge into a unit. One thinks largely in terms of national integers, of which the United States is one. Like a historian of the old school or a writer of diplomatic notes, one conceives of what the United States is doing about this or that. It is taken, as schoolmen say, as an entity. Then one happens to receive a newspaper from one of the smaller towns, from any town, that is, smaller than New York—and sometimes Chicago. Then one gets a momentary shock. One is brought back to earth. And the earth is just what it used to be. It is a loose collection of houses, of streets, of neighborhoods, villages, farms, towns. Each of these has an intense consciousness of what is going on within itself in the way of fires, burglaries, murders, family jars, weddings, and banquets to esteemed fellow citizens, and a languid drooping interest in the rest of the spacious land.

Very provincial? No, not at all. Just local, just human, just at home, just where they live. Of course, the paper has the Associated Press service or some other service of which it brags. As a newspaper which knows its business, it prints "national" news, and strives assiduously for "national" advertisements, making much on provocation of its "national" circulation. But somehow all this wears a thin and apologetic air. The very style of the national news reminds one of his childhood text-book in history, or of the cyclopædia that he is sometimes regretfully obliged to consult. Let us have this over as soon as possible and get to something interesting, it all seems to say. How different the local news. Even in the most woodenly treated item there is flavor, even if only of the desire to say something and still avoid a libel suit.

Yet there is a strange phenomenon noted. These same papers that fairly shriek with localisms devote a discreet amount of space to the activities of various Americanization agencies. From time to time, with a marked air of doing their duty, there are earnest editorials on the importance of Americanization and the wickedness of those who decline to be either Americanized or to go back where they came from. But these weighty and conscientious articles lack the chuckle and relish one finds in the report of the increase of the population of the town and of its crime wave.

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[1] From *The Dial*, June, 1920.

One vaguely wonders whether perhaps the recalcitrants who are denounced may not also be infected by the pervading spirit of localism. They decline to get Americanized for the same reason they put up with considerable annoyance rather than go back. They are chiefly concerned with what goes on in their tenement house, their alley, their factory, their street. If a "trained mind"—like the writer's, for example—can't tell very well from these articles just what Americanization is, probably the absorbed denizens of the locality are excusable for not trying to find out more about it. One gathers of course that Americanization consists in learning a language strangely known as English. But perhaps they are too busy making the American language to devote much time to studying the English.

In any case, the editorial emphasis on Americanism stands in extraordinarily vivid contrast to the emphasis in the news columns on local interests. The only things that seem to be "nation-wide" are the high cost of living, prohibition, and devotion to localisms. A Pacific Coast newspaper just reaching Peking contains on its front page the correspondence between President Wilson and Secretary Lansing about the latter's resignation. Doubtless in London the news was of the first importance. The San Francisco editor was too good a journalist not to print the entire correspondence faithfully. But it was entirely overshadowed by a local graft case as to headlines, space given, and editorial comment.

This remark is not a complaint. It is merely a record of a fact easily verified in almost any city in the United States.

The editor doubtless sympathized with the feeling of the mass of the readers that a civic reformation at home was more important than a cabinet revolution in Washington; certainly more important for the "home town," and quite likely for the country—the country, mind you, not the nation, much less the state. For the country is a spread of localities, while the nation is something that exists in Washington and other seats of government.

Henry Adams somewhere remarks in effect that history is a record of victories for the principle of unity in form and of plurality in effect. The wider the formal, the legal unity, the more intense becomes the local life. The defeat of secession diversified the South even more than the North, and the extension of the United States westward to the ocean rendered New England less exclusively a New Englandish homogeneity and created a unique New York, a New York clustering about Wall Street. When we have a United States of the World, doubtless localism will receive its last release—until we federate with the other planets. And yet there are those who fear internationalism as a menace to local independence and variety!

I am not, however, essaying a political treatise. The bearing of these remarks is upon the literary career of our country. They perhaps explain why the newspaper is the only genuinely popular form of literature we have achieved. The newspaper hasn't been ashamed of localism. It has revelled in it, perhaps wallowed is the word. I am not arguing that it is high-class literature, or for the most part good literature, even from its own standpoint. But it is permanently successful romance and drama, and that much can hardly be said for anything else in our literary lines.

The exception, as usual, proves the fact. There are journals of hundreds of thousands—nay, millions of circulation, which claim to be national, and which certainly are not local, even when they locate their stories in New York. This seeming exception is accounted for by the simple fact that localities in the United States are connected by railways and roads upon which a large number of passenger trains and motor cars are moving from one place to another. There is an immense population constantly in transit. For the time being they are not localists. But neither are they nationalists. They are just what they are—passengers. Hence the *Saturday Evening Post* and other journals expressly designed for this intermediate state of existence. Besides, the motor car fugitives must have advertisements and pictures of their cars. What becomes of all these periodicals? The man who answered this question would be the final authority on literature in America. Pending investigation, my hypothesis is that the brakeman, the Pullman porter, and those who clean out the street-cars inherit them.

Now the thing that makes these periodicals somewhat thin as literature (even if they provide exciting reading matter for those in a state of passage from one locality to another) is that they have to eliminate the local. They subsist for those who are going from one place and haven't as yet arrived at another. They cannot have depth or thickness—nothing but movement. Take all the localities of the United States and extract their greatest common divisor, and the result is of necessity a crackling surface. The bigger and more diversified the country, the thinner the net product.

Isn't this the explanation also of the "serious" novel, of its comparative absence and its comparative failure when it does come into existence? It aims at universality and attains technique. Walt Whitman exhausted the cataloguing of localities, and it hasn't occurred to the novel writer to dig down in some locality mentioned in the gazetteer till he strikes something. The writers of short stories have done something but they have hardly got beyond what is termed local color. But a locality exists in three dimensions. It has a background and also extensions. I haven't read Mary Wilkins' stories of New England life for many years, but I have only to think of them to recover the whole feel of the life. They are local with a faithfulness that is beyond admiration. But they lack background.

To invert a sentence of Mr. Oppenheim's: The persons in them are characters but they have no manners. For manners are a product of the interaction of characters and social environment, a social environment of which the background, the tradition, the descent of forces, is a part. And in Mary Wilkins' stories, as in the New England she depicts, the traditions are the characters. They have become engrained. There is no background with which they may interact. There are only other characters and the bleak hills and the woods and fields. All, people and nature alike, exist, as the philosophers say, under the form of eternity. Like Melchizedek, they have no ancestry or descent—save from God and the Devil. Bret Harte and Mark Twain have dimensions as well as color. But the former never attained adequate momentum for lack of a suitable audience. The latter had an audience when he came East but it was an alien one. He tamed himself lest he should shock it too much. His own, his real, locality could not be projected on the Eastern locality without reserve. He believed in his locality, but he believed in his audience more.

We are discovering that the locality is the only universal. Even the suns and stars have their own times as well as their own places. This truth is first discovered in abstract form, or as an idea. Then, as Mr. Oppenheim points out in the February *Dial,* its discovery creates a new poetry—at least so I venture to paraphrase him. When the discovery sinks a little deeper, the novelist and dramatist will discover the localities of America as they are, and no one will need to worry about the future of American art. We have been too anxious to get away from home. Naturally that took us to Europe even though we fancied we were going around America. When we explore our neighborhood, its forces and not just its characters and color, we shall find what we sought. The beginning of the exploring spirit is in the awakening of criticism and of sympathy. Heaven knows there is enough to criticize. The desired art is not likely to linger long, for the sympathy will come as soon as we stay at home for a while. And in spite of the motor car, moving about is getting difficult. Things are getting filled up—and anyway we only move to another locality.

17. PRAGMATIC AMERICA[1]

In one of the numbers of *The Freeman* Bertrand Russell writes: "The two qualities which I consider superlatively important are love of truth and love of our neighbor. I find love of truth in America obscured by commercialism of which pragmatism is the philosophical expression; and love of our neighbor kept in fetters by Puritan morality." The statement comes to us with double importance. For it is obviously dictated by Mr. Russell's own love of truth and love for us as his neighbor. Police records and newspaper columns do not seem to indicate that Puritanism is effective in fettering our love for our neighbor's wife however much it restricts our love for him. If pragmatism is the intellectual reflection of commercialism, pragmatists seem to be assured of a speedy victory of their philosophy in England and the continent of Europe; for there are rumors, apparently authentic, that commercialism exists in strength in these outlying parts of the world. But such matters may be passed over, especially as Mr. Russell tells us that he is aware that the evils he finds in us are not unknown in the rest of the world, and that he urges their potency among us because we are more complacent, more boastful of our "idealism," less possessed of a critical minority than is the old world.

Mr. Russell is probably not entirely alone in the world in regarding love of truth and of neighbor as the two supreme human excellences. In the United States there are those who agree, at least in profession. The fact that the belief had some currency before he voiced it makes it the more important to consider the state of these virtues, and the power of their enemies among us. One otherwise attractive line of discussion is closed to us. We cannot cite evidence that we compare favorably with the rest of humanity in love of truth, and possibly a little more than favorably in respect to love of neighbors. For such a method turns against us. It is just another sample of our obdurate complacency, of the rationalizing idealization with which we obscure our critical perception of the truth.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* April 12, 1922.

The suggestion that pragmatism is the intellectual equivalent of commercialism need not, however, be taken too seriously. It is of that order of interpretation which would say that English neo-realism is a reflection of the aristocratic snobbery of the English; the tendency of French thought to dualism an expression of an alleged Gallic disposition to keep a mistress in addition to a wife; and the idealism of Germany a manifestation of an ability to elevate beer and sausage into a higher synthesis with the spiritual values of Beethoven and Wagner. Nor does the figure of William James exist in exact correspondence with a glorification of commercialism. The man who wrote that "callousness to abstract justice is *the* sinister feature of United States civilization," that this callousness is a "symptom of the moral flabbiness born of the exclusive worship of the bitch-goddess SUCCESS," and that this worship "together with the squalid cash interpretation put upon the word success is our national disease" was not consciously nor unconsciously engaged in an intellectual formulation of the spirit he abhorred. Nor was Charles Peirce conspicuous for conformity to commercial standards. Emotional irritation coexists in our humanity with the consideration that love of truth is a superlative good, and it is capable upon occasion of blinding that love.

Nevertheless, there is something instructive about our spiritual estate in the fact that pragmatism was born upon American soil, and that pragmatism presents consequences as a test and a responsibility of the life of reason. Historically the fact is testimony to "Anglo-Saxon" kinship; it is testimony to spiritual kinship with Bacon, who wrote that "truth and utility are the very same thing, and works themselves are of greater value as pledges of truth than as contributing to the comforts of life"; who taught that the end and the test of science and philosophy are their fruits for the relief and betterment of the estate of humanity; while also holding that converting science and philosophy to immediate fruitage for lucre and reputation is their curse. American pragmatism is testimony that the tradition of Bacon carried on in divers ways by Hobbes, Locke and Hume has taken root here.

Yet there is special significance in the fact that this tradition was first revived and then made central by Peirce and James in the United States. Any one who wishes to take a census of our spiritual estate (along with the censorship implied in a census) will assuredly find the pragmatic spirit important. It is a commonplace, however, that strength and weakness, excellence and defect, go together, because they are the two sides of the same thing. If, therefore, love of truth is to express itself in a discriminating way, it must be willing to attach itself to our sense that consequences are the test and the token of responsibility in the operation of intelligence until its significance is extracted. It is not in the first instance a question of the truth of this feeling. The disposition may be, if you please, as obnoxious to ultimate philosophic truth as it is repellent to certain temperaments. But first we have to find out what it means, what it means for both good and bad. Love of truth is manifest in desire to understand rather than in hurry to praise and blame.

A conviction that consequences in human welfare are a test of the worth of beliefs and thoughts has some obvious beneficial aspects. It makes for a fusion of the two superlatively important qualities, love of truth and love of neighbor. It discourages dogmatism and its child, intolerance. It arouses and heartens an experimental spirit which wants to know how systems and theories work before giving complete adhesion. It militates against too sweeping and easy generalizations, even against those which would indict a nation. Compelling attention to details, to particulars, it safeguards one from seclusion in universals; one is obliged, as William James was always saying, to get down from noble aloofness into the muddy stream of concrete things. It fosters a sense of the worth of communication of what is known. This takes effect not only in education, but in a belief that we do not fully know the meaning of anything till it has been imparted, shared, made common property. I well remember the remark of an unschooled American pioneer, who said of a certain matter that some day it would not only be found out, but it would be known. He was ignorant of books, but he declared the profound philosophy that nothing is really known till it operates in the common life.

Any such attitude is clearly a faith, not a demonstration. It too can be demonstrated only in *its* works, its fruits. Therefore it is not a facile thing. It commits us to a supremely difficult task. Perhaps the task is too hard for human nature. The faith may demonstrate its own falsity by failure. We may be arrested on the plane of commercial "success"; we may be diverted to search for consequences easier to achieve, and may noisily acclaim superficial and even disastrous "works" and fruits as proof of genuine success instead of evidence of failure. We not only may do so, but we actually are doing so. If the course of history be run, if our present estate be final, no honest soul can claim that success exceeds failure. Perhaps this will always remain the case. Humanity is not conspicuous for having made a successful job of life anywhere. But an honest soul will also admit that the failure is not due to inherent defects in the faith, but to the fact that its demands are too high for human power; that mankind is not up to making good the requirements of the faith, or at least that that part of a common humanity which inhabits these United States is not up to it, and that the experiment must be passed on to another place and time.

Yet the gloomiest view reminds us of another phase of the pragmatic faith. Undoubtedly in expressing his sense of a world still open, a world still in the making, William James reported, perhaps with some superfluous accretions of romanticism to his native idiom, a characteristic feature of the American scene. Be the evils what they may, the experiment is not yet played out. The United States are not yet made;

they are not a finished fact to be categorically assessed. Mr. James' assertion that the world is still making does not import a facile faith. He knew well that the world has also its madeness, and that what is done and over with fearfully complicates the task of making the future that human better we should like it to be.

A discriminating spiritual census of the United States will, therefore, ask about the already made things which we inherit and which mix with our creative making to arrest, divert and pervert it. After all we inherit from a Europe which was, compared with our scene, a made affair. Every day our cities are eloquent of the past fruits of a feudal Europe. His power far exceeds mine who can tell just how much of our present ill is due to the commercialism which is of our making and how much is due to deposit of an ancient feudalism. Commerce itself, let us dare to say it, is a noble thing. It is intercourse, exchange, communication, distribution, sharing of what is otherwise secluded and private. Commercialism like all isms is evil. That we have not as yet released commerce from bondage to private interests is proof of the solidity and tenacity of our European heritage. Commerce in knowledge, in intelligence, is still a side-issue, precarious, spasmodic, corrupt. Pragmatic faith walks in chains, not erect.

One other heritage of things already made still has to be reckoned with, reckoned with in social practice as well as in formulation. These United States were born when the pragmatic and experimental faith of the English tradition was in eclipse. Bacon did not exaggerate the control of nature to be obtained from study of nature. But he enormously underestimated that inertia of social forces which would resist free application of the new power to the relief and betterment of the human estate, and which would effect a private monopolization of the fruits of the new power of knowledge. Those who were called liberals lost their faith in experimental method. They were seduced into desiring a creed as absolute, as final, as eternal as that wielded by their opponents. The dogma of natural rights of the individual was the product.

The pioneer, agrarian American scene was a congenial home for the new dogma. We tied ourselves down to political and legal practices and institutions radically hostile to our native disposition and endeavor. Legalism, along with feudalized commercialism, wedded to form modern commercialism, is the anti-pragmatic "made" which hinders and perverts our pragmatic makings. It is incarnate in constitutions and courts. The resulting situation is not one which calls for complacency. But the beginning of improvement is to place responsibility where it belongs.

Our noisy and nauseating "idealism" is an expression of the emotions which would cover and disguise a mixed situation. There is a genuine idealism of faith in the future, in experiment directed by intelligence, in the communication of knowledge, in the rights of the common man to a common share in the fruits of the spirit. This spirit when it works does not need to talk. But its workings are paralyzed here, arrested there, and more or less corrupted everywhere by a feudalized commercialism and a legalism which we cover up with eloquent speeches because we do not honestly confront them. Discrimination is the first fruit of love of truth and of love of neighbor. Till we discriminate we shall oscillate between wholesale revulsion and the sloppy idealism of popular emotion.

Book Four

WAR AND PEACE

To be interested in ends and to have contempt for the means which alone secure them is the last stage of intellectual demoralization.

Not all who say *Ideals, Ideals,* shall enter the kingdom of the ideal, but only those shall enter who know and who respect the roads that conduct to the kingdom.

John Dewey.

1. THE SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF WAR[1]

Severally and collectively mankind always builds better or worse than it knows. Even in the most successful enterprises aims and results do not wholly coincide. In executing our immediate purpose we have to use forces which are outside our intent. Once released, however, they continue to operate, and they bring with them consequences which are unexpected and which in the end may quite submerge the objects consciously struggled for. Such an immense undertaking as the present war is no exception. The will to conquer describes the immediate aim. But in order to realize that end all sorts of activities are set going, arrangements made, organizations instituted, as incidental means. After they have been called into being they cannot be whisked out of existence merely because the war has come to an end. They have acquired an independent being and in the long run may effect consequences more significant than those consciously desired. If, for example, one takes a cross section through the warring countries at present, one finds a striking rise in power of the wage-earning classes. Through the necessities of war, their strategic position in modern social organization has been made clear, and the Russian Revolution has brought the fact to dramatic self-consciousness. Is it not conceivable that some future historian may find this consequence outweighing any for which the war was originally fought?

If it is the unintended which happens, a forecast of the consequences of the war seems doubly futile, for it is hard enough to disentangle even the professed aims in such a manner as to make them precise and definite. Yet it is possible to see some of the forces which have been released by the war. Through fixing attention upon them, we make some guess about the future in its larger outlines.

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[1] From *The Independent*, June 22, 1918; published under the title *What Are We Fighting For?*

The first result which I see is the more conscious and extensive use of science for communal purposes after the war. Changes which are effected by embodying scientific discoveries in mechanical inventions and appliances endure. The transformations brought about first in industry and then in general social and political life by the stationary steam-engine, the locomotive, the internal combustion engine, etc., have stayed put, while matters which absorbed in their day much more of conscious attention and made much more of a stir in the realm of thought, have sunk beneath waves of oblivion. Mechanically speaking, the greatest achievements of the year have been, of course, the submarine and airplane, the mastery of the undersea and the air. Is it not likely that the combined effects of the two will do more to displace war than all the moralizing in existence? Anticipations of the future are too readily couched in terms of the fantastic rather than of the commonplace; or rather the miraculous, once established, becomes commonplace. But considering the social revolution wrought by steam and electric transportation on land and water in abolishing parochial and provincial boundaries, it seems probable that air navigation will round out their work in obliterating nationalistic frontiers.

The war has, in addition to specific inventions, made it customary to utilize the collective knowledge and skill of scientific experts in all lines, organizing them for community ends. It is unlikely that we shall ever return wholly to the old divorce of knowledge from the conduct of social affairs—a separation which made knowledge abstract and abstruse, and left public affairs controlled by routine, vested interest and skilled manipulation. The one phase of Prussianism, borrowed under the stress of war from the enemy, which is likely permanently to remain, is systematic utilization of the scientific expert. Used for the ends of a democratic society, the social mobilization of science is likely in the end to effect such changes in the practise of government—and finally in its theory—as to initiate a new type of democracy. With respect to this alteration, as with respect to the airplane, there is more likelihood of underestimating than of exaggerating the consequences which are to follow.

Another consequence, not directly willed but made necessary as an incident of the war, is the formation of large political groupings. Almost all the nations of the world are now arrayed on one or other of the two sides. Not only is such a world-wide organization including the peoples of every continent a new and unique fact, so much so that the world for the first time is politically as well as astronomically round, but the character of the alliances is quite unprecedented. In order that the military alliance may be made effective, there is in effect if not in name a pooling of agricultural and industrial resources, a conjoint supervision of shipping and hence of international trading, a world-wide censorship and economic blacklist. In addition each nation now has an interest in knowing about other nations, which has put the world as a whole on the map for the citizen of Little Peddlington and Jay Corners.

The kind of knowledge and interest that was once confined to travelers and the cultured has become widely distributed. When a million or two young men return from France, the jolt given to our intellectual isolation by the very fact of the war will be accentuated. And Europe, it is safe to say, will have learned as much about us as we about it. The shrinkage of the world already effected as a physical fact by steam and electricity will henceforth be naturalized in the imagination. All of these things mean the discovery of the interdependence of all peoples, and the development of a more highly organized world, a world knit together by more conscious and substantial bonds.

Whatever the immediate decisions of the statesmen who sit in the peace conference at the end of the war, this means that an international state is on its way. Few people realize what a small number of independent states remained in the world even before the war—many times less than there were within the present German Empire a century ago. Consolidation has proceeded with the same certainty and acceleration as in the case of the multitude of small local railway systems which once sprawled over this country—and from the same causes. The war has speeded up the movement, and in the various commissions and arrangements which it necessitated will leave behind mechanisms which are bound to continue in operation—first in order to meet actual post-war needs and then because there is no way of getting rid of them without uprooting too many other things which will have got linked up with them.

It is a mistake to think that the movement for the self-determination of nations, the releasing of nationalities now held in dependence, will arrest, much less reverse, the integrating movement. Cultural emancipation of nationalities and local autonomy within a federation are to be hoped for; if they are not attained, the war will have been fought in vain so far as its most important conscious objective is concerned. But even if this goes beyond local autonomy to the point of complete political independence of a new Bohemia, Poland, Ukrainia, Palestine, Egypt, India, it will not militate against the virtual control of the world by a smaller number of political units. The war has demonstrated that effective sovereignty can be maintained only by states large enough to be economically self-supporting. New nations could exist permanently only if guaranteed by some large political union, which would have to be more closely knit together than were the treaty-alliances which "neutralized" (till the war broke out) some of the smaller states of Europe.

To say, however, that the world will be better organized is not—unfortunately—the same thing as to say that it will be organized so as to be a better world. We shall have either a world federation in the sense of a genuine concert of nations, or a few large imperialistic organizations, standing in chronic hostility to one another. Something corresponding to the present anti-German federation, with minor realignments in course of time, might constitute one of these; the Central Empires and southeastern Europe another; Russia, it is conceivable, would go it alone, and the Oriental countries might make a fourth. In this case, we should have a repetition of the Balance of Power situation on a larger scale, with all its evils, including the constant jockeying to secure by threat and bribe the allegiance of Scandinavia, Spain and some of the South American countries to one imperialistic federation or another.

The choice between these two alternatives is the great question which the statesmen after the war will have to face. If it is dodged, and the attempt is made to restore an antebellum condition of a large number of independent detached and "sovereign" states allied only for purposes of economic and potential military warfare, the situation will be forced, probably, into the alternative of an imperially organized Balance of Power whose unstable equilibrium will result in the next war for decisive dominion.

The counterpart of the growth of world organization through elimination of isolated territorial sovereign states is domestic integration within each unit. In every warring country there has been the same demand that in the time of great national stress production for profit be subordinated to production for use. Legal possession and individual property rights have had to give way before social requirements. The old conception of the absoluteness of private property has received the world over a blow from which it will never wholly recover.

Not that arbitrary confiscation will be resorted to, but that it has been made clear that the control of any individual or group over their "own" property is relative to public wants, and that public requirements may at any time be given precedence by public machinery devised for that purpose. Profiteering has not been stamped out; doubtless in some lines of war necessities it has been augmented. But the sentiment aroused against profiteering will last beyond the war, while even more important is the fact that the public has learned to recognize profiteering in many activities which it formerly accepted on their own claims as a matter of course.

In short, the war, by throwing into relief the public aspect of every social enterprise, has discovered the amount of sabotage which habitually goes on in manipulating property rights to take a private profit out of social needs. Otherwise, the wrench needed in order to bring privately controlled industries into line with public needs would not have had to be so great. The war has thus afforded an immense object lesson as to the absence of democracy in most important phases of our national life, while it has also brought into existence arrangements for facilitating democratic integrated control.

This organization of means for public control covers every part of our national life. Banking, finance, the supervision of floating of new corporate enterprises, the mechanism of credit, have been affected by it to various degrees in all countries. The strain with respect to the world's food supply has made obvious to all from the farmer in the field to the cook in the kitchen the social meaning of all occupations connected with the physical basis of life. Consequently the question of the control of land for use instead of for speculation has assumed an acute aspect, while a flood of light has been thrown upon the interruption of the flow of food and fuel to the consumer with a view to exacting private toll. Hence organization for the regulation of transportation and distribution of food, fuel and the necessities of war production like steel and copper.

To dispose of such matters by labeling them state socialism is merely to conceal their deeper import: the creation of instrumentalities for enforcing the public interest in all the agencies of modern production and exchange. Again, the war has added to the old lesson of public sanitary regulation the new lesson of social regulation for purposes of moral prophylaxis. The acceleration of the movement to control the liquor traffic is another aspect of the same fact. Finally, conscription has brought home to the countries which have in the past been the home of the individualistic tradition the supremacy of public need over private possession.

It may seem a work of supererogation to attempt even the most casual listing of the variety of ways in which the war has enforced this lesson of the interdependence, the interweaving of interests and occupations, and the consequent necessity of agencies for public oversight and direction in order that the interdependence may become a public value instead of being used for private levies. It is true that not every instrumentality brought into the war for the purpose of maintaining the public interest will last. Many of them will melt away when the war comes to an end. But it must be borne in mind that the war did not create that interdependence of interests which has given enterprises once private and limited in scope a social significance. The war only gave a striking revelation of the state of affairs which the application of steam and electricity to industry and transportation had already effected. It afforded a vast and impressive object lesson as to what had occurred, and made it impossible for men to proceed any longer by ignoring the revolution which has taken place.

Thus the public supervision and control occasioned by this war differ from that produced by other wars not only in range, depth and complexity, but even more in the fact that they have simply accelerated a movement which was already proceeding apace.

The immediate urgency has in a short time brought into existence agencies for executing the supremacy of the public and social interest over the private and possessive interest which might otherwise have taken a long time to construct. In this sense, no matter how many among the special agencies for public control decay with the disappearance of war stress, the movement will never go backward. Peoples who have learned that billions are available for public needs when the occasion presses will not forget the lesson, and having seen that portions of these billions are necessarily diverted into physical training, industrial education, better housing, and the setting up of agencies for securing a public service and function from private industries will ask why in the future the main stream should not be directed in the same channels.

In short, we shall have a better organized world internally as well as externally, a more integrated, less anarchic, system. Partisans are attempting to locate the blame for the breakdown in the distribution of fuel and the partial breakdown in food supplies upon mere inefficiency in governmental officials. But whatever the truth in special cases of such accusations, it is clear that the causal force lies deeper.

Fundamental industries have been carried on for years and years on a social basis; for public service indeed, but for public service under such conditions of private restriction as would render the maximum of personal profit. Our large failures are merely exhibitions of the anarchy and confusion entailed by any such principle of conducting affairs. When profit may arise from setting up division and conflict, it is hopeless to expect unity. That this, taken together with the revelation by the war of the crucial position occupied by the wage-earner, points to the socialization of industry as one of the enduring consequences of the war cannot be doubted.

Socialization, as well as the kindred term socialism, covers, however, many and diverse alternatives. Many of the measures thus far undertaken may be termed in the direction of state capitalism, looking to the absorption of the means of production and distribution by the government, and to the replacement of the present corporate employing and directive forces by a bureaucracy of officials. So far as the consequences of war assume this form, it supplies another illustration of the main thesis of Herbert Spencer that a centralized government has been built up by war necessities, and that such a state is necessarily militaristic in its structure.

On the other hand, it must be pointed out that in Great Britain and this country, and apparently to a considerable degree even in centralized Germany, the measures taken for enforcing the subordination of private activity to public need and service have been successful only because they have enlisted the voluntary coöperation of associations which have been formed on a non-political, non-governmental basis, large industrial corporations, railway systems, labor unions, universities, scientific societies, banks, etc. Moreover, the wage-earner is more likely to be interested in using his newly discovered power to increase his own share of control in an industry than he is in transferring that control over to government officials. He will have to look to politics for measures which will secure the democratization of industry from within, but he need not go further than this.

Reorganization along these lines would give us in the future a federation of self-governing industries with the government acting as adjuster and arbiter rather than as direct owner and manager, unless perhaps in case of industries occupying such a privileged position as fuel production and the railways. Taxation will be a chief governmental power through which to procure and maintain socialization of the services of the land and of industries organized for self-direction rather than for subjection to alien investors. While one can say here as in the case of international relations that a more highly organized world is bound to result, one cannot with assurance say which of two types of organization is going to prevail. But it is reasonably sure that the solution in one sphere will be congruous with that wrought out in the other.

Governmental capitalism will stimulate and be stimulated by the formation of a few large imperialistic organizations which must resort to armament for each to maintain its place within a precarious balance of powers. A federated concert of nations, on the other hand, with appropriate agencies of legislation, judicial procedure and administrative commissions would so relax tension between states as to encourage voluntary groupings all over the world, and thus promote social integration by means of the coöperation of democratically self-governed industrial and vocational groups. The period of social reconstruction might require a temporary extension of governmental regulation and supervision, but this would be provisional, giving way to a period of decentralization after the transfer of power from the more or less rapacious groups now in control had been securely affected.

The determination of the issue in one sense or the other will not, of course, immediately follow the conclusion of the war. There will be a long period of struggle and transition. But if we are to have a world safe *for* democracy *and* a world *in* which democracy is safely anchored, the solution will be in the direction of a federated world government and a variety of freely experimenting and freely coöperating self-governing local, cultural and industrial groups. It is because, in the end, autocracy means uniformity as surely as democracy means diversification that the great hope lies with the latter. The former strains human nature to the breaking point; the latter releases and relieves it—such, I take it, is the ultimate sanction of democracy, for which we are fighting.

2. AMERICA AND WAR[1]

Politics means getting certain things done. Some body of persons, elected or self-constituted, takes charge, deciding and executing. In the degree in which a society is democratic this governing group has to get the assent and support of large masses of people. In the degree in which the things to be done run counter to the inertia, bias and apparent interests of the masses, certain devices of manipulation have to be resorted to. The political psychology of the older school, that of Bentham and Mill, taught that in a democratic state the governing body would never want to do anything except what was in the interests of the governed. But experience has shown that this view was over-naïve. Practical political psychology consists largely in the technique of the expert manipulation of men *en masse* for ends not clearly seen by them, but which they are led to believe are of great importance for them.

Thus the psychology of the professional politician resembles that of the prestidigitator. The attention of those to be influenced is directed to objects and acts which habit has rendered congenial and attractive, and meantime something quite different is carried forward to an unforeseen result. As a rule the most effective form of motivation is one which combines appeal to highly idealistic ends with appeal to immediate profit: the Old Flag and an appropriation, the prevention of the vicious schemes of the opposing party plus a larger price for crops and general prosperity.

The political leader perpetually forgets, however, that the state of public imagination and interest is in flux, and that the time comes when the cumulative effect of minor changes is so great that the people cannot be "handled" after the old fashion. Then the politician goes on repeating the old slogans and cries and is baffled by failure to get the wonted reaction. Is this going to happen in connection with the demand for intense and unified motivation imposed by the war? There is an old and established technique of supplying motive in wartime. Many newspapers and some public men do not seem capable of now responding in any other way than the old, and hence they are incapable of imagining people at large being moved in unprecedented ways. If these men guess wrong and have any large influence in determining the course of popular appeal, the error in practical psychology will have incalculable consequences for evil.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Aug. 18, 1917; published under the title *What America Will Fight For.*

The orthodox technique is exhibited in gross in any collection of war posters; in more refined ways it is seen in any anthology of patriotic poetry. Home and hearth, defense of ancestral altars and graves, glory and honor, bravery and self-immolation are its familiar themes.

There are serious reasons for doubting the availability of this mode of procedure at the present time. The domestic politics and issues of the last few years, the history of the war as reported to the American people up to the time of our entrance, our geographical isolation and our racial composition coöperate to make reliance upon it an exceedingly precarious undertaking. Yet many souls which are ardent for the war and who suspect the country of undue apathy are urging wholesale recourse to it. The Washington correspondent of a newspaper which has been insistent as to our share in the war ever since the sinking of the Lusitania recently clearly set it forth. It is not hard, he said in effect, to account for a general apathy. The motives which have usually led nations into war have been promise of national gain, urgent fear of an immediate danger and smouldering habits of hate, which are readily blown into flame. But the United States has deliberately eschewed all national aggrandizement; it does not sincerely believe that its national destiny or security is threatened, and we have been officially warned to set aside hatred and rancor. It would seem as if these premises pointed to some psychology of appeal unlike the time-honored one. But the implication of this writer is indicated in his sigh for a Zeppelin or for German submarines at our coast. Wait, he seemed to say, until our men get into battle, and the casualty lists come in. Then fear and hate will awake and we may expect "enthusiasm" for war. One expects this line of argument from confirmed pacifists when they set forth the evils of war, but when it comes from a journal devoted to the war cause it shows how serious may be the consequences of a wrong reading of popular psychology. For if fear and hate are the things which are to be chiefly aroused, is there not a probability that, with our historic commitments, they will turn against war itself rather than against Germany?

There is a saturation point for all human emotions. All the warring nations manifest war weariness. To some extent this is because it is impossible to keep year after year the emotions at the pitch to which they rose at first. And we who have shared in the war only vicariously, only through reading, have gone through a like satiation. The earlier days, the days of Liége, Louvain, the Lusitania, the days when hope and dread trembled in suspense, cannot be relived. Along with this repleteness of feeling goes political skepticism. Although capable of great ruthlessness in action, we are lenient and amiable in our judgments. Very large numbers of our citizens, including those of strong pro-Allies feeling, have systematically taught themselves to discount all the more violent appeals to passion. The resulting skepticism extends to pretty much the entire apparatus of traditional slogans. The once burning catchwords of honor and glory, prestige and power, fall coldly on the ear. To be actively stirred by these ideals at the same time that one has been taught to believe that Germany's surrender to them is responsible for the world tragedy is not a congenial or natural attitude. To create a war motivation by resort to "patriotic" appeal when large numbers of people are convinced that nationalistic patriotism was chiefly responsible for the outbreak of war is to operate against the tide of events and almost to invite failure. Burnt-out ashes cannot be made to glow, no matter how fervid the appeal.

If one asks for the alternative motivation, analysis of the motives which have been operative up to the present time seems to give the answer. There is the sense of a job to be undertaken in a businesslike way, and there is a vague but genuine vision of a world somehow made permanently different by our participation in a task which taken by itself is intensely disliked. There comes to mind the picture of the young men who responded to the call for officers in training. There was no hip-hurrah, no illusions of glory and grandeur, no enthusiasm if enthusiasm means excitement and intoxication of motive, no hatred, no desire for revenge. Conventional heroics and self-hypnotism stirred by crowd-hypnotism were replaced by a serious earnestness, whose chief trait was the sense of a job to be done, a hard job, but one which had to be done so that it could be done with. Such a motivation lacks the glamor and impetuous rush of traditional war psychology. By way of compensation it is infinitely more potential for intelligence, and it is in line with our habitual national psychology—the psychology of a businesslike people.

So conventional are our views, however, that there is little perception of its availability and efficacy for intense and collective motivation. The American people has inherited the romantic European tradition, according to which the businesswise disposition is merely a sign of a mercenary and dollar-chasing mentality. Consequently we disguise its hold over us. If we recognized the feudal, land-lordly and predatory bias back of the tradition we should perceive that a businesslike psychology is one of intelligent perception of ends to be accomplished and effective selection and orderly arrangement of means for their execution. And our national intelligence is as shrewd and quick in this direction as it is slow and insensitive in esthetic perceptions or in sustained hatreds.

Any one who cares to observe the type of war interest which exists all around him instead of feeding his eyes with his hopes and fears may note how largely it is an interest in specific results and in the technology of their accomplishment. This is, indeed, a novel psychosis for war, so unheard of that it will require sincerity of insight to trust it, to appeal to it. But any other course involves a dangerous under-estimation of the political education undergone by the American people during the past years and of the average level of political intelligence. We are in a peculiar situation. There is dense ignorance of European conditions, histories and policies; but there is a lively and fairly accurate sense of the drift of events and of the type of results to be attained. To inform this sense with knowledge, to translate the anticipation of what is desired into a workable program of measures, to take the American people into confidence with respect to what has to be done and the ways of doing it is a method strangely remote from bellicose heroics, but one likely to prove strangely effective.

This sense of a job to be accomplished cannot be segregated from an underlying national idealism. Here, too, history is prophetic. What various leagues and societies totally failed to accomplish in the way of stirring up the American people when they appealed to fear, hatred and revenge, when they emphatically harped on rights and honor, that President Wilson effected when he addressed himself to the American desire for stable peace and an established amity of peoples through comity of democratic nations. A task has to be accomplished to abate an international nuisance, but in the accomplishing there is the prospect of a world organization and the beginnings of a public control which crosses nationalistic boundaries and interests. It is not, in my opinion, fair to say that these aims are as yet immediate actualities; too much remains to be done. But it is ridiculous to say that they are mere idealistic glosses, sugar-coatings of the bitter pill of war. They present genuine possibilities, objects of a fair adventure. And almost any day the shifting course of events may give them an engrossing actuality. If that day comes, the fervor of the crusader in behalf of the heart's desire will add itself to interest in a workmanlike performance in behalf of a necessary task. Meantime the course of those interested in securing the necessary motivation for war is to keep the ways open and clear for the coming of this reinforcing and consummating impetus.

3. CONSCRIPTION OF THOUGHT[1]

Social psychologists, notably Mr. Trotter in his account of herd psychology, have described the peculiar mental effect of war upon the civilian population. Vague unlocalized anxiety and fear; dread of isolation, and desire for company to reinforce confidence and opinion; quick and easy accessibility to rumor, indeed, an eager hospitality to it; extreme credulity as to both good news and bad; a suspicious attitude which finds spies and enemies everywhere; scandalmongering of pessimistic inventions as to incompetency in high places and disloyalty in all places—these are some of the observed facts of mass-psychology in times of great emotional stir when the issue hangs in abeyance. There is no need to reduce the variety of manifestations to any single principle. But running through them all is a demand for solidarity in order to prosecute war, combined with an emotional instability in the face of the shifting panorama of success and failure, an instability which is continually eating into solidarity.

We have not suffered as yet in this country from a bad attack of war nerves; the scene is too remote. On a small scale, however, practically all of the phenomena of Europe in the first year of the war have been duplicated. The most striking effect up to the present has been a morbid sensitiveness at any exhibition of diversity of opinion. One of the accompaniments of abnormal emotional states is likely to be an extraordinary sense of mental lucidity. The more irrational the condition, the greater the attendant sense of self-possessed rationality. So it is with us at present. Our reactions to dissent and criticism are mainly reactions of irritation, due to the hypersensitiveness of nerves on edge. But we justify our attacks and suppressions on the rational ground that social cohesion is a necessity, and that we are simply taking measures to secure union. That this rationalization is a piece of self-inflicted camouflage appears as soon as we call to mind the lessons of experience regarding the inefficiency of all prior attempts to dragoon thought and feeling.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Sept. 1, 1917.

I am not questioning the importance of social solidarity, of union of action, in war times. As with the soldier, so with the civil populations there is demand for closed ranks, for mass formations, for lining up with eyes right, and forward by platoons. Some surrenders and abandonments of the liberties of peace time are inevitable. Men pay more for flour and beefsteak whether they like it or not; and at countless social points they have to ask themselves whether they will make a sacrifice willingly from sense of union with their fellows, or sourly, peevishly, disgruntedly, in a sense of superior isolation. Moreover, the needed cohesion in action is best attained along with intellectual and emotional unity. Without a certain sweep of undivided beliefs and sentiments unity of outer action is likely to be mechanical and simulated. But what is denied is the efficacy of force to remove disunion of thought and feeling.

There is something strange in the history of toleration. Almost all men have learned the lesson of toleration with respect to past heresies and divisions. We wonder how men ever grew so hard and cruel about differences of opinion and faith. We are perplexed when we read how the heretic was regarded as a man with a plague which would surely spread unless he, the heretic, was extirpated. We reason with philosophic wisdom about the impossibility of conquering mind by brute force, of changing ideas by means of the truncheon or the nightstick. We recall that such attempts at direct suppression of thought have usually ended by increasing the vitality of obnoxious beliefs; we quote the saying that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church. We are surprised that leaders had not enough common sense to allow unpopular ideas to burn themselves out or die of inanition. But when some affair of our own day demands cohesive action and stirs deep feeling, we at once dignify the unpopular cause with persecution; we feed its flame with our excited suspicions; we make it the center of a factitious attention, and lend it importance by the conspicuousness of our efforts at suppression.

There is probably no one in the country who was not aware that many persons among us were pro-German in their sympathies; that there were others who were opposed to all war, and yet others with whom this war was unpopular, and others who centered their hostility upon the policy of conscription. These are facts well known to every one. There is no evidence that their influence is great enough to hamper success in carrying on the war. There is the regular machinery of law, somewhat sharpened in any case by recourse to the "war-power," for taking care of those whose lack of intellectual and emotional sympathy carries them into any overt attack upon law or the government. It is not judgment, it is uneasy emotion troubled by its own lack of direct outlet in action, which clothes simple facts with dreadful and hidden import, which finds latent treason in German type, and power to paralyze the military arm in a conference of Greenwich Village pacifists or socialists. Then comes the resort to the "secular arm," to the machinery of administrative action, to the pressure of organized public agitation. And these for us operate not to persuade the dissentients, but to gag them; not to develop union, but to force disunion out of sight where it will breed and fester; not to render division innocuous by humor and polite indifference, but to manufacture importance and create significance. It is of course a proper part of the technique of those at whom the attempted conscription of mind is directed to profess a shocked horror, a resentful surprise. But unless they are as lacking in sense as those who have zeal without knowledge, they must utter their protestations with their tongues in their cheeks, and pray God daily that their enemies will again come to their rescue and scatter abroad their propaganda as left to themselves they could never succeed in doing.

I am not, then, specially concerned lest liberty of thought and speech seriously suffer among us, certainly not in any lasting way. The fight was carried on against so much greater odds in the past and still made its way, so that I cannot arouse any genuine distress on this score. Indeed, there is something rather funny in the spectacle of ultra-socialists rallying to the old banner of Elihu Root with its inscription of the sanctity of individual rights and constitutional guaranties, and crying aloud all the early Victorian political platitudes. What I am concerned with is rather the historically demonstrated inefficacy of the conscription of mind as a means of promoting social solidarity, and the gratuitous stupidity of measures that defeat their own ends. Yet there is a way in which these things do undermine freedom of thought:—not the freedom of those who are attacked, but of those who do the attacking or who sympathize, even passively, with the attack. Absence of thought, apathy of intelligence, is the chief enemy to freedom of mind. And these hasty ill considered attempts to repress discussion of unpopular ideas and criticisms of governmental action foster general intellectual inertness. The sensation of activity caused by excited emotion gives an illusion of mental acuteness and alertness; the energy required for serious thinking is drafted off in superficial channels of suspicion and hostility.

Now our American effective participation in the war is much more likely to be hampered by lack of those ideas which can spring only from discussion, only from spread of knowledge and enlightenment of belief, than by indulgence of small groups and cults in free display of their sacred party emblems and religious passwords, no matter how obnoxious the latter are to the great majority. For the ultimate American participation should consist not in money nor in men, but in the final determination of peace policies which is made possible by the contribution of men and money. There is a tendency to extend the wished-for conscription of ideas from out and out "stop-the-war" discussions, to all those who desire a general discussion of American war aims and peace policies. There is evident fear lest such discussion divert energy from the immediate task of carrying on war vigorously;—as though those who are not actually fighting would spend all their working hours in paying income taxes and economizing on food if they only refrained from thinking and talking about America's real interest in the war and how that interest is to be defined and made effective in detail. Here, I repeat, is the real danger in that policy of "Hush, don't think, only feel and act" to which every forward step in the conscription of thought commits us. There is not a tithe of the danger to our effective participation in the war from those who think wildly and erratically that there is from those who do not think enough. Even if the President is prepared to come forward at the right time with the wisest of all possible peace measures, we shall have missed the greatest contribution which the war has to make to our future national integrity, if these measures come before a people intellectually unprepared and apathetic. We shall then have the physical fact of peace whatever it may be, but not its meaning. We shall have taken a step forward in overcoming a physical and territorial isolation from the world, but shall remain as provincially separate as before in thought and interest. Above all we shall have missed the great experience of discovering the significance of American national life by seeing it reflected into a remaking of the life of the world. And without this experience we shall miss the contribution which the war has to make to the creation of a united America.

4. IN EXPLANATION OF OUR LAPSE[1]

In the presence of accomplished events, what I wrote a few weeks ago on the conscription of mind is strangely remote and pallid. The increase of intolerance of discussion to the point of religious bigotry has been so rapid that years might have passed. In the face of such intense and violent reactions as now prevail, commendation of sanity is no more audible than is any other still small voice of reason amid howling gales of passion. With treason and sedition there can be, there should be, no parley. And it would be impossible to put the popular notion of what constitutes treason and sedition better than it has been put by a distinguished academic authority in saying that with the entrance of the United States into the war what had before been wrongheadedness became sedition and what had been folly became treason. When summary rhetoric displaces the decisions of the courts, when such an utterance is enthusiastically cited in justification of the abrupt dismissal of college teachers, it is idle to appeal to reason. We shall not tolerate treason; and if you wish to know what is treason, the answer is as definite as it is uproarious: Treason is every opinion and belief which irritates the majority of loyal citizens. For the time being the conservative upholders of the constitution are on the side of moral mob rule and psychological lynch law. In such an atmosphere a sober effort to locate the real abode of folly and wrongheadedness would itself appear treasonable.

The appeal is no longer to reason; it is to the event. What the event will be is certain in the light of historic fact. Everywhere, even among peoples not so habituated to free criticism and free talk as is the American, the attempt to meet opinion with a club and belief with a bludgeon has defeated itself.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Nov. 3, 1917.

The only open questions are as to the time of the reaction and the direction it will take. One may hope that the suddenness of the onset bespeaks an equally quick recovery, although one deprecates the expectation that it will be as violent. Unless a halt is called, it is altogether likely that the great silent unperturbed mass of America, which believes in the war and which has confidence in the righteousness of the cause and in the force of the American people to work its will in an orderly way, will be provoked to sudden wrath in favor of fair play. As I write it is not settled whether the official in Washington who is clothed with a power Michaelis must envy will deny the mails to the *Call* and the *Vorwaerts*. If he does, it is possible the act will mark a turning point. If the act should not elect Hillquit as Mayor of the City of New York, it would come so near to doing so that, as the saying goes, there would be no fun in it.

Since some such event, rather than what philosophers have called rational discourse, is now the decisive factor, it seems better to inquire into the cause of our sudden lapse than to combat it with idle words. We are told both by pacifists and inflamed patriots—who have so much in common in their mode of thought—that no explanation is required; that the phenomenon is an inevitable accompaniment of war psychology. I doubt it. By all reports, we have gone further in the path of bigotry in a few months than England went in years. France was too busy and too serious to indulge itself similarly. We have to go to Germany to find an out and out parallel, as we should have to go to German professordom to find an adequate analogue to the behavior of some members of an American university faculty of applied science—action which would persuade even a pragmatist of the difference between pure and applied science. And Germany, as we have well learned, exhibited its angry intolerance because of special causes, especially because of its regimented docility and because it was deceived as to the facts. No, we cannot accept this lazy explanation by war psychology. To discover the special causes invites curiosity; the actual discovery might contribute something to a sound recovery.

The first explanation which suggests itself does not, in my judgment, take us very far. To some extent and in some instances, loyalty has been solicited into the paths of a passionate bigotry as a means to the accomplishment of private ends, whether satisfaction of a long cherished grudge or achievement of some immediate victory in the long drawn out economic struggle. There are doubtless some who have the will to exploit the circumstances of war in this fashion. But success depends upon the presence of other less deliberate, more spontaneous and widespread factors.

Among these latter I should place first, doubt as to the depth of our own national unity. Much of the violence of current intolerance is unconscious testimony to a suspicion that the diverse ingredients of our population are not, after all, so integrated as we desire. There was so much unwise talk about hyphenatedism before the war, unpatriotic militarists permitted themselves such unbridled denunciation of our immigrant population, that a subtle uneasiness was created. We have had sufficient evidence of German intrigue and unfaith to demand general alertness against those efforts at disunion and division which are genuinely, that is to say legally, treasonable. But various would-be leaders and noisy leagues are not morally innocent of promoting disunion through the distrust which they have sown of all who have dared to differ from them in matters of policy.

An atmosphere of undefined suspicion and doubt is just the one which most readily calls out intolerance. And this intolerance creates by its methods an uncertainty which did not before exist. Considering our remoteness from Europe, our historic isolation and our heterogeneity of population, it is a fair guess that future history will be amazed at the certainty and unity of our national conduct. Let us hope it will not also be called upon to state that the serious blemish in the record comes from the divisive action of those who generated discord in their excited readiness to detect and denounce it where previously there had existed only a difference of opinion to be met with argument. In particular, if it turns out that the immigrant population from Russia which might, because of the Russian revolution, have been won to ardent support of our American war policy has been alienated from its support by substitution of an unsympathetic moral coercion for a sympathetic appeal to argument, a heavy responsibility will lie at the door of the present bigots of patriotism.

The other explanation is more creditable to us, and augurs better for a wholesome as well as a speedy recovery. We are unused to the ways of war, and like every eager and energetic beginner we are pressing our stroke. In many ways we have been tumbling all over ourselves and getting in our own way since war was declared. The exhibition, even if awkward, is not altogether unlovely. The amusement aroused by the display is tinctured with affection as for all the riotous gambolings of youth. It is not to our discredit that we were unfamiliar with the ways and usages of war, and that we were incapable of displaying, for example, the ordered decency of the French who have lived for decades in the sobering presence of a national danger. Getting into the war really upset our equilibrium for the time, not because we were opposed to the war, but because of our desire to make not only a good job of it but also a speedy and extensive one. To do everything and to do it all at once, with the biggest war loans, the most airplanes and so on, has been our desire.

And I believe—though it may be my hope is the source of my belief—that some of our intolerance at diversity of opinion and our willingness to suppress the civil liberties of democracy in the name of loyalty to democracy is merely a part of our haste to get into the war effectively, a part of the rush of mobilization, which, thank heaven, had to be improvised because of our historic and established unmilitarism. So far as such is the case, positive achievement will restore sanity because it will mean attainment of maturity and of the self-confidence and orderly discipline that mark the passage of youth into maturity. Meantime it behooves liberals who believe in the war to be more aggressive than they have been in their opposition to those reactionaries who also believe in war—and who believe that loud denunciation of treason on sight is the best way to regain a political prestige of hate badly discredited. Let the liberal who for expediency's sake would passively tolerate invasions of free speech and action, take counsel lest he be also preparing the way for a later victory of domestic Toryism.

5. CONSCIENCE AND COMPULSION[1]

Those in contact with youth know that a considerable number have undergone a serious moral strain in the weeks since war was declared by the United States. Much larger numbers have had to make a moral adjustment which if not involving a tragedy of the inner life has been effected only with some awkward trampling of what has been cherished as the finer flowers of the soul. And how could it have been otherwise? I doubt if any propaganda has ever been carried on with greater persistence or with greater success—so far as affecting feelings was concerned—than that for peace during the decade prior to 1914. The times were so ripe that the movement hardly had to be pushed. Our remoteness from the immediate scene of international hatreds, the bad aftertaste from the Spanish-American War, the contentment generated by successful industrialism, the general humanitarianism of which political progressivism was as much a symptom as social settlements, the gradual substitution of calculating rationalism for the older romantic patriotism—all of these things and many more fell in with that general spirit of goodwill which is essential America, to create a sense of war as the supreme stupidity. War came. But there persisted the feeling that it was "over there" and that we at peace were the preservers of sanity in a world gone mad. Some of the phrases used in this sense by President Wilson gave great offense to our present allies, but they were the phrases which best expressed the average American feeling.

At last we were in it ourselves. And is it strange that thousands of young people who had taken the peace movement with moral seriousness found themselves upset? Already an attempt is being made to befog the past. It is intimated that our ante-bellum pacifism was a compound of sentimentality, cowardice and a degenerate materialism bred of excessive comfort. Nothing could be further from the truth. Current pacifism was identified with good business, philanthropy, morality and religion. Combine Mr. Carnegie and Mr. Bryan and you have as near the typical American as you are likely to find. Especially is it true that the churches took up the cause of peace as a great moral issue. Clergymen obliged to shun political issues because they were so closely linked with struggle for economic power gladly added peace to divorce and temperance as subjects which were safe and also "live." The American habit of discussing political questions in a moral vocabulary found full scope with peace and war. In our colleges the Y.M.C.A.'s were even more ardent promoters of peace sentiments than were intercollegiate socialist clubs.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* July 14, 1917.

We are not an over-agile people morally. No one has yet depicted the immense moral wrench involved in our passage from friendly neutrality to participation in war. I hardly believe the turnover could have been accomplished under a leadership less skilful than that of President Wilson, so far as he succeeded in creating the belief that just because the pacific moral impulse retained all its validity Germany must be defeated in order that it find full fruition. That was a bridge on which many a conscience crossed with no greater dexterity in balancing than conscience frequently finds necessary. But there were many who still had doubts, qualms, clouds of bewilderment. How could wrong so suddenly become right? Among the questioners were many whom we are wont to term idealistic, men and women who have the most difficulty in identifying the conventional and the popular with the right and good. And it is among these that there was enacted a genuine tragedy when the impulse to loyalty, to service, to unity came into conflict with their moral abhorrence of war, which they had learned to look upon as murder, and murder of a peculiarly stupid sort. Conscription did not originate the crisis in moral experience, but it brought it acutely to a focus.

I can but think that such young people deserve something better than accusations, varying from pro-Germanism and the crime of Socialism to traitorous disloyalty, which the newspapers so readily "hurl" at them—to borrow their own language. Nor does it quite cover the ground to urge that genuinely conscientious objectors be given that work, when they are drafted, which will put the least heavy load possible upon their consciences. The country ought to be great enough in spirit as it is great enough in men and in the variety of tasks to be performed to make this a matter of course. But it is to be feared that if local tribunals take their cue from current newspaper objurgations they will regard it as their duty to punish the objectors as dangerous malefactors instead of asking to what tasks they may most usefully be assigned. It is not, however, the problem of practical administration that I raise, but the nature of the moral education which has been revealed in our American aversion to war and in the ways in which persons perplexed by the coercions of wartime have met their dilemmas. For at the very worst most of these young people appear to me victims of a moral innocency and an inexpertness which have been engendered by the moral training which they have undergone.

It is perhaps a penalty which we have paid for our unusual development of good nature and good-will that our moral training emphasizes the emotions rather than intelligence, ideals rather than specific purposes, the nurture of personal motives rather than the creation of social agencies and environments. The tendency to dispose of war by bringing it under the commandment against murder, the belief that by *not* doing something, by keeping out of a declaration of war, our responsibilities could be met, a somewhat mushy belief in the existence of disembodied moral forces which require only an atmosphere of feelings to operate so as to bring about what is right, the denial of the efficacy of force, no matter how controlled, to modify disposition; in short, the inveterate habit of separating ends from means and then identifying morals with ends thus emasculated, such things as these are the source of much of the perplexity of conscience from which idealistic youth has suffered. The evangelical Protestant tradition has fostered the tendency to locate morals in personal feelings instead of in the control of social situations, and our legal tradition has bred the habit of attaching feelings to fixed rules and injunctions instead of to social conditions and consequences of action as these are revealed to the scrutiny of intelligence.

I am not concerned to argue that a different method of dealing with moral issues, a more social and less personal and evangelical method, would have brought all our perplexed idealists to decide that our share in the war is righteous and conscription a necessary part of the means of making our share effective. But I do know that it would result in giving weight to considerations of an order now mostly neglected, and would have taken the problem out of the emotional urgencies and inhibitions of inner consciousness into the light of objective facts. I may perhaps indicate the nature of the change by a quotation that I recently ran across: "In the past ten thousand saints working with their hands could not make as many enameled bricks as two sinners working with present machinery can now turn out." The comparison of hands with personal virtues and of physical machinery for making bricks with social mechanisms for sustaining peace presents itself, I hope, without elaboration from me. It is, however, too favorable to the efficacy of merely personal morality in a situation like the present; for hands are physical machinery—forces, as far as they go; while personal good feeling even of the most ardent kind toward the wounded, dying and starving of Europe begins and ends in itself. The more one loves peace (of course I do not mean by peace the mere absence of military war) the more one is bound to ask himself how the machinery, the specific, concrete social arrangements, exactly comparable to physical engineering devices, for maintaining peace, are to be brought about. Conscience proceeding on this basis would operate very differently from that whose main concern is to maintain itself unspotted within, or from that whose search is for a fixed antecedent rule of justification. One of my most depressing experiences in connection with this matter was the number of young men who when war was actually declared merely clumsily rolled their conscience out from under the imperative of "Thou shalt not kill" till it settled under the imperative of "Obey the law," although they still saw the situation exactly as they had seen it before.

One pities suffering, and the suffering of a perplexed and resentful overridden conscience is really suffering. One pities victims. But the fact that the merely good, the merely conscientious, are the victims in every social crisis should lead us to inquire whether they are not the victims of moral futility. If at a critical juncture the moving force of events is always too much for conscience, the remedy is not to deplore the wickedness of those who manipulate events. Such a conscience is largely self-conceit. The remedy is to connect conscience with the forces that are moving in another direction. Then will conscience itself have compulsive power instead of being forever the martyred and the coerced.

6. THE FUTURE OF PACIFISM[1]

There is no paradox in the fact that the American people is profoundly pacifist and yet highly impatient of the present activities of many professed or professional pacifists. The disposition to call the latter pro-German and to move for their suppression is an easy way of expressing a sense of the untimely character of their moves at the present juncture. But the war will pass, and the future of the profound American desire for peace, for amity, for unhampered and prosperous intercourse, is a topic which is intimately connected with the war itself. For upon its constant consideration depends whether the impulse to a better ordered world which reconciled America to war shall find satisfaction or meet frustration. And I know no better way to introduce the subject than a consideration of the failure of the pacifist propaganda to determine finally the course of a nation which was converted to pacifism in advance.

The explanation, I take it, is that it takes two to make peace as well as to make war; or, as the present situation abundantly testifies, a much larger number than two. He was a poor judge of politics who did not know from the very day of the Lusitania message—or at all events from that of the Sussex message—that the entrance of the United States into the war depended upon the action of Germany. Any other notion was totally inconsistent with any belief in President Wilson's sincerity; it imputed to him an almost inconceivable levity in a time when seriousness was the chief need. Those who voted for him for President on the ground that he "kept us out of war" and who felt aggrieved when we got into war have only themselves to blame. He had unmistakably plotted a line which led inevitably to conflict with Germany in case the latter should take the course which she finally adopted.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* July 28, 1917.

This indictment of professional pacifism for futile gesturing may seem to rest upon acceptance of the belief in the political omnipotence of the executive; it may seem to imply the belief that his original step committed the nation irretrievably. Such an inference, however, is merely formal. It overlooks the material fact that President Wilson's action had the sanction of the country. I will not enter into the question of legal neutrality, but morally neutral the country never was, and probably the only stupid thing President Wilson did was to suppose, in his early proclamation, that it could be. And this brings us back to the basic fact that in a world organized for war there are as yet no political mechanisms which enable a nation with warm sympathies to make them effective, save through military participation. It is again, an instinctive perception of this fact which encourages the idea that pacifists who do not support the war must be pro-German at heart.

The best statement which I have seen made of the pacifist position since we entered the war is that of Miss Addams. She earnestly protests against the idea that the pacifist position was negative or *laissez-faire*. She holds that the popular impression that pacifism meant abstinence and just keeping out of trouble is wrong; that it stood for a positive international polity in which this country should be the leader of the nations of the world "into a wider life of coördinated activity"; she insists that the growth of nations under modern conditions involves of necessity international complications which admit "of adequate treatment only through an international agency not yet created." In short, the pacifists "urge upon the United States not indifference to moral issues and to the fate of liberty and democracy, but a strenuous endeavor to lead all nations of the earth into an organized international life."

That intelligent pacifism stands for this end, and that the more intelligent among the pacifists, like Miss Addams, saw the situation in this fashion need not be doubted. But as Miss Addams recognized in the same address there are many types of pacifists. I question whether any one who followed the pacifist literature which appeared in the year or two before we got into the war derived from it the conception that the dominant ideal was that ascribed to pacifism by Miss Addams, namely, that the United States should play a "vitally energetic rôle" in a political reorganization of the world. But even if this had been the universal idea of what was theoretically desirable, the force of circumstances forbade pacifists who drew back at war as a means of bringing about this rôle, from pressing it.

The pacifist literature of the months preceding our entrance into war was opportunistic—breathlessly, frantically so. It did not deal in the higher strategy of international politics, but in immediate day-by-day tactics for staving off the war. Because the professional pacifists were committed to the idea that anything was better than our getting into the war, their interest in general international reorganization had no chance for expression. They were in the dilemma of trying to accomplish what only definite political agencies could effect, while admitting these agencies had not been created. Thus they were pushed out of the generic position of work for the development of such agencies into the very elementary attitude that if no nation ever allowed itself to be drawn into war, no matter how great the provocation, wars would cease to be. Hence the continuous recourse to concessions and schemes, devised *ad hoc* over night, to meet each changing aspect of the diplomatic situation so as to ward off war. The logic seems sound. But the method is one of treating symptoms and ignoring the disease. At the best, such a method is likely to remain some distance behind newly appearing symptoms, and in a critical disease the time is bound to come (as events demonstrated in our case) when the disease gets so identified with the symptoms that nothing can be done. All this seems to concern the past of pacifism rather than its future. But it indicates, by elimination, what that future must be if it is to be a prosperous one. It lies in furthering whatever will bring into existence those new agencies of international control whose absence has made the efforts of pacifists idle gestures in the air. Its more immediate future lies in seeing to it that the war itself is turned to account as a means for bringing these agencies into being. To go on protesting against war in general and this war in particular, to direct effort to stopping the war rather than to determining the terms upon which it shall be stopped, is to repeat the earlier tactics after their ineffectualness has been revealed. Failure to recognize the immense impetus to reorganization afforded by this war; failure to recognize the closeness and extent of true international combinations which it necessitates, is a stupidity equaled only by the militarist's conception of war as a noble blessing in disguise.

I have little patience with those who are so anxious to save their influence for some important crisis that they never risk its use in any present emergency. But I can but feel that the pacifists wasted rather than invested their potentialities when they turned so vigorously to opposing entrance into a war which was already all but universal, instead of using their energies to form, at a plastic juncture, the conditions and objects of our entrance. How far this wasted power is recoverable it is hard to say. Certainly an added responsibility is put upon those who still think of themselves as fundamentally pacifists in spite of the fact that they believed our entrance into the war a needed thing. For the only way in which they can justify their position is by using their force to help make the war, so far as this country can influence its final outcome, a factor in realizing the ideals which President Wilson expressed for the American people before and just upon entering the war. All such pacifists—and they comprise in my opinion the great mass of the American people—must see to it that these ideals are forced upon our allies, however unwilling they may be, rather than covered up by the débris of war. If the genuine pacifism of our country, a pacifism interested in permanent results rather than in momentary methods, had had leadership, it is not likely that we should have entered without obtaining in advance some stipulations. As it is, we (so far, at least, as any one knows) romantically abstained from any bargaining and thereby made our future task more difficult.

Not that the difficulty is all abroad. We have plenty of Bourbons and Bureaucrats in international diplomacy at home, and war undoubtedly strengthens their position by making them appear the genuine representatives of our war motives and policies. Their attitude is well expressed in the fact that since their imagination is confined to the flat map, their intellectual preparation for the post-bellum scene consists in redrawing the future map of Europe and the world—a form of indoor sport which even the literary men of England have now well nigh abandoned. Thus the present task of the constructive pacifist is to call attention away from the catchwords which so easily in wartime become the substitute for both facts and ideas back to realities. In view, for example, of the unjustified invasion of Serbia and Belgium, the rights of small nationalities tend to become an end in itself, a means to which is the "crushing" of Germany. The principle of nationality on its cultural side must indeed receive ample satisfaction in the terms of war settlement unless fuel for future conflagrations is to be stored up. But to get no further than setting up more small isolated nationalities on the map is almost wilfully to provoke future wars. If the day for isolated national sovereignty in the case of large nations has been rendered an anachronism by the new industry and commerce, much more is that the case for small political units. The case of Ireland, the clutter of nationalities in southeastern Europe, the fact that all the smaller neutral nations are now leading a distressed existence as appanages of the warring Powers, show how much more important questions of food supply, of coal and iron, of lines of railway and ship-transportation are for the making and ordering of states than the principle of isolated nationality, big or small. Germany was realistically inclined in its belief that the day of the small nation—in its traditional sense—had passed. Its tragic error lay in that egotism which forbade its seeing that the day of the big isolated nation had also passed.

So one might, I think, go over, one by one, the phrases which are now urged to the front as defining the objects of war as the terms of peace and show that the interests of pacifism are bound up with securing the organs by which economic energies shall be articulated. We have an inherited political system which sits like a straitjacket on them since they came into being after the political system took on shape. These forces cannot be suppressed. They are the moving, the controlling, forces of the modern world. The question of peace or war is whether they are to continue to work furtively, blindly, and by those tricks of manipulation which have constituted the game of international diplomacy, or whether they are to be frankly recognized and the political system accommodated to them. The war does not guarantee the latter result. It gives an immense opportunity for it, an opportunity which justifies the risk. Military men continue to think within the lines laid down in the seventeenth century, in the days when modern "sovereign" nations were formed. Statesmen, guided by historians and that political science which has elevated the historic facts of temporary formations into an abstract and absolute science, work on the same model. As a result, too many influential personages are pure romanticists. They are expressing ideals which no longer have anything to do with the facts. This stereotyped political romanticism gives the pacifists their chance for revenge. Their idealism has but to undergo a course in the severe realism of those economic forces which are actually shaping the associations and organizations of men, and the future is with them.

7. THE CULT OF IRRATIONALITY[1]

Neither the existence nor the positive value of the irrational in man is to be glossed over. All the instincts, impulses and emotions which push man into action outside the treadmill of use and wont are irrational. The depths, the mysteries, of nature are non-rational. The business of reason is not to extinguish the fires which keep the cauldron of vitality seething, nor yet to supply the ingredients which are in vital stir. Its task is to see that they boil to some purpose. To this end, there must be proportion in the ingredients and a certain regulation of the temperature.

It is not surprising nor yet of itself regrettable that the non-rational in human nature is particularly in evidence in wartime. All emotion bears witness to departure from the habitual, to the presence of an emergency or crisis. And in such a vast crisis as war there is something wholesome in the popular feeling which regards marked absence of indignation, and an excessive exhibition of balanced judgment, as signs of apathy as to the ends of the war.

Under circumstances when all the reserves of power have to be maintained in full action, there is something suspicious in a manifestation of pure rationality. To be stirred is evidence that one is a participant; to be wholly and conspicuously reasonable is evidence that one is an onlooker, a spectator. Many will remember how resentful European peoples in the war were when Americans before we entered into it referred to the insanity which had seized Europe. Many Americans now find it impossible to recover their own former attitude in this respect, an attitude even of many who were always pro-Ally in their sympathies. War which once seemed an insanity now seems natural, righteous and reasonable altogether. That which once seemed a disaster now seems a beneficence. The difference is the normal difference between the one who looks on from without and the one who shares from within.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Nov. 9, 1918.

It is not the rise of the irrational as such, accordingly, that must give pause to those who would use intelligence as a director of instinct and passion. It is the deliberate cultivation of the irrational. For the cult is not spontaneous and natural; it is intentional and purposeful. It is ulterior, full of design. It raises questions: What design is behind it? Whose interests are concerned in the careful and systematic working up of the irrational? Who is taking advantage of a natural and wholesome stir of feeling to intensify it abnormally till men see only red, and to deflect it till rational criticism of what is politically and economically obnoxious can be represented as lack of patriotic interest in the war? It is the business of deliberate thought to direct the play of emotion to an end. There are many ends, and the value of the deliberate cultivation of emotions depends upon what ends are held. Is irrationality in the mass cultivated by a few in order that the attention of the many may be diverted from something which would otherwise arouse intelligent opposition? Is it being worked up to a boiling point in order that certain securities and guaranties which are hostile to the wishes of an influential class may be overridden, and that when the proper time comes certain schemes, rendered invisible by the prevailing excitement, may be put over? Not the irrational itself, but the systematic cult of it, is, let it be repeated, the sinister thing.

Everybody who has watched the course of events knows that the deepest impulses and emotions of Americans as a body were enlisted in whole-hearted support of the war because of the end which was presented to them. They bore in imperturbed silence the earlier shrill cries of those who would arouse their emotions for the sake of war itself, for revenge and hatred. When they saw before them their own end, a world organized for the possibility of amicable intercourse, because organized on a democratic basis, the whole preciously restrained flood of impulse was let loose. But one has only to observe the present cultivated propaganda of the irrational to discover that an insidious and skilled effort is being made to detach the volume of passionate energy from its original end and to turn the emotion itself from a means into an end.

The spread of the war emotions unfortunately lends itself too readily to such manipulation. As they swell, they tend to blot from view, save in the more thoughtful, the ends for which they came into play and which justify their intense eagerness. The leaders of the cult of the irrational then strive to alter the emotions into those of fear, suspicion and hatred, knowing well—even if they have never thought of it—that when these feelings are excited they will attach themselves to lower ends, ends which better serve the purposes of those who instigate the cult.

A few months ago the average American needed no one to tell him that we had to win the war, and he needed no one to tell him what winning the war meant. President Wilson had voiced his aim and intent, however inarticulate they had been previously. To win the war was to bring about the state of things which should make any similar war impossible in the future, and this state of things meant the destruction or reduction to impotency of arbitrary and secret agencies of governments pursuing aims contrary to the interests of the common man wherever he lived all over the world. Military defeat and military victory were parts of this end just in so far as they should prove to be parts of it—that is, indispensable conditions of its attainment.

Neither sentimentality on our own part nor smooth trickery on the enemies' part were to stand in the way. But the cult of the irrational has striven to persuade us that a military defeat of Germany had only to be complete enough to be of itself a winning of the war irrespective of any further consequences. It has also taught that only a thoroughgoing and absolute military defeat could be a winning of the war irrespective of all other changes in the constitution and disposition of our foes.

Why? What is the hidden purpose? The answer is that powers which never for a moment heartily subscribed to President Wilson's war and peace aims, but which realized the impossibility of a frontal attack, powers which either distrusted democracy or realized what its victory meant for their own class interests, set a flanking movement under way. They have pulled every wire to create a belief that those who regard winning the war as equivalent to winning the objects of the war are defeatists if not actual sympathizers with Germany. They deprecate as presumption and egotism every effort to put forward as a reality the American ideals in the war. They intimate that such conduct shows lack of recognition of the sacrifices made by our Allies and lack of confidence in them. And by our Allies they here mean not the mass of the people who are themselves animated by democratic hopes, but those elements in the governments which have shown themselves as most nearly imperialistic and unreconstructed.

It is easy to foresee the time when the authors of the present cult will come forward with frank disparagement of the League of Nations, and will propose for the prevention of future wars as a substitute a more assiduous devotion to those principles of exclusive and militant nationalism of which Prussia has been the efficient exemplar. The subtle hidden propaganda to this end is already creeping into the open, and it requires no prescience to see that with the imminence of the Peace Conference it will no longer take the trouble to disguise itself.

But the cult has another end which will never be avowed. It is the source of the present endeavor to use the war emotions to bring about a suppression of discussion and criticism, which would make objects of suspicion of all who still think and speak honestly even when their thoughts run counter to the immediate passion of the day.

We remember the zeal and emphasis of those conservative critics of democracy who before the war loudly proclaimed the need of checks and guaranties against the will of the populace. It is a commentary on their sincerity that not a single voice has been raised from this quarter to protest against the one thing in which there is need to be on guard against the uncertain will of the populace—namely, its intolerance, when aroused, of discriminating discussion. It is just these reactionaries, these constitutional disbelievers in the people, who are now most active in egging on the intolerance of the populace. It is they who take advantage of the increased pomp of authority with which the war has necessarily clothed some men to put a stigma upon all whose liberalizing influence in domestic policies they dread. For it is not so much this suppression of a periodical or that conviction of an accused person which counts. The important thing which the cultivators of irrationality never lose from view is the discrediting which permanently weakens an obnoxious intellectual influence.

Every sensible American is willing to sacrifice something of his ordinary freedom of speech, just as he is willing for the sake of the war to surrender some of his accustomed wheat or sugar. He promptly realized that when many are giving their lives, there is an uncouth egotism involved in an attempt at a literal maintenance of all the privileges of peace. But just as he would resent a discovery that he was going without the food which is usually his own not for the sake of the common good, but in order that some one else might gorge, so will he resent any evidence that the machinery of espionage and restriction, made necessary by the war, is being used for personal and class ends.

The war has shown an unexpected voluntary docility in the American people in its willingness to submit to limitations whose purpose is clear. But every incident which indicates that this docility is being turned to private account will breed a sullenness which is as extreme and harmful as the suppression which generates it. Not the least of the many evils bred by the cult of domestic suppression and suspicion is that besides an irrational submissiveness among the cowardly it cultivates an irrational rebelliousness in others. The spontaneous play of non-rational instinct ebbs and flows naturally. Cultivated irrationality is a hateful thing, which easily gets out of all control.

8. FIAT JUSTITIA, RUAT CŒLUM[1]

Some one once had the happy thought of summing up absolutistic morals in a phrase. That something called justice is to be done even though it bring down the heavens in ruin, is the final word of an ethics which is resolutely irrelevant to the circumstances of action and the conditions of life. But the skill which invented the phrase dulls by the side of the greater cunning which disguised the fact that the phrase is an ironic summary of every moral code that leaves consequences out of account. For it is only accident if abstract ethics does not always bring wreck in its train. Yet those who recommend this adage of an unswerving morality always wear an expression of superiority though wilfully disregarding the consequences of wreaking vengeance under the plea of vindicating eternal justice.

To get even is one of the radical tendencies of our original human nature. To hit back is part of the business of healthy animal defense. That the animal reaction takes so instinctively a mathematical form, a demand for an exact evening-up of the score, is one of the humors of nature, due perhaps to some intermingling of æsthetic symmetry. Among savage peoples nothing can exceed the literalness with which the dictum of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, is enforced. Witness the authentic record of a case where a man who killed another by falling upon him from a tree was condemned to sit in the place where his victim had been and permit some one else to fall upon him. Such absurdities show the primitively non-rational character of the impulse to retribution, the amiable disregard of any danger to the man whose turn it was to fall being characteristic of the disregard of results found in instinctive action.

But although the instinct of retaliation precedes intelligence, reason comes after and beholding the work of instinct flatters the enraged fighting animal by giving the eulogistic name of justice to his blind impulse. Then the dupe of passion, filled with the immense satisfaction of having discharged his emotion in action, is convinced that he was actuated from the start by a dispassionate love of the sublime moral principle of rational justice. Intelligence, which is effectively intelligence only when it directs instinct through foresight of consequences, relapses into the complacent accomplice of an animal passion. To make another suffer is not only to have the joy of successful power and satisfied instinct, but seems to mark the vindication of some universal cosmic law of righteousness. Thus it is that men of sound and vigorous physique moralize exclusively in terms of effecting righteousness when they turn moralists, while those of paler academic blood compensate for lack of immediate and muscular outlet for instinct by vicarious imagining of an impersonal law which mysteriously works justice.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Sept. 29, 1917.

When injury has been wrought and passions run high, mass psychology operates in the same way. How often is it argued that "justice" demands this or that, while the terms of an enduring peace are under consideration, when the context makes it clear that justice means taking it out on Germany as the chief offender, irrespective of the influence upon the future of the punishment inflicted. Indeed, it is often implied that there is something cowardly, almost dastardly, in any attempt to discuss the future of international relations until Germany's just penalty has been meted out. Let the heavens fall, let the war continue with all the suffering and destruction that it brings upon us as well as upon our foes, so be it that "justice is done"—that is, so be it that that retribution is visited upon Germany and the past is evened up. In such an atmosphere, one who bears in mind that the past is gone and cannot be undone, that no amount of future suffering lessens by the tiniest bit the sufferings of the past, becomes a source of irritation and an object of suspicion to those who indulge in an irresponsible outburst of primitive emotion. He is thought to deny the essential principle of justice, and is lucky to escape without being charged with manœuvering in the enemy's interest.

Nevertheless the future alone is ours to live in, to say nothing of being alone ours to influence. And no matter how long the war may last, the one thing which is sure is that the time after the war will last infinitely longer. It is this fact which makes it worth while to bear the miseries and destructions of war. It is this fact which aligns the seekers for retributive justice with the "stop the war" at any cost pacifist group. Both are so overwhelmed by the present, the amiable pacifists by its woes and the vengeful punishers by the wrongs done by those who brought it on, that they cannot see those long stretches of the future which in making war worth while also determine its just aims. The gist of rationality in human affairs is time perspective, while passion, even passion for peace, for avenging justice, obliterates everything but the passing moment which then swells to form the entire landscape.

Suffering for misdeeds is indeed among the consequences which count in determining intelligent policy for the future. It is absurdly sentimental to say that force can never be so exercised as to affect men's minds, and that consequently defeat, actual or prospective, cannot aid in a reform of German lust for spiritual and political monopoly. Force, even shocks of force, can compel a nation or an individual out of a self-cultivated illusion of spiritual isolation, and remind it of the realities of a world in which others count and have to be taken into account. Especially is it true that suffering the evil consequences of resort to a course of military domination can permanently affect the future mind of Germany. For since, as German apologists are fond of saying, the German empire was created on embattled fields of victory, faith in a polity of organized autocratic militarism is justified by its past fruits for the German nation. Just as victory at the Marne would have fixed its megalomaniac insanity upon Germany for no one knows how long, so discovery that its polity does not pay is a condition of a change of national temper. But to view the demand for defeat and suffering as a factor in influencing the future is a radically different thing from treating it as a vindication of the majesty of Justice. The one course has measure and limit; it invites the use of intelligence to discover when and where and how much. The other course knows no metes nor bounds; it is a blind lurch into the infinite. It is lawless irresponsibility intoxicated with the mission of serving as executor for the absolute. In scorning to take consequences into account, it becomes blind to the destruction of one's own life forces involved in the ambition to play the part which primitive religions attributed to the Omnipotent. It fails to take into consideration the practicality of the task undertaken, and in assuming the rôle of the Almighty creates the illusion of an almightiness to decide the course of events which has no relation to military or economic facts. It is not sentimental pity for Germany but a wise self-interest which dictates that a pragmatic regard for the future and not a passion for abstract justice shall control discussion of the aims of war and the terms of peace.

9. THE POST-WAR MIND[1]

To make plans for the future we need knowledge of operating influences. Especially is a knowledge of the distinctively human response to the situation, of the psychological factor, indispensable. This is the more true in the degree in which our civilization becomes democratic. For every democratic advance means a release of fundamental human qualities and an increase in their power and prestige. In a stratified social order human nature is touched only through fixed and few channels. But the weakening of fixed custom and authoritative imposition takes away the bars and leaves human nature open and accessible. It is played upon more widely and freely by surrounding conditions and displays itself more directly and intensely. Any sound estimate of the social future following the war must attach importance to the question of the immediately uppermost human reactions.

The commonest fallacy in predicting what is genially termed the "new era" springs from projecting the psychology characteristic of war time into ensuing days of peace. The first condition of any correct forecast is to note that upon the whole the reactions *from* war are contrary to those which occur *to* war. Instead of carrying over into the future the states of mind which the stress of war evokes, we should ask what states are subdued in war, and forced into the background. For when the constraints of war are removed and when the peculiar eagerness it generates dies from want of nutriment, these subconscious and suppressed tendencies will resume their activity. And quite probably the resumed activities will be so enhanced by their enforced inhibition that, until they have evened things up, they will be the dominant factors. A fair way then to estimate the post-war psychology is to take the spontaneous emotional predictions called out by the pressure of war and reverse them.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Dec. 7, 1918.

Seriousness, determination and constant preoccupation with the future, with what is coming next, mark the human response in war. A great but uncertain issue hangs constantly before the mind, which can dwell neither in yesterday nor, for any length of time, in to-day. Events are in flux, and the outcome is in suspense. The event which is still to be, the coming defeat or victory, demands attention. The entire attitude is favorable to consideration of coming change. Predictions of readjustments, sweeping changes, flourish spontaneously. For it is some great and final alteration of the face of events to which the mind is attuned. With the let up of war, with the issue determined, the tension relaxes, and the immediate present regains with added force its command. Not the arduous labor of reconstruction but enjoyment of the present, of the gains to be snatched from using the opportunities of pleasure and profit in things as they are, captures the mind. The commercial expansions, the fierce outbursts of "materialistic" money-making that have followed in the immediate wake of most modern wars, are not wholly due to the need of making good the objective losses of war, nor yet wholly to a continuation of the profiteering of war itself. They are in part due to the normal psychology of release from the unnatural strain which war puts upon human nature, a nature that is capable of infinite heroism upon occasion, but that can no longer sustain the heroic mood when the occasion is past. An Englishman long resident in Japan noted that after the Russo-Japanese war, young men who earlier had had dreams of scholarship, statesmanship and military glory turned eagerly to money-making as the great "sacrifice" which the new condition of the nation exacted of them. This is only an unusually naïve expression of the usual reaction from war.

The concentration upon the future characteristic of war inevitably takes on a rosy hue. To admit the prospect of defeat is the beginning of defeat itself. Till the issue is decided, unconquered hope colors expectation with limitless optimism.

This expression of the nerving of a people against present evil and threatened disaster outruns the limited portion of time devoted to war and projects into the future the image of a new day, which is to be happy beyond all the experiences of the past. Every great war is to usher in a time of enduring peace; it is to see the establishment of justice, the dawn of a new era. Millennial expectations are not born in times of prosperity. In such days, the absorbing present is good enough. The millennium is the compensatory refuge of immediate distress and imminent evil. But victory generates buoyancy and buoyancy is likely to find a vent in quick satisfactions. The paradise of surrounding milk and honey displaces the new order that has to be labored for. Most of the glowing prophecies of an inevitable social reconstruction to follow the war merely transfer into the peaceful future the reaction peculiar to war. It will be all too easy to go on cultivating our plots on the verge of Vesuvius till a new catastrophe overtakes us.

The tragedy of war also breeds a certain exaltation of mood hailed by sympathetic observers of a literary turn of mind as a religious conversion. We have doubtless all heard persons of this type lament that America has not been in the war long enough to experience the intensity of suffering that purchases this elevation of feeling, this spiritual exhilaration, which is sometimes referred to as the priceless boon conferred by the war. It is probably no accident that it was the New York *Journal,* most unremitting in urging unforgiving hate of the Germans, that met the end of the war with a sigh of regret that we Americans had not been in the war long enough to suffer the full "chastening of calamity." But a sensible judge of human nature would be thankful that humanity had been preserved not only from unnecessary suffering, but also from the abnormal strain involved in what, by protective psychological coloration, is called chastening. Having been saved this extreme, there is the greater hope that we may be saved the extreme of frivolity and reckless pleasure-seeking which is the usual reaction when human nature is too long on the rack. Even as it is, it is likely that the excessive sexual excitation which heroic literary commentators and civilian journalistic moralists overlook will have far more abiding consequences than the much heralded spiritual uplift which fascinates their gaze.

An intelligent English historian who had written shrewdly of the development of political ideals and practices from Metternich to Bismarck, pointing out the non-fulfilment of the high hopes aroused by the defeat of Napoleonic aggression, greeted the present war, when it was but a month or two old, as the opening of a new era. He traced throughout the realm of international relationships, domestic politics, the relation of the sexes, capital and labor—all the spheres of conflict in fact—the substitution of an era of tolerance and good will for one of intolerance and antagonism. Already it is easy to see that he wrote under the influence of that over-emphasis of emotion produced in a people in the first glow of becoming "common servants and common sufferers in the same cause," to quote an English philosopher who celebrated the outbreak of brotherly love which is but the reverse side of fighting. The Russians and Germans who experienced the same sense of unity as the outcome of being banded together have now turned their guns on one another. Fortunately we shall not signalize the return to the ordinary activities of life in the same way. But one is building on the sandiest of foundations who expects much help in dealing with post-war problems, domestic or foreign, from the community of emotional consciousness generated by war. Men will resume the opposition of interests where they laid them down. We may indeed count ourselves lucky if these are not intensified by the truce, by the stirrings of hate and suspicion bred by war, and by the extraordinary and abnormal readjustments that have to be undertaken.

These paragraphs are in no sense a prediction of the future. All attempts at such prophecies are vitiated by the same fact. They may foretell, in the degree of the intelligence of their author, the future so far as that is shaped by forces seen to be working contemporaneously. They omit the effects of some force which is so seemingly slight as to be negligible, but which will in the future modify in the most unpredictable ways all the known forces. Mr. Wells, for example, could prophesy the liberalizing of Russia—that was easy because all modern forces were making autocracies out of date. He could not foresee Bolshevism and the subtle ferment it would introduce into all the otherwise calculable factors. In this sense the weak things will always confound the mighty—the future will be determined by the coming event which at the given moment is still so nascent as to escape detection. I am not, then attempting to tell what is going to happen; nor to play the part of one who predicts that the hopes of a new era are doomed to disappointment.

But it is important to know what we can count on and what will surely elude us. So far as our expectation of a happier future is based upon projecting into the future the conscious states characteristic of war, it *is* doomed. And in large measure it is fortunate that such is the case. For I have said nothing about the uglier reactions of war—fear and its twin, hate. These unhappily are more enduring than most of the emotions mentioned. They are not so much conscious states, superficial and transitory, as attitudes of will, of action, which eat their way into permanent disposition. But even these things pass when persistently confronted by objective conditions. The embittered missionaries of a permanent vengeful punishment and cultivated hatred of Germany should be compelled to retire and undergo a period of historical study. The transfer of international ill-will and friendliness as respects England, France and Germany would form an illuminating lesson. But the sequel of our Civil War, the consequences of the "reconstruction" imposed by distrust and hate and the story of the persistence of its bad effects long after the inevitable emotional reconciliation occurred might alone suffice to teach a much needed truth.

To state some of the human reactions from war is not to predict. It is merely to analyze what already exists—human nature. Such an analysis may, however, assist in planning for the future. For it warns us against trusting to the emotions to do a work which only the most laborious and faithful intelligence can accomplish. It will warn us, with respect to our enemies, against planning a future based on suspicion and hostility. It will warn us, in the infinitely complex problems of domestic readjustment, against trusting to the vague aspirations and protective hopefulness produced in wartime. It will teach us that reliance upon such undisciplined desires is one of the chief reasons why the course of events has in the past frustrated the ardent hopes of men in the great crises of human history. It will suggest dependence upon the homelier and less exciting work of an intelligence which resolves problems into their detailed elements and which contrives piecemeal and patiently for their solution.

10. THE APPROACH TO A LEAGUE OF NATIONS[1]

In official communications regarding the war, the phrase "Associated Governments" frequently occurs. The mere fact that the United States is not technically an Allied Government is doubtless the reason for the use of the phrase. It does not however take a forced interpretation to find something significant in the term. "Allies" is filled with implications of union for offense and defense. It is charged with the militaristic significance of the old order; it conveys precisely that which the foreign policy of the United States has always avoided. For we have never been the "Ally" of any power. The term "Associated" suggests, on the contrary, the new order. It suggests union for the sake of common ends and interests. Although military necessity gave it birth, its overtones are of the modern world of industry and commerce—of voluntary cooperation among equals to attain results which concern all alike.

The contrasting phrases may be used to indicate the two approaches to the future League of Nations, one rooting in political needs, the other in economic necessities. The older conception was not only an expression of purely political traditions, but these traditions were inseparably connected with those military considerations which are the inevitable outgrowth of a world of independent sovereign states whose sole official combinations with one another must perforce be directed, defensively or offensively, against some other combination of states. Not even Mr. Roosevelt has ever said anything harsh enough about the delusions of those who would cultivate unpreparedness for war in a political world so constituted that the sole legally integrating factor among different nations is combination with respect to war. The earlier conception of a League of Nations as an arrangement whose main, if not sole, purpose was to "enforce peace" exhibits the same preoccupation, the same belated ideas.

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[1] From *The Dial*, Nov. 2, 1918.

Those who are skeptical about the possibility of a League of Nations, those who dwell upon all the difficulties which have to be met, generally carry over into their discussions legal-mindedness which reflects the old military-political system. And many of those who argue for it still ignore all the lessons of the war and revert to the notion of a combination whose chief trait would be an extension of the old Hague Tribunal, provision for legal arbitrament plus agencies of conciliation, and, when needed, for enforcement of decisions by combined arms against a recalcitrant state. Yet if the war has made anything clear it is that such a scheme deals with effects not causes, symptoms not forces; that it is negative not constructive, and doomed to fail at some critical moment when most needed. The real problem is one of organization for more effective human association and intercourse. The newer politics signify the social mind carried into questions of human relationships, while the older politics meant the formulations of the legal mind concerned with defense and litigation. Every statesman of the world to-day, every political thinker, can be categorically placed according as his plans and ideas are formed primarily in the negative terms of protection against opposition and threatening danger, or in the positive terms of association for realization of common interests. Every passing day (and every passing year of the future) will make it clear that what distinguishes President Wilson from the other statesmen of the epoch is his prompt recognition that, given the conditions of modern life, no adequate defense and protection of the interests of peace can be found except in a policy based upon positive cooperation for interests which are so universal as to be mutual.

This means that a system of ideas and activities which expresses contemporary industry and commerce is being substituted for the ancient system which ignored and despised business and magnified the ethics and politics of dignity, honor, aggression, and defense. It is no accident that the formulation of the new order came from this country, which by the fortune of history and geography escaped most completely from the ethics of maintaining a status of established dignity, and which has committed itself most completely to the ethics of industry and exchange. President Wilson's propositions have commended themselves to the average American as a simple and almost matter of course, although unusually eloquent, statement of the very axioms of our own life. Only courtesy, the urgent need for American assistance, and a slowly growing perception of the essential truth of what he says—a perception largely compelled by the increasing influence of industrial workers in the older countries—have veiled their alien and "idealistic" character in the European countries. For the latter are controlled by the older ideas of personal alliance, instead of by the newer ideas of association in common activities.

A League of Nations whose main purpose is to enforce peace by an extension of legal mechanisms of controversy and litigation is idealistic and academic. It would work in periods of recuperation and quiescence; it would break down, in all probability, when confronted with problems of national expansion and a redistribution of the centers of effective power. Taken by itself, it represents simply a consecration of the politics of the particular balance of power which obtains at a given time. But an organization of nations which grew out of common everyday necessities, and which operated to meet the commonplace needs of everyday life with respect to food, labor, securing raw materials for the reparation of a devastated world, and so on—an organization which grew out of wants and met them would, once formed, become so indispensable that speedily no one could imagine the world getting on without it. It would go of itself; it would possess the only final sanction of any human institution—satisfaction of acknowledged needs and furtherance of urgent interests. It would generate in time any legal and political formulations and mechanisms which were needed to take care of the controversies and conflicts of interest that would still arise. But there is all the difference in the world between a system of courts, laws, decisions, and coercive enforcements which rests upon an organized system of wants and satisfactions, and which gives that system added security, and a system which, taking no constructive care for common interests, spasmodically attempts to keep peace by bringing into play legal devices.

It is a commonplace that the present war has revealed the primacy of economic and industrial concerns in even military affairs. It is not so frequently observed that it is this primacy which has already brought into being a League of Nations of a type not contemplated by those who have urged one on legal grounds. Every day the "Associated Governments" are dealing with questions of the distribution of shipping, raw materials, food, money and credit, and so on. Nobody who thinks believes that these problems will be less pressing after peace. On the contrary, they will become more urgent in some respects. For there will be the danger of a disastrous competition among nations now compelled by war exigencies into a coalescence. New problems of the distribution of labor, immigration, production for exportation will emerge. To annihilate or reduce the agencies of international regulation which already exist would be an act of incredible wantonness. Not to stabilize and expand their scope would be one of almost incredible stupidity. But given such an agency of international regulation, defined and authorized by the Peace Conference itself, and there exists in effect a new and international type of government. Can any one believe that once such an agency were in existence it would not inevitably tend to be employed for all sorts of new purposes not expressly contemplated in its original constitution? Its very utility for recognized needs would render it natural to enlarge its functions to deal with future perplexities of international import. A Hague Tribunal, a legal ordering of international disputes, growing out of and depending upon an international organization of this positive and constructive sort, would not be spasmodic, negative, artificial, and in important matters always too late. It would play the same constant rôle which domestic courts play in internal conflict of interests.

11. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY[1]

The ethics of honor and dignity, the idealization of their assertion and defense, are deeply ingrained in the minds of all the ruling classes—whether their rule is the direct rule of governors or the more efficacious indirect rule of opinion and sentiment. This morale of pride and fear is most deeply embedded in all that concerns the relationships of states to one another. In contrast, the ethics of industry and of reciprocal contractual service are lacking in prestige. They seem too prosaic, utilitarian, and materialistic to possess moral status. They lack glamor and romance; they are not glorified by the halo that reflects historic sacrifice and heroism in their behalf. We cannot easily conceive them as the subject matter of poetry and legend. And so far are men from actuation in their conduct by calculation of self-interest that nothing which does not become the stuff of poetry and passion can command full allegiance.

Those who are skeptical about the possibility of a reversal of moral prestige with respect to these two principles would do well to recall that Germany has sincerely regarded itself as *the* idealist among modern nations, and has contemptuously considered the United States as *the* materialistic and commercial people. This fact may develop hospitality to the recognition that what is morally at stake is a conflict of ideas and idealizations inherited from feudalism with those which express the transition to a democratic ordering of life. This being the case, it requires only a courageous expression of the newer morale of industry and commerce to insure that in time poetry, glamor, and romance will become attached to it also. For these things, important as they are, are not self-generated nor substantial. They are adjectival. They will in the processes of time cluster about any order that commands men's practical allegiance and in consequence their admiration.

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[1] From *The Dial,* Nov. 16, 1918.

The decline of democracy in comparative prestige during the last generation, the relative eclipse into which it has passed, will be reversed by the outcome of the present war. A war the final outcome of which is demonstrably to be determined by the efforts of a nation that entered the war to make the world safe for democracy will effect a transformation of sentimental valuations. The permanence of this reversal will depend upon whether the democratic movement gives its own case away by continuing an unconscious adoption of the older morale of honor and defense of status, or has the intellectual courage to assert the moral meaning of industry, exchange, and reciprocal service.

These considerations may seem remote from the question of the practicability of a League of Nations in order to end international anarchy. But so to think involves a tremendous underestimation of the practical part played in human life by the imagination and the emotions gathered about it. The past system is not supported by any rational appeal to usefulness; its upholders always decry such an appeal as contrary to its proper elevated and noble nature. Mere external habit would not sustain it in the face of constant exhibition of its deficiencies, were not the idealizations of emotion enlisted in its behalf. Country, fatherland, nation, honor, rights, defense, protection, glory, sacrifice: these are words which express the forces which above all else maintain the established order—or disorder. Against this, the contrary sentimental idealizations which spring from a certain attempt to give Christianity a mild, pacifistic interpretation are pathetically helpless.

But the old order of ideas is implicated in much more definite and positivistic ways in the maintenance of the present system. Let any one seriously ask himself what he understands by diplomacy and why it is that such disparagement hangs about it, and he will see what is meant. Everywhere outside of the United States, diplomatists have been drawn from the aristocratic class—that is to say, from precisely that class which has preserved most nearly unimpaired the old ethics of honor, dignity, nobility, and purely personal relationships—the class which has preserved in the most intact way the old noble contempt for the impersonal service rendered by exchange of goods industrially and mechanically produced. It is not diplomacy as an abstraction which tragically failed the world at a crucial moment. It was concrete human beings, diplomatists, who showed their ignorance of modern forces and their incapacity to manage them.

This class of persons manifested all the marks of the old moral order. Secret diplomacy is not a mere technical device; it is something more than a mere rule of traditional usage. It carries with it all the signs of a class so personally and professionally set apart that it moves in a high, inaccessible realm whose doings are no concern of the vulgar mass. It breathes contempt for publicity because it springs from contempt for the public. It would maintain the privacy which characterizes the intercourse of gentlemen with one another in matters which are their primary concern.

For the most part the great powers have directly continued with respect to international relations the traditions which developed when the relations of states were matters of the personal relations of sovereigns who owned the states, and when ambassadors were the personal representatives of their personal superiors. It was no iconoclast but an authority like Sir Thomas Barclay who said of the statesmen of Europe who have controlled foreign policies for the last generation: "Present generations who have suffered through the incompetency and failure of their governing classes are not likely to allow themselves to be deluded again as to the realities of war compared with those of peace." But there is no way of surely remedying this evil state of affairs save by transferring the management of international relations from men who are completely, subconsciously even more than consciously, committed to an old belief—whose minds and hearts are wholly possessed by it—over to men whose habitudes of thought have been formed by dealing with the facts of modern industry and the give and take, for common interests, of modern commerce.

A League of Nations which should be conceived primarily in political terms of the old sort would inevitably leave the older type of diplomatists in control. They are on that ground already; moreover the activities it requires have no drawing power for men who think spontaneously in terms of the realities of modern life. For some time to come, as in the past, big financiers and men of business will largely regulate international relationships for the greater part of the time. But there is a constant division of responsibility between them and those who control the political foreign-offices. The latter, in acting as agents for the former in times of peace, produce situations which carry things beyond the wishes and out of the power of the economic rulers. Something would be gained in clarity and responsibility by any arrangement which made explicit, constant, and formal the power actually wielded by business, and which effectively brought the training and technical ability of its representatives directly to bear upon the problems of international intercourse. But such a movement could not end at this point. When international commissions and boards have representatives of big business upon them, because their technical training is required to handle specific questions, they will also have to seat economists and representatives of labor. The scope and significance of the questions which would be turned over to them for adjustment would constantly grow. Just as the war has led many an able and trained business man to put his special abilities at the disposal of the public interest, so a new type of international diplomacy would stimulate the tendency to use the intellectual power generated in modern industry and commerce for something besides personal advantage. No one can afford to ignore or despise this particular sort of ability and training. The decision of the character of the immediate future in both domestic and international matters depends first of all upon whether they are chiefly used in secret and irresponsible ways for personal power and advantage, or whether they are gradually sublimated by being put to public use in behalf of a public interest.

12. A LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM[1]

The hopeful approach to a concert of nations is along the economic road which aims to further common interests, rather than by the negative and legal road which contents itself with litigation and the adjudication of disputes. What does "equality of trade conditions" mean, and how is it to be achieved and guaranteed? Woodrow Wilson has contributed to clarification of the thesis. It precludes economic boycotts and selfish economic combinations; it precludes, as he unequivocally states, all preferential trade arrangements. Access to raw materials may be assumed to mean guarantees of outlet to the sea, with the free ports and the internationalized railways and watercourses necessary for adequate commercial use of such ports. But obviously equalization of trade conditions among nations demands something more. It has been demonstrated that more is needed to secure freedom and equality of conditions between individuals than to declare them legally all free and equal, while leaving them to unrestricted competition with one another. Immense inequality of power is compatible with formal equality. The same thing will surely develop with respect to any merely legal equality among nations. Certain nations have a tremendous superiority in population, natural resources, technical progress in industry, command of credit, and shipping. Nothing better calculated to develop actual inequality of trade relationship among nations could well be found than a system which set up a nominal mathematical equality and then threw matters practically into the hands of the present big nations. Under the old régime it was at least an object for every powerful state to attach to itself and its sphere of influence a certain number of the smaller and weaker states. To some extent the former were compelled to bid, by grant of economic concessions, for the support of the latter. A League of Nations which deprived economically weak states of all the advantages as well as disadvantages of the old system of groupings would merely leave them to be devoured by the competition with one another of the three or four big states of the world.

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[1] From *The Dial,* Dec. 14, 1918.

This may account for the fact that as yet nations like Spain and Italy have not been seen to manifest enthusiasm for the project of a League of Nations. How can they be sure that, in effect, it is not a combination of, say, the United States and the British Empire, with incidental concessions to France, to control the commerce of the world, and to achieve, with no violation whatever of political equality, virtual subjugation of all other peoples? The question doubtless puts the matter with harsh exaggeration, but it suggests that a nation like, say, Italy cannot be expected to engage heartily in the new system of international organization unless she has some assurance in details as to how her economic interests are to be protected. Her primary question and that of other nations similarly situated will be: does the new system enable the more powerful peoples to take advantage of our weaknesses, or will it be so constituted as not merely to reenforce whatever strong points we possess with respect to the world's markets, but actually to make good our deficiencies? Shall we be given legally guaranteed access to coal and iron, but exacted at the highest prices that the market will bear (including a virtual monopoly of the world's shipping by other nations), or will administrative commissions of the League equitably survey the whole field and see to it that we get that relative share of the world's resources which an adequate development of our own powers requires? Shall we have to compete under onerous terms for the world's capital and credit, or will there be some assurance that credit will be equitably assigned to us for, say, such a development of our own hydroelectric power as will make us less economically dependent upon the very nations which supply the credit?

Such questions may seem to answer themselves. They may appear to exact a spirit not merely of justice but of altruism toward economically weak peoples, which it is hopelessly Utopian to forecast. Even so, the questions are worth putting even if only to suggest that the basic problems of an effective League of Nations involve more than a surrender of that arbitrary irresponsible political power we call national sovereignty, that they also involve surrender of ruthless economic activities which, to last analysis, rest only upon the possession of superior power due to accidents of position and history. But after all, the questions do not assume a fantastic altruism on the part of the bigger nations. They do assume, however, an *enlightened* self-interest—enlightened enough to see that some price must be paid for an adequate guarantee against the recurrence of wars which, even when valued in the most materialistic of cash terms, are indefinitely more costly than the charges imposed by the economic self-restriction in question. Not only this, but also enlightened enough to look ahead and weigh the advantages of trade, extended over a long period, with a nation growing in internal prosperity, against immediate trade profits based upon taking advantage of a nation's needs and calculated to keep it in industrial subjection.

For in the long run this is the only question. Does trade flourish better and pay better with a weak and impoverished customer or with one having increasing wants because of increasing power to supply them? This, in last resort, is the question of a narrow protectionism versus an intelligent free trade. And thus we arrive, although perhaps by an unexpected route, at the heart of the question of the meaning of equality of trade conditions and the removal, as far as possible, of economic barriers. The classic doctrine of international free trade was hopelessly defective in that it entirely overlooked the need of intelligent supervision and positive controlling action if real equality of conditions is to be secured. The classic doctrine was bound up with the dogma of *laissez-faire* among nations, and that doctrine was bound to work as fatally applied to nations as when applied to the relation of individuals. The doctrine rested upon the fantastically unreal theological doctrine of the goodness of Nature when left to herself, and of the natural harmony of interests. It ignored the fact that Nature means only the existent distribution of power, and that to fall back on the existent distribution of relative strength and weakness in the present world of states is to leave the destiny of the world at the mercy of rapacious economic prowess. Against such a dogma the protective policy has stood, however stupidly, for the need of some kind of human direction of natural forces.

In other words, any practicable and any desirable general adoption of a policy of international free trade means the development of powerful international administrative commissions dealing with such matters as equality of labor standards, the regulation of shipping, and, for some time to come, of food, raw materials, and immigrants, and above all of the exportation of capital and the distribution of the available credit of the world. Equality of trade conditions means *equalization* of conditions; it cannot be secured without giving to the maintenance of peace the same kind of intense intellectual labor, study, and foresight which has gone to the conduct of the war—the same in kind, but continued and persistent as well as comprehensive and impartial in scope. If a particular nation would gain in trade by keeping up low labor standards, then there must be power to penalize the commerce of that nation as a means of equalization. If it overstimulates science and industry along lines calculated to make other nations dependent upon it at a critical juncture—as Germany developed the dye industry as an adjunct to explosives—then that must be dealt with as an international government would deal with an excess cultivation of an armed force.

The problem is indeed difficult and complex. But its solution is not Utopian. It requires, let it be repeated, exactly the same kind of cooperating ability of experts of all sorts which within a year took America from a peace basis to an effective war basis. The mobilization of the necessary variety and scale of forces was possible because of the faith and devotion behind the cause. That is the issue which faces the world, and especially the United States, with respect to the organization of the world on the basis of international democracy. The resources and abilities are at hand, if we choose to use them. The question is as to the depth and endurance of our desire.

13. OUR NATIONAL DILEMMA[1]

Nothing is easier to say than that the period of our national isolation is past. Nothing is simpler to proclaim than that we are now called upon to assume the burden of sharing in the conduct of world affairs. Large words about these things make a double appeal. Our inherent idealism responds—and so does our vanity and our love of power. The two responses so intermingle, so cover each other, that the wonder is that the appeal has not been irresistible. Why has it failed? Under what conditions may it succeed?

Quite probably it is fortunate for us that nationalistic ambitions and imperialistic aggressions were so undisguisedly powerful in the peace negotiations. We owe monuments to Clemenceau, Sonnino and Balfour. Probably in our excited idealism nothing less flagrant than the exhibition they gave could have averted our becoming innocent and ignorant accomplices in the old world game of diplomacy. As it was, the contrast between prior professions and actual deeds was so obvious as to evoke revulsion.

That the revulsion should have found most articulate expression in narrowly nationalistic inhibitions and repudiations of foreign responsibilities may be unfortunate; but it was, possibly, in its after effects better than nothing. The terms in which Republican Senators articulated American selfishness in response to European selfishness would not of themselves have commanded the assent of the American people. There was a deeper instinct and emotion behind the rejection. Doubtless it was associated with our historic policy of no foreign entanglements. But it is desirable to clarify the emotion expressed in this attitude. What in addition to national egoism lies back of the instinct against being mixed up in the affairs of foreign nations?

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[1] From *The New Republic,* March 24, 1920.

The answer seems clear. We have a preference for democracy in politics. Our attachment is doubtless halting, and subject to deflections and corruptions, to say nothing of being not adequately enlightened. But it is genuine. Responsible government and publicity are our ideal, and upon the whole the ideal fares as well as most ideals in a rude and imperfect world. But, putting it roundly, democracy has never had even a look-in with respect to conducting the foreign affairs of peoples, and this is true even of nations that are democratic in their management of domestic affairs. By virtue of our geographical position and the fullness of our empire within, rather than by any moral virtue, we have maintained a state of relative innocence through abstention. We have had no foreign policy save to have none, barring the sacred Monroe Doctrine. We dwelt pleasantly enough in our Garden of Eden. During the war, we thought we could easily extend its blessings to the entire world. But the undisguised scramble after the armistice days reminded us of the Fall of Man, and we hurried back into our Paradise, though remaining on the lookout for remunerative investments in the outer world of sin and misery.

Yet it is true that a policy of isolation and non-participation is impossible. When we have invested enough in European countries they will be as near to us as Mexico now is. We may have the same tender interest in maintaining the stability of established powers, that democratic France has shown for the old autocratic régime of Russia. The war itself is sufficient demonstration that aloofness and neutrality have gone by the board; their day is over. We cannot longer piously inscribe the Open Door on parchments impressed with our national seal, and then complacently retire to such a distance that we can identify words with facts. But the most significant thing is not that our period of isolation is done with so that we must henceforth have foreign policies, League of Nations or no League. It is that henceforth our internal policies, our problems of domestic politics, are entangled with foreign questions and invaded by foreign issues.

It is not for us to choose whether we shall remain isolated.

Who would have believed a few years ago that universal military service could be injected as a vital question into American politics? The problems of taxation that will come up in connection with our national debt will remind us that we cannot keep domestic politics pure and unspotted from the international world. We shall be fortunate if issues of bonuses and pensions do not become important partisan questions. The intimate connection of labor problems with immigration is another reminder. Pro-Irish, pro-British, or Jewish, questions suggest another side of our entanglement.

Economic reactionaries have succeeded in creating a Bolshevist issue among us, the most contentedly middle class nation on earth. They are trying to "sell" this issue to the American people by wholesale advertising through news and editorial columns. Sixteen per cent Americans raise the issue of one hundred per cent Americanism in behalf of policies that judged by all sane American history are anti-American. Yes, wherever we turn we find plenty of reminders that the angel with a flaming sword forbids our return into the Garden of innocence and isolation.

The net effect, however, is a dilemma, a dilemma so serious that for the present there is no visible way out. We must guard ourselves against the idealizations with which we customarily protect ourselves from seeing the realities of an unpleasant situation. The dilemma is that while our day of isolation is over, international affairs are still conducted upon a basis and by methods that were instituted before democracy was heard of as a political fact. Hence we engage in foreign policies only at the risk of harming even such imperfect internal democracy as we have already achieved.

There is no use in blinking the non-democratic foreign policy of the democratic nations, of France and Great Britain. The Versailles Conference was not an untoward exceptional incident. It was a revelation of the standing realities. To recognize this fact is the sole guarantee that as we surrender our innocence we may yet be able to retain our integrity.

For example, as I write, a copy of the *New Republic* comes to hand with a discussion from a contributor and an editorial on a naval alliance between Great Britain and the United States. A residence in the Far East makes one aware of the possibilities of such an alliance; it makes one almost ready to cheer for it on any terms. A Chinese-owned newspaper in Shanghai carries at the top of its front page a standing slogan: "British-American cooperation in China is the A B C of safety and progress for China." And most Americans and British add a hearty amen.

And yet, and yet—an alliance, but an alliance for what? Just an alliance, without any definition or discussion of ends and methods which will make democratic control a reality and not a name? All treaties relating to the Far East are designed, if we trust their makers, to maintain the peace of the Orient, the territorial integrity of China and the Open Door. The additional expense of engrossing upon them that they are designed to promote the welfare of humanity would be slight. Now the main fact about British policy in China, in fact in Asia, is that it is conducted with one eye upon India, or rather with both eyes upon India and an occasional look elsewhere.

Is there as a matter of fact any use in discussing a naval alliance with Great Britain if we have not faced what our relation, say, to Britain's Indian policy is to be? Suppose that an economic blockade of India should become as desirable as that of Russia seemed lately to be;—are we to be accomplices in that also? The reverberation of our surrender of the Philippines upon all problems of the Far East, from Korea to India, will be great. What would be the effect of a formal alliance upon our Philippine policy? Would it not inevitably strengthen the propaganda that we retain them, lest their surrender "endanger the peace of the Far East"—as the phrase always goes?

The case is not even as if we had any guarantee that we are going to have democratic control of our own foreign policies when we enter upon them. And I am speaking generally, not of the special instance just mentioned. Congress must indeed share in the opening of war and the Senate in its concluding.

But it is an elementary fact that we have not developed a technique of popular control. How was the Russian adventure of Great Britain finally halted? Partly, of course, by the common sense of diplomats who concluded it wouldn't pay. But from the popular side not by an effective check such as we take for granted in domestic affairs, but by fear of mutinies abroad and strikes at home. Would we be better off?

It is easier to state the dilemma that isolation is impossible and participation perilous than to state any solution. But meantime we should certainly tread warily. We should avoid all general commitments, and confine ourselves to the irreducible minimum, and that most specifically stated.

"Meantime," until what? Until the labor parties of European democracies, or some other liberal organization, supervises and directs the foreign policies of those nations with jealous regard for democratic principles, and until we have ourselves attained not merely greater knowledge of foreign and international politics but have developed the sure means of popular control. Diplomacy is still the home of the exclusiveness, the privacy, the unchecked love of power and prestige, and one may say the stupidity, characteristic of every oligarchy. Democracy has not touched it. Beware of contamination through contact. That, I think, is the sound instinct behind our aversion to foreign entanglements.

We are not holier than other nations, but there is an obligation upon us not to engage too much or too readily with them until there is assurance that we shall not make themselves and ourselves worse, rather than better, by what is called sharing the common burdens of the world, whether it be through the means of a League of Nations or some special alliance.

14. SHALL WE JOIN THE LEAGUE?

I[1]

The French adventure in the Ruhr checked the rising propaganda for the entrance of the United States into the League of Nations, but it has not entirely arrested it. The case as the pro-Leaguers present it is very simple: Isolation means the continuance of war, cooperation the cessation of war. The League of Nations represents the method of cooperation; it represents the only existing attempt in that direction. The syllogism completes itself. Probably the reasoning is too simple to impose even upon those who indulge in it; they are merely capitalizing the opposition to war which is still so general among the people, after the fashion well known to propagandists. Stir up an emotion and at the same time offer an object and the emotion will seize upon the object no matter how great the logical and practical irrelevance.

Had it not been for the coincidence of Lausanne and the Ruhr, the appeal would have had a certain timeliness. Bankers who know what they want and idealists who feel strongly that they want something different from what exists make common cause. The imagination of the administration seems to have been exhausted by the effort of thinking up the Washington Conference. In contrast with the least imaginative administration of recent political history, the florid imagination of Mr. Wilson shines like a beacon in the dark. Influential persons and newspapers that favored the League and whose pride of opinion is involved, seize every fresh European disturbance as an opportunity for saying "We told you so." They have no lack of texts.

The propaganda appeals to what is our weakest, although not our worst, national trait as well as to what is best in our sentiment. We want to be busy, to be in things, to be virile and red-blooded. It irks our boastful self-esteem to be out of things, quiescent, when things are happening, and it appeals to our conceit to be told that everything would be all right if we only said the word, if we only "assumed our proper responsibilities." Duty has often served as a mask for blind energy. We are like a youth who isn't quite sure in spite of his braggings whether he is really grown up and who wants to do something to prove it. Having been informed from Europe after the war was ended that we came too late and that our effort was negligible in effecting the outcome, it restores our conceit to be told that as we saved Europe once so we must now come to its rescue again. Saving the world is the part we most like to enact in the drama of history.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* March 7, 1923.

But our better side is also stirred by the identification of international cooperation with joining the League. There is pity and horror and a sincere desire to be of use. We are comfortable and prosperous, at least relatively so. Are we not selfish to the point of cruelty when we maintain isolation? Are we not in effect saying that the world may go to smash as long as we can enjoy our pleasures? Since we helped to make the Versailles Treaty and the League was our own pet notion, we have an unfulfilled responsibility. Not all the guilt for the present state of Europe lies on the shoulders of Europe. Then at the last there comes in the prevalent abhorrence of war and the blind feeling that the League of Nations, however imperfect, represents a step taken in that international cooperation which may at last substitute peaceful adjustment for war. At least the League stands as an outward symbol that binds nations together. It is a shameful crime, so it is argued, that the United States after having proposed the idea, should at the first sign of inconvenience to ourselves, have cowardly deserted the attempt to realize it. A friend says it is the Great Refusal of history, fit to go on record by the side of that of the rich young man of the New Testament.

I have never seen that argument accomplished much in answer to such considerations. They express a desire, a hope and a fear, and emotions are not readily amenable to argument. It does little good to point out that none of the important post-war questions are in the hands of the League of Nations; that they are in the hands of various commissions which are officially committed to enforcing the Treaty of Versailles; and that in any case the League of Nations is not a League of Nations but of governments, and of the governments whose policies played a part in bringing on the war and that have no wish to change their policies. It is almost useless to point out that as long as Russia and Germany are kept outside the League its international character is a farce, and that it must be in effect a combination or conspiracy of a few great powers against these countries. Facts are of little avail against feeling.

But those who oppose our joining the League and those who are still doubtful have a right to demand that the propagandists shall make a great deal clearer than they have yet what they mean by international cooperation. No intelligent person, apart from party politics or the exigencies of consistency with some position taken in the past, favors isolation for its own sake, or is cold to the idea of cooperation. But cooperation with whom and for what? Even those whose natural bias is toward the League are interested in having light shed on this subject. International cooperation is hardly possible unless there is something international with which to cooperate. What is it and where is it? Are we to cooperate with France and her satellites upon the continent? Or are we to side with Great Britain in her differences of opinion, her fundamental conflicts of policy with France? What is to be our attitude on the subject of reductions of reparations? If responsible French statesmen openly charge the English with a desire to break the Treaty of Versailles because the English propose certain modifications in the reparation clauses, will similar proposals from us which might go further promote international goodwill or international bitterness? What is the American people prepared to offer from its side?

Such questions might be multiplied almost indefinitely. Until they have been carefully thought out and some definite guarantees secured in connection with some definite plan, any specific move toward international cooperation on our part will be but a repetition of what happened when we plunged into the war without having first come to an understanding with our associates, only to find in the end our hands tied in the execution of our own policies by conflicting European policies in general, and secret agreements in particular. And somehow "honor," the honor that demands that gambling debts take precedence of everything else, required that the secret understandings should be carried out in violation of our public utterances and promises publicly accepted by our European associates. Why repeat the experiment without even the excuse of wartime excitement, without the warning of an experience of which we were then innocent?

The question of cooperation is not only a question with whom in Europe we are to cooperate and what for, but also of unity and division of opinion at home. Irrespective of conflict and confusion in Europe, there is equally great confusion and conflict in our own opinion as to what should be done in Europe and how it should be done. It is perhaps for this reason that current pro-League propaganda ignores all details, and appeals to the sentiment against war and assures us that as soon as we join the League, Turkish atrocities will be impossible and the sword will be broken. Who can say with assurance what the prevailing sentiment is with respect to the French invasion of the industrial regions of Germany? There are many influential newspapers which defend it; there are others which are noncommittal and ready to approve or condemn as events turn out. The anti-German hatred aroused by the war is still active; perhaps the mass does not care to think beyond the alleged fact that France suffered so much that Germany still deserves whatever it gets. The moment we are entangled in European affairs this difference of sentiment among us ceases to be a sentimental affair and becomes a matter of public policy and of domestic politics. We shall either be doing something which, no matter in what direction, arouses bitter strife among ourselves, or our representatives abroad will commit us to something for which Congress and the people will not stand, and the history of President Wilson at Versailles will be repeated.

Again, the neglect of Russia is incredible. Russia is still the most populous nation of Europe and potentially the most powerful. Whether ten or forty years pass before the position of Russia is restored makes little difference. Before we talk much more about international cooperation with the world at large and offer ourselves as both Moses and Messiah, might it not be well to find out just what our attitude is with respect to Russia and her part in the world's affairs? We might make Russia an objective test of our willingness and our ability to engage in international cooperation.

Whether we look at the situation in Europe or at home, it is hard to find any evidence of readiness to cooperate in any definite and systematic way, much less to tie ourselves up with that League of governments which embodies all the forces which have brought the world to its present pass. Europe does not want and will not tolerate our cooperation except on its own terms, and it is divided against itself as to those terms. The notion that we have only to offer ourselves as universal arbiter—and paymaster—and all will be well is childish in the extreme. But even if it came anywhere near the actual condition in Europe, who are we that we may serve in such a capacity? Every contending group in Europe is found here: pro-English, pro-French, pro-German, pro-Serbian, pro-Greek and pro-Bulgarian—almost everything pro except pro-Turkish, with all the antis involved in these various partisanships. And in addition we are ignorant, inexperienced, governed by emotion rather than by information and insight. The fact that only appeal to emotion can possibly be successful in engaging us to enter the League of Nations is the most conclusive reason possible for our staying out of it.

II

Mr. ——[1] has combined two issues raised in my article, one the main point, the other referred to incidentally, and in one paragraph. The matter I was mainly discussing was the tone and temper, moral and intellectual, of the current arguments in behalf of our joining the League. The other point is the objective merits of the League. In combining the two he has failed, as far as I can see, to get such force as my article may have had, to refute its contention.

It is an intelligible proposition that, even if the League had claims upon this country which personally I do not believe it has, the purposes of our entrance into it might be compromised and even frustrated by the mental and moral state of mind, in Europe and in this country, that attended our going in. No thoughtful person will now deny, I suppose, that the reasons which governed a small group in this country in leading them to advocate our entering into the late war were not shared by the mass of people in this country before or after we went in, and were very different from those which animated the ruling statesmen of our Allies in desiring to get us in. The result was when the war aims were gained, the peace aims were lost. The present seems to me closely to parallel the former situation. For one I have no desire to see the mistake repeated.

Take the European side of the state of mind. Piously speaking, the ruling statesmen of Europe, of course, do not wish war. But neither do they wish to avoid it enough to lead them to reduce armaments, balance budgets, straighten out their affairs, and try to create a decently stable and amicable Europe. Under these circumstances, I submit that we should distrust the motives of some of the Europeans who are anxious to have us get into their politics. They want us now for the same reason that they wanted us during the war—to add power to *their* policies. There are others of whom this is not true;

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[1] From *The New Republic*, March 28, 1923. Since the letter of the critical correspondent is not reprinted here, his name has been omitted and all other references to him have been deleted.—Ed.

they are desperate because they realize the desperate state of Europe. We are entitled, however, to discount their desire until Europe shows some evidence that it is coming to their point of view. In any case they are naturally—and quite properly—looking at the matter from the standpoint of Europe. What happens to us in case our entrance makes things no better is not their affair. But it *is* our affair.

A Europe which is divided against itself on every important issue is not a Europe in which we are likely to reduce appreciably the risk of war, and it is a Europe in which we intervene at our own peril, at the peril of becoming entangled in the old problems of the balance—that is, the preponderance—of power. It is perhaps irrelevant to the present writing, but I think it is time that we told the European propagandists who are lecturing us both on our morality and our own best interests that they have a more pressing field of labor in both these respects at home.

These considerations would hold good, even if the American people were prepared to assume the responsibilities urged upon us. The dangers of our entrance would still be enormous. But when we are divided in sentiment and sympathy, when we have no worked-out policy shared by any large number of even the more intelligent part of our electorate, when we are ignorant and inexperienced in foreign affairs, it appears to many of us to be more than dangerous: to be gratuitous folly.

As for the merits of the League upon which point the article spoke only briefly: In any case, it is necessary to distinguish between such merits as the League may have for European countries and merits of such transcendent character as to demand our entering it. One may wish it well for Europe and rejoice in every stabilizing influence it may exert. Admit all the claims for its accomplishments that have been made, and there is still no reason given why *we* should enter into it. But even as a European affair certain main facts stand out.

(1) It is tied up with the Treaty at Versailles; hardly a clause in it is free from entanglement with the iniquities of

that Treaty. And its constitution cannot be changed without a unanimous vote. If we can do anything to mitigate these evils, let us do it. But we assuredly can do more while we are free than after we have tied our hands by joining the League. If we can do nothing now, we could do less than nothing then.

(2) The war-breeding issues in Europe are obviously reparations, the Ruhr, and the Near Eastern question. None of these questions has been touched by the League. The judgment of "neutral" nations is most distinctly not wanted. When we are told that Europe wants and will welcome our "initiative and guidance," we wish to know when the age of miracles returned.

(3) France, the dominant nation on the continent, has never disguised her scepticism about the League. She affords a striking example of the fact that the old policies and the old type of politicians are still absolutely in control. But suppose we turn to Great Britain from which now proceeds the most active propaganda for our joining. It can escape the attention of no one that the British no longer speak of American cooperation. "American intervention" is now the uniform phrase. It has the merit of honesty.

(4) The League is *not* honestly named. It is a League of governments pure and simple.

There is one point upon which I should like to say an added word—the permanent court of international justice. The resolution of Senator Borah was before the Senate before President Harding and Secretary Hughes moved. That resolution calls for a court with "affirmative jurisdiction" and a court based upon a codification of International Law which makes war a public crime.

It also provides for adopting and adapting any existing machinery as far as that carries out in part the idea of the resolution. Here is a practicable measure of union of the forces of peace for cooperation. The existing court has no independent jurisdiction; worse than that it is based on an international law which legitimizes war as a final resort. As far as I know no one has answered the argument of Senator Knox showing that the constitution of the present League makes war permissible in six cases and mandatory in three others. And this is offered as the only road to peace! I am confident that mere partisanship will not prevent sincere lovers of peace from getting behind the proposals of Senator Borah.

15. FORCE AND IDEALS[1]

It will be recalled that the decision of the Versailles Conference as to Japan's claims in China was announced at the end of April. A few weeks after this time, when I was giving some lectures in one of the chief educational centers of China, the teachers and students were asked to hand in questions in writing. They responded in large numbers. The question asked most frequently, repeated over and over again in different terms, ran about as follows: "During the war we were led to believe that with the defeat of Germany there would be established a new international order based on justice to all; that might would not henceforth make right in deciding questions between nations; that weak nations would get the same treatment as powerful ones—that, indeed, the war was fought to establish the equal rights of all nations, independently of their size or armed power. Since the decision of the peace conference shows that between nations might still makes right, that the strong nation gets its own way against a weak nation, is it not necessary for China to take steps to develop military power, and for this purpose should not military training be made a regular part of its educational system?" At every educational gathering since, this question has been uppermost.

The matter is not referred to here for discussion in connection with China. China can become a strong nation only through industrial and economic development. Any military efforts, apart from this development, would only prolong the present chaos, and at most create an hallucination as to national power. The implications, however, of the question come home to every one who favored the participation of the United States in the war on what are termed idealistic grounds. It comes with especial force to those who, strongly opposed to war in general, broke with the pacifists because they saw in this war a means of realizing pacific ideals—the practical reduction of armaments, the abolition of secret and oligarchic diplomacy and of special alliances, the substitution of inquiry and discussion for intrigue and threats, the founding, through the destruction of the most powerful autocracy, of a democratically ordered international government, and the consequent beginning of the end of war. Once having taken sides, vanity is enlisted. As President Wilson is moved to "make the best" of the actual outcome, so all those who favored America's action in the war from idealistic reasons are tempted to make the best of its outcome. And "making the best of it" means blurring over disagreeable features so as to salve vanity. Consequently the pacifists who were converted to war are obliged to undertake an unusually searching inquiry into the actual results in their relation to their earlier professions and beliefs. Were not those right who held that it was self-contradictory to try to further the permanent ideals of peace by recourse to war? Was not he who thought they might thus be promoted one of the gullible throng who swallowed the cant of idealism as a sugar coating for the bitter core of violence and greed? Is the pacifist *a l'outrance*, the absolutist of peace, the only one who can make a valid claim to untarnished idealism? Have the ideals of humanity, of self-determination, justice to the weak, been hopelessly discredited through being inscribed?

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Oct. 8, 1919; published under the title *The Discrediting of Idealism.*

The defeat of idealistic aims has been, without exaggeration, enormous. The consistent pacifist has much to urge now in his own justification; he is entitled to his flourish of private triumphings. Superficially, his opponent—I mean the one who placed himself also on idealistic ground—has not much to urge except the scant though true plea that things would have been much worse if Germany had won, as she would have done without the participation of the United States. The defeat, however, is the defeat which will always come to idealism that is not backed up by intelligence and by force—or, better, by an intelligent use of force. It may seem like a petty attempt to get back at the pacifist to say that the present defeat of the war ideals of the United States is due to the fact that America's use of "force to the uttermost, force without stint," still suffered from the taint of complacent and emotional pacifism. But it may fairly be argued that the real cause of the defeat is the failure to use force adequately and intelligently. The ideals of the United States have been defeated in the settlement because we took into the war our sentimentalism, our attachment to moral sentiments as efficacious powers, our pious optimism as to the inevitable victory of the "right," our childish belief that physical energy can do the work that only intelligence can do, our evangelical hypocrisy that morals and "ideals" have a self-propelling and self-executing capacity.

If the principle of force to the limit had been in operation in behalf of our ideals, complete information would have been had at an early date regarding the secret agreements that were outstanding, and our share in the war would have been made to depend upon a clearing of the decks. This would have shown distrust of our Allies, and an ungenerous wish to take advantage of the hour of their critical need of our help? There speaks our inveterate sentimentalism, our unwillingness to use the force at hand in support of our ideals. Either we and our Allies were fighting for the same ends or we were not. There was no moral generosity in putting them in a position of willingness to use our help for professed democratic ends when in reality they were to use it for imperialistic ends. On our side, if we had had a tenth of the faith in concrete intelligence used at the right juncture that we had in fine phrases, many of the obstacles to securing at the end a peace in accord with our idealism would have been swept away in the earlier months of 1917. It is exceedingly silly to regard as a failure of idealism what ought rather to be charged against our own lack of common sense.

Past history would have shown what any knowledge of the present situation confirms—that the type of man brought forward by war is not the type needed to make peace. The urgencies of war bring to the front the kind of man who can make quick decisions in the face of immediate pressure of circumstance. Such statesmen are bound to be of the aggressive and quasi-gambling type. At best they represent the government of war, not the pursuits of normal peace with its long-time interests and consequences. Mr. Norman Angell and a few others, but Mr. Angell especially, taught all during the war the indispensable necessity of provision for popular representation at the peace conference. Everybody who heard him was impressed with the reasonableness of the proposition. But nothing was done. Was this an intelligent use of the force at our command?

President Wilson as a peacemaker is the exception that proves the rule. Owing to the accidents of our electoral and party system, he was the one figure in the Councils who had not been given his place and influence by the exigencies of war. He represented, and upon the whole with more than ordinary representative capacity, the normal interests of men and governments in times of peace. Yet in essentials he was overruled. Why? Because it was thought that, by some magic, dumb millions could be given effective voice through him. He seems to have thought that, contrary to all experience of representative government, he could "represent" the unrepresented interests of the common people whose main concern is with peace, not war. It would be difficult to imagine any greater travesty on the use of force to the uttermost than the idea that one man could secure a just decision by appealing *a la improvisatore* over the heads of diplomats to the unorganized, scattered and unenlightened peoples of the earth. When he became inclined to act in this way the diplomats had only to point out to him that he would thereby decrease the waning power of governmental authority, increase popular unrest, and run the risk of plunging Europe into the chaos of political revolutions. After that, he could not even speak effectually for himself, to say nothing of "representing" the unrepresented peoples of the earth. He made his popular appeal in the case of Fiume, indeed, but its chief tangible effect was to strengthen Imperial Japan in its encroachments upon the people of China.

There is another force, an immense force, which might have been used in behalf of the war ideals of the United States, a force which might still be employed though less effectually. There is the economic and financial force of the United States. It may be doubted whether the world has ever seen such a spectacle as that of the last few years. The United States has extended money and credit almost "without stint" to governments of Europe irrespective of whether they were supporting the announced policies of the United States, nay, even when those governments were doing what they could to undermine American ends. And doubtless the average American has taken pride in this fact. We are so generous, so disinterested, that we do not bargain or impose conditions. In short we are so childishly immature, so careless of our professed ideals, that we prefer a reputation for doing the grand seigneur act to the realization of our national aims. This is the acme of our sentimentalism. Can we blame the European statesmen if to put it with blank vulgarity they play us for suckers?

Such considerations as these, which might be indefinitely multiplied, show that not idealism but *our* idealism is discredited, an idealism of vague sentiments and good intentions, isolated from judgment as to the effective use of the force in our hands. It may be said that this is not our fault, but President Wilson's. There are a few who are entitled to the benefit of this plea, but only a few. President Wilson is a scapegoat convenient to save our vanity. But he successfully appealed to the American people and led them.

If they—if we—had been different, he would have had to use different methods to get results. History will probably record that his idealistic speeches corresponded to the spirit of the American people; and that the blame which belongs to him is not that of betraying the American spirit but of embodying its weaknesses too faithfully. Take one example. The use of force in behalf of our professed ideals would certainly have involved the use of all the thinking, speaking and writing of the liberals and radicals who in the end could alone give sympathetic and intelligent support to the aims eloquently set forth by President Wilson. Instead, we had a policy of suppression of free speech, of espionage, and of encouragement of the violent unrestraint characteristic of the reactionary. It is easy to blame for this Mr. Wilson's personal desire to play the part of Atlas supporting alone the universe of free ideals. An accomplice his conceit assuredly was, but the American people who revelled in emotionalism and who grovelled in sacrifice of its liberties is the responsible cause. Immaturity and inexperience in international affairs consequent upon our isolation mitigate the blame. But they would not have taken the form they took were it not for our traditional evangelical trust in morals apart from intelligence, and in ideals apart from executive and engineering force. Our Christianity has become identified with vague feeling and with an optimism which we think is a sign of a pious faith in Providence but which in reality is a trust in luck, a deification of the feeling of success regardless of any intelligent discrimination of the nature of success.

It may be that the words idealism and ideals will have to go—that they are hopelessly discredited. It may be that they will become synonyms for romanticism, for blind sentimentalism, for faith in mere good intentions, or that they will come to be regarded as decorative verbal screens behind which to conduct sinister plans. But the issue is real, not verbal. There remains a difference between narrow and partial ends and full and far reaching ends; between the success of the few for the moment and the happiness of the many for an enduring time; a difference between identifying happiness with the elements of a meagre and hard life and those of a varied and free life. This is the only difference between materialism and idealism that counts. And until we act persistently upon the fact that the difference depends upon the use of force and that force can be directed only by intelligence, we shall continue to dwell in a world where the difference between materialism and idealism will be thought to be a matter of opinion, argument and personal taste. To go on opposing ideals and force to each other is to perpetuate this régime. The issue is not that of indulging in ideals versus using force in a realistic way. As long as we make this opposition we render our ideals impotent, and we play into the hands of those who conceive force as primarily military. Our idealism will never prosper until it rests upon the organization and resolute use of the greater forces of modern life: industry, commerce, finance, scientific inquiry and discussion and the actualities of human companionship.

16. FORCE, VIOLENCE AND LAW[1]

What is force, and what are we going to do with it? This, I am inclined to think, is the acute question of social philosophy in a world like that of to-day. A generation which has beheld the most stupendous manifestation of force in all history is not going to be content unless it has found some answer to the question this exhibition has stirred into being. Having witnessed the spectacle of continuous wholesale bombing, can we henceforth reprimand the sporadic and private bombing of the anarchist without putting our tongues in our cheeks? Or shall we say that he is right in principle, but wrong just in that his exercise of force is casual and personal, not collective and organized? We are to "prepare." How are we to decide whether this willingness to resort to the threat of force is a pledge of the final loyalty to ideals, or an evidence of growing contempt for the precious fruits of human labor, the only things which stand between us and the brutes? Is force the highest kind of laborious industry or is it the negation of industry?

We cannot ask this about war without being led to extend our questioning. Once we have uttered the question, everything in civilization throws it back at us. From the barracks it is but a step to the police court and the jail. Behind the prison rises the smoke of the factory, and from the factory roads lead to the counting-house and the bank. Is our civic life other than a disguised struggle of brute forces? Are the policeman and the jailer the true guardians and representatives of the social order? Is our industrial life other than a continued combat to sift the strong and the weak, a war where only external arms and armor are changed? Is the state itself anything but organized force? In the seventeenth century political theorists talked frankly in terms of force and power. We have invented a more polite terminology. Much is now said of the common will and consciousness; the state figures as a moral personality, or at least as a juridical one. Hasn't our thinking lost in clearness and definiteness as our language has become more sentimentally courteous?

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Jan. 22, 1916.

Yet common sense still clings to a *via media* between the Tolstoian, to whom all force is violence and all violence evil, and that glorification of force which is so easy when war arouses turbulent emotion, and so persistent (in disguised forms) whenever competition rules industry. I should be glad to make the voice of common sense more articulate. As an initial aid, I would call to mind the fact that force figures in different rôles. Sometimes it is energy; sometimes it is coercion or constraint; sometimes it is violence. Energy is power used with a eulogistic meaning; it is power of doing work, harnessed to accomplishment of ends. But it is force none the less—brute force if you please, and rationalized only by its results. Exactly the same force running wild is called violence. The objection to violence is not that it involves the use of force, but that it is a waste of force; that it uses force idly or destructively. And what is called law may always, I suggest, be looked at as describing a method for employing force economically, efficiently, so as to get results with the least waste.

No matter what idealists and optimists say, the energy of the world, the number of forces at disposal, is plural, not unified. There are different centers of force and they go their ways independently. They come into conflict; they clash. Energy which would otherwise be used in effecting something is then used up in friction; it goes to waste. Two men may be equally engaged about their respective businesses, and their businesses may be equally reputable and important, and yet there may be no harmony in their expenditures of energy. They are driving opposite ways on the road and their vehicles collide. The subsequent waste in quarreling is as certain as the immediate waste in a smash-up. The rule that each shall turn to the right is a plan for organizing otherwise independent and potentially conflicting energies into a scheme which avoids waste, a scheme allowing a maximum utilization of energy. Such, if I mistake not, is the true purport of all law.

Either I am mistaken, or those persons who are clamoring for the "substitution of law for force" have their language, at least, badly mixed. And a continuous use of mixed language is likely to produce a harmful mixture in ideas. Force is the only thing in the world which effects anything, and literally to substitute law for force would be as intelligent as to try to run an engine on the mathematical formula which states its most efficient running. Doubtless those who use the phrase have their hearts in the right place; they mean some method of regulating the expenditure of force which will avoid the wastes incident to present methods. But too often the phrase is bound up with intellectual confusion. There is a genuine emotional animosity to the very idea of force. The "philosophy of force" is alluded to scornfully or indignantly—which is somewhat as if an engineer should speak deprecatingly of the science of energy.

At various times of my life I have, with other wearied souls, assisted at discussions between those who were Tolstoians and —well, those who weren't. In reply to the agitated protests of the former against war and the police and penal measures, I have listened to the time-honored queries about what you should do when the criminal attacked your friend or child. I have rarely heard it stated that since one cannot even walk the street without using force, the only question which persons can discuss with one another concerns the most effective use of force in gaining ends in specific situations. If one's end is the saving of one's soul immaculate, or maintaining a certain emotion unimpaired, doubtless force should be used to inhibit natural muscular reactions. If the end is something else, a hearty fisticuff may be the means of realizing it. What is intolerable is that men should condemn or eulogize force at large, irrespective of its use as a means of getting results. To be interested in ends and to have contempt for the means which alone secure them is the last stage of intellectual demoralization.

It is hostility to force as force, to force intrinsically, which has rendered the peace movement so largely an anti-movement, with all the weaknesses which appertain to everything that is primarily anti-anything. Unable to conceive the task of organizing the existing forces so they may achieve their greatest efficiency, pacifists have had little recourse save to decry evil emotions and evil-minded men as the causes of war. Belief that war springs from the emotions of hate, pugnacity and greed rather than from the objective causes which call these emotions into play reduces the peace movement to the futile plane of hortatory preaching. The avarice of munition-makers, the love of some newspapers for exciting news, and the depravity of the anonymous human heart doubtless play a part in the generation of war. But they take a hand in bringing on war only because there are specific defects in the organization of the energies of men in society which give them occasion and stimulation.

If law or rule is simply a device for securing such a distribution of forces as keeps them from conflicting with one another, the discovery of a new social arrangement is the first step in substituting law for war. The ordinary pacifist's method is like trying to avoid conflict in the use of the road by telling men to love one another, instead of by instituting a rule of the road. Until pacifism puts its faith in constructive, inventive intelligence instead of in appeal to emotions and in exhortation, the disparate unorganized forces of the world will continue to develop outbreaks of violence.

The principle cuts, however, two ways. I know of no word more often deprived of meaning and reduced to a mere emotional counter than the word "end," of which I have made free use. Men appeal to ends to justify their resort to force when they mean by ends only footless desires. An end is something which concerns results rather than aspirations. We justify the use of force in the name of justice when dealing with criminals in our infantilely barbaric penal methods. But unless its use is actually an effective and economical means of securing specific results, we are using violence to relieve our immediate impulses and to save ourselves the labor of thought and construction. So men justify war in behalf of words which would be empty were they not charged with emotional force—words like honor, liberty, civilization, divine purpose and destiny—forgetting that a war, like anything else, has specific concrete results on earth. Unless war can be shown to be the most economical method of securing the results which are desirable with a minimum of the undesirable results, it marks waste and loss: it must be adjudged a violence, not a use of force. The terms honor, liberty, future of civilization, justice, become sentimental phantasies of the same order as the catchwords of the professional pacifist. Their emotional force may keep men going, but they throw no light on the goal nor on the way traveled.

I would not wish to cast doubt on anything which aims to perceive facts and to act on their light. The conception of an international league to enforce peace, an international police force, has about it a flavor of reality. Nevertheless force is efficient socially not when imposed upon a scene from without, but when it is an organization of the forces *in* the scene. We do not enjoy common interests and amicable intercourse in this country because our fathers instituted a United States and armed it with executive force. The formation of the United States took place because of the community of interests and the amicable intercourse already existent. Doubtless its formation facilitated and accelerated the various forces which it concentrated, but no amount of force possessed by it could have imposed commerce, travel, unity of tradition and outlook upon the thirteen states. It was their union, their organization. And no league to enforce peace will fare prosperously save as it is the natural accompaniment of a constructive adjustment of the concrete interests which are already at work. Not merely the glorification of either war or peace for their own sakes, but equally the glorification of diplomacy, prestige, national standing and power and international tribunals at large, tends to keep men's thoughts engaged with emotional abstractions, and turns them away from the perception of the particular forces which have to be related. The passage of force under law occurs only when all the cards are on the table, when the objective facts which bring conflicts in their train are acknowledged, and when intelligence is used to devise mechanisms which will afford to the forces at work all the satisfaction that conditions permit.

17. AMERICA AND THE WORLD[1]

There seems to be a little irony in the fact that upon Washington's Birthday the topic most apt for discussion is connected with the participation of America in a world war. Instead of a little strip of territory sparsely populated, able to maintain its own with the great nations of the world chiefly because of the advantage of remoteness, we are now a continental state, able to confer with the nations of the world on equal terms. While once there was enough to do in conquering a wilderness, we have now come to the end of the pioneer period, and have a margin of energy to draw upon.

The change has, of course, been brought about by that same development of industry and commerce which has annihilated distance, drawn all peoples into closer relations, and made the affairs and interests of one nation the concern of all, for weal or for woe. The fact that the interdependence which the new industry and the new methods of transportation and intercommunication have brought about should first reveal itself in strains and alignments for conflict does not alter the essential fact that the world for the first time now finds itself a round world, politically and economically as well as astronomically. That nations from every continent on the globe are engaged in the war is the outer sign of the new world struggling to be delivered.

It is a commonplace that whatever else the war means, it signifies for our own country the end of its period of isolation. Whether for better or for worse, America is no longer a people unto itself. America is now in the world. Unless this change of position is to mean that we are to be affected by the jealousies, the intrigues, and hostilities which have marked other nations longer in the world, we must see to it that those other nations accept and are influenced by the American idea rather than ourselves by the European idea. Of late we have been afflicted with national bashfulness, with a shy self-consciousness as to noting even that there is an American idea, lest we be guilty of spread-eagleism. We have assumed a self-depreciatory, almost apologetic, attitude towards the rest of the world. But unless our contribution to the present world struggle is to be confined to military and economic force, it must be that we have an idea to contribute, an idea to be taken into account in the world reconstruction after the war. What are the important aspects of this idea?

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[1] From *The Nation*, March 14, 1918; from an address delivered at Smith College on Washington's Birthday; published under the title *America in the World.*

Politically, federation; *e pluribus unum*, where the unity does not destroy the many, but maintains each constituent factor in full vigor. It is not accident that the conceptions of a world federation, a concert of nations, a supreme tribunal, a league of nations to enforce peace, are peculiarly American contributions. They are conceptions which spring directly out of our own experience, which we have already worked out and tested on a smaller scale in our own political life. Leaders of other nations may regard them as iridescent dreams; we know better, for we have actually tried them.

One of the greatest problems which is troubling the old world is that of the rights of nationalities which are included within larger political units—the Poles, the Irish, the Bohemians, the Jugo-Slavs, the Jews. Here, too, the American contribution is radical. We have solved the problem by a complete separation of nationality from citizenship. Not only have we separated the church from the state, but we have separated language, cultural traditions, all that is called race, from the state—that is, from problems of political organization and power. To us language, literature, creed, group ways, national culture, are social rather than political, human rather than national, interests. Let this idea fly abroad; it bears healing in its wings.

Federation, and release of cultural interests from political dictation and control, are the two great positive achievements of America. From them spring the other qualities which give distinction and inspiration to the American idea. We are truly interracial and international in our own internal constitution. The very peoples and races who are taught in the Old World that they have an instinctive and ineradicable antipathy to one another live here side by side, in comity, often in hearty amity. We have become a peace-loving nation both because there are no strong Powers close to our borders and because the diversified elements of our people have meant hope, opportunity, release of virile powers from subjection to dread, for use in companionship and unconstrained rivalries. Our uncoerced life has been at liberty to direct itself into channels of toleration, a general spirit of live and let live. Since our minds have not been constantly impressed with the idea that the growth of another power means the decay of our own, we have been emancipated to enjoy sharing in the struggles which exist wherever there is life, and to take its incidental defeats in good humor.

In working out to realization the ideas of federation and of the liberation of human interests from political domination we have been, as it were, a laboratory set aside from the rest of the world in which to make, for its benefit, a great social experiment. The war, the removal of the curtain of isolation, means that this period of experimentation is over. We are now called to declare to all the world the nature and fruits of this experiment, to declare it not by words or books, but by exhibiting the two primary conditions under which the world may achieve the happiness of a peace which is not the mere absence of war, but which is fruit-bearing concord. That we should have lost something of our spirit of boasting about our material greatness is a fine thing. But we need to recover something of the militant faith of our forefathers that America is a great idea, and add to it an ardent faith in our capacity to lead the world to see what this idea means as a model for its own future well-being.

18. MORALS AND THE CONDUCT OF STATES[1]

In his article on the legal status of war, Mr. Levinson pointed out that according to the older theory of personal relations and the still prevailing theory of national relations, lower interests, material and mundane affairs, may be discussed, and adjudicated, while conflicts in higher interests, ideal and spiritual affairs, must be settled by armed force in duel or war. Swift himself never conceived such irony. Comment or amplification can only detract from the completeness of the picture of a world morally upside down. Mr. Levinson's further suggestion of some supernational organization based upon a preliminary outlawing of war suggests, however, a question of morals which may well be discussed. What is the cause of the present separation of private and public morals? What will be the moral consequences of an assimilation of national and private codes to each other?

Lamentations as to the gulf which divides the working ethical principles of nations from those animating decent individuals are copious. But they express the pious rather than the efficacious wish of those who indulge in them. They overlook the central fact that morals are relative to social organization. Individuals have to be moral because they can be. They can be because they are partakers in modes of associated life which confer powers and impose responsibilities upon them. States are non-moral in their activities just because of the absence of an inclusive society which defines and establishes rights. Hence they are left to their own devices, secret and violent if need is deemed imminent, in judging and asserting their rights and obligations. The distance which separates the code of intrigue and conquest permissible to nations from the code exacted of persons measures the significance for morals of social organization. The nations exist with respect to one another in what the older writers called a state of nature, not in a social or political state.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* March 23, 1918.

The not infrequent saying that international law expresses not true but only moral law is a striking indication of the widespread absence of scientific understanding of morals. The actual fact is that until nations are bound together by the law of a social order there cannot be any truly moral obligations existing among them. The attempt on the part of a particular nation to conceive of its relations with other nations in genuinely moral terms may be a source of weakness. The bald enunciation of any such position as this is, very properly, shocking. The frank acceptance of the double standard of conduct on the part of Germany has seemed to other nations to be an example of that abolition of all morality commonly known as Machiavellianism. But this attitude of abhorrence is effective only in the degree in which it marks an aspiration for the establishment of a social order among nations wherever moral relations may obtain. The moral deadliness of the assertion of a "higher" morality for a nation lies in its cynical contempt for the possibility of a society of nations where moral regulations would exist. Conversely, if the conception of a federated concert of nations obtains more widely and ardently in America than elsewhere it is not because we are so much more moral than others that we can conceive of a higher social state; it is rather that being more highly socialized we can conceive of a new morality.

The plea that nations *ought* to regulate themselves by the moral code which obtains among individuals is likely to degenerate into a sentimentalism which projects action on the base of wishes instead of facts. It escapes this sentimentalism only as it is a symptom of a discontent with the present social order which will momentarily express itself in a demand for a new social organization. To indulge in vituperations at the wickedness of war and in asseverations of the obligations of states to act upon the basis of the most enlightened code is merely to permit one's self a Pharisaic luxury—unless one is willing to fight for the establishment of a social organization which will make moral responsibilities and regulations a fact.

We are still incredibly subjectivistic in our moral ideas. The common assumption of the Protestant world is that men are gifted as individuals with conscience and that this conscience brings into existence acts and social relations which may approximate its high dictates. So far as anything objective, anything external to the individual is recognized it is usually something supernatural, God or some of those mitigated substitutes for theological supernaturalism which modern thought calls transcendental absolutes and values. A pacifist clergyman in California recently proclaimed his supreme right to follow not only for himself but for propaganda among others the dictates of his own conscience even when they brought him into conflict with the law of the land: his right to do it not only in the sense of willingness to stand the penalties which would follow, but in the sense that the state had no right to inflict any penalties if he chose to obey what his conscience told him was the law of God. He doubtless offended the loyalty of thousands of his fellow citizens. It may be doubted how many of them recognized that he was asserting the essence of moral anarchy, by which I mean a course which would not only lead to practical anarchy but to a destruction of all moral distinctions whatever. For "conscience," that is the aggregate of the moral sentiments and ideas of man, is not the author and judge of social institutions, but the product and reflex of the latter. They are functions of social organization. They reflect criticism of the existing social order as well as approval of it. But in this capacity they are heralds of a changed social order. They are significant only as they become the pivots about which turn active efforts for the reconstruction of the social order. The notion that it is possible to get bodies of men to act in accord with finer moral sentiments while the general scheme of social organization remains the same is not only futile, it is a mark of the subtlest form of conceit, moral egotism.

If only there were a general recognition of the dependence of moral control upon social order, all of the sentiment and well-wishing opinion that is now dissipated would be centred. It would aim at the establishment of a definitely organized federation of nations not merely in order that certain moral obligations might be effectively enforced but in order that a variety of obligations might come into existence. The weakness on the ethical side of previous discussions of international courts and leagues has been that these have so largely assumed that moral considerations are already adequately cared for, and that it remains only to give them, through proper agencies, legal effect. The result was that moral enthusiasm was no sooner aroused than it was chilled by finding only legal technicalities with which to occupy itself, more international laws, treaties, courts, diplomats and lawyers. It wanted machinery to propel a great new idea and it found itself confronting additions to make the old machinery work better, to keep going the old idea of ultimate national sovereignty and irresponsibility. It found itself confronted with negative provisions for making war more difficult to enter upon, but which refrained from dealing in any positively organized way with those defects in social organization from which wars proceed. All proposals short of a league of nations whose object is not the negative one of preventing war but the positive one of looking after economic and social needs which are now at the mercy of chance and the voracity of isolated states, assume that war is the effect of bellicosity—which is exactly on the intellectual level of the famous idea that it is the dormitive power of opium which puts men to sleep.

Warlikeness is not of itself the cause of war; a clash of interests due to absence of organization is its cause. A supernational organization which oversees, obviates and adjusts these clashes, an organization which, as Mr. Levinson points out, is possible only with coincident outlawing of war itself, will focus moral energies now scattered and make operative moral ideas now futile. It will align the moral code of state behavior with the best which obtains as to personal conduct. But it will do more than that. It will give personal conscience a new stay and outlook. It will permit the social principle which is the heart of all morals to find full instead of hampered expression; it will enable it to be courageous because consistent. It will generalize that secularization or humanization of morals which is now so halting and vagrant that it leads many persons to escape supernaturalism only to land in a half-suppressed scepticism as to the possibility of any intelligent and objective morals, anything beyond social convention on one hand and personal taste on the other.

When I said that it is mere sentimentalism to deplore the deviation of the moral standard of states from that of persons unless one is willing to fight for a social organization which will permit moral relations and regulations to exist, I meant fight in every sense of the word. War to put a stop to war is no new thing. History shows a multitude of wars which have have been professedly waged in order that a future war should not arrive. History also shows that as a pacifist, Mars has not been a success. But a war waged to establish an international order and by that means to outlaw war is something hitherto unknown. In just the degree in which the American conception of the war gains force, and *this* war becomes a war for a new type of social organization, it will be a war of compelling moral import.

19. WHICH WORLD COURT SHALL WE JOIN? [1]

Our country has been favored above other nations in its geographical position and by its history. Our remoteness from the great warring countries, our size and our resources have for the most part protected us from the entanglements, the jealousies, suspicions and animosities which the long, sad centuries have decreed to Europe. With such conditions it would be a shame indeed if a spirit of good will, a spirit of amity to other nations, had not grown up among us. We are sinners above other nations when without the excuse of European nations we surrender to pride, exclusiveness, distrust and the spirit of isolation and the other tendencies that make war so easy. This situation is not a privilege to be enjoyed; it is a trust which we have to use for the welfare of the nations of the world. It is an opportunity, and an opportunity that imposes a responsibility.

We have, to be sure, an economic interest in the peace of the world, since peaceful and industrious nations make the best and safest customers. I would not belittle any motive that tends toward peace. But we have an interest in the peace of the world deeper and broader than that which self-interest dictates. We are bound by the history and spirit of our position in the world, and the law of *noblesse oblige*—the law that urges that every human being shall use his advantages and privileges not for his own enjoyment alone, but as well for the aid and service of his neighbors—lies more heavily upon us than it does upon any other nation that has ever existed. If we should be recreant to this trust we prove ourselves unworthy of our past and of our opportunity.

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[1] From *The Christian Century*, Oct. 18, 1923; an address in debate with Manly O. Hudson under the auspices of the *Unitarian Laymen's League* in Boston, May 21, 1923; published from the corrected and approved stenographic report under the title *Shall the United States Join the World Court?*

I believe that, upon the whole, our fellow-countrymen have a feeling for this fact. There are blots upon our escutcheon in our international relations. There are blots, unfortunately, still forming, in our dealings with weaker nations, especially to our south. But as yet I am not ready to admit that the American people is lacking in a profound fund of international good will or in the desire to make that effective in action. Our American idealism is not dead, it is not even sleeping; but it is confused, distracted, perplexed. The reason is obvious. It was given a channel of expression in which its manifestation was frustrated, and since then it has not known where to turn or what to try out. It has retired, discouraged, into itself. It has found itself blocked in the manifestation of its will to enter into co-operative relations with European nations; that will has been blocked by the hatreds and intrigues of the political order of Europe, embodied in its diplomacies, its foreign offices and its conference of ambassadors. The disorder of European international relations, including treaties and international law, centers about the war system.

We have the word of Lord Robert Cecil for it that the warmongers are still active in Europe; that the standing armies and navies of Europe are larger than they were before the war; that the budgets devoted to war purposes in Europe, the money raised by taxation of the people for the support of armies and navies, is greater to-day than it was before the late war, in spite of the overwhelming triumph of the allies, the broken power of the prostrate enemies, and the absence of anybody in sight against whom this increase of military and naval power is to be directed. Naturally, under such circumstances American idealism has been discouraged and is waiting for something that will unite its desire to assist in a real reign of international amity and peace. It is waiting for the discovery of a channel through which it can operate, a channel that does not conduct to the political system of Europe which is at bottom bound up at every point with the war system—a system of deceit and intrigue, predation and violence. Such a proposition has at last been put before the American people. Its short name is the Outlawry of War.

This name denotes more than a sentiment of moral justice. It denotes a general plan consisting of a few simple, understandable principles. War is not merely thought of and denounced as criminal; it is to be made a public crime by international law. It is not outlawed by rhetorical resolutions passed by either peace societies or parliaments. A judicial substitute for wars as a method of settling disputes is to be created in the form of a supreme court of justice of the world, which will be a real supreme court of justice for and of the world and not the kind of thing to which the phraseology of the story of Voltaire is so readily applied that I will not go out of my way to apply it to the so-called permanent court of international justice. A judicial substitute for wars as a method of settling disputes is created in the form of a supreme court of the nations of the world, the court sitting and deciding cases under and by an international law that has made war a crime and the instigators or breeders of war as much criminals as any other kind of murderers that now infest the earth.

The appeal to law and the court seems to many at first sight cold and dry. There is little glamor about it. Its appeal is to judgment rather than to mere feeling. At second sight, however, it seems to many chimerical; good, but too good to be true. After a period of feeling that it does not amount to much of anything, there is likely to come a feeling that it amounts to altogether too much to be practical. But from personal experience I feel that if any one allows the idea to stay in his mind, there will come a third period when the notion is understood, and that understanding it is equivalent to its hearty and enthusiastic acceptance—at least its acceptance by all who believe that the war system is the world's present greatest evil.

The only contribution that I can make to the present discussion is to do what I shall be able to do in a weak way to bring about a better understanding of the proposition. If I can succeed in any way in furthering this understanding, I am more than willing to leave subsequent developments to your own intelligent consciences. The gist of the plan may be got at most readily by considering the proposition for the world court. And I hope you will not think that I have come here to oppose a proposition for a world court, or for America's share in it. I have come here to plead for a real world court, a supreme court to substitute judicial decisions for war as a method of settling disputes among nations. It is natural, it is inevitable, that disputes, controversies, conflicts of interest and opinion shall arise between nations as between persons. Now to settle disputes *finally*, whether they are between nations or individuals, the experiences and wisdom of the world have found two methods, and only two. One is the way of the law and courts; the other is the way of violence and lawlessness. In private controversies the former way is now established. In disputes among nations the way of violence is equally established. The word "established" is used advisedly. The evils of particular wars tend to blind us to a particular fact, namely, that the world lives to-day under a war system; a system entrenched in politics, in diplomacy, in existing international law and in every court that sits under existing international law.

The proposition, then, is not the moral proposition to abolish wars. It is the much more fundamental proposition to abolish the war system as an authorized and legally sanctioned institution. The first idea is either utopian at present or merely sentiment. This other proposition, to abolish the war system as an authorized, established institution sanctioned by law, contemplated by law, is practical. To grant the difference between these two propositions, one simply to do away with wars and the other to eliminate the war system as the reigning system under which international politics, diplomacy and relations are conducted—to understand the difference between these two propositions is fundamental. Recourse to violence is not only *a* legitimate method for settling international disputes at present, under certain circumstances it is the only legitimate method, the ultimate reason of state.

This fact explains the futility of present courts and of serious efforts at disarmament. It expresses also the source of moral contradiction in present life. In all domestic relations resort to violence is a crime. It is practical to treat it as a crime, however, because there is an alternative method, the method of judicial trial and decision. But in international relations resort to violence is authorized, and it is authorized because of the absence of the alternative, the judicial substitute. In this region, and in this region alone among human relations, law is on the side of the use of violence. It is on the side of the use of that which everywhere else law makes a crime. And I invite you to consider the serious and fundamental nature of this contradiction between the moral sentiment of the world and the international law which it is operating under, and to ask if there is any probability that the future peace efforts of mankind are really going to be more successful in reducing or preventing war than the efforts of the past have been until this condition of things is changed. Disputes are bound to arise. If we do not want them settled by violence we have got to find some other way to settle them. And as I have said, the experiences of mankind in the past have discovered but one way, that of law administered through a court. Before any one, then, speaks lightly of law and court in this direction, he is bound to remember that when disputes assume a certain kind of intensity we know of but two ultimate ways of settling them—the one, the way of violence applied by the interested parties; the other, the way of law, applied by parties as disinterested and impartial as human nature permits to exist.

While the center of the proposition, then, lies in the idea of a real court, everything depends upon what law is applied by the court. Under what law does it operate? And recall again that the present law of nations contemplates and authorizes recourse to war. A provision of international law which outlaws recourse to war is therefore a pre-condition of a court which in a true sense shall be a true court of international law and justice. The one objection that I have heard is that a revision or the formation of international law is a laborious and slow process and that something needs to be done at once. Well, something does need to be done at once, but something that amounts to something and something that is more than a blind gesture of combined hope and desperation.

Now this something which needs to be done at once is simple and reasonably short in execution. It is largely a matter of eliminating everything from existing law that is concerned with war as a method of settling disputes. Do this, provide a court, and the remaining part of the task of perfecting and further developing the rules of intercourse and peace will naturally be taken up and worked out *pari passu* with the function of the court itself. And here, as in other practical measures, we must ask what the alternatives are. Even supposing it should take time to develop an international law which does not recognize war, I ask you, what better use can be made of the time than to employ it in this way? Or is it to be employed as Europe has been employing it since the so-called peace at Versailles, when six armed disputes since the Treaty of Versailles have shaken the system of Europe; and there are other disputes as bitter as any of these which have led to war, that are still unsettled?

I hope no one will take my word for the extent to which existing international law is bound up with war system. Consult the texts and decide for yourselves. The immortal work of Grotius is entitled *The Laws of Peace and War,*—laws of war. Two of his three books are devoted exclusively to the discussion of war and that topic spills over into the remaining book. Its relation and importance has not improved in modern treatment. Let me recall to you the situation of the last Hague conference in 1907, popularly if ironically termed a peace conference. It adopted fourteen measures, conventions, rules, relating to international conduct, of which twelve related to the conduct of war and two related to arbitration and peace. Six to one in favor of war as against the rules of peace is a fair measure of the relative importance which war and peace have shown in existing international law.

The last war certainly gave us a sufficiently impressive appearance of the farcical if it were not tragic nature of the efforts by rules of war to humanize war. In the doctrine of self-preservation, military necessity and the like, international law leaves plenty of loopholes for any ingenious nation. But the necessity of the case is that the object of a warring nation is to win the war and not to lose it by reason of humanity and politeness. The law, however, is a question of procedure as well as substance. The procedure is quite as important as its substance. Regarding substance, the resolution of Mr. Borah, which embodied the project which my good friend Mr. Levinson of Chicago has been working on for many years, provided that, war having been made a public crime by the law of nations, a code of international law or the law of nations, amplified, expanded and brought down to date, should be created and adopted. As to jurisdiction, it says that a judicial substitute for war should be created, and if existing in part, adapted and adjusted in the form and nature of an international court modeled on our federal supreme court in its jurisdiction over controversies between sovereign states; such court to possess affirmative jurisdiction to hear and decide all purely international controversies as defined by the code or arising under treaties. The adjective "affirmative," a prefix to "jurisdiction," is, as you will have gathered from the words of my friend Mr. Hudson, an important qualification. The adjective signifies that any nation, great or small, can ask to have a hearing in any controversy with any other nation, and it thus guarantees what is indispensable to anything worthy to be called a permanent court of international law and justice, namely, that disputes which are serious enough to cause war may have an opportunity to be brought before the court. This provision is indispensable, because otherwise the court in the future will do what it has done in the past—break down when it is most needed, and will function only when it is not needed in order to prevent war.

Remember what happened in 1914. Serbia admitted all the demands of Austria's ultimatum except one, and offered to submit that one point to the Hague tribunal. But that tribunal had no affirmative jurisdiction, and neither does the present court of the league. So Austria simply had to ignore, not even pay any attention to this suggestion of the other party, and we know what happened.

Supposing that John Doe and Richard Roe have a dispute and Doe suggests taking it before a court. Roe replies, "No, I prefer to settle this matter by personal combat. I don't propose to allow you to have a court hearing. I don't propose to have the court meddle in this matter at all." Would not our civil courts be a joke under such circumstances? Would we think that we really had courts of civil law and justice, or would violence reign supreme whenever any individual or group of individuals felt that they were strong enough to resort successfully to coercive force?

There is one other point of almost equal significance regarding jurisdiction. Much has been made in this discussion and the public mind in my humble judgment has been much obfuscated by the distinction between legal and non-legal disputes, justiciable and non-justiciable disputes. The effect is obfuscating, for it tends to create the impression that certain disputes are intrinsically and necessarily non-legal. But all that legal and non-legal means is that certain cases are triable and other cases are not triable; and the important thing is, who decides what cases are triable and what cases are not triable. Any kind of case becomes legal, becomes justiciable, the moment the law and the courts operating according to that law declare that that particular kind of case is a kind of case that the courts should hear and decide.

Now at present any nation can decide arbitrarily that an issue is political and therefore non-legal and non-triable. It can decide for itself that it involves national honor or a vital interest, and hence is subject to no other adjudication than that of resort to arms. A prime condition of a permanent court of international peace and justice is, then, that law and the courts, not the arbitrary will of a party, shall decide what kind of cases under what circumstances are triable by the court.

Now undoubtedly one of the chief and one of the difficult functions of those who draw up the new body of international law will be to attempt to draw the line in precisely such cases. This is a matter for experts and not for a layman like myself. But I venture the statement that if there is any real will to peace in the world, it is just those cases which are now alleged to be non-legal in nature which will be declared to be the very ones that most demand and exact the attention of the law and the court.

The third point to which I would call your attention is the question of the penalties for non-compliance with the decisions of the court, the so-called sanctions. Here again I quote the words of the resolution introduced shortly before the termination of the last session of the senate, by Senator Borah. The court is to have for the enforcement of its decrees "the same power as our federal supreme court; namely, the respect of all enlightened nations for judgments resting upon open, fair investigations, impartial decisions and the compelling force of an enlightened public opinion." The essence of that statement is that there is no effort to use armed force to enforce the decisions of the court against the recalcitrant party. In other words, the measure is logical—not merely formally logical but substantially logical in its adherence to the idea that war is a crime. It does not provide an exceptional case in which war shall be resorted to. It should not be forgotten that the use of police power against an individual who is recalcitrant is radically different from the use of power against a nation which is recalcitrant. The latter is war, no matter what name you give it. It involves the use of army and navy, of artilleries and high explosives, blockades, starvation, poison gas, submarines and aeroplane bombs. You do not make that thing the less war by giving it the polite name of police force. You cannot coerce an entire nation save by war. To outlaw war and in the same measure to provide for war is to guarantee the perpetuation of the war system.

But I do not need to dwell upon this, for the situation is the same with respect to this proposition that it is with any other proposition before the American public. I quote with much pleasure from the recent address of Secretary Hughes concerning the proposed entrance of the United States into the league court: "The truth is that the decisions of the court will have the most solemn sanction that it is practicable to obtain. When nations agree to submit a dispute to a tribunal and to abide by the decision, its observance is a point of international honor of the highest sort. You can really have no higher sanction than this, and it is one which will be all the more keenly felt when the decision is not merely one of a temporary tribunal but of a permanent court supported by practically all the nations of the world."

The case does not stand very different in the minds of its supporters from the proposition of the league of nations, as stated by Lord Robert Cecil. I shall not try to enter into all the minutiæ of the exegesis of the covenant of the league. President Wilson and Justice Clark insist that it does mean the use of force on the one hand; Lord Robert Cecil and his friends that it does not. To make one exception to the outlawry of war is to open the door to any and all war; that is Lord Robert's statement. This proposition to outlaw war as it has been outlined is positive and constructive. It is not negative. It is not hostile to any other measure having a tendency to secure the freeing of the world from the menace of the war system. I hesitate, therefore, to contrast it even by implication with any other measure. For the forces of peace we need union, not division. Existing divisions among them are among the greatest assets of those people, powerful out of all proportion to their number, who believe in war.

But, after all, a practical responsibility lies on each one of us. Each one has to ask himself whether he is expending his activities in behalf of some plan which is positive and constructive in effort, or which is divisive and so, relatively to what might be accomplished, is negative. There is no inherent rivalry between the plan proposed and the Hague court or the league court. In the passage I quoted the resolution provides that a judicial substitute for war shall be created, or, if existing in part, be adapted and adjusted. This provision opens the way to a consideration of the claims of the Hague tribunal or the league court, either or both. It will hardly be candid, however, not to point out conditions under which the two plans may become practically incompatible.

Really, the conditions have already been laid down and you can apply them for yourself to the existing proposition. The existing tribunals, whether of The Hague or the league, operate under an international law which sanctions recourse to war. That is the first difference. Secondly, these courts, either or both, possess only optional and voluntary jurisdiction. I am not lawyer enough to know exactly what optional compulsory jurisdiction means. There are some exceptions. There are some exceptions in the case of the league court where the jurisdiction is sometimes optional. But these exceptions are bound up with what to my mind is in many ways the worst feature of that court, namely, its connection with the interpretation and enforcement of the iniquities of the treaty of Versailles. As Mr. Hudson told you, without perhaps emphasizing the point quite the way I would, the cases where it has compulsory jurisdiction are the cases where disputes and treaties depend upon the Versailles treaty.

Thirdly, these existing courts operate under the full force of the distinction between legal and non-legal cases, which will deprive them of efficacy, it is safe to prophesy, whenever they are really needed to prevent war. I am not here to oppose any plan which makes for peace; I am not here in any way to get anything but instruction and enlightenment from the very straightforward and candid statement that Mr. Hudson has made. But we all have a practical issue to decide: However feeble and slight our influence may be, are we to use that influence in behalf of securing law against war or in behalf of an international law which is largely concerned with the rules of war? Shall we by the exercise of our influence declare that we are satisfied and that America is satisfied with a court which lacks effective jurisdiction, or shall we make it known that we and the United States so far as we count in the United States stand for an international law that treats war as a public crime and war-breeders as criminals?—that we stand for a real court where judicial decisions are a substitute for recourse to violence? I cannot decide these questions for you, none of us can decide them for any one else; but every person surely needs to view this situation with his best thought and candor and make up his own mind upon just where he stands.

Secretary Hoover recently endorsed the idea of Senator Borah, but he added in his Des Moines speech that it was a counsel of perfection beyond any present practicability. While I disavow any desire or intention to speak for the influence of anybody but myself, for which I am bound, whether I want to or not to assume a personal responsibility, I do question the right of Secretary Hoover or anybody else to speak for the people of the United States or the world in stating that "While I am in favor of it, the world is not ready for it yet." I do not feel so sure that I am so much better or wiser than the rest of the world to justify me in making any such statement as that.

The question is one for us to decide. Are we really against the war system, or are we against it in feeling?—do we desire to make some friendly gesture, to hold out a little finger a little way across the oceans of discord, but not ready to do something positive and soon? Are we ready to salve our conscience with a pious aspiration, some so-called "step," or do we wish to effect a significant and genuine change in international relations? Until this question has been put up to the American people and other peoples, I will not admit the insincerity of the will of the world—I do not speak of the will of the rulers and politicians of the world, but of the people of the world—the insincerity of its will against war.

The proposal before us accomplishes one good-sized step. It puts up to the people of the world—puts up for the first time in human history—a proposition which is simple, which is understandable, which is fundamental, on the basis of which the peoples of the world can record whether their will is for peace or for the continuance of the war system. And as I would again remind you, the question for our immediate and practical decision is not whether this proposition will put an end to wars, but whether we believe that it is worth while for us to make an effort, and to give the peoples of the world an opportunity to force upon the political leaders of the world the necessity of going upon record on this point. One thing is perfectly certain: If the peoples do not want war they will respond to this proposition. If, on the other hand, it should turn out they do want war, then war will continue with increasing horror. I for one do not wish to waste any further time or energy with any of these propositions which are perfectly futile if war is bound to go on.

Having heard a number of discussions and objections upon this point, I would like to ask each one of you before he commits himself to objection to the outlawry of war whether logically the objection does not imply that the war system is bound to go on? Now maybe it is, I cannot prove that it is not; but I only say that such an objection proves altogether too much, because it makes every effort, it makes every meeting and every discussion and every proposition such as we have here now or at any other time perfectly meaningless and footless, significant at most simply as a temporary relief of our own personal emotion. And meantime this proposition to outlaw war does put it up to the peoples of the world to find out whether they want the war system to continue or do not want it to continue.

I want to say one word in conclusion about a matter that I should prefer to have said nothing about, this matter of steps, steps, steps. How long have we been taking steps to do away with war, and why have they accomplished nothing? Because the steps have all been taken under the war system. It is not a step that we need, it is a right-about-face; a facing in another direction. And when we have committed ourselves to facing in another direction we have all future time to take steps in. No advance in human history that was of any great importance was ever made by taking steps along old lines. Think of that proposition. Taking steps along old lines aids in perfecting principles and methods that are already established, but they never initiate the great steps in human progress. These always come by finding a new method of attack upon the problem. The telephone was not arrived at by taking steps to perfect our vocal organs till we could shout more loudly. The self-binding reaper was not an evolution step by step out of the old hand cradle. The locomotive did not originate by improving our breed of horses, any more than the use of animals in transportation grew by steps that we took to improve our legs. The internal combustion locomotive did not come by steps taken to improve the steam locomotive. I submit to any engineer that no significant step forward in mechanical improvement has ever occurred excepting by finding a new method of approach to get around the obstacles which had piled up and blocked old methods. And the same is true of all social progress. I believe the fallacy which most paralyzes human effort to-day is the idea that progress can take place by more steps in the old wrong direction. We can, if we please, take steps to perfect the international law and international courts under the old system, but let us not delude ourselves to think that in improving details of this system we are taking a single step towards the elimination of the war system of the world.

If there be somewhere some grinning devil that watches the blundering activities of man, I can imagine nothing that gives him more malicious satisfaction than to see earnest and devoted men and women taking steps, by improving a legal and political system that is committed to war, to do away with war. The proposition to outlaw war is a step from the standpoint of law, because it means that the development of law which has been going on for countless ages is now to be extended to the only realm of human relationship where violence still controls. If we look back to savage times we find a time when every human relationship that gave rise to dispute was settled by private combat. We have now substituted law and the court for every direction but one. From the standpoint of law, then, I say that the proposal to outlaw war is a real and a logical and a culminating step in the evolution of law. But from the standpoint of war it is no step to improve the rules and laws of war. It is a right-about-face to change the whole method.

It is impossible to anticipate and answer all objections, but there is a misunderstanding which I find is frequent. It is assumed that this plan is a rival to discussion, conference and negotiation. What an absurd idea! We might as well allege as an objection to the civil courts that their existence precludes negotiations between parties to a dispute. The contrary is obviously the case. The existence of courts, in making recourse to private violence a crime, obviously stimulates and promotes recourse to discussion, conference and negotiation. At present, why is it that so much of international conference and negotiation is tainted and futile? Because it goes on under the shadow of the war system. It is this fact which has done so much to make diplomacy a synonym of intrigue, concealment, and trickery. Outlaw war, and instead of discouraging the meeting of the nations of the world for frank and open discussion and conference, for the first time in the history of mankind you release for conference and negotiation the intelligent good will of the peoples of the world.

I have referred several times to the fact that this outlawry of war is a new mode of approach, an attack from a different angle. And in conclusion I wish to refer to it again. We are asked not merely, what is the ultimate method of procedure, but how are we to proceed? Well, this new method of approach applies here, too. Other schemes for peace, excepting the purely educational and moral ones, have relied upon the initiative of rulers, politicians or statesmen, as has been the case, for example, in the constitution of the league of nations. Here at last is a movement for peace which starts from the peoples themselves, which expresses their will, and demands that the legislators and politicians and the diplomats give effect to the popular will for peace. It has the advantages of the popular educational movement, but unlike the other educational movements for peace it has a definite, simple, practical legislative goal. When we consider the extent to which politicians, left to themselves—I am especially referring to those diplomats who have to deal with foreign offices—the extent to which they are tied up to the political tradition and institution of war, until they think and act almost entirely in its terms, excepting when the dislike of the common people restrains them, it is not necessary to point out the importance of this difference. Just think what a difference it makes whether you begin with the people and end with the politicians, or begin with the politicians and end by putting something over on the people.

There is one obstacle that is worth discussing. That is our own apathy, our own skepticism, our own half-heartedness. Let us get to work to concentrate public opinion upon this issue and induce the peoples—first, the American people—to compel recognition of this proposition by the politicians, and the theoretical objections that can be heaped up from now to doomsday will vanish like the morning dew before the morning sun.

20. WHY NOT OUTLAW WAR? [1]

Readers of Mr. Lansing's account of diplomacy at Versailles will recollect one conflict of principles which may be disentangled from its accompanying personal complications. Mr. Lansing stood for a legal approach and settlement; Mr. Wilson for a political method and solution. Independently of the fact that both of them neglected the economic phase of the situation, and apart from the wisdom of special legal and political measures to which each was committed, there is a genuine problem behind such a difference of attitude. Politics and law are closely tied together; they cannot ultimately be severed. But as methods of approach to a social situation they may be as far apart as the poles.

From the standpoint of the tactics of propaganda, the advocates of American participation in the League of Nations have so far had the advantage. An already formulated political policy was in the field and there was no alternative of legal method before the world. This condition of affairs was corrected when Senator Borah introduced his resolution committing the United States to the outlawry of war, through a revision of international law and provision for an international court.

Senator Borah's proposition is one which advocates of the League of Nations should favor. They may not think it goes far enough, but they can hardly deny that whether with a League or without one, it presents an indispensable measure of international cooperation. Since the main hold of the League idea upon the American people lies in a belief or at least a hope that somehow it will help end war, only the inconsistency born of partisanship will prevent the pro-Leaguers from rallying to its support. At the same time, the provisions of the resolution are so independent of the notion of a League that they help us in drawing a contrast between the political and the judicial methods of dealing with international disputes.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* March 21, 1923.

As some of us see the matter, the political approach to the abolition of war is hopeless—at least at the present time. For it falls back upon and relies upon exactly the same forces that in the past have produced wars. The unified organization and mutual cooperation of allied nations during the war created an illusion of real unity to which many fell victims, myself among the number. For those who thought that there really was such a unity in existence, no question was more natural than to ask: Why not maintain, why not carry over into peace this same unity of interest and effort? Why not utilize, with some necessary changes, the mechanism of administration that unified action during the war, to unify policies after the war? If cooperation was required to win the war, the same kind of cooperation is needed to maintain peace and put an end to war. Of course thoughtful people saw the difficulty, theoretically not insuperable, which lay in bringing into this organization the allied nations on the other side. But post-war conditions have made it clear that the problem with respect to former foes is only a special instance of the insuperable difficulty that existed among the Allies themselves. The conditions of war time merely covered up for the time being vast historically rooted antagonisms of policy which, as soon as the pressure of war was removed, inevitably came to the surface.

There have been plenty of preachments that the Allies should maintain war unity in peace time, plenty of lamentations that they have not done so. But all of them were words, words. The older conflicts remained, not only in all their ancient force but actually increased by the war. For there was effected a hegemony of France on the continent which is almost as Napoleonic as that against which Great Britain waged long war, and which is contrary to her whole political tradition. The old balance of power was shattered. Economic exhaustion and the necessity of recuperation sharpened the older competition of interests, and the questions of how to distribute reparations afforded standing occasions of friction. The only practicable way to have carried wartime unity over into time of peace would have been a voluntary continuation of that subordination of other nations to France which was a military and geographical necessity in war time. Here, there is some act of France to be regretted; there, some act of England, and so on. But everything that has occurred and is occurring in Europe is simply a manifestation of forces that go back for centuries in the history of Europe. They are not special acts to be deplored; they are symptoms of forces to be understood.

When certain means have proved that they lead to conflict and friction, it is the part of elementary prudence to seek other means which will cut under or go around the forces that cause the trouble. Only stupendous thoughtlessness will assume that if we whip up these same means into increased energy or manipulate them in some mechanical way, they will suddenly begin to operate for totally different ends. The political case is summed up in the fact that it assumes and rests upon the legality of war as the ultimate method of settling disputes. It is no accident that the Constitution of the League of Nations definitely contemplates and even prescribes coercive physical force, economic and military, as the final sanction for making its will prevail. In doing so, it is only running true to political form. The fact that in effect the exercise of this force is not lodged in the League as a whole but in the five chief nations among the victorious Allies is again a necessity if the question is approached in terms of politics. A world which legitimizes recourse to war will always be on the verge of war.

What are the alternatives? One is complete reorganization of the world, especially upon the economic side. There are those who say that war will not cease till its "causes" are eliminated. Since these causes are mainly or wholly economic and industrial, it is then argued that radical transformation of our system of industry and commerce is the only way to avert the constant menace of war.

Even its most ardent advocates must admit, however, that this method is remote in attainment. Its more logical adherents even insist that a long period of civil strife as well as of foreign "capitalistic" wars must precede its attainment. For the present, accordingly, it is only a counsel of despair and do-nothing. There remains one other method: that of the courts, of law and judicial procedure. There is some reason to share the current depreciation of legal systems and concepts. But only the blindly sceptical will allow their aversion to certain methods of law as it now is to prevent their seeing that, in human history, law is the sole alternative to resort to force, individual and collective, as a method for arranging disputes due to conflict of interests.

There is at least one objection which advocates of a League of Nations cannot make against Borah's resolution. They cannot argue that it is impracticable and impossible. If nations will not carry their willingness to cooperate to the negative and formal point of outlawing war and the positive point of providing an international supreme court, it is ridiculous to suppose that they will go to the extreme required for constructive political cooperation. If they can come to no agreement when meeting under no pressure of threatened crisis, and under cold and formal auspices of legality, they will surely not agree when a crisis is actually at hand and the air is tense with fear, suspicion and cupidity. To the confirmed sceptic and cynic there is no conclusive answer. But every one else will be moved by the fact that the experience of mankind for thousands of years has found no other way of peaceful settlement of disputes than the way of courts and law. Every one can see at a glance that while at some period of history personal disputes were left for the parties concerned to settle by combat, mankind with all its blindness and stupidity has already reached a point where everything but international dispute has been removed from the arbitrament of armed force. We are not appealing to some abstract law of evolution but to the collective experience of all mankind throughout the ages when we assert that an international court based on carefully codified law that makes war a crime, having as full jurisdiction in cases of honor as in other cases, is the sole practicable road to the goal which every day is seen the more clearly to be one with the preservation of civilization itself.

Law is proverbially formal and unemotional and in such a vein I have written. Since it is an insult to readers to dwell further upon the horrors, dangers and crimes of war, there remains but one question: the method of preventing it. The political method has failed: it fosters war. Sentiment, Christianity, religion, moral ideals have failed. There is one way which has not been tried; that is the simplest way and the way backed by the experience of humanity in all similar cases. One should deny oneself any attempt to arouse enthusiasm and procure adherents for this method, by asserting, what so many idealists have claimed for their panaceas, that it would forever eliminate the chances of war. Law has not put an end to disputes in other fields; it will hardly do so in the international field. Criminal law has not prevented crimes. I should hesitate to claim that the outlawry of war will absolutely ensure us against the crime of war. But law does afford a peaceful mode of settling disputes that otherwise lead disputants to personal and private war in order to maintain their claims. And war outlawed, branded as a crime, is a totally different thing from war which is legitimate—and as things now stand the only legitimate ultimate recourse. There is some discussion, for example, about the legality of present French action in the Ruhr. But only a few persons recognize that if France declares war against Germany her every act at once becomes unquestionably legal. French declaration of war might be immoral; it might be inexpedient. But it would be legal, and all the acts that flowed from a state of war would be legitimized by the law of nations and by national law.

What is the use of talking about ending war as long as this state of things remains? What is the hope of abolishing it if we assume in advance that outlawry by the common consent of nations is impracticable? Fortunately, so far as this country is concerned, there is already enlisted in behalf of Senator Borah's proposition a much larger and more solid body of support than most persons dream of. Scores and scores of societies have already petitioned in favor of this action; hundreds of public meetings have endorsed it by resolutions. Those who call it fantastic have little real conception of public opinion in this country. And if after this country has got solidly behind the movement, Europe remains cold and indifferent, what has become of our alleged influence and moral leadership of the world? If the moral belief of the world cannot crystallize into simple law, the law of a court, then everything is hopeless and there remains nothing but to watch civilization go down to destruction or wait for some accident to save it. In language of prudence and moderation, the resolution of Senator Borah offers to the world a supreme test of its intelligence and of the sincerity of its protestations in behalf of peace. But the challenge, the test, the trial, comes first of all to the American people.

21. IF WAR WERE OUTLAWED[1]

It is natural that first reactions to the Levinson-Borah plan of outlawing war should be largely hostile. The reasons, however, are psychological rather than practical or logical. We have been thinking for a long time along other lines. The scheme seems too simple and too thorough-going. It seems almost like a trick, a magic wand. The real difficulties are that our minds are so full of other plans that it is hard to switch them into new tracks. We have been thinking in terms of gradual approaches, of "steps" towards an eventual abolition, by arbitration treaties; conciliation courts; reduction of armaments; condemning the guilty nation after war has broken out; political combinations to enforce peace by coercion through superior force; educating the moral sentiments of the people; economic reforms to do away with causes of national rivalries, etc. The new plan moves on different lines. It is not opposed to the others, but it does cut across them. It attacks the problem of war from a different angle. Hence the difficulties are those of switching from one line of thought to another.

I propose to offer some considerations which may facilitate the needed transfer of thought. One unfavorable reaction is due to the fact that this is a legal scheme, a lawyers' plan. And we live in a time of scepticism about law and its efficacy. The causes are obvious. In many directions laws are so constant in their influence that we take them for granted. We do not note them any more than we think of the air we breathe. In other respects social conditions have changed more rapidly than the legal system: at these points we are critical of law. But the only fundamental condition of the efficacy of any well thought out system of law is that it represent the general moral conviction of the community. Unless the moral sentiment of the world has reached the point of condemning war there is nothing that can be done about it. If it has reached this stage, then that conviction should be crystallized in law—in orderly authorized procedure. One may of course disbelieve in any and all international law. But if one believes at all in it, he is not asked to believe that law will work miracles. He is only required to think of the practical differences that will be made when the law makes war a crime instead of legitimizing it.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* April 25, 1923.

The fundamental difficulty at present is that moral conviction and sentiment have no channels of operation. Almost every one is opposed to war in general. But almost every one is also likely at some time to find himself in a position where he must either assent to some particular war, or place himself in hostility to the action and law of his own country. We find ourselves in a tragic moral predicament. Either after having accepted the protection of the community and enjoyed its benefits, one has to deny responsibility to it when it feels that it most needs his support, or one must join in support of what his conscience declares in general to be a thorough evil. When wars were waged chiefly by governing classes and hired soldiers it was much easier to salve individual conscience. Under present conditions the moral dilemma is forced home to every civilian, man or woman. When war is a crime by the law of nations, conscience is on the side of the law of one's community and law is on the side of conscience. The warlike people will then be the non-patriotic and the criminals. The pacifist then becomes the active patriot-loyal citizen, instead of an objector, a nuisance and a menace, or a passive obstructionist. The appeasement of the world can never be brought about as long as the public conscience and public law remain at odds with each other.

The case is the same with industrial appeasement. The argument that it is fantastic to outlaw war until the economic causes that bring about war have been radically altered puts the cart before the horse. It is fantastic to suppose that serious attention to the causes of economic evils is going to be possible as long as men live under the shadow of the war system. Consider the burden put upon efforts at social amelioration because of the use of eighty-five percent of our national expenditures to carry the costs of past wars and to be in readiness for future ones. But even more important is the diversion of mental and moral energy, of interest and attention. How can the most ardent devotee of any project of basic economic and social reorganization expect to get even a fair hearing for his ideas as long as the shadow of war is over every social question? Let the reader run over any list of such plans, from socialism and the single tax to fundamental changes in education, and then reflect upon the extent to which discussion, experiment and execution are compromised and hindered by problems and issues connected with the menace of war. The more one directs his attention to this phase of the matter, the more one will be convinced that instead of postponing the consideration of war till some reform has been accomplished, we should get war out of the way in order that the reform may have a fair chance. The larger part of the discouragement, cynicism and half-heartedness as to social advance which is now so prevalent reflects the overhanging danger of war. With war outlawed, it is safe to predict a great revival of liberal confidence and interest. Till this step in world appeasement has been taken, a feeling of uncertainty and futility will paralyze social effort.

Outlawry of war is equally a condition of political appeasement. One outstanding case may serve as an index. Most Americans believe in the right of France to security. We have refused to enter into political guarantees of that security for fear of being drawn into quarrels or wars. What better guarantee of the security of France can be had than the outlawry of war by common consent of nations? With security gained in this non-political fashion, there would be an immense liberation of all the forces that make for amicable relations. The backbone of the strength of aggressive restorationists in Germany and aggressive imperialists in France would be broken. The straining of friendly feeling between this country and France due to mutual recriminations would cease. The United States could then engage in cooperative undertakings free from the fears that now restrain us. The minor states of Europe could settle down to the needed tasks of reconstruction. As long as war lowers, it is mere pious exhortation for us to urge Europe to settle down and "go to work."

Thus the outlawry of war is a condition of the permanent appeasement of international relations. It liberates the problem of future world organization from the complications that now attend it. At present any union or association of nations is likely to become in effect, whatever it be in name and profession, an old fashioned alliance for offensive and defensive purposes. Many persons who are opposed to the present League and who will remain opposed to any plan that contemplates an Over-State have an open mind or even an ardent desire for future cooperation among nations, when there is some assurance that this cooperation will not entangle us in political rivalries and animosities. Most persons who are "irreconcilables" with respect to schemes linked up with the decisions of Versailles, are anything but unreconciled to the idea of conference and cooperation. They are only waiting for a plan that is feasible. The outlawry of war clears the track and will make the consideration and development of such plans practicable.

Take one concrete case—that of our relation to the existing Court of International Justice. Those who urge our joining point out that such a court is distinctly an American contribution to international thought and law, and charge us with gross inconsistency for not joining. But the difficulty, be it real or unreal in fact, is its connection with the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations as it now exists. Senator Borah's resolution wisely provides that the Court, to be established on the basis of a re-codification of international law making war a public crime, may adapt any existing legal arrangement that in part serves as an international court of justice. The provision is obviously aimed at utilizing an existing court. But it is used on the basis of war outlawed and thus the fears that lead to present opposition to our participation are allayed. This is but one example of the difference that will be made in many movements toward a world federated in law and sentiment but not in political and military rule.

The argument that the plan to outlaw war makes no provision for sanctions of international coercion and penalization proves too much. It is a logical argument when it comes from those who believe in the war system. It sounds strangely in the mouths of those who believe in the substitution of international cooperation for international antagonism. They plead for the abolition of war—and for its retention as a means of coercion. For what else does an international army, even though called a police force, mean in substance? Abolish war, and at the same time keep war up our sleeves! The contradiction is more than merely logical. It means the perpetuation of that attitude of mind that perpetuates war. If the moral conviction of the world will not restrain a nation from resort to war after its case has been publicly heard and adjudged and after it has given its own consent to the outlawry of war and to abiding by the decisions of the Court, the world will not get rid of war under any system. Moreover each nation engages to punish warbreeders as offenders against its own law. Internationally, there is open and complete reliance upon moral force with repudiation of war as a last resort. Domestically, there are the legal guarantees and methods that already operate. What else is there that can be effectually relied upon without committing ourselves to the maintenance of the war system as legal?

22. WHAT OUTLAWRY OF WAR IS NOT[1]

The editorial columns of the *New Republic* have several times commented upon the tendency of persons engaged in an effort to do away with war to divide into hostile groups. The comments regret a prevalent disposition to assume that some one method is the sole and exclusive method. It is obvious that anything interwoven as war is with tradition, national histories, politics, economics, diplomacy and education must be approached from many angles. It is natural that some persons should be interested in one mode of approach and other persons in another. But the only intelligent strategy is that of coordinated division of labor, instead of mutual recrimination and attack which only strengthen and delight the forces that make for war.

Mr. Lippmann's article in the *Atlantic Monthly* on the Outlawry of War is an exemplification, and, to some of us at least, an unexpected one, of the main point of these editorials. Not that Mr. Lippmann does anything so crude as openly to advocate one method as the sole method; it is by suggestion and implication rather than by direct advocacy that he commends the so-called League of Nations as the panacea. In attacking the proposition to outlaw war he represents it as a rival to everything else and as such a rival as necessarily to exclude recourse to all other methods whatsoever for lessening the probability of war. In fact the scheme as it is presented by Mr. Lippmann is a rival to the most elementary common sense. For this reason I cannot imagine that his article will seriously damage the movement to outlaw war; it presents it in such a light that the unbiassed reader is likely to feel, without much analysis, that intelligent persons could hardly have advocated such a scheme. What it is likely to damage is the cause of peace. For it adds the authority of Mr. Lippmann's name to the ardor of those who are so devoted to the existing League and its so-called World Court that they feel in duty bound to attack any and every other plan for coping with those international disputes that breed wars.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Oct 3, 1923.

As I have implicitly charged Mr. Lippmann with misrepresentation of the plan—not intentional of course—it is only fair that I should give some indication of the ways in which he has misrepresented it. In the first place, no one acquainted with the formation and growth of the plan in the mind of its author, Mr. Levinson, dating from the early period of the war, long before our entrance into it, would recognize the account Mr. Lippmann gives of its history. According to him the plan to outlaw war is the manifestation of sheer genius for contrariety; it is the product of irreconcilability for the sake of irreconcilability. For he says it was "first employed to strengthen a league, before there was a League. It was used to defeat the League after there was a League, and to advocate an international court before there was a Court. Now that the Court has been created, it is being used to defeat the Court, and to advocate another court which does not exist." Whence Mr. Lippmann naturally concludes that the plan has "a perfect record of irreconcilability."

It is properly Mr. Levinson's business to say what he thinks needs to be said regarding the inception and development of the plan to outlaw war. But meantime from contemporaneous knowledge I should like to match Mr. Lippmann's account by another. The idea was formed before a League of Nations was broached in any way. After the idea was broached it was employed to define the basic indispensable condition of an association of nations: that its foundation be the agreement of adhering nations to make war a public crime and to submit their disputes to adjudication by a court. As long as there was a prospect of such an outcome Mr. Levinson and the other friends of his scheme heartily supported Mr. Wilson irrespective of political creed. When Mr. Wilson surrendered his cause, and the Covenant of the League not only tied the League to the iniquities of the Versailles Treaty but failed to outlaw war, the friends of outlawry of war remained faithful to their cause. Part of the plan from the first was the creation of a "judicial substitute for war"—a court to which parties to an international dispute would agree to submit, under the terms of international law making war a crime, their controversies for hearing and decision. To that conception they have adhered without wavering. Mr. Lippmann is better informed concerning the present court than many of its emotional adherents. He will hardly say, I think, that it answers this description, or even that it is a court in the accepted legal sense of the term court. Thus the record is not one of irreconcilability but of fidelity to an idea. Mr. Lippmann and others may not like the idea; the more reason for giving a correct account of its history.

We come to the idea itself. I select three points from Mr. Lippmann's account of the plan for outlawry. He asserts that the plan after nominally outlawing war introduces "a set of reservations which withdraws from the scope of the code and the competency of the court many, if not most, of the major policies which cause disputes. Finally it disembowels the outlawry of war by legalizing wars in defence of those major policies which are excluded from the competence of the court and the code." If this were a correct account, it should settle the matter for all sensible persons. Any such plan is a dishonest pretense; further argument against it is needless.

But Mr. Lippmann's sole evidences that such reservations are made, apart from a speech by Senator Knox in which he expressed his personal opinion about matters that are domestic and hence outside the scope of an international tribunal, are that the right of self-defence is reserved, and that "Senator Borah's resolution seems to justify in addition wars of liberation." Mr. Lippmann then reaches his sweeping conclusion as to the disembowelling of outlawry by identifying the right of self-defence with defence of any national policy, pointing out that all modern wars are nominally defensive, and by identifying wars of liberation with the "right to go to war for what you call your liberty." Now the right of self-defence has a definite and long established legal meaning: it is the right to defend one's self *when actually attacked.* Strictly speaking, it was not necessary to include that item, for such a right simply cannot be taken away by any code. Reference to it was probably inserted because otherwise some persons would object to the plan by inquiring: "What are you going to do if actually attacked by another nation? Are your hands tied by your agreement to treat war as a crime?" The reference to liberty is a bugaboo of the same nature. Wars of liberation are civil wars, internal revolutions, outside any international code; wars of a subject class or group against what they regard as intolerable tyranny. The peculiarity of such wars is that they are now crimes by law; not by international law but by domestic law; and yet to the minds of most persons they are the most justifiable of all wars. And I take it that what Mr. Lippmann finds in the Borah resolution which seems to justify any war with another nation "for what you call your liberty," is simply an allusion to this anomalous situation. I submit that Mr. Lippmann does not strengthen his argument by presenting these men of straw.

In the second place, Mr. Lippmann works himself up to the point where he succeeds in convincing himself that the plan to outlaw war involves the abolition of all diplomatic methods. He says, "The central fallacy of their argument is this refusal to acknowledge the necessity of diplomacy for just those war-breeding disputes which are not within the competence of their code and their court. For if diplomacy is a necessary method of maintaining peace, then no plan which does not provide for it can be an effective plan to abolish war. And if the method of diplomacy is necessary, then the reform of that method is one of the most urgent of human needs." I confess this argument goes beyond me. The plan to outlaw war also fails to provide for the institution of marriage, of private property, and a number of other things which many people believe to be quite as necessary as is diplomacy. How Mr. Lippmann managed to bring himself to the opinion that failure to provide for ambassadors and conferences means that the plan to outlaw war is in any way antagonistic to them is a mystery I cannot explain. The suggestion that diplomacy is in some need of reform is, however, pertinently welcome. I imagine that the friends of the outlawry of war believe that the most effective way to reform diplomacy is to make recourse to war a crime and provide a court for the settlement of disputes when diplomats come to an impasse. The plan "fails to provide" for abolishing secret treaties, military alliances (and all existing alliances are essentially military) and the intrigue and chicanery, which, in common repute, are accompaniments of traditional diplomacy. It is arguable that the chief cause for the things that make reform of diplomacy so urgent a human need would disappear if war were outlawed and a court were always in the offing. It is arguable that the notion that it will be reformed in any other way is a case of that "tragic futility of noble sentiments frustrated by confused ideas" to which Mr. Lippmann calls attention.

The third point is like the second, perhaps is only an instance of its principle. Mr. Lippmann quotes from the Borah resolution to outlaw war as follows: "The genius of civilization has discovered but two methods of compelling the settlement of human disputes, namely, law and war." This generalization Mr. Lippmann says is "utterly untrue. The genius of civilization has invented, besides law and war, countless other methods of settling disputes." And he mentions, besides representative government and federalism (which to most minds involve law and courts), mediation, conciliation, friendly intervention, compromise and conference. Mr. Lippmann evidently read the passage carelessly. It does not say that law and war are the only methods of settling disputes, but the only ways of *compelling* their settlement—quite a different proposition, and one that I shall continue to believe until I am shown the contrary.

This in itself is perhaps not a very important matter. But the use that Mr. Lippmann makes of his misunderstanding *is* important. For he employs it to make a strong argument for adjustment of disputes by conference and by political methods. And his implication of course is that the proposition to outlaw war is opposed to the use of such methods. The disjunction is thoroughly unwarranted in itself and quite foreign to the friends of the proposition to outlaw war. Since Mr. Lippmann has made so much of the "irreconcilability" of Senator Borah, he might have remembered that it was Senator Borah who first suggested a conference to limit armaments, and that he was the author of the resolution to call an economic conference with representatives of European nations. And a little inquiry would have informed him that Mr. Levinson's practice as a lawyer consists precisely in settling disputes between large economic interests with a minimum of resort to the courts. These personal matters are pertinent. For they illustrate the fact that the alleged exclusive alternatives between law and courts on one side and political methods on the other are wholly of Mr. Lippmann's own making. The genuine alternatives are between political methods based upon a system which legalizes war, and political methods which have as their basic principle that war is a crime, so that when diplomacy and conferences cannot reach agreement the dispute shall be submitted to a court. It is reasonable, to say the least, to believe that the method of conference, conciliation and mediation will be much more employed and employed with greater good faith and sincerity when recourse to war is a recognized public crime than it is now. For the method will be liberated from the menace which now almost makes necessary recourse to chicanery, secrecy and underhand intrigue, and those threats of force which win Mr. Lippmann's approval. For when Mr. Lippmann says that diplomacy is required which works not only by conference and bargaining but "also in last analysis by the threat of force" he admits what he has previously denied: that law is in final analysis the only discovered alternative to force as a means of *compelling* settlement of disputes. To a thoughtful reader this admission of the necessity of using the threat of force explains Mr. Lippmann's inability to understand the proposition of outlawry of war. For the essence of that proposition is to substitute the method of judicial settlement for the method of force. Mr. Lippmann may be ready to assume in advance that any such proposition is Utopian. The friends of the outlawry of war hold that it is worth trying, and that unless it is capable of succeeding war will never be abolished. And since the threat of war implies war, the major premise of Mr. Lippmann's argument seems to be that war will never be abolished. It would have been simpler to have attacked the outlawry of war on this avowed ground.

At all events we have here the nub of the whole matter. Of course politics and political methods will long, possibly forever, affect the international relations of states. What the proposition to outlaw war calls attention to is the radical difference between the present status of international politics, assuming as it does the legality of war and using a diplomacy based upon that legality, and the conduct of international politics when law is a public crime. To many of us it is a "tragic futility" to expect that the present European political system, based, as it is, upon the tradition of war and the enmities accompanying it, will eliminate war or greatly reduce its probabilities. For that international system was born and bred in the briar-patch of war. It is bound up with it and with the threat of force at every point. The present state of Europe, wherever we look, confirms this statement. Until war is outlawed and a judicial substitute for it is provided, it is hopeless to propose American participation in that system. The American people may be very ignorant about international affairs, but it knows enough to know that entanglement in that system means entanglement in a war system. In my judgment it is also intelligent and generous enough to engage in international association when international politics are cut loose from war and the threat of force. When war is outlawed, the politics of international relations will be liberated to pursue a normal development. The obvious policy of the friends of internationalism and of a genuine association of nations is for them to work for the outlawry of war instead of opposing it as a rival to the association of nations.

In conclusion I would say that I should feel that I was following too closely the model of discussion set by Mr. Lippmann if I did not add that the foregoing fails to touch upon one portion of Mr. Lippmann's argument, the portion which deals with a genuine rather than a fictitious difficulty. I refer to that part of his paper that urges the difficulty in the way of preparing an international code under which a world court could effectively act. Concerning this matter I shall say something later.

23. WAR AND A CODE OF LAW[1]

In the minds of those who seriously question the project to revise international law and provide an international court so that recourse to war shall be a crime, the difficulty connected with forming a code of law to govern the conduct of the court is likely to loom largest. I am quite ready to admit that those who favor the plan easily tend to fix their faith in the general idea and trust to the future to solve the concrete difficulties when once the basic idea is accepted. But this disposition is quite offset by the corresponding tendency of those to whom the idea does not appeal, to fix their minds on the difficulty of making a code and to see nothing else. In any case it must be remembered that it is no part of the business of those who are urging trial of the plan to propose in advance a ready-made code. For it is part of that plan that the code shall be drawn up by expert jurists representing the various nations. There is no dodging the issue in declining to state in advance just what the conclusions of the assembly of jurists must be. It is a fair demand, however, that the general difficulties in the way of the jurists themselves be faced in discussion of the project. First of all, it is necessary to discriminate between genuine difficulties and those which in the end will probably turn out to be imaginery, and to this point alone this article is directed.

Mr. Lippmann has urged with force and skill that the making of a code of international law is essentially a political legislative act, so that it involves the "setting up of a world legislature. The conference which was to make the code would have to lay down laws affecting the very existence of governments and the destiny of nations." So he charges those who oppose any plan that involves a super-state with a glaring contradiction. For they are really asking, according to him (if they only knew what they are about), for "a supercourt and a superconference to legislate a supercode."

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Oct. 24, 1923.

The question of consistency is not nearly so important, of course, as the question of fact, but the issue of fact may be approached by the road of the issue of consistency. For the accusation of inconsistency may be turned about. The position taken by Mr. Lippmann proves altogether too much for any one who believes in the existing League Court and in American adherence to it, who believes in it in anything but a Pickwickian sense, or as a cellar entrance into the Council of the League. Would it have been necessary to have had a code covering all kinds of political disputes between nations as an antecedent of the competency of even the Hague tribunal to pass upon the clause of the Austrian ultimatum that Serbia wished to refer to that tribunal? Would political legislation affecting the very existence of governments have been required to enable the existing League Court to pass upon the construction of the Treaty of Versailles so as to determine judicially whether or not the French invasion of the Ruhr was authorized by its terms? Would it have required a superlegislature and a superstate code to hold back the action of Italy in bombarding and seizing Corfu until a court had passed upon Greek responsibility for the murder of commissioners and the proper liability of Greece for the atrocity? If so, the objection of Mr. Lippmann logically makes any court an impossibility and profession of faith in one an insincere farce.

The question is of importance because it points to the issue of fact. It is quite clear that the three incidents cited are precisely the sort of thing that now precede wars, and equally clear that the sole indispensable condition of their submission to a court is the willingness of nations to submit them. They were not submitted to an international court. The reason, however, was not because there was no supercode in existence. The existing state of international law, whatever its imperfections, would have sufficed to secure a judicial hearing and decision, were it not for the one fundamental imperfection in that code against which the outlawry project is directed; namely, its legalizing of resort to force which enables any nation that thinks it can get away with it to constitute itself the final judge in its own cause. In reality the chief difficulty in discussion of an international code adequate for the purposes of a court is a subtle psychological one. Unconsciously we tend to project into the future situation all the attendants of the present system of legalized war, and thus fail to recognize the extent to which difficulties spring from the legalizing of war, and would disappear were war outlawed. One will come, I believe, to very different conclusions about the difficulties in the way of developing an adequate code according as he considers the actual antecedents of the wars that the world has endured in the last fifty years, or as he conjures up all possible conflicts of national interests. If he pursues the latter method, he will be likely to come out where Mr. Lippmann stands; if he takes the former course, he will see that these conflicts of interest resulted in war because war is now an authorized way of securing a settlement of disputes. Then he will acknowledge that the difficulties in connection with formation of a code are largely technical, and concern for the most part just those questions of procedure which jurists are accustomed and competent to deal with.

To prove this point conclusively it would be necessary to take up the immediate antecedents of each of the wars of the last fifty years. In lieu of such a consideration we may appeal to the general belief that even arbitration if it were universally resorted to would prevent most wars, for it would provide time for passion to cool; it would prevent that almost fatalistic forward push of conflicting interests into war that now exists; it would provide publicity to unify and direct that enlightened public sentiment and judgment of the world which now is at the mercy of prejudice, clamor and propaganda.

Even more pertinent is consideration of the actual relation that obtains between the outbreak of war and the undoubted and undeniable conflicts of interest that exist and that will long continue to exist. There has been friction, for example, between Japan and the United States; and enough, to make some persons at least on both sides of the water talk about the prospect of war. Nominally much of this friction has been associated with our laws restricting immigration. Consequently one who thinks in general terms about international disputes may come to the conclusion that the international code would have to legislate upon the question of immigration, and point, as does Mr. Lippmann, to the extreme improbability that the United States Congress would ever entrust such legislation to an international assembly. But as matter of fact, Japan itself has regulations governing immigration into its territories as drastic as those of the United States, as well as strict laws regulating the alien ownership of real property. The history of diplomacy demonstrates that the issue of immigration is not the *cause* of war; friction on this point is merely utilized to arouse popular feeling to the point of supporting a war that is really waged for quite other reasons—in this case presumably economic causes connected with control of the Asiatic mainland.

It may be replied that to form a code that would regulate such economic conflicts would be even more difficult than one regulating immigration. The answer to this objection is that it would be totally unnecessary. The outstanding fact is that the avowed purposes of modern wars are never coincident with their actual causes. No one can conceive either Japan or the United States publicly avowing that its real object was the economic control or monopoly of China, and going to the Court for a decision on that case. By the nature of the case the only questions that could be taken to a court are avowed objective issues. The present legalizing of war makes possible a complete confusion of these avowed issues with hidden and unavowed conflicts of interest, honor and prestige. But the only causes that a court would pass upon and that a code has to cover are the reasons which a nation is willing openly to expose to the world; and resort to war after the court had decided the case against the nation would be a public confession of hypocrisy, and of an underlying predatory disposition. So far then is it from being true that an international code would have to pass upon all important questions of national prestige and honor, that the converse is true. Questions of prestige and honor are now of inflammatory importance because of the legalizing of war and the absence of a court; they will remain the main reliance in the technique of enlisting support of a war waged for unavowed reasons until war is outlawed. Then they will suddenly lose their present importance, except for a nation that is willing to defy by criminal action the decision of a court and the public opinion of the world.

I cannot conceive that any one will deny that the real causes of important modern wars are different from the avowed reasons for them, or that the gaining of popular support for most wars depends upon the power of foreign offices and the press to confuse the two. One of the chief grounds for belief in outlawry of war is that the creation of the judicial substitute for war would render it hard to keep up this confusion. We may take some instances from the list of causes of war put forth by Mr. Lippmann. "Are the natural resources of undeveloped countries the property of the natives to have and hold as they see fit, or have European and American nations rights in them?" This is an important and difficult question, but since it leads to war only as a concealed and not an avowed cause, the code would not have to legislate upon it. Can any one imagine that Germany would have seized Shantung upon the publicly avowed ground of control of raw materials? The alleged cause, the murder of nationals, is on the contrary precisely the sort of thing that a code and court can deal with.

What would have happened in the Boer trouble, if the British had stated that their purpose was command of natural resources? "May Mexico confiscate American oil property?" I can readily imagine that under certain circumstances, oil might be the *real* cause of war between Mexico and the United States: I cannot imagine that the American people would ever go to war with Mexico if the avowed cause of the war were to support American oil interests, nor can I imagine any

American government admitting this to be the cause of a war. On the other hand, property disputes are just the sort of thing that courts are always dealing with; it needs no radically new code to enable an international court to deal with them. "Do nations which happen to block the access of other nations to the sea owe any duty to landlocked peoples, which ought to limit their sovereign rights over their own ports and railroads?" I am far from denying that this is a genuine and important problem. But nations avowedly grab ports and go to war to get them, because of past national history, of interest in their nationals who are said to be a majority of the population and so on, not because of the economic claim. And since the latter issue would not go to the Court it does not have to be considered by the code.

To get a picture of the dependence of the possibility of securing support for war upon covering up economic causes with idealistic reasons, we need only recall that at one time the mere suggestion that the late World War was at bottom an economic conflict was almost enough to land its author in jail. Provision of a judicial substitute for war would almost automatically tend to disentangle the nominal and alleged reasons from the underlying conflict of interests, and make it necessary to refer the latter to the proper organs for dealing with them, namely, the agencies of negotiation and political adjustment. For, as I have said before, the friends of Outlawry do not urge it as a substitute for political means, but as the method of securing that division of labor between legal and political agencies that will alone enable both of them to function effectively. Any one who realizes the difference between the present system of lawless and anarchic international political action and political action as it would become when associated with law, will also perceive that, given the expression in law of the popular abhorrence of war, the difficulties in the way of developing a code for the purposes of a court are quite manageable. Discussion of its actual scope and content is such a technical matter that I gladly leave it to lawyers.

24. AMERICA'S RESPONSIBILITY [1]

The "practical idealism" of the United States has perhaps assumed a pharisaical tinge due to over-advertising. Like another fine thing and fine word, "service," it has been cheapened by the use to which it has been put by self-seekers and by those who grab at any idealistic phrase which is current in order to advance any cause in which they are interested. Nevertheless there is an immense fund of goodwill and desire to be of help to those in need diffused among the American people. This is no especial credit to us; it would be a shame were it otherwise. It was born of pioneer conditions, fostered by the mobility of life and the need of improvising cooperative adjustments to meet new conditions, and is demanded by the amplitude of our resources on account of which so many are raised above the pressure of personal need. Much of the energy which in other countries drives along political channels goes in this country in voluntary unions devoted to the public welfare.

This fund of goodwill, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, still exists with respect to international affairs. There are definite causes for our attitude of aloofness from European struggles and problems. Large portions of our population migrated here in order to escape ills of one sort or another from which they suffered across the sea. They wanted to get away mentally and morally as well as physically; they still want to forget. In a pinch they are for their old country as against some other country, but in general they are anti-European. The diversity of our immigrant population is another factor. There is hardly a national group which has not a tradition of fear, suspicion, hostility toward some other European nation which is its historic enemy. One of the conditions required in order that these different groups may live in amity on this side of the water is that there should be a tacit agreement to put European questions in the background, to leave them alone as far as possible. Otherwise our politics and our social life would have continued and repeated all the historic strifes of Europe.

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[1] From *The Christian Century,* Dec. 23, 1926.

Physical distance inevitably carries with it a certain amount of psychological isolation. The mass of people occupied with the things which have to be done in their daily life have little leisure and little call to give much thought to affairs going on in remote places. All the forces of self-preservation work automatically against mixing in matters, especially political ones, which are so far away as to be beyond adequate knowledge, not to say beyond control. Minding one's own business is a form of conduct that commends itself even more nationally than domestically. Consider how close the British Isles are to the continent of Europe, and yet how her whole traditional policy up to very recent years has made in the direction of isolation. Isolation is not a high ideal but it denotes a better state of things than one of meddling which involves the meddler in unpleasant complications and does no one else any good in the end. There is something humorous in the rebukes and advice freely handed out to Americans regarding the selfishness and futility of American isolation, in view of the century-old similar policies of Great Britain in spite of her much closer and more numerous contacts.

Even such a cursory summary as these remarks would be woefully incomplete were there not mentioned the disillusionments following the war. The outcome of the war served as an enormous political education; I do not say a complete or adequate one. But the prevalent feeling of having been fooled—prevailing even among those who think we would have to do the same thing over under like circumstances, only in a different spirit—together with the withdrawal which accompanies this feeling, is not a mere emotional gesture due to temporary fatigue and disgust. It is attended with a much greater knowledge than the American people had before of the realities of

European racial and economic rivalries, political intrigues and diplomatic methods. Few have taken the trouble to go into the details of the discussion of war guilt. But great masses of people are convinced that the war merely reflected the European state of mind and of politics. They see, in spite of Locarno and one or two other favorable occurrences, no marked sign that the state of the European mind and politics has undergone any change, save such as is due to exhaustion. Fundamentally the attitude of aloofness is due to a determined aversion to mixing in the complications of European strife, intrigue and mutual treacheries. There is a natural aversion to experiencing the troubles incident to getting mixed up with such a situation. But there is more than that. There is a firm belief that the whole American situation and tradition in international matters is radically diverse from the European system.

This need not imply that we think we are morally better. Admission that present Europeans are not to blame for what they have inherited, nor we deserving because of what we have inherited, does not affect the fact. That fact is the important thing, and the fact is that the two systems are different. The notion that we can really be of help to Europe by joining in their affairs on terms that are set by their unhappy international and diplomatic heritage seems to me silly. We shall simply be drawn in, and our system assimilated to theirs.

What has been said may be taken superficially as a justification of a policy of isolation on our part. The intention is wholly different. A few of the causes of the tendency toward isolation have been stated. Even should one regard them all as evil—which they certainly are not—they exist as facts and help determine the situation. Any realistic thinker, one who wishes not just to be idealistic in his private inner consciousness but to see ideals carried out, must take them into account. They stand as a solid block against certain methods which are most urged upon us as methods of cooperating with European recovery and of assisting the cause of world peace. The efforts in question come from many high-minded and devoted men and women. But they are pathetic. The whole set and movement of American affairs dooms them to disappointment. The fact that the conscious fund of American idealism with respect to international friendship has gone so largely into such impossible channels is a large part of the explanation of why the genuine practical idealism of the American people has remained latent and ineffective.

Thus we come to the real purpose of the statement regarding the causes of American aloofness. Upon what terms and along what lines can American sentiment, belief and action be mobilized in behalf of the supreme cause of international understanding and goodwill? The attempt to force them into channels which are opposed to their very nature results only in increasing aloofness, in promoting indifference, or even antagonism. The campaign for the league court, and its fate, should demonstrate this fact to any persons with open eyes. It is a pity, a tragedy, to see so much potential energy for good go to waste because of misdirection, while so much more potential energy, which might be roused into activity for international peace, remains passive and inert.

I am accordingly addressing an appeal to those who have been actively and energetically concerned with bringing Europe and the United States together in behalf of world peace and amity. Why not search for a method and agency of operation which calls into play all the actual and latent practical idealism of the country? Why not seek means which are in accord with American tradition and outlook, measures whose consequences do not involve getting implicated in the heritage of European war politics, and which will afford Europe an opportunity to free herself from that incubus? Is there anything the United States can do for Europe half as important as to share in emancipating her from the legalized war system? It is not just the results of the last war which weigh down Europe, which reduce her, which threaten her civilization. It is even more the prospects of the next war, and the next. It is the war system. Relieved from that dead weight and overhanging menace, no one believes that Europe has not enough resources—material, intellectual, moral—to recover herself, and become a leader in the friendly rivalry of civilizations. Anything which we do or can do that serves in whatever way, direct or indirect, closely or remotely, to perpetuate the war system, is a disservice to Europe. Let the practical idealism of the United States do for Europe the one thing that Europe most needs and the one thing which is most in harmony with American tradition and aspirations, and in time all other needed things will be added.

The search for such a method and agency would quickly reach its mark. It is already at hand. It is embodied in the resolution of Senator Borah and the suggested treaty of Mr. Levinson. I have yet to hear an objection which did not boil down to a conviction that the proposal does not meet European conditions, that it ignores the past conflicts of the European states and the crying demand of these states for guarantees and security. Well, that is just the glory of the scheme. It *is* remote from *existing* political conditions in Europe, which are at once the fruit of the war system and the seeds of future war. Any other scheme than the outlawry of war in basing its guarantees upon force is a guarantee of war. Any security that rests upon the threat of war assures war. As far as the argument implies that Europe is so wedded by its past to the war system that it will neither help itself nor be helped by others out of it, the argument proves too much. If Europe is determined upon suicide nothing can be done. But the adoption of such a pessimistic attitude is unjustified. It will remain unjustified until the United States has put itself squarely behind the outlawry of the war-system, has made clear the terms upon which Europe and the United States can cooperate for peace and in peace, and has then been refused by Europe.

The first responsibility rests with this country. It must first commit itself by the adoption of the Borah resolution and of the measures that are sequels to it. In spite of all the enthusiasm the idea has aroused, it is not yet committed. If the committal is delayed, the responsibility will not lie wholly upon those who are indifferent to the rest of the world and to the ties which bind us to it, nor wholly upon those who are skeptical about the possibility of lasting peace and goodwill among nations, nor upon those who accept war as the final arbiter of national disputes. It will rest in some measure with those impractical idealists who waste and divert the energies of the country upon projects which will never appeal to the citizenship of the country. There is such a thing as knowing so much about the details of the European situation that the mind is held enslaved by them and thinks in terms of the European tradition and system, proposing a mitigation here and a palliation there. There are times and places where a basic point of view and a broad outlook are demanded, and where attention to the trees forbids a sight of the jungle. The sole fundamental issue is the outlawry or the perpetuation of the war system.

25. "AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHER NATIONS"[1]

On March 9, 1918, Mr. S. O. Levinson published in *The New Republic* an article entitled "The Legal Status of War." It put forward the first public proposal for the outlawing of war. In April of last year, M. Briand in a public speech stated that "France is willing publicly to subscribe to an engagement with the United States tending to outlaw war (using an American expression) between the two nations." Not long afterwards, he showed that his statement was not a casual, irresponsible remark, by officially transmitting, as Foreign Minister of France, to our own State Department, the suggestion that the two nations should, by solemn compact, completely renounce war as an instrument of policy with respect to each other, binding themselves to settle all disputes of whatever nature by pacific means. A few months ago Secretary Kellogg replied, suggesting a multilateral treaty instead of a bilateral one, and the making of an effort to secure the adherence of all the principal powers.

The immediate effect of this reply was to check the bilateral treaty; the ultimate fate of both proposals now lies on the lap of the gods. But whatever the eventual outcome—and there are good grounds, as we shall see, for hoping that the negotiations have not come to an *impasse*—history records few more dramatic incidents. Within ten years an idea of the most far-reaching character of any ever put forth as to international relations, an idea developed by a private citizen without official connections, one promoted without the backing of any large and well financed organization, and one promptly condemned as Utopian, has made its way into responsible negotiations between two great powers. One would have to look far to find a parallel.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, March 7, 1928.

The reception of Secretary Kellogg's note by Briand and by the European press has made one fact clear, henceforth written upon the record so plainly that it cannot be effaced. The proposal of a many-sided treaty was declared unwelcome because it conflicted with war-engagements assumed by members of the League of Nations to other nations of the League. Those who objected to the entrance of the United States into the League on the ground that it committed us, under articles Ten and Sixteen, to participation in European wars, and who met with hot denials from friends of the League, may find some satisfaction in the now officially established confirmation of their position.

The New York *World* will not be suspected of hostility to the League. In its editorial columns of January 12, 1928, speaking of Secretary Kellogg's counter-proposal, it said: "It was suggested that all the nations subscribe to a treaty renouncing war. A more accurate description of this proposal would have been to call it a treaty to renounce the covenant of the League of Nations, the Treaty of Locarno and all the French defensive alliances in Europe. For the whole European political system to-day is based on the theory *not* of renouncing war as an instrument of policy but of *pledges to wage war* against any nation which disturbs the peace." (Italics not in the original.) It would be impossible to state the situation more accurately. Just what would have happened, however, if any opponent of our entry to the League had drawn this contrast between the American and the European systems? The same editorial of the *World* condemned the Secretary of State's proposal as absurd and amateurish, as a source of irritation, and as leading to a sure fiasco. To quote again from the editorial, "The European idea is to maintain the *status quo* by a general guarantee to make war upon any nation which attacks the *status quo* by force." There are those who will think that Mr. Kellogg's proposal was not inept if it made perfectly clear the fact that the European "idea" is of the sort stated—although there is no reason for supposing that the desire to bring about such a clarification was the intention of his suggestion. From now on, we at least know where Europe stands and where we stand with reference to her commitment by war pledges to the *status quo.*

Nevertheless, I am not willing to think that the European commitment to the war system is so irretrievable that there is a deadlock which makes impossible any systematic coöperation of the United States with Europe in the interest of peace. In an important article by Senator Borah in the New York *Times* of February 5, he makes some points which seem to have escaped notice. In the first place, he points out that Briand's original proposal would be estopped by the reasoning he employs against a multilateral treaty. For if the United States were to engage in war against a signatory member of the League and the League Council decided our war was unjustifiable, France's obligation to the League would compel her to take up arms against us, and her treaty with us would be a scrap of paper. More important, however, is the constructive point which he makes. Supposing, he argues, that a multilateral treaty were signed not only by the chief powers but also by the lesser nations who are supposed to stand especially in need of guarantees of security. Supposing, further, that some signatory nation violated its treaty compact by attacking a nation which is a member of the League. By every rule of the binding force of contracts, a violation by one party releases other parties from their obligations under its terms. It would be a simple matter to insert a clause to that effect in the multilateral treaty. The obligations of the nations which are members of the League would thus be met; they would be free to come to the aid of the nation that was attacked. The United States and other non-League members would be free to take whatever stand they judged desirable under the circumstances. In short, there is a simple way out of the seeming *impasse:* work to make the treaty more, instead of less, inclusive.

It would seem as if the only logical course for France to pursue were to join with the United States in securing as many signatory nations as possible, since a sufficiently wide range of adhering nations would both cover the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policies, and permit nations that are members of the League to carry out all their obligations to it. Such a move, instead of "torpedoing the League," could not fail to strengthen its position. Moreover, such action on the part of France would be wholly in line with Briand's original proposal. For, as Senator Borah reminds us in the article referred to, that proposal suggested that the treaty between France and the United States would serve "as an example to other nations."

In his reply to Mr. Kellogg's proposal to extend the treaty of outlawry of war to other nations, Briand, however, introduced an idea not contained in his first proposal: namely, the outlawing of "aggressive" war. And a considerable portion of American pacific opinion has been inveigled into a belief that definition of what constitutes aggression is the necessary first step, to be followed by an outlawing of the nation which then engages in aggression as that has been defined. This notion has gained such wide currency that League obligations are now frequently spoken of as if they were based on mutual agreement to attack an aggressor nation. This is, however, sheer confusion; there is nothing about an "aggressor nation" in the covenant. Moreover, although the definition is often proposed as a much needed improvement in the idea of outlawing war, it evinces an almost total lack of comprehension of that idea. War is at present an institution legalized under existing international law. To outlaw the institution of war is a radically different thing from outlawing a nation. Use of the latter conception shows that those who employ it are still thinking and talking in terms of legalized war.

The injection of the idea of outlawing "aggressive war"—i.e., of outlawing an aggressor nation—needs to be accounted for. It is not at all hard to find the explanation. The passage already cited from the *World* reads: "To maintain the *status quo* by a general guarantee to make war upon any nation which attacks the *status quo*." In this phrase is contained the reality of any definition of "aggression" that would be satisfactory to France. That nation is the aggressor that strongly questions the *status quo;* in other words, that questions the settlements made by the war treaties. The diplomacy of the great European powers is quite adequate to the task of declaring a nation an aggressor which agitated vigorously for their revision, even if it did not take up arms to secure the revision. Under actual conditions, the treaty engagements of France with Poland and Czechoslovakia outside the League, engagements which Briand now urges against the possibility of becoming a party to multilateral treaties, take on a sinister aspect. There can be no doubt of the pious intent of the American group which is so devoted to defining "aggression" as a preliminary to the outlawry of an aggressive nation. But when it is noted that the European *status quo* is that fixed by the Paris war treaties, and that the League is the armed guardian of the settlement thus arrived at, the proposal to make the United States a party to a treaty which outlaws "aggression" is simply, from the European point of view, to make it a party to guaranteeing the results of the war treaties, with all their injustices. I fear the aspirations of the American group are far removed in their conception of "aggression" from the realities of the European situation, as these are used to define "aggression" by France and her allies.

That the reference in the *World* editorial to guaranteeing by armed force the *status quo* was not ill-considered is made perfectly clear by earlier editorials in that journal. Under the date of December 3 it said: "Substitute the word 'revision' for the word 'aggression' and the words 'maintenance of the Paris treaties' for the word 'security,' and you have the real meaning of this interminable debate." It is accordingly surprising to find the *World,* together with a section of the American internationally minded group, now supporting Briand's position as against Mr. Kellogg's. In a further editorial of January 13, the *World* said: "The League, the Locarno treaty and the various alliances are all built on the idea not of renouncing war but of waging war against any nation which disturbs the peace—that is, an aggressor nation." Since the

World at least is under no illusions as to the identity in the minds of France and her allies of "disturbing the peace" with striving for revision of the Paris treaties, why is it that the *World* does not bring its great influence to bear against the Briand injection of aggression? There appears to be but one course for American lovers of peace, namely, to get firmly and unanimously behind Kellogg's proposal for a general treaty of renunciation of war, and thereby execute the spirit of Briand's original idea of setting an example to the nations of the world. If the nations do not intend to embrace the opportunity thus afforded, it can only be because they propose to reserve to themselves the right to use war in promoting their national ambitions. If such be the case, it is just as well to have no treaties which disguise the real situation and which lull lovers of peace into a wholly delusive notion of the prospects of peace.

26. OUTLAWING PEACE BY DISCUSSING WAR[1]

Public opinion adjusts itself slowly to any proposed novel project in human relationships. Habit is even more solidly entrenched in beliefs, in modes of thinking and understanding, than in outer actions. Much of the current reaction to the Briand reply concerning the renunciation of war by a far-reaching multilateral treaty, illustrates the mental inertia by means of which old ideas are used to interpret a new idea, even though the latter is antithetical to them. Adherents of the "outlawry" policy have often said that the greatest difficulty in the way of getting an intelligent hearing for that idea comes from the fact that imagination, even when supposedly envisaging the situation after the legitimacy of war is renounced, projects into the picture the present situation in which war is the legalized ultimate method of settling disputes.

This statement is confirmed by the reaction of a considerable number to the new status given the outlawry idea by the Briand reply. Instead of its being discussed in terms of the situation that should and may come about when nations have solemnly agreed "never to seek the settlement of any difference or conflict of whatsoever nature or origin save by pacific means," it is largely discussed in terms of war—of what would happen if one of the signatory nations should violate its pledge and go to war! It would be hard, I think it would be impossible, to find a better illustration of the hold that the habit of thinking of international relations in terms of war has acquired. Similarly, when the relation of the League of Nations to the proposal is discussed, the thing chiefly put to the fore is not the stimulation and reinforcement it may give the work of the League in seeking out appropriate pacific means of settling disputes, but its effect on the actual or implied war-making powers of the League! This way of looking at the question it is fashionable to call "realistic." It strikes me as the stupidity of habit-bound minds.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, May 16, 1928.

An amusing trait of the discussion is that when the relation of the League through its members to a nation waging a war is under consideration, the argument assumes that all nations bound by a treaty to go to war will keep their word. But when it is a question of a treaty to settle disputes by other methods than war, the chief consideration is the probability that nations—always, of course, the other nations—will *not* keep their word, even though given in the most comprehensive and most far-reaching international document ever drawn.

Treaties to make war have, it would seem, an irresistibly attractive and binding force; treaties not to make war are in all probability scraps of paper.

The New York *World* has reduced to a formula the idea that Europe, through the League, is committed to the policy of sustaining peace by treaties which provide for going to war, and that Europe shows no sign of doubting that these treaties will be sacredly observed. It speaks well for the candor of the *World* that, although a supporter of the idea that the United States should enter the League, it presents the function of the League in the form least palatable to the American public—including most of the American supporters of the League. Although I do not happen to be personally a supporter of the policy the *World* advocates, I do not think it is true that the business of keeping peace by waging a joint war is the chief of the League's functions with respect to peace; I should suppose that even those who regard this as a necessary measure in some contingency, look on it as a desperate last resort, instead of the League's main concern. The formula reappears, however, in a *World* editorial of April 11. The editorial says: "Europe is organized on the principle of maintaining peace by waging war against the nation which starts a war. Europe has not the slightest intention of abandoning that principle."

I do not profess to have any mandate to speak for Europe as to what it is willing or unwilling to do. Without assuming any such lofty rôle, a layman like myself may, however, doubt whether the "principle" in question is thought, even by the nations who have hesitatingly and ambiguously committed themselves to it, to be one upon which a vast continent can be "organized." A layman may entertain a modest doubt whether a vague and as yet uncertainly formulated willingness to wage war in common is exactly a principle of organization. Entertaining the doubt, one may venture to go on to doubt whether the *World's* further statement, based on this premise of Europe's determined refusal, covers the whole case or the most important phase of the effect of Briand's last reply. It says: "M. Briand has led Mr. Kellogg around by polite but perfectly logical steps to a point where the proposal to outlaw war has become really a proposal to define the policy of the United States toward the League." To one who is not wholly bound by the habit of thinking of international relations in terms of war, it seems that a truer statement would be that the negotiations have come around (with perhaps Mr. Kellogg doing a considerable part of the leading) to a point where the United States and the nations in the League will have to discuss the nature and operations of the procedures and mechanisms by which the common agreement to settle disputes by pacific means can be converted into an effective reality.

To say this is only to repeat the statement that the very essence of the position which Briand has accepted is that the negotiations for a multilateral treaty must terminate in some plan for finding and employing peaceful means in lieu of warlike ones for settling disputes. There may be those, whose ideas do not get beyond headlines, who suppose that the signing of a treaty in general terms would end the whole matter. It is hard to believe that any responsible statesman entertains that idea. Certainly every active proponent of the outlawry idea has always held that any such general statement would, and could, be but a preliminary to providing adequate means for reaching pacific adjustments. It could be but a preliminary for further negotiations respecting arbitration, conciliation, conference, revision of international law to comply with its terms, a world court and so on.

The harm that is done in discussing the present status of the negotiations as if they mainly concerned some future war lies just here. The harm and danger are practical. The American public, and possibly some Senators, need to be prepared for subsequent efforts that will have to be made in order to provide the necessary pacific means of adjustment of disputes. Discussion in terms of what would happen in case of war distracts attention from this essential need. If discussion does not prepare the public mind for the necessity and we are caught unawares, then when the treaty has been negotiated, we may well be in for another failure, a failure humiliating to our national self-respect and tragic in its consequences for the world.

Book Five

TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

If democracy be a serious, important choice and predilection it must in time justify itself by generating its own child of wisdom, to be justified in turn by its children—better institutions of life.

John Dewey.

1. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS[1]

On the surface it is just coincidence that the foundation of this association and the publication of the *Principles of Psychology* of William James were so nearly contemporaneous, their respective dates being, as you know, 1891 and 1890. In view, however, of the depth and breadth of the influence of James, we who are celebrating to-day our twenty-fifth anniversary are at liberty, I think, to consider the coincidence as more than chronological, and to date back by one year the gestation of our association. At all events, it would be ungrateful to engage in any discussion of the past and future of social psychology without recalling the few rich pages of the *Principles* which are devoted to the social self, and, in the discussion of instincts, to the native reactions of human beings in the presence of one another. Big books have been written since which are hardly more than an amplification of suggestions found in these few pages. When, for example, a few years later, the *Socius* became the hero of a psychological drama, not many recalled that he had already been introduced under that very name in the pages of James.

Again it is outwardly a mere coincidence that the work of Tarde on the *Laws of Imitation* was published in the year in which the *Principles* saw the light of day, and that practically all of Tarde's work fell within the decade lying between 1890 and 1900. But behind the pure coincidence there was the recognition of the need for social ends of a more scientific treatment of collective human nature, and the important rôle of psychology in building up the new social science. While James confined himself to pregnant suggestions concerning the new forms which human experience and selfhood take on because of the presence of other human selves, Tarde attempted an ambitious interpretation of almost all facts of social organization, progress and degeneration in terms of certain rubrics to which he gave a psychological quality. For more than a decade his work and that of his followers in France and in the United States—among whom we may cite in diverse directions Baldwin and Ross—dominated social psychology and almost sociology. I shall not rehearse the old discussions about Imitation as a psychological fact and a social force. I shall assume with most of contemporary psychological critics that as a descriptive and explanatory conception it misplaced emphasis and tended to distort facts. But nevertheless we cannot minimize the immense power of this stage of social science in popularizing the idea of social psychology, and in bringing into recognition many facts, such as the importance of prestige, fashion, sensitiveness to the beliefs of others, the difficulties which innovation, no matter how reasonable, has to meet, etc., facts which are permanently imbedded in social science. Tarde himself was certainly one of the most stimulating and varied of writers, and I do not think we shall ever outgrow some of his contributions, although to my mind they are found rather in logic than in psychology—such as the necessity for reducing the gross phenomena of social life into minuter events which may then be analyzed one by one. The most fruitful of his psychological conceptions was ahead of his time and went almost unnoted. It was that all psychological phenomena can be divided into the physiological and the social, and that when we have relegated elementary sensation and appetite to the former head, all that is left of our mental life, our beliefs, ideas and desires, falls within the scope of social psychology.

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[1] From *The Psychological Review,* July, 1917. An address given on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the American Psychological Association, New York, Dec. 28, 1916; published under the title *The Need for Social Psychology.*

I hope I may find general agreement in pointing to the work of McDougall and Thorndike respectively as indicative of the next great force in social psychology, together with such writings as those, upon the social side, of Graham Wallas. Aside from valuable contributions in detail, the significance of these contributions lies, to my mind, in recalling social psychology from the wrong track in which the Imitation and Suggestibility schools had set it going. For those schools gave the dawning science a wrong twist in carrying over into science the old popular and practical antithesis of the individual and the social, and thus setting up two independent and even contrary sciences—individual and social psychology. As a concrete illustration of the absurd results to which this antithesis led, it is perhaps sufficient to refer to those bizarre writings on the psychology of the crowd in which it was assumed that the psychology of the individual left to himself is reflective and rational, while man's emotional obsessions and irrationalities are to be accounted for by the psychology of association with others. From the root of all such aberrations we were recalled the very moment the problem was presented not as one of the relationship of a mythical psychology of an isolated individual mind to the even more mythical psychology of a mass or crowd or public mind, but as the problem of the relationship of original or native activities to acquired capacities and habits. Henceforth our social psychology is placed upon the sure ground of observation of instinctive behavior; it can develop upon the basis of fact undistorted by the requirement of meeting preconceived notions imported from without. The whole question of imitation, for example, reduces itself to one of fact: Is imitativeness one of the original tendencies of human nature? If so, what is its intensity and mode of working in conjunction with the other unlearned activities?

The popularizers of science will doubtless remain half a generation behind this as well as other scientific advances, but for those who have learned the lesson of recourse to fundamental responses, the way is opened for emancipation from the greatest foe with which social science has had to contend—which I shall take the liberty of calling the monistic. How often have we been invited to build up our social, political, and ethical explanations in terms of some single and supposedly dominant mental constituent! How often discussions and disputes have been, at bottom, only a question as to which of rival single claimants we shall yield allegiance! Instincts to power, to control of others, fear of authority, sex, love of pleasure, of ease, all have been appealed to, and explanations constructed in terms of one or another exclusively. Henceforth it is, I submit, pure wilfulness if any one pretending to a scientific treatment starts from any other than a pluralistic basis: the complexity and specific variety of the factors of human nature, each operating in response to its own highly specific stimulus, and each subject to almost infinite shadings and modulations as it enters into combination and competition with others. The conception of social psychology resulting from this mode of approach becomes essentially one with that set forth by Professor W. I. Thomas in his paper on the province of social psychology at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science in 1904. On the one hand our problem is to know the modifications wrought in the native constitution of man by the fact that the elements of his endowment operate in this or that social medium; on the other hand, we want to know how control of the environment may be better secured by means of the operation of this or that native capacity. Under these general heads are summed up the infinity of special and difficult problems relating to education on the one hand and to constructive modification of our social institutions on the other. To form a mind out of certain native instincts by selecting an environment which evokes them and directs their course; to re-form social institutions by breaking up habits and giving peculiar intensity and scope to some impulse is the problem of social control in its two phases. To describe how such changes take place is the task of social psychology stated in generalized terms.

I hope I do not need to disclaim an attempt to give in even the barest summary the history of social psychology during the past twenty-five years. My object has been quite other. I have only wanted to refer to some salients in the intellectual fortifications constructed during this period for the sake of pointing out, in equally general terms, something of what now confronts us, waiting, nay demanding, to be done. Before passing on to this point, I feel I must avert possible misunderstanding by mentioning two allied factors which have also influenced the development of which I have spoken. One is the application of statistical methods to psychological research; the other, the behavioristic movement. Neither was devised primarily in the interests of social psychology. The requirements of education have, however, been a powerful agency in promoting the former, while education presents, of course, one phase of the problem of social control. Speaking more broadly, social phenomena are of a kind which demand statistical mathematics rather than the type of mathematics which has been evolved especially for use in dealing with physical facts. Condorcet's great essay on "The Progress of the Human Mind" forecasts a future in which human arrangements would be regulated by science. In dealing with the influence of mathematical science he points to the newly developing theory of probabilities as that branch of mathematics which is fraught with infinite potentiality for control of social progress. I think it is only fair to see in statistical psychology a step forward, short and halting though it be for the immediate present, in the realization of Condorcet's prophecy.

The behavioristic movement inevitably tends to confirm the tendency of which I have already spoken in connection with the writings of James, McDougall, and Thorndike. It transfers attention from vague generalities regarding social consciousness and social mind to the specific processes of interaction which take place among human beings, and to the details of group-behavior. It emphasizes the importance of knowledge of the primary activities of human nature, and of the modifications and reorganizations they undergo in association with the activities of others. It radically simplifies the whole problem by making it clear that social institutions and arrangements, including the whole apparatus of tradition and transmission, represent simply the acquired transformations of original human endowments.

This provides the possibility of a positive method for analyzing social phenomena. I shall avoid engaging in passing in the disputed question of the value of an introspective psychology. But it seems almost self-evident that even if introspection were a valid method in individual psychology, so called, it could not be of use in the investigation of social facts, even though those facts be labelled social mind or consciousness. Yet one has only to look at the writings of the Austrian and German school of "folk-psychologists" (say of Wundt, obviously the most important) to see how this treatment has been affected by an assumed need of making the method and results of social psychology conform to the received categories of introspective psychology. From such deforming of facts the behavioristic outlook immediately redeems us; it represents not an improvement in detail but a different mode of attack. It is not as yet possible to estimate the significance of this alteration. In my opinion, however, the chief cause of the backwardness of social psychology has resided in the artificiality of the endeavor to adapt the rubrics of introspective psychology to the facts of objective associated life. The opening of another road of approach may therefore be expected to emancipate inquiry.

I thus come to the explicit statement of the purpose of my reminiscent sketch. The aim was to justify the presentation of the conviction that the quarter century in which this Association has existed marks just the emancipation of social psychology from influences which prevented its development on its own feet and its own merits, while the work done on lines which (as it seems to me) must be abandoned, have nevertheless done the great service of enforcing the vast field open to a social psychology, and the great need it has to serve. I turn accordingly from the past to the future, or if you will from prophecy taking the guise of history to prophecy frankly avowing itself as such.

I foresee, then, a great reflex wave from social psychology back into general psychology. An important conclusion in the psychology of native activities does not seem to have been drawn as yet by those who would base a scientific psychology upon this foundation. The conclusion seems inevitable that since "mind" does not appear in the original list of instincts, it represents something acquired. It represents a reorganization of original activities through their operation in a given environment. It is a formation, not a datum; a product, and a cause only after it has been produced. Now theoretically it is possible that the reorganization of native activities which constitute mind may occur through their exercise within a purely physical medium. Empirically, however, this is highly improbable. A consideration of the dependence in infancy of the organization of the native activities into intelligence upon the presence of others, upon sharing in joint activities and upon language, make it obvious that the sort of mind capable of development through the operation of native endowment in a non-social environment is of the moron order, and is practically, if not theoretically, negligible.

The net outcome of the newer type of psychological method is thus an unexpected confirmation of the insight of Tarde that what we call "mind" means essentially the working of certain beliefs and desires; and that these in the concrete—in the only sense in which mind may be said to *exist*—are functions of associated behavior, varying with the structure and operation of social groups. Speaking in general terms, there is no more a problem of the origin of society than there is of the origin of chemical reactions; things are made that way. But a certain kind of associated or joint life when brought into being has an unexpected by-product—the formation of those peculiar acquired dispositions, sets, attitudes, which are termed mind. This by-product continually gains in relative importance. It increasingly becomes the significant acquisition among all the varied reorganizations of native tendencies. That anything which may properly be called mind or intelligence is not an original possession but is a consequence of the manifestation of instincts under the conditions supplied by associated life in the family, the school, the market place and the forum, is no remote inference from a speculative reconstruction of the mind of primitive man; it is a conclusion confirmed by the development of specific beliefs, ideas and purposes in the life of every infant now observable.

On the face of it, this conclusion has implications only for the theory of psychology. But slight scrutiny makes obvious its consequences for the struggle to gain control of the forces forming society. The ultimate refuge of the standpatter in every field, education, religion, politics, industrial and domestic life, has been the notion of an alleged fixed structure of mind. As long as mind is conceived as an antecedent and ready-made thing, institutions and customs may be regarded as its offspring. By its own nature the ready-made mind works to produce them as they have existed and now exist. There is no use in kicking against necessity. The most powerful apologetics for any arrangement or institution is the conception that it is an inevitable result of fixed conditions of human nature. Consequently, in one disguise or another, directly or by extreme and elaborate indirection, we find the assumed constitution of an antecedently given mind appealed to in justification of the established order as to the family, the school, the government, industry, commerce and every other institution. Our increased knowledge of the past of man has, indeed, given this complacent assumption a certain shock, but it has not as yet seriously modified it. Evolution in the sense of a progressive unfolding of original potencies latent in a ready-made mind has been used to reconcile the conception of mind as an original datum with the historic facts of social change which can no longer be ignored. The effect on the effort at deliberate social control and construction remained the same. All man could do was to wait and watch the panorama of a ready-formed mind unroll. The French school of imitation, and its present successor, the Durkheim school of collective mind, has practically the same outcome as the German school of Volk-geist in this respect. All are engaged in explaining the past and present, and (if they predict at all) in predicting the future on the basis of the past. The new point of view treats social facts as the material of an experimental science, where the problem is that of modifying belief and desire—that is to say mind—by enacting specific changes in the social environment. Until this experimental attitude is established, the historical method, in spite of all the proof of past change which it adduces, will remain in effect a bulwark of conservatism. For, I repeat, it reduces the rôle of mind to that of beholding and recording the operations of man after they have happened. The historic method may give emotional inspiration or consolation in arousing the belief that a lot more changes are still to happen, but it does not show man how his mind is to take part in giving these changes one direction rather than another.

The advent of a type of psychology which builds frankly on the original activities of man and asks how these are altered, requalified and reorganized in consequence of their exercise in specifically different environments brings with itself the experimental attitude, and thereby substitutes the interest in control for the interest in merely recording and what is called "explaining." If mind, in any definitely concrete sense of that word, is an offspring of the life of association, intercourse, transmission, and accumulation rather than a ready-made antecedent cause of these things, then the attitude of polite aloofness or condescending justification as to social institutions has its nerve cut, and with this the intellectual resources of sanctified conservatism disappear. Instincts become mind when they are organized and directed with reference to the ends of attention, esteem, and endeavor which are supplied by the shared life of the place and time. The kind of mind they become depends upon the kind of objects of attention and affection which the specific social conditions supply. The task of unravelling the arrangements which exist into elements of native instinct and past acquisitions is indeed an infinitely complex and difficult one; not the less hard and extensive is the job of showing how this and that association with other persons develops this and that intellectual and emotional disposition—or mind—in this and that individual having his own peculiar original endowment. But if the history of human achievement in knowledge proves anything, it is that the all-decisive discovery is that of an effective and fruitful method. When men once hit, after endless awkwardness, upon the right road, the rest takes care of itself. Scientific movement becomes orderly and cumulative in the very process of occurring. Social and mental phenomena become intelligible because they come within the scope of the experimental method of attack. And again the history of science testifies to a conclusion which may also be arrived at theoretically—the introduction of the experimental method is all one with interest in control—in modification of the future.

There is a genuine modesty, and there is a stupid simulation of modesty which is only a mask for lazy complacency. No science has so much cause to be humble about its actual achievements as has social science, including social psychology. But in prospect, in possibility, social science seems to me to stand about where physical science stood three centuries ago in the early years of the seventeenth century. There is the same halting and obstructed tendency to move from the attitude of the outside spectator, classifier and justifier of things as they are outwardly given to that of the active participant and modifier, from that of wholesale organization to that of retail reorganization. The experimental method in physical matters brought with it a technique of control—a technique of invention and construction. Specific desired ends can be formulated in specifically analyzed terms; the conditions of their attainment stated; these conditions subdivided into known and unknown factors, and some definite estimate made as to the practicability, at the given time, of attacking the problem. That we are without any such technique in social matters is self-evident. That the attainment within reasonable time of a similar technique stands and falls with the possibility of developing a human psychology which shall be experimentally applicable to the understanding of social affairs is not, however, self-evident, and is my excuse for reiteration.

I venture accordingly to repeat a thought which I had the honor of presenting before this association some years ago. The need of social control is, of course, as old as associated life itself. But the need of that control at the present time is tremendously accentuated by the enormous lack of balance between existing methods of physical and social direction. The utilization of physical energies made possible by the advance of physics and chemistry has enormously complicated the industrial and political problem. The question of the distribution of economic resources, of the relationships of rich and poor was never so acute nor so portentous as it is now; and this state of affairs is as much the result of progress in physical science as is the recognition of the Copernician astronomy. The present war is too vast and too tragic to permit one lightly to summon it as evidence for any merely theoretical thesis. But is it not, I ask, a demonstration made to order of those old words of Thomas Hobbes? "The utility of moral and civil philosophy is to be estimated, not so much by the commodities we have from knowing those sciences as from the calamities we receive from not knowing them." Such a conception is not fashionable just now; it is easier to place blame upon fate or upon the innate wickedness of human nature as seen in this or in that set of human beings. But the ultimate fate is the fatality of ignorance, and the ultimate wickedness is lack of faith in the possibilities of intelligence applied inventively and constructively.

Physical science has got to the point of bringing even the ends of the earth into physical, forceful relations with one another, and to the point of mobilizing all its resources for a contest in aggression and endurance. We are overwhelmed by the consequences of the very sciences into which have gone our best thought and energy for these last few hundred years. We apparently do not control them; they control us and wreak their vengeance upon us. Yet how infantile and pusillanimous are those who talk about the bankruptcy of science and who blame the increase of knowledge for our situation. Physical knowledge, and the consequent technique of control of physical forces, has far out-run social knowledge and its technique. The recourse of a courageous humanity is to press forward in the latter until we have a control of human nature comparable to our control of physical nature.

From the point of view of the psychology of behavior all psychology is either biological or social psychology. And if it still be true that man is not only an animal but a social animal, the two cannot be dissevered when we deal with man. Hence it is that subsequent years have enabled me to find added meaning in words which I spoke before this association years ago, and which in conclusion I venture to repeat. "We are not called upon to be either boasters or sentimentalists regarding the possibilities of our science. . . . But we are entitled in our daily work to be sustained by the conviction that we are not working in indifference to or at cross purposes with the practical strivings of a common humanity. The psychologist in his most remote and technical occupation with mechanism may be contributing his bit to that ordered knowledge which alone enables mankind to secure a larger and to direct a more equal flow of the values of life."

2. SOCIAL ABSOLUTISM[1]

The writer's ignorance is such that he is unacquainted with the works of Ratzel. His curiosity was stirred and if the truth be told his wrath also, by a quotation from Ratzel he recently read. This said that a "philosophy of the human race worth its name must be charged with the conviction that all existence is one—a single conception sustained from beginning to end upon one identical law." It sounds rather metaphysical, and like a somewhat discredited Teutonic metaphysics at that. But it must have some immediate pertinence. For it is found (I regret to say it) in an advertisement of Wells's new world history. Wells's book is inaccessible where this is written. It is accordingly impossible to tell how far the book agrees in spirit with the dictum of Ratzel. But Wells can hardly be wholly innocent. For the following words are quoted from him:—"History is no exception amongst the sciences; as the gaps fill in, the outline simplifies; as the outlook broadens, the multitude of details dissolves into general laws."

Now I make bold to say that this isn't science. It is the Victorian view of science which is the same as saying that it is the semi-literary, semi-sentimental, semi-moral, popular view of science, that was fashionable in the days when it was found necessary to appeal to science in order to repair the ravages wrought by science in popular beliefs. Historically it descends from the day when Sir Isaac Newton threw the mantle of deism about the physical universe. It required Spencer with his conception of evolution fully to domesticate the idea in the English mind. Or, rather, we may say it took the Tennysonian mind to rescue evolution from its bad repute, and to capture the doctrine and set it to work in behalf of popular credulous optimism. It is no wonder that in words omitted in the passage quoted, from Ratzel, the latter says that the philosophy of the human race "must begin with the heavens and descend to earth." He perhaps was thinking of the astronomical heavens. But in fact the doctrine, even in its milder Wellsian form, began in the theological heavens, and then descended to mundane affairs.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Feb. 9, 1921.

However, we must not rely even upon the odium antitheologicum. The doctrine might conceivably be true in spite of its origin, when it is applied to nature and history. But, oh, the remoteness of the doctrine that as we learn more facts, the outline simplifies: the vague remoteness of the plea that as science learns more facts, the multitude of details dissolves into general laws! That is precisely, according to the work of every existing living science, what doesn't happen. As known details multiply, we discover laws by which we formulate them and we also find laws by which to tie laws together. Some uniformity is conceivable for every discovered and discoverable detail. That much holds good. But such a statement is radically perverted when it is thought to mean that facts dissolve into general laws. We might as well say that when we find streets by which to find our way about in clumps upon clumps of houses, the houses dissolve into the streets; it is because the houses are obdurately there that we have to make streets; and it is because facts exist in such irregular thickets that we have to use every possible clew to introduce some kind of formulation, that is, of uniformity. If one wants a rough criterion for marking off the old popular view of science from the actual work of science he can find it here. Does exposition proceed on the assumption that concrete facts melt away into laws which then melt into more general laws? Then we are in the face of a period when thought was ruled by imported pre-scientific notions "which began in the heavens." Or do we find law treated as a descriptive formula for facts, so that there is a multitude of laws terminating in the same fact, according to the point of view from which it is described? Then science is speaking in its own voice.

This is dogmatically said, and it can hardly be proved without a long technical treatise quite out of place. But it is worth saying dogmatically if only to induce a reader to question that assumption which makes it easy for him to assume a unitary and absolutistic point of view when he approaches human history. It is, to speak moderately, a little unfortunate that such a saying as that of Wells is contemporary with the relativity doctrine of Einstein which substitutes for the neat, smooth, well-ordered world of Newton a world which is full of puckers and skews. Mechanics has always been the stronghold of the facts-dissolving-into-law notions, and it now appears probable that the science of mechanics has much more to do with our way of approaching and measuring facts than it has to do with nature.

We are interested, however, in the conception in its bearing upon human history and society. In this application, it appears that the doctrine is simply a "rationalization" of social monism, that is, of the attempt to impose a single movement upon history and a single law and rule upon man. One may sympathize with a longing for some state which shall reduce international anarchy to order, and enable harmonious intercourse to take the place of war. But even here it makes a mighty difference whether the super-state is something into which the multitude of nations is to "dissolve," or whether it is a descriptive formulation of conditions under which the multitude of local states, provinces, towns, villages, and other human groups may follow more securely their own careers, and voluntarily engage in undisturbed and fruitful conversation with each other. For the only conversation in which participants "dissolve" is the one in which some tyrant bore monopolizes discourse, while voices melt into monotony.

Mr. Wells long ago accused Americans of not being state-minded. He was right. We are (or were before the war seized us and we evolved a fair imitation of the British Dora) so far from being state-minded that we didn't even know exactly what Mr. Wells meant. It took the war and the Versailles project of a League of Nations to teach us; or we should have unanimously replied that the charge was not an accusation but a compliment. Not that the state isn't upon the whole a respectable and needed institution, but that to become state-minded instead of socially-minded is to become a fanatic, a monomaniac, and thus to lose all sense of what the state is. For a state which shall give play to diversity of human powers is a state in which the multitude of human groups and associations do *not* dissolve. It is a mechanism, up to the present a rather clumsy one, for arranging terms of interplay among the indefinite diversity of groups in which men associate and through active participation in which they become socially-minded.

There is no doubt that politics is a more reputable career than average American esteem makes it out to be, for the trained mechanic is needed in every pursuit. We have taken our cue too much from those untrained in political mechanics and skilled in personal preferment. But our depreciatory estimate of politics is nearer the truth than a glorification of a state of social unity and law in which concrete human beings dissolve. Such sayings are still dogmatism rampant. But they are intended to sharpen the issue, to make alternatives clear. For the alternatives are either variety and experiment or a single conception of life sustained from beginning to end upon one identical law. Those who like the latter kind of thing will go on liking it. But the average man is entitled to become clear upon what he likes, and to become aware of where a choice is taking him. What the average American has practically liked in the past is clear enough in spite of our failure to make it clear to ourselves intellectually. We have believed in live and let live, in giving everything a show, in an easy toleration, in at least a passive good will. It was not hard to believe in those things and think we were living up to them as long as we had plenty of room in which to give everybody a chance. Now we awake to a discovery that we are crowded within and pushed from without. We find that if we are not to be hypocrites we must fight with intelligence and art for the things which in the past were given us by nature and fortune. We must become conscious of the principle upon which we have unconsciously acted. We have talked a great deal about democracy, and now for the first time we have to make an effort to find out what it is. We must, if you please, discover a social philosophy in order to clarify social activities.

We may choose a philosophy of unity of existence which exhibits a single conception borne up upon one law. We may search history for evidence of the one conception and law. But in that case we should know what we are doing. We are making a breach with all the impulses which have urged us in the past. We are turning to some form of social absolutism. The varieties of social absolutism are not exhausted in the divine right of kings nor in the Prussianism which we told ourselves we were fighting to destroy. The idea is capable of Protean forms. At the present time there is one militantly active form of this philosophy of one movement in history and one law in society entrenched in Russia. Foreign opinion has been so distracted by all kinds of minor issues and reports, largely lies, that it has failed to grasp the situation in its simplicity. The one end of history is the abolition of classes through the institution of communism by a dictatorship, not of the proletariat but of intellectuals representing a dumb and stupid proletariat. The one law of history is strife, internal conflict, civil war of classes. This is not any longer a theory of Marx expounded in manifestoes and books. It is a creed in action, a creed held with intense religiously fanatic fervor. The Marxian reading of Hegel in its monism, its absolutism and its conviction that all movement comes by internal strife, is embodied in Bolshevik Russia to-day. One does not have to meet Lenin; one has only to meet any intelligent Russian of the Bolshevist faith to know how ultimate, fierce and integral is this faith. For the Bolshevists know what they mean when they reserve their deepest contempt for democracy, even though they know even less than, say, we Americans what democracy really means, its essential pluralism, experimentalism, and consequent toleration.

It requires either hypocrisy, an innocence which is the dupe of hypocrisy, or else a faith equal to that of the Bolshevists and, informed by an opposite philosophy, to declare one's adherence to democracy, after the outcome of a war declared to have been a war in behalf of democracy. On the face of things the opponents of democracy, whether capitalistic or Bolshevistic or imperialistic have the best of the situation. Yet it may be that the best thing which can happen to the ideal of democracy is to be put on the defensive. For then it will no longer remain a vague optimism, a weak benevolent aspiration, at the mercy of favorable circumstances. It may become a compact, aggressive and realistic intelligence directing circumstance. Such an idea will recognize that its one great enemy is the hankering of men for unity of existence, aim and law in whatever form it may offer itself. It will recognize the infinite variety of human nature, and the infinite plurality of purposes for which men associate themselves together. It will recognize that progress is never in one line, but comes when a variety of things move along together. It will take its stand on the conviction that this movement comes about by many-sided interaction in which lee-way is given each force and principle for an experimental development. It will distrust every emancipation of the masses from above whether coming from a benevolent capitalism or a proletariat dictatorship.

These are generalities. A single specific illustration may be given. If one adopts the belief in unity of purpose and law in social matters but is opposed to the Bolshevist-Marxian gospel, then the policy of Clemenceau, Millerand and Wilson regarding Russia is right. It is the plain fact that this philosophy commits those who hold it to encouraging revolution and civil war in every country. The dictators of Russia are neither insincere nor cloudy-minded. They know and mean what they believe. Hence the rival social absolutist will declare for war on Russia; or, failing that, complete non-intercourse and blockade. He will declare for suppression, censorship and espionage at home; or, failing that, for a campaign of vilification and emotional terrorism. In so doing he is of course playing the Bolshevist game and illustrating the absolutism which underlies the Bolshevist philosophy. Sympathizers with Bolshevist ideas in America who deplore the blockade and the internal campaign against communistic ideas either lack the intellectual clarity of the real Bolshevists or are laughing in their sleeves. Otherwise they would welcome the confirmation these things give of the Bolshevist philosophy.

In other words, while there are no signs of conversion of America to Bolshevism, there are signs of decay of democracy and of unconscious adoption of some form of social absolutism. For if we believe in democracy we shall believe in the right of that vast group of human beings known as Russians to make their own experiments, to learn their own lessons in their own way. We shall be confident of their ultimate failure, at home and abroad, in just the degree in which we have an intelligent command of democratic ideas and methods, but we shall also believe that no group of human beings ever goes wholly wrong, and that along with the ultimate bankruptcy of Marxian absolutism there will develop many contributions of positive value to the problems of a better ordering of life, and we shall be anxious to learn and adopt these social lessons. Any other policy means that we are encouraging a capitalistic social absolutism in opposing a proletarian absolutism.

3. POLITICAL SCIENCE AS A RECLUSE[1]

The conquest of the rude and disorderly phenomena of physical nature by science had a peculiar unforeseeable reflex upon man's attitude toward social institutions and occurrences. That it should suggest that they also are neither the manifestations of inscrutable supernatural forces nor the sport of chance was natural. There was nothing peculiar or unexpected in the conception that social phenomena, like physical, come under "the reign of law." This is explicable enough. But chance, arbitrary free will and supernatural intervention were not the only rival causal powers with which the notion of a science of collective human affairs had to contend. The radical foes of the existent social order in the eighteenth century taught almost unanimously that institutions were the product of accidents due to human ignorance, plus fraud and the despotic will of a few men to use the many. They taught that the new social order was to be a product of the voluntary arrangements among men who substituted knowledge for ignorance, and freedom for political and ecclesiastic enslavement. The conception of "the reign of law" in human affairs cut across this humanism of the French Enlightenment, and as a consequence the project of a social science turned into a rationalizing of social phenomena by showing that they are necessary, not accidental; the effect of universal, and hence rational, laws, not of the play of human beliefs and choices, wise or unwise.

Social science thus became in substance an organized justification of the main structures of society as they exist: it operated to strengthen the sentiment of human impotency and futility. To intervene is to interfere; to interfere is to invite the disaster that comes from any attempt to "violate" natural law.

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[1] From *The New Republic,* April 27, 1918.

This is the uniform intellectual background of the *laissez-faire* philosophy of society. And, the reaction against *laissez-faire* as a practical policy has not come into the possession of *ideas* with which to arm itself, by which to define and justify itself. It has presented rather a fusion of philanthropic sentiment, of the practical feeling that something had to be done whether there was any scientific warrant for it or not, of the working of an underlying traditional empiricism which had not been seriously affected by pretensions to a science, and of a vague belief that the new science of evolution gave philosophic support to attempts to accelerate social evolution even though nothing could be done to alter or direct its course.

While the conception that the economic phenomena of society are the necessary products of natural laws was essentially a contribution of English thinkers, the "sciences" of history, institutions and the state were constructed in Germany. Typically German philosophy is all of it primarily a defensive reaction against French revolutionary philosophy. Since the latter had exaggerated the effect of human ignorance, deliberate imposture and deliberate despotism in behalf of consciously entertained self-interest, German science revelled in a philosophy of inner necessity, a higher reason transcending human reasoning, an intrinsic absoluteness of law. The fact that Germany alone of modern nations underwent no political revolution and was imbued with the doctrine of the hopelessness of a revolution rendered such a justifying science a compensatory necessity. The great and successful German propaganda of the nineteenth century consisted in the spread of its distinctive scientific rationalization of history and institutions, especially of the state.

This accounts for the obvious scholastic flavor which hangs about the orthodox treatise of political science. Universal and necessary laws and principles mean something rational, and reason as distinct from experience means—vide Kant—concepts. There must be then an essential nature of the state, from which its significant attributes must flow; all the general notions must then hold together in logical order. Otherwise there would be no "science," but only a collection of empirical facts lacking the credentials of an authenticated science. Such an incident as the lobby at Albany would stand on the intellectual level of state sovereignty, Tammany Hall be as important as the bicameral system, and the methods by which big corporations influence legislation rank with the eternal truth of the proper distribution of governmental powers. In a true "science," mere empirical facts cannot figure except as they are framed within a concept or trimmed down to be an illustration of a law, in either dislocated from their everyday context.

Every rationalistic science, that is to say every science whose aim is to explain by reference to general notions, is bound down to static principles, just as every experimental science is held to description of what is going on. The former "explains" the necessity of things as they exist by showing their connection with eternal truths; the latter sees how things are changing into something else so as by seeing to facilitate prediction and control. Classic political science thus becomes a recluse from the world of affairs and alternates between a pedantic conservatism and a complacent acceptance of any brute change which happens, if only a decent time be allowed to elapse. To label anything "truth" is indeed to use a powerful preventive. But social phenomena do not congeal simply because they are covered over with static conceptions; classic social science is no Joshua. When physical science consisted of classifying and explanatory concepts, the world of nature presented facts which conformed to them, and also anomalies and accidents. There was nothing to *do* about either of these things, once they had been squared up with the concepts duly provided. Since change is the primary social fact as surely as motion is the primary physical fact, a science which despises change as empirical is impotent before the facts. Thus it is that the dominion of static ideas over men's minds makes for ill considered revolution as truly as for reactionary conservatism.

A genuine conservatism is an attitude of will or endeavor; it marks a union of thought with effort. It is compelled to take account of actual changes, to select and to adapt in order to conserve. The static standards of the classic science of nature did not indicate an affectionate clinging to things as they had been in opposition to things as they might become. They rather expressed the intense inclination of the imagination to take them as they never had been and never would be. Much of what arrogates to itself the high name of social conservatism is also nothing but the lazy indulgence of a secluded and self-involved imagination.

There is something humorous in the way in which the classicist detects personal wilfulness, romantic fancy and undisciplined impulse in the projects and experiments of the reformer or radical in politics and art. His own standards (called rational because they consist in a circle of logically ordered concepts) express in effect only one of his emotions—a personal aversion to change. Lacking the intellectual and moral force to face change and to assume the onerous task of directing it, rendered uncomfortable and irritable when the facts of a moving world are forced upon him, he recovers his disturbed calm by holding some innovating subversive group, some Bolsheviki, responsible for the change, and seeks again the soothing contentment of his own well-ordered intellectual drawing room. In these smoothed out and becalmed precincts, he becomes the romantic expounder of truths "eternal" enough, he hopes, to last out his life time of undisturbed complacencies.

Meantime the serious work, the work of observing the multitudinous changes which are going on, of detecting their quality and movement, of forecasting their probable consequences, and inventing mechanisms to turn them to account, gets poorly done. Social control becomes a matter of luck. The dull fellowship of legitimate and allowable truths is confronted by an onrush of social forces which work their will upon us. We oscillate between eulogizing the established order as though there were any order except that of change and eulogizing all change—after it has happened—as an illustration of some mysterious law of evolution. We argue as if stability and alteration, order and innovation, were to be discussed as possible alternatives. We talk as if it were a question of putting the matured wisdom of the fathers over against the irresponsible whims of youngsters, or of letting loose the vital spirit of youth to do battle with a musty and decrepit antiquity. But all this is romantic and secluded; it does not get beyond the confines of the imagination. If the unescapable fact is that changes are going on anyway and incessantly, effective intelligence has no point of contact with such phantasies. Its concern is to find out what particular changes are going on, how their consequences may be forecast, and through what further changes within our command they may be directed to the better of two possible results. In the world of natural change, men learned control by means of the systematic invention of effective tools only when they gave up preoccupation with lofty principles logically arranged, and occupied themselves seriously with the turmoil of concrete observable changes. Till we accomplish a like revolution in social and moral affairs, our politics will continue to be an idle spectator of an alternation of social comedies and tragedies, compensating for its impotency by reducing its applause and hisses to a scheme of fixed canons which the show is then imagined to exemplify.

4. THE NEW SOCIAL SCIENCE[1]

The pronunciamento of the committee of the English Labor party says the war is consuming the peculiar social order in which it arose; that if it is not the end of civilization it is at least the end of an industrial civilization which the workers will not willingly resuscitate. Mr. Schwab, according to newspaper statements, has gone considerably further. He foresees a social renaissance in which the man without property, the workman who labors with his hands, is going to be the man who will dominate the world. I doubt if those who fear and dislike any serious change in the constitution of society could be better served than by the development of a lazy automatism which assumes that as a matter of course tremendous social changes, all tending to improve the condition of wage-earners, are bound to occur after the war. If the change is left to either miscellaneous evolution or miscellaneous revolution to accomplish, the magician will probably disappear at a critical moment and leave things much as before, plus increased unrest and disorder on one side and increased stringency of control on the other. The English manifesto is too wise to indulge in optimistic infantilisms. It recognizes that there is a job ahead which requires an extraordinary union of energy, emotional warmth and intellectual light.

With respect to England, Mr. Hobson in his *Democracy After the War* has clearly set forth the coalition of forces which will prevent if it can a democratic reorganization of industrial society. This country will be in worse plight in many respects. The employment problem with demobilization of soldiers and munition workers will be immense. The pressure in any case for reduction of high wages will be great; already many employers and large investors want an importation of

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[1] From *The New Republic*, April 6, 1918.

Oriental labor and would publicly work for it if they thought there was any chance of success. The industrial dislocations effected by the war will affect labor rather than capital, because the effect of war is amalgamation of industries and integration of capital. This relatively fluid and impersonal character will keep capital in the concentrated reservoirs into which the war has gathered it. Powerful financial interests are largely in control of credit and hence of the value of money, and they will have under their management a huge accumulation of evidences of debt bought in conditions of expanding credit or cheap money. Through the contraction of credits which will follow the inflations of war they will be in a position to demand payment with an "honest dollar," that is, dear money. Up to the present there is little evidence in this country of any corresponding organized concentration of power on the part of labor. Its centralization is hampered by a fixed habit of thinking and acting in terms of immediate wages and hours of labor instead of in terms of control of economic conditions. The public shows little signs of intervening to alter the guerilla warfare going on between employers and employed—of which every daily paper gives the evidence. At the best the problem of effective concentration of labor power has all the difficulties of a human problem as against the mainly technical problem of solidifying financial power. In addition to these considerations, effective political action will meet an obstacle which does not exist in Great Britain. Our constitution will presumably be again in force after the war. To see the property-less man in the saddle under such conditions requires a peculiarly exuberant imagination.

Set over against these difficulties and obstructions there is as yet just one large accomplishment sure to become more salient with every month which the war continues: An awakened and altered sense for human affairs. Up to the present the advance is almost exclusively psychological and educational. Fixed beliefs have been shocked into disintegration. Complacent convictions which were thought to be based on reason have been pried loose and the rock of prejudice exposed. Imagination has got used to seeing "impossible" things done in a large way, and the achievement has rendered us docile, more receptive alike to the lessons of experience and to entertainment of strange ideas, of new possibilities. Certain factors in society, especially labor on one side and scientific competency or intellectualized skill on the other, have been quickened by the strains of great social emergency to a sense of their pivotal place. Above all, it has been discovered that intelligence and training are available for the conduct of great public affairs in the public interest when occasion generates the will to employ them for that end. The feeling is subtly spreading that after such a demonstration of power in behalf of public concerns, only absence of effective desire, or the power of contrary desire to serve private interests, will permit the restoration of the older order. We have gained a presentiment that what the public wants there is the intelligence and skill to make good; that sinister wants rather than lack of capacity stand in the way. This education, this change in social psychology, is what has occurred. An altered state of imagination and desire will not of itself go far. But it is a condition without which other changes will not go anywhere. A changed outlook due to facing the world from another attitude is a precondition of a permanent invasion of new fields. A clarification of the outlook through definition of the altered attitude is itself a practical undertaking. It signifies something to realize in just what respects the intellectual supports of reactionary conservatism have been weakened. To note that supposed "scientific" foundations are turning into a bundle of myths is to aid in defining what had to be done next. When the cheeks of the augurs so bulge that their speech ceases to be understandable, it is time for a new articulation. The exposed myth is that the existing social order is a product of natural laws which are expounded in a rational, a scientific, way in the traditional sciences of society. A "science" of any subject-matter implies a rational order in that subject-matter. The accepted social sciences do not, indeed, hold that any comprehensive directive intelligence is so much at the base of the existent social order as perforce to justify its being what it is. But political and legal science rest upon the assumption of certain general and fixed conceptions which in the main the present static order exemplifies. Economic science regards the dynamic order of society as the result of the cumulative intelligence of an indefinitely large number of beings, each devoting his own intelligence to the things to which it is peculiarly adapted, namely, the pursuit of interests which lie within personal control. The net result in the existent social order is supposed to be resolvable into an immense assemblage of minute and wonderfully interwoven acts of intelligent adaptation. While sociology has been uneasy under the domination of these sciences, it has largely devoted itself to discovering other "laws," especially those of evolution, which determine society to be what it is and in so far justify it, or which at least throw the burden of change upon the future workings of evolution, that Providence of the modern enlightened man, piously credulous in spite of all his professed scepticisms.

If the war has revealed that our existing social situation is in effect the result of the convergence of a large number of independently generated historic incidents, it has shown that our ordinary rationalizing and justifying ideas constitute an essential mythology in their attributions of phenomena to basic principles and intelligently directed forces. When it is seen that intelligence has for the most part been confined to working within the sphere of these various incidental happenings to glean from each some local usufruct, it becomes apparent that the net result is something irrational, something unplanned and unintended, in short a historic accident. And in turn it appears that any science which pretends to be more than a description of the particular forces which are at work and a descriptive tracing of the particular consequences which they produce, which pretends to discover basic principles to which social things conform, and inherent laws which "explain" them, is, I repeat, sheer mythology. This is the negative side of the education enforced by the war. The need of radical modification of aims and methods in the face of a serious social crisis, which makes clear the extent to which the present order rests upon habit, intrigue, private deflections of social forces to personal uses, love of barbaric luxury and display, secret business and secret diplomacy, reveals how little affairs have been effects of intelligent desire and direction. In so doing, they give a blow in the end certain to be fatal to the "sciences" which assume intelligence and rational law in their explanations and systematizations. One may doubt whether William James foresaw how soon events would confirm his presentiment that a substitution of pragmatic experimentalism for the reign of rationalistic sciences involves an "alteration in the seat of authority."

The exigencies have shown that intelligence exists as an operative power. It has revealed the capacity of organized intelligence to take hold of affairs and direct the movement of massed details. The response of affairs has proved them amenable to such management. A centralized intellectual policy has been demonstrated to be feasible as well as imperatively needed. Empirical description of forces is not, then, the whole of the social science which should replace our rationalized mythology. What is required is large working hypotheses concerning the uses to which these forces are to be put. Legislation, administration and education must be regarded as having the rôle of an experimentation which tests and perfects ideas rather than as a program which merely executes them. There is, of course, an immense amount of empirical subject-matter contained within the confines of existing social sciences. The only trouble is that has been "framed up" and betrayed by its mythical and apologetic setting. When released from this context it is available for defining present tendencies and obstacles, and hence is relevant to the development of plans of social reordering and a technique of social control. Only by becoming instruments of projected action and responsible to consequences effected by action can the social sciences escape from archaic theological designs and from methods framed on the model of a mathematical rationalism which is extinct outside of morals and politics.

The social situation creates a demand for such a science if the intelligence to be brought to bear on social reconstruction is not to be lamed and confused. A happy presentiment is displayed in the fact that the English Labor programme terminates with a demand for science and yet more science, and in the fact that the hand worker and brain worker are everywhere coupled. But the outcome will be as happy as the instinct only if it be acknowledged that a new social order cannot be built with the help of a science inherited from an old social order. The war ought to give a final blow to that myth still current in Marxian circles that a new era will be ushered in by the breakdown of the present régime of capitalism due to the completed evolution of the latter, a breakdown in which it remains only for the proletariat to step in and take complete possession. The doctrine smacks, of course, of the Hegelian dialectic of opposites. But that is only its formal aspect. Its subject-matter is the belief in a catastrophe, an end of the world, to be followed by a millennial period. This recurrent doctrine always testifies to the existence of a desire which is not capable of translation into specific means and ends through intelligent action. Its adoption into "scientific socialism" is merely a confession of the absence of science, of the absence of that spirit of projecting, reasoning and experimenting in terms of detail which is the mark of every science that has achieved itself. The war has shown, I repeat, that it takes detailed intelligence, not mere desire, however praiseworthy, to manage society in an emergency. It has thereby cleared the way for a science of ideas in action which will trust not to negative forces, to bankruptcy, to bring about what is desired, but to positive energy, to intellectual competency, to competency of inquiry, discussion, reflection and invention organized to take effect in action in directing affairs. The result will not be sudden and millennial. But it will be steady; and, as in all experimental science, a mistake will be a source of enlightenment and not a cause of reaction.

5. INDUSTRY AND MOTIVES[1]

Discussion of an industrial change which should increase the importance of service and reduce that of profit needs it seems to me to make a marked distinction between service and profit as motives and as consequences. I have little trust in "service" as a motive force in regulating the organization of industry and the flow of its products. This distrust is not due to pessimism about human nature, but to a belief that motives of any sort are incidental rather than fundamental, that in the main they reflect social situations rather than cause them. There is a good deal of ground for agreeing with Adam Smith and his followers in saying that our breakfast table is better served at present than it would have been if producers and distributors had been actuated by benevolent regard for their fellowmen. It is difficult to see how the latter could establish and keep going the mechanism of production and exchange.

But Adam Smith and his followers seem to me to have been guilty of a similar fallacy in supposing that the present scheme, such as it is, is exclusively or mainly the product of self-love or desire for profit. It seems upon the whole to be rather a product of the need of man to keep busy, to do something, to satisfy wants of many kinds, plus the pressure exercised by conditions in fixing the channels of human action. It may seem absurd to deny that the existing régime is a product of the desire for pecuniary gain. But it is also absurd to deny that the present system has some degree of service of human needs as its *consequence,* though not as its aim. The just charge is that the flow of service is arrested, interfered with and deflected to the point of serious and increasingly intolerable human maladjustments by factors of pecuniary profit. If we try to put the facts together without exaggeration we get, it appears to me, the following conclusion: Desire for profit never produced the existing situation. But the existing situation is such that it puts a premium on the desire of using the concrete business situations that present themselves in such affairs as hiring labor, making and marketing goods, giving and withholding credit, so as to make *a* profit out of them, to turn them to account in the way of making pecuniary gain. And the result is that arrest and perversion of the flow of service spoken of above.

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[1] From *The World Tomorrow,* December, 1922.

This statement is rather abstract; so much so that it may be retorted that for all practical purposes it makes no difference whether this particular formulation be adopted or the familiar one that treats desire for gain as the motive force which keeps industry and commerce going. If it does make no difference in diagnosis of causes of evil and in search for remedies, I should be the first to admit that it is an intellectual subtlety not worthy of attention. But I believe it makes a fundamental difference.

In the first place, habit, with the opportunity and pressure of circumstances, are the forces that even now keep the vast mass of men at work. Think over the men and women you know—farmers, laborers, small shopkeepers, the average professional person including teachers, housekeepers—and ask if this is not so. In addition you will find a comparatively small number of persons, of greater moral energy than usual, in whom a conscious desire for service is evident, and another small group of greater economic energy than usual who are concerned with making pecuniary profit. In many ways the latter rule the roost and fix the conditions under which the mass, who are engaged in doing what conditions permit and require, live and work. But the mass does not think the game of profit making is worth while; unconsciously and in effect they do not think so. They want to get along, to have a good time, to support their families, to enjoy companionships with others, to win a reasonable degree of approval from others. They regard these things as more important than making profit. If the desire for profit were more widely spread than it is, the comparatively small number who are engaged in manipulating affairs for profit would not have the easy time they now have: it wouldn't be such a monopoly. Is it not probable then that it is something in the situation rather than in human motives which so accentuates at present in a few the activities for gain—whether gain of money, or, more usually, gain of power of which money is a symbol and instrument?

In the second place, the conditions which so stimulate the activities of profit are largely due to mechanical inventions—the applications of steam and electricity. These mechanical inventions are the result of science, and the scientific discoveries which brought about the industrial revolution were not to any large extent the product of either a wish for service or for gain. They were mainly due to the fact that a certain number of persons found outlet for their energies and interests in observations, experiments and mathematical calculations. And in the earlier period at least the chief inventions were not due to love of profit but to a similar inner urge for release of energies in congenial ways. Recently, without doubt, invention has been more commercialized, it is more a matter of business absorbed in the general scheme of business.

In the third place political conditions and legal relations still embody even in so-called democratic countries many survivals of feudalism. Modern industrialism was developed and still operates under conditions fixed by feudalism; many evils which we attribute to modern industrialism have their real origin in conditions fixed before the capitalistic development. Take one illustration from a situation emphasized by the single-tax agitation—the private ownership of land values. It would be absurd to deny that business for gain is a powerful factor in obstructing changes of laws and methods of taxation which would socialize land values; but the *origin* of private seizure of land values goes back to legal arrangements which long anteceded modern business. Considering the amount of evidence presented by single-tax reformers that a change in laws of landholding and taxation would facilitate business and more widely distribute gains it seems likely that inertia, laziness, ignorance and unreflection play quite as large a rôle in perpetuating the old legal situation as do the profits that now accrue by its means to a limited number of persons. Many other illustrations could be found.

The point of these three considerations lies in their application to methods which would release the flow of services and render it more equitable. First, the importance of education is indicated. The newspapers that have the widest circulation among the poor are the newspapers that give most attention to the activities and enjoyments of millionaires. If it were not for the popular admiration of wealth and the power it confers, the place of wealth-getting in social life would enormously shrink. This is a matter of education in its wide sense. When popular appreciation of artistic enjoyment and other modes of human satisfaction spread those who devote themselves to business as exclusively as do present "leaders" of society will be looked upon with a certain pity or contempt. Again our present education is so limited in scope (think merely of the age at which the great majority cease schooling to say nothing of what they get before leaving) that the mass of persons have no recourse save to accept the industrial situation which they find and conform to it. Their interest in art, intellectual activity, social intercourse on a worthy plane has not been awakened, or if it has been they are not equipped with the means of satisfying it.

Secondly, the development of science is still one-sided and incomplete. Knowledge of physical forces and of the means of controlling them has far outrun knowledge of human energies and means of using them. It seems safer to count upon scientific development in the latter direction to bring about vast changes in the social situation than it does to work for a change of motives without scientific progress. Again, physical science is still restricted. Just as the existing economic situation is so largely due to inventions made possible by mathematics, physics and chemistry, so it is probable that the next and inevitable industrial revolution will have the same cause. Suppose it were true that chemists had found a way to make gold and silver as cheap and common as tin or aluminum. What would happen to our existing economic régime? Suppose chemists succeed in finding ways to release the energies of the atom so that any group of individuals can easily and cheaply have access to the energies and appliances which control production. Can any one estimate the social consequences upon present capitalism based as it is upon control of machinery? Were I a capitalist I should be kept awake nights more by the expectation of such changes than by Bolshevism and Socialism.

Thirdly, there is the limited but genuine field of legal changes which will alter the conditions under which industry, banking and commerce are carried on. I do not think that those who expect every desirable change to come in this channel are very wise. But it is true that changes in conditions of appropriation and use of property, affected mainly by changes in modes of taxation and of investment, would alter deeply the conditions under which business is carried on, so as to release and secure an equitable flow of services.

The sum total of changes in these three directions would create an industrial order in which the present exaggeration of profit and gain would be enormously reduced. We should have business whose consequence was service. But the motive would not be so much service as established, customary opportunities for a freer, fuller and richer life. Business just as business has not been carried as yet to the point of merchandizing publicity, knowledge about conditions, opportunities and results. Much of the present confusion, congestion and one-sided control of power is the product of private access to facts on the part of a privileged few, together with secrecy about their activities and their consequences. Given changes in education, in science and in law, a more even access to knowledge of conditions and opportunities would result. Publicity about the activities of industrial and financial captains and the consequences of their doings would bring an overwhelming check of public sentiment to bear upon what they do. They would take much more pains to do things that will stand inspection.

This is far from being the whole of the change that would result, but it is a change that would alone bring about nothing less than a revolution in the present régime so as to make service the rule, instead of a disturbed and partial function. Agitation for more humane and reasonable motives in conduct of business has its place, but that place it seems to me is part of a wider process of education which will modify attention to the opportunities of the social situation.

6. ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL REORGANIZATION[1]

One of the striking sentences that introduces the pronunciamento of the committee of the English labor party is that war is consuming the very basis of the peculiar social order in which it has arisen; that the war, in short, is consuming not merely munitions and steel and ships and human lives, but the social order out of which it arose. The same document refers to a statement by a Japanese statesman that the present war represents the collapse of European civilization. And they go on to say that it does mark, if not the death, in Europe, of civilization, at any rate the culmination and collapse of a distinctive industrial civilization which the workers will not seek to reconstruct.

These, perhaps, are extreme statements. But they come, at all events, from an influential section. They represent the opinions of the organized wage earners of Great Britain, the best organized laborers as laborers, probably, in the world. But we have all of us seen statements, which if not so extreme, would have seemed extreme to the point of exaggeration only a few years ago—statements coming from such very different quarters as Mr. Schwab, the steel magnate, in this country, Cardinal Bourne, of the Roman Catholic Church in England, Mr. Ralph Adams Cram, the architect. Coming from men of very unlike antecedents and outlook, they agree that, in all human probability, the world faces, as an indirect consequence of the war, serious and profound internal changes, internal reorganization; and they all agree that these changes have to be met and forestalled with sympathy and intelligence on the part of the community as a whole, unless we are to drift into a time of serious internal disorder and unrest.

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[1] From *The Journal of Race Development*, April, 1918; published under the title *Internal Social Reorganization After the War.*

An English journal of trade and finance, a class journal of finance, remarked a little while ago that the war had revealed that the true wealth of England consists not in its capital, but in its human resources, in the enterprise, the initiative, the enduring, organizing power, the skill and industry of the men and the women. It is that point, perhaps, which the war has made to stand out, that though we are living in a mechanical civilization, and living in a war which is a mechanical war beyond anything known in the past; yet, after all, it is not the gun so much as the man behind the gun, and not so much the man behind the gun as the man in the field and in the factory, and the women in the home and in the shop and in the kitchen, that are really determining the outcome of this war. All other wars have been, to a large extent, wars of armies, wars of those who have been expressly mobilized for military service; but it is the commonest of commonplaces about the present war that the men on the front, the men in the trenches, the men in uniform, represent merely the first line of that larger army which includes practically the entire organization of all of the people. Now, it is because this war has thrown such a strain upon the entire economic, industrial and social organization, that it is so fraught with symptoms of change. We need to ask ourselves what are the chief weaknesses in the existing order which have been brought to light by the excessive stress and strain of war. In general, of course, those weaknesses are all of the same sort. War, whatever else its qualities and traits, at all events represents a necessity of unity of action, of organized, coöperative action, for a public, general, and common purpose and end; and the weaknesses that have been revealed exhibit the extent to which that life which we call social has been organized and arranged for private and conflicting purposes, rather than for a common and public end. They show that because of disposition of our affairs upon this private, particular and conflicting basis, we have failed to secure that stability of organization, that efficiency of conjoined action, which the modern world demands.

Now, some of these weaknesses (I rather should say all of them) most people had been conscious of before the war. There have been, in one sense, no absolutely new revelations regarding the weak points in our social fabric, but the war has been nevertheless a tremendous education. It has thrown into relief upon a large scale, has projected on a map as it were, a picture which he who runs may read. It has taken the discussion of these weaknesses and defects out of the region of academic discussion and made them a matter of general knowledge and of public interest.

The first of the deficiencies which I will mention as having to be cared for in any effective reorganization which may take place after the war is the failure of our social order in the past to secure to its members steady and useful employment. It would be difficult to bring any more severe indictment against anything that calls itself a civilization, than the fact that it is not able to utilize the energy, physical, intellectual and moral, of the members who are desirous and anxious of rendering some kind of service, of producing some kind of needed and useful commodity; that it has not been able systematically to give all of its members a chance to do something. The evil, and the unnecessary character of the evil of unemployment is, then, the thing which I would put first, because it represents, in anything that professes to be civilization, the most obvious and definite point of weakness.

Now, this is serious, not merely from the standpoint of the enormous poverty and misery which insecure and precarious employment entails upon a large part of the population, but, if possible, even more serious because of the undermining of morale, of character, which comes with such a situation as this. We all know how demoralizing charity is. Every society of organized charity is teaching and constantly preaching the evils of indiscriminate charity, how it destroys the character of those who become its recipients. Cannot we generalize this lesson and apply it to the whole industrial situation? What is the effect upon the self-respect of the large classes of men and women who periodically, once in so often, find themselves in large numbers thrown out of employment, and find that they have to beg, not for charity, but for even a chance to do work in turning out commodities or in rendering services which society actually needs? The undermining of confidence in oneself, of respect for oneself, the undermining of faith or belief in the world and in others that comes because of precarious and insecure tenure of employment is I think impossible to overestimate. When people find that they cannot do things that they are capable of doing, the attitude that comes toward the world is either one of impotence and enfeeblement, or else one of bitterness and hostility. Now, these things are, perhaps, sufficiently obvious. They are not new. There was plenty of discussion of the problem of unemployment and the remedies for it, before the war, but the war in its conduct has made the consciousness of it more acute and more general, and it has shown that the problem is not inevitable, that it is capable of human administration and handling. It has proved that it is possible for men, pooling and organizing their intelligence and experience, and having the authority of the government behind them, to take hold of the industrial and economic processes and see to it, even in a period of such great stress as during the war, that no man or woman who is capable of work shall lack useful, steady, and reasonably remunerative employment.

Another phase of the unemployment problem is that of the leisure class, so called. You may have heard the anecdote of the foreign critic who said to an American young woman that the great lack of American life was the absence of a professional leisure class; and she said, "Oh, no; we have them, only we call them tramps!" But unfortunately not even in this country does the professional leisure class consist entirely of tramps. We have the unemployed not only at the lower end of the social and industrial scale, but we have them at the upper end, also, of the industrial and economic scale—the parasites, the persons who live for display and luxury, instead of from the fruits of social service actually rendered.

Now, the war has made emphatic, self-conscious, the term "slacker." Is there anything worse, anything more contemptible or obnoxious, in social slackers in times of war than in times of peace? Will not the pressure on everybody to-day for what he can do in this time of stress remain after the war in an increased social contempt directed at all persons and all classes who persistently remain slackers, parasites, from the standpoint of engaging in occupations which perform a work useful to society?

The second evil that I would mention is the degraded and inhuman standard, or scale, of living which is found on the part of so many of the industrial population—of course, partly as a consequence of chronic employment or, at least, insecure employment, but partly because of the low rate of return for employment. We are accustomed, of course, to connect low wages and lack of work with poverty and suffering, but we too often fail to translate poverty and the misery that goes with it into terms of the general vitiation, the general deterioration of the scale of life on the part of a large element of the population. We fail to note what an unhuman lowering it means of the standard of physical health—though here again was a point that was being agitated more and more, even before the war, involving a consideration of the question of the socially unnecessary deaths, illnesses, accidents and incapacitations that come from the bad economic conditions under which so much of modern industry is carried on. You may have seen the statistics which were collected some time ago—not very long ago—by the department of Child Welfare in Washington, showing the relative chances of life for children born in the well-to-do portions of the population, as compared with the similar chances on the part of children of the wage-earning class. The loss there is merely one symptom, of this lowered, this almost inhuman, standard of living under which a considerable part of the population exists. It affects not merely the bodily health, nutrition, nourishment, physical vigor, *et cetera,* but it enters also the æsthetic and the intellectual scale. We are too apt to pride ourselves upon our public and universal system of education without knowing that the great majority of the population get the benefit only of the more rudimentary and elementary phase of our educational system, and that by far the larger percentage of children leave the public schools before they have an education which any one of us—any member of the well-to-do and cultivated portions of society—would regard as any education at all. They leave us with the ability to read and write, to figure, with a little geographical and historical knowledge, and a miscellaneous acquaintance with trivial literature, but at an age so early that it is not possible for them to have reached, under the influences of education, a matured, trained intelligence. If they rise then, if they have the ability to rise, it is rather because of the native superiority which they retain than because of the training which they have received under our educational system. I need not dwell upon this. We need only to think of the conditions under which masses of our populations live, not merely in the slums, but wherever there is a congested industrial population, to realize how low, as compared with the attained standards of the well-to-do element of the population their plane of living really is.

In the third place, the war has revealed the serious weaknesses and defects which exist with respect to efficiency of production and distribution. Now, this is the particular phase of the matter upon which our existing old social order most prided itself. It might have admitted that it had not done so well with the human side of the problem, but it has been contended that, so far as efficiency in the invention, organization and utilization of the machinery of production and distribution is concerned, the present age is almost infinitely in advance of any that has preceded. Of course, in a certain sense, as compared with older civilizations—those that came before the great industrial revolution—this is true enough; for these mechanical inventions are, of course, the product of scientific discovery. They are the product of the release of men's minds in the study of nature and the mystery of natural forces. It is a great mistake to suppose that our mechanical inventions of machines and implements—the steam engine, the telegraph, the telephone, the motor car, and the other agencies of production and distribution—are the actual fruit of the present industrial order. On the contrary, they are the fruit of the discoveries of a comparatively small number of scientific men who have not labored for recognition and who have never got it, very much—at least, in the way of pecuniary recognition. It simply happened that conditions were such that the men of means, men possessed of the financial and pecuniary resources, could utilize these fruits of natural science.

Furthermore, efficiency is not an absolute thing; but, of course, as every engineer tells us, it is a matter of ratio. Efficiency is a matter of the ratio which the actual output bears to the available resources; and looked at from that standpoint, not in comparison with the output of past ages, but as a matter of ratio which exists now between the present output and the resources now available, we cannot pride ourselves on having attained any great amount of even industrial efficiency in production. I need hardly remind you of the fact that when greater efficiency was required in England and in this country, the government had to take charge of the distributing agencies, the railroads. I need not remind you of the breakdown in the production and distribution of coal, from which we suffered a little while ago; and however much or however little the blame for that is to be laid at the doors of any particular individuals, the real difficulty, of course, goes much further back. It goes back to the fact that we have had production and distribution organized on a non-social basis—a basis of pecuniary profit. And when they suddenly had to be switched over to the basis of public need and public service, they naturally broke down. The great inefficiency here is, however, the failure to utilize human power. The great advance has, of course, been in the utilizing of natural power—steam and electricity, the machines, implements, and so on; but we have not succeeded in engaging, enlisting and releasing available human energy. Even before the war, the great employers of labor and those who were compelled to make a study of the labor problem were coming to realize that the problem was increasingly a psychological problem due to the failure of work, under present conditions, to enlist the interest and the attention of the great masses of the wage earners. What is called the "turn over" of labor, the fact that so many men have to be hired and then fired in order to keep a certain average number at work, is simply one symptom of the breakdown of our industrial system on the human side. I heard the other day of one of our new shipyards on the New Jersey coast where, in order to keep a thousand men steadily at work a week, they had to hire 1200 men a week—that is to say, they had to hire 50,000 men a year to keep 1000 men at work a year. Now, that, of course, is a very large average, fifty to one, but I saw, as you may have seen, in the report of the Pennsylvania Railroad, that in order to keep 250,000 men steadily at work, they had to engage, during the past year, 250,000 more—and the Pennsylvania Railroad has the reputation of being, on the whole, if not *the* best, one of the very best organized industrial enterprises in the United States. Now, that is simply a symptom of the fact that men's minds, hearts, thoughts, interests, are not engaged, under the present system, in the work which they are doing, and that there is, consequently, an enormous waste and inefficiency. It is said that in many industries in England, the average output since the war is higher than the highest estimate of the industrial expert, the industrial labor engineer, before the war: in other words, the average laboring person, under the increased stimulus, the interest which he takes in his work because of the war, is doing more now beyond the limit that the labor expert thought was possible for the most skilled laborer before the war. In this country, many persons have estimated that the average efficiency of the average workman, under ordinary conditions, is about 40 percent as compared with what the individual might do if he took anything like a personal, not to say vital, interest in his work.

Now, this is serious not merely because of the relative failure of production and the waste of energy, but because of the intellectual and moral deterioration which inevitably occurs when large bodies of people are doing things for which they do not care, to which they have an aversion, and which do not in any way appeal to them. The rapid growth of migratory labor, vagrant and tramp labor, is another evidence of the intellectual and moral deterioration that comes. I suppose almost every adult person who has a job in life which interests him, which appeals to him intellectually and morally, would say that his occupation, together with his personal relations to his family and friends, is the great, steadying influence in his life, the axis about which his activities are organized, that which gives his conduct stability, that which gives his thoughts, his emotions and interests direction. Now, when a person is separated or divorced from interest in his work, you have a psychological and moral phenomenon of almost incalculable significance.

Another failure on the side of human efficiency is the failure to detect and utilize the great variety of abilities which actually exist in the population. A colleague of mine made a study of the distribution of men of science in this country, taking those who now have a reasonable standing as men of science. He traced back their childhood education and early environment. He found that these New England states produced, in proportion to the population, a number of scientific men which is out of all ratio to the corresponding number produced in the southern states. Now, I do not think those of us who are New England born ought to pride ourselves that there is superior hereditary native ability on the part of the Yankee. It is simply an illustration of the compelling power and the stimulating, selective power of environment, including education, social prestige, demand, and all the other factors. When you get a figure of, say, twenty-five to one, it gives a definite picture of the amount of talent, the amount of ability and capacity, which is left dormant, latent, unutilized under our present social system. When we consider that the mass of the population are wage earners, and, as I have already said, that the great mass of the population leave school and systematic, educational opportunities cease, somewhere between the age of twelve and fourteen (when they have got along to the fifth or sixth grade of the elementary school) we may apprehend that the amount of waste which comes from unutilized capacity in the present social order is literally incalculable. The abilities which are stimulated by the present order in industry are great, but they are very one-sided. What is especially stimulated, because it is especially demanded and rewarded, of course, in our present system, is a highly specialized form of ability—pecuniary and financial ability. Even the technological ability, the scientific and engineering ability, is nowhere nearly as highly stimulated or rewarded as is the particular kind of financial and pecuniary ability that goes with capacity to command a market and secure a sale in the market for goods. The artistic capacities and abilities, a large part of the scientific capacity, a considerable portion, as I intimated, of technological ability, and many, if not most, forms of social capacity, ability to inspire and to lead others remain only partially stimulated.

Now, in such a situation as this, we are not, I think, entitled to unthinking optimism about the certainty of great progress or about the particular direction which social reorganization will take after the war. There is going to be, of course, a very great demand and a very great pressure, especially from the side of labor, as is indicated in this British document to which I have referred; but there will also be a very great inertia, very great obstacles and difficulties to contend with. We are not entitled to assume that automatically there is going to be a desirable reorganization and reconstruction after the war. We may, possibly—it is conceivable—go through a long period of social drifting and social unrest. The question is whether society, because of the experience of the war, will learn to utilize the intelligence, the insight and foresight which are available, in order to take hold of the problem and to go at it, step by step, on the basis of an intelligent program—a program which is not too rigid, which is not a program in the sense of having every item definitely scheduled in advance, but which represents an outlook upon the future of the things which most immediately require doing, trusting to the experience which is got in doing them to reveal the next things needed and the next steps to be taken. Now, the one great thing that the war has accomplished, it seems to me, of a permanent sort, is the enforcement of a psychological and educational lesson.

Before the war, most persons would have said, who recognized these evils: Well, they are very great. We all recognize them. We deplore them, but the whole situation is so big and so complicated that it is not possible to do anything about it. We have got to wait for the slow process of evolution. We have got to wait for the working out of unconscious, natural law to accomplish anything serious and important in the way of reorganization. Well, I think the war has absolutely put an end to the right to the claim of anybody to say things of that sort. It is proved now that it is possible for human beings to take hold of human affairs and manage them, to see an end which has to be gained, a purpose which must be fulfilled, and deliberately and intelligently to go to work to organize the means, the resources and the methods of accomplishing those results. There was a saying, made famous by the Boer War, and largely through the writings of Mr. Wells the novelist, about "muddling through somehow." Now you might call it muddling through, or trusting to evolution: it does not make much difference in the practical effect. That was the general attitude, I think, even of well-intentioned people—people who recognized before the war these evils to which I have been referring and who hoped for a better world, but under the stress of war it has been found possible to get hold, if not of all the brains of the nation, of at least a considerable part of them and of its executive and administrative ability, and to systematize and mobilize them as well as the physical and natural forces, to do a certain job, to realize a definite end and aim—the job which had to be done, and the end which had to be secured.

Now, in view of this situation, it seems to me that we cannot in any good conscience return, after the war, to the old period of drifting, so-called evolution, as a necessary method of procedure. The real question with us will be one of effectively discerning whether the intelligent men of the community really want to bring about a better reorganized social order. If the desire, the will and the purpose are strong enough, it has been demonstrated that, under conditions of very great strain—abnormal strain and pressure—human beings can get together coöperatively and bring their physical resources and their intellectual resources to bear upon the problem of managing society, instead of letting society drift along more or less at the mercy of accident.

That is the great psychological lesson, it seems to me, of the war, with reference to social re-ordering after the war. The lines of action—intelligent, organized and coöperative action—must, of course, be determined from a consideration of these points of weakness which I have pointed out; and I have spent so much time on the negative side of the question because until we know where the weak points are, the deficiencies, the ills, and the diseases, we can have, of course, no clear cue as to where to direct our intelligent efforts.

The first great demand of a better social order, I should say, then, is the guarantee of the right, to every individual who is capable of it, to work—not the mere legal right, but a right which is enforceable so that the individual will always have the opportunity to engage in some form of useful activity; and if the ordinary economic machinery breaks down through a crisis of some sort, then it is the duty of the state to come to the rescue and see that individuals have something to do that is worth while—not breaking stone in a stone yard, or something else to get a soup ticket with, but some kind of productive work which a self-respecting person may engage in with interest and with more than mere pecuniary profit. Whatever may be said about the fortunes of what has technically been called socialism, it would seem to be simply the part of ordinary common sense that society should reorganize itself to make sure that individuals can make a living and be kept going, not by charity, but by having productive work to do.

In the second place, war has revealed the possibilities (this is simply repeating what I have already said) of intelligent administration—administration which will raise and maintain on a higher level the general standard and scale of living. The minimum wage is not one of the visions of the nations that have been longer in the war than we have; it is not, with them, a dream, an uplift notion: it is an accomplished fact.

Great Britain is already spending an immense amount of money for the housing of its laborers, and, as we have found out in connection with our shipping program, we cannot do what we have got to do, unless we first see to it that there are decent, comfortable and sanitary housing facilities for the population. One of the demands which has already been made in England, which would help, also, to take care of the unemployment problem after the war, is that this great work of housing, conducted under national social auspices, shall go on until the slums, with their bad sanitary, moral, and bad æsthetic influence, have disappeared and every individual has a home to live in and surroundings to live in which observe the ordinary amenities of human life. The movements for insurance against accident, insurance against illness, insurance against the contingencies of old age, which were already active before the war, have also, of course, been given a tremendous acceleration.

Now these are all phases of keeping up the standard of livelihood—not merely of economic livelihood, but of physical, moral, intellectual, and æsthetic livelihood on the part of the great wage earning masses of the population; and as I have already said, the war has shown that even with the extraordinary demand upon the thought and the attention and the energy upon the battlefield, there is still left over, in time of war, enough ability and energy to deal much more effectively with these questions than they were being dealt with before the war. That means that there can be no excuse for any delay when there comes a time of greater leisure. Upon the cessation of the stress of the war, society can take hold of these problems in a much more vigorous, intellectual and systematic way than ever before.

The third phase that I mention is the need of securing greater industrial autonomy, that is to say, greater ability on the part of the workers in any particular trade or occupation to control that industry, instead of working under these conditions of external control where they have no interest, no insight into what they are doing, and no social outlook upon the consequences and meaning of what they are doing. It is often said that the war has given an enormous stimulus, temporarily, at least, to state socialism. But if any one notes what is actually going on in Great Britain and in this country, he will conclude, I think, that it is not so much unmitigated state socialism, as what we might call industrial socialism that is being promulgated. Great Britain, for example, has not taken the ownership of the railways, nor the coal mines and other great industries. It would be very difficult to say who does own them any more. What has happened is that the government now insists upon having its representative—that is to say, a representative of the interests of the community as a whole, of the state and nation, on every controlling board. The investors, the owners of the stocks, *et cetera*, have also a representative; but it has also been found that in order to maintain complete efficiency, the laborers themselves have to have a representative.

That, in the main, has been the direction in which economic and industrial reorganization is taking during the war, first in Great Britain, where they have had a longer experience, and it seems to have pretty well marked the path upon which we are entering. This does not involve absolute state ownership and absolute state control, but rather a kind of conjoined supervision and regulation, with supervisors and arbiters, as it were, to look after the public interests, the interests of the consumer, the interests of the population as a whole, others to represent those who have their capital immediately invested, and others to represent those who have their lives (in the form of work) immediately invested. And just because, under the stress of war, things so naturally and almost inevitably take that direction, it seems to me that that is the line of future social reorganization, if it goes on in a continuous, orderly way. But this means an increasing share given to the laborer, to the wage earner, in controlling the conditions of his own activity. It is so common now to point out the absurdity of conducting a war for political democracy which leaves industrial and economic autocracy practically untouched, that I think we are absolutely bound to see, after the war, either a period of very great unrest, disorder, drifting, strife—I would not say actual civil war, but all kinds of irregular strife and disorder, or a movement to install the principle of self-government within industries.

These three things, then, seem to me the essential minimum elements of an intelligent program of social reorganization.

7. A SICK WORLD[1]

It is significant that the callings dignified by the title of professions have to do with the troubles and evils of mankind. Priests cure souls, saving from sin, or at least from its consequences; lawyers heal disputes and physicians bodily ills. Aside from sport, amusements and recreation it is diseases that men are most aware of and that they are willing to pay for having "cured." And games and shows owe to-day a considerable portion of their attraction to the fact that they give a temporary relief from consciousness of troubles. Journalism is said to be becoming a profession, but here accident, murder, war and conflict form a large part of "news," certainly the sensational or striking part. The pathology of social life appears to be its exciting and interesting part. Medicine is indeed becoming preventive, but the very word shows that trouble is still uppermost in thought. Avoidance of evil rather than pursuance of a normal life may not be what men most prize, but it is what they are most aware of. The profession of law is becoming more an advisory adjunct to the conduct of business and less a matter of lawsuits. But the most hopeful would hardly contend that this fact means that law is becoming a mode of constructive social direction, or other than a counsel as to how business corporations can do what they want or need to do without involving themselves in trouble.

The world has always been more or less a sick world. The isles of harmony and health with which we dot the map of human history are largely constructions of the imagination, cities of refuge against present ills, resorts for solace in troubles now endured. But it may be doubted if the consciousness of sickness was ever so widespread as it is to-day. Our optimism of the cheery word, of sunshine and prosperity is a

[1] From *The New Republic*, Jan. 24, 1923.

little too assertive; the lady protests too much. Our recourse to enjoyment is a little too fevered and noisy. They both testify to the pervasive and overhanging consciousness of disease. In earlier periods of history such epochs have been attended with an outburst of religion. To-day this way out is not taken. Science, technology and business have left their impress. Upon the whole the world will be satisfied only with something which is more businesslike than past religions, something with more show of technique and the outward semblance of up-to-date science.

In short, we have such phenomena as Couéism, an appeal and a method as old as the cave-man but dressed up in the latest fashions of the day. The method has always "cured" some; it will cure a considerable number to-day. In fact, an expert could go into any audience and pick out, with a small margin of error, just those who are susceptible. The hypnotic device of setting up inability to unclench joined fingers impresses an audience with the fact that there is marvellously "something in it"; it also enables the operator to select just those persons upon whom to work his "cures." Putting the word cures in quotation marks will seem to devotees to imply a particularly mean, because insinuating, method of disparagement; a way of admitting in words that some persons are helped while denying it as a fact, and thus escaping responsibility for taking any definite stand. But it is not intended by the device of quotation marks to question the fact that autosuggestion cures exactly as drugs cure. The object is to suggest the need of examining the whole idea of cure in its relation to the troubles of a sick world.

A cured body or mind is in no sense the same thing as a healthy, vitally growing mind or body, any more than winning a law suit is the same thing as cooperative social relationships, or payment of reparations the expression and guarantee of harmonious international relationships. Cure is a negative idea; health a positive one. The interest in cures and salvations is evidence of how sick the world is; it is also evidence of its unwillingness to deal with the causes of its sickness; its preoccupation with symptoms and effects. A cure may reduce, suppress or transfer an effect; it does not touch the cause. Or if it does, it is something more than a cure. It is re-education; it is restoration of an organism which manifests symptoms of health because it is rightly constructed.

Does any one suppose that suggestion, whether externally induced or self-induced, although it may remove symptoms and the consciousness of disorder and suffering, actually makes over those conditions in the body which have caused the trouble? If it did, the methods would apply as surely to "organic" diseases as to those ills where cures are effected. A society or an individual which is living positively and constructively will be growing; it will be getting "better and better" every day. The fact would make it quite unnecessary to subject oneself to a suggestion. The whole technique, the very idea, of cure indicates that fundamentally evil, trouble, still exists; it proves that negative ideas and practices instead of constructive ones still dominate our consciousness. A truly healthy life would indeed "prevent" many troubles but it would occur to no one that its value lay in what it prevented. Such a life would be simple and spontaneous joy, vigor and achievement. Being better signifies something radically different to having less of a trouble.

Any critical appraisal of such methods as those of Couéism seems to imply lack of sympathy for those who are relieved. Any relief, it would seem, is at least so much net gain. But all cheap, short cuts which avoid recognition of basic causes have to be paid for at a great cost. The greatest cost is that palliative and remedial measures put off the day in which fundamental causal factors are faced and constructive action undertaken. They perpetuate the domination of life by reverie, magic, superficiality and evasion; they perpetuate, that is, the sickness of the world. As long as the mind is set upon curing we shall need to be cured. Only education and re-education into normal conditions of growth accomplishes anything positive and enduring. And taking this road means that the specific, definite and complicated conditions of normal health and growth are studied and discovered, and positive endeavor taken in accord with them. No thoughtful person can admit that giving and taking dopes, whether they be physical or mental, in any way forwards the needed knowledge and action. Dependence on cures retards, hampers and confuses. Partial and superficial science, physiological or psychological, carried into immediate execution, is the greatest enemy of genuine and effective science. It substitutes error for ignorance, false conceit for the possibility of learning. Suggestions to the subconscious have the advantage of neither the animal nor the human method of control. They are a hopeless mixture.

Another item of incalculable cost is found in the attendant self-hypnosis of the public at large. Mr. Coué, his methods, cures and personality have filled the columns of the newspapers for weeks. His journey across the ocean was recorded day by day by radio and in newspaper headlines. Mr. Phillips in his column of humor in the *Globe* hit the nail on the head, as he so often does, when he said that, while the method had been practised from times immemorial, older practitioners suffered from the lack of effective press-agency. There is literally no difference between the methods by which Couéism has been exploited and the methods of propaganda used in the war. Both involve a surrender of conscious and intelligent direction of life to the effects of reiteration and appeal to the senses and emotions, an appeal which obscures and corrupts the most precious thing in man—his intelligence. Admitting the utmost claims that can be made for the merits of Couéism, it is not the merits nor their recognition which attract the public; purely factitious considerations which involve surrender of mind are the influential factors. When one compares the benefits of the relief that some sufferers will obtain at Coué's hands and voice, with the harm done by increased dependence upon blind clamor and undiscriminating rumor, by habits of increased unintelligent response to stimuli that owe their force simply to their sensory and emotional accumulation, when one thinks of the growth of credulity and the abandonment of judgment, the balance on the side of benefits is not impressive.

By chance it happened that the same boat which brought Coué brought another person who teaches and practices organic education and re-education, conscious control, the positive rectification of our sensory appreciations and the judgments and acts that depend upon a correct organic consciousness. There is no doubt about the existence and operation of the subconscious. But the quality, nature and operation of the subconscious depend upon definite conditions. Its workings can be helpful rather than detrimental only when it is itself right. Making it right depends upon its bodily conditions being right—a state which cannot be achieved without a conscious control of them obtained only by positive labor, physiological, intellectual and moral.

The coming of Mr. Matthias Alexander went unheralded. The contrast between the reception of the two men affords a fair measure for our preference of a seemingly cheap and easy way of dealing with symptoms, our wish to be cured rather than to be well. We are now told, every day, following Mr. Wells, that the race is on between catastrophe and education. Half-science, publicity, which is propaganda, reliance upon a sub-consciousness which is already corrupted, work against the adoption of the method of education, against, indeed, any serious search for its conditions and methods. And if the antithesis between education and catastrophe is just, this means that they are working on the side of catastrophe.

8. SCIENCE AND THE EDUCATION OF MAN[1]

One who, like myself, claims no expertness in any branch of natural science can undertake to discuss the teaching of science only at some risk of presumption. At present, however, the gap between those who are scientific specialists and those who are interested in science on account of its significance in life, that is to say, on account of its educational significance, is very great. Therefore I see no other way of promoting that mutual understanding so requisite for educational progress than for all of us frankly to state our own convictions, even if thereby we betray our limitations and trespass where we have no rights save by courtesy.

I suppose that I may assume that all who are much interested in securing for the sciences the place that belongs to them in education feel a certain amount of disappointment at the results hitherto attained. The glowing predictions made respecting them have been somewhat chilled by the event. Of course, this relative shortcoming is due in part to the unwillingness of the custodians of educational traditions and ideals to give scientific studies a fair show. Yet in view of the relatively equal opportunity accorded to science to-day compared with its status two generations ago, this cause alone does not explain the unsatisfactory outcome. Considering the opportunities, students have not flocked to the study of science in the numbers predicted, nor has science modified the spirit and purport of all education in a degree commensurate with the claims made for it. The causes for this result are many and complex. I make no pretense of doing more than singling out what seems to me one influential cause, the remedy for which most lies with scientific men themselves. I mean that science has been taught too much as an accumulation of ready-made material with which students are to be made familiar, not enough as a method of thinking, an attitude of mind, after the pattern of which mental habits are to be transformed.

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[1] From *Science,* Jan. 28, 1910; an address of the vice-president and chairman of Section L, Education, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston, 1909; published under the title *Science As Subject-Matter and As Method.*

Among the adherents of a literary education who have contended against the claims of science, Matthew Arnold has, I think, been most discreetly reasonable. He freely admitted the need of men knowing something, knowing a good deal, about the natural conditions of their own lives. Since, so to say, men have to breathe air, it is advisable that they should know something of the constitution of air and of the mechanism of the lungs. Moreover, since the sciences have been developed by human beings, an important part of humanistic culture, of knowing the best that men have said and thought, consists in becoming acquainted with the contributions of the great historic leaders of science.

These concessions made, Matthew Arnold insisted that the important thing, the indispensable thing in education, is to become acquainted with human life itself, its art, its literature, its policies, the fluctuations of its career. Such knowledge, he contended, touches more closely our offices and responsibilities as human beings, since these, after all, are to human beings and not to physical things. Such knowledge, moreover, lays hold of the emotions and the imagination and modifies character, while knowledge about things remains an inert possession of speculative intelligence.

Those who believe, nevertheless, that the sciences have a part to play in education equal—at the least—to that of literature and language, have perhaps something to learn from this contention. If we regard science and literary culture as just so much subject-matter, is not Mr. Arnold's contention essentially just? Conceived from this standpoint, knowledge of human affairs couched in personal terms seems more important and more intimately appealing than knowledge of physical things conveyed in impersonal terms. One might well object to Arnold that he ignored the place of natural forces and conditions *in* human life and thereby created an impossible dualism. But it would not be easy to deny that knowledge of Thermopylæ knits itself more readily into the body of emotional images that stir men to action than does the formula for the acceleration of a flying arrow; or that Burns's poem on the daisy enters more urgently and compellingly into the moving vision of life than does information regarding the morphology of the daisy.

The infinitely extensive character of natural facts and the universal character of the laws formulated about them is sometimes claimed to give science an advantage over literature. But viewed from the standpoint of education, this presumed superiority turns out a defect; that is to say, so long as we confine ourselves to the point of view of subject-matter. Just because the facts of nature are multitudinous, inexhaustible, they begin nowhere and end nowhere in particular, and hence are not, just as facts, the best material for the education of those whose lives are centered in quite local situations and whose careers are irretrievably partial and specific. If we turn from multiplicity of detail to general laws, we find indeed that the laws of science are universal, but we also find that for educational purposes their universality means abstractness and remoteness. The conditions, the interests, the ends of conduct are irredeemably concrete and specific. We do not live in a medium of universal principles, but by means of adaptations, through concessions and compromises, struggling as best we may to enlarge the range of a concrete here and now. So far as acquaintance is concerned, it is the individualized and the humanely limited that helps, not the bare universal and the inexhaustibly multifarious.

These considerations are highly theoretical. But they have very practical counterparts in school procedure. One of the most serious difficulties that confronts the educator who wants in good faith to do something worth while with the sciences is their number, and the indefinite bulk of the material in each. At times, it seems as if the educational availability of science were breaking down because of its own sheer mass. There is at once so much of science and so many sciences that educators oscillate, helpless, between arbitrary selection and teaching a little of everything. If any questions this statement, let him consider in elementary education the fortunes of nature-study for the last two decades.

Is there anything on earth, or in the waters under the earth or in the heavens above, that distracted teachers have not resorted to? Visit schools where they have taken nature study conscientiously. This school moves with zealous bustle from leaves to flowers, from flowers to minerals, from minerals to stars, from stars to the raw materials of industry, thence back to leaves and stones. At another school you find children energetically striving to keep up with what is happily termed the "rolling year." They chart the records of barometer and thermometer; they plot changes and velocities of the winds; they exhaust the possibilities of colored crayons to denote the ratio of sunshine and cloud in successive days and weeks; they keep records of the changing heights of the sun's shadows; they do sums in amounts of rainfalls and atmospheric humidities—and at the end, the rolling year, like the rolling stone, gathers little moss.

Is it any wonder that after a while teachers yearn for the limitations of the good old-fashioned studies—for English grammar, where the parts of speech may sink as low as seven but never rise above nine; for text-book geography, with its strictly inexpansive number of continents; even for the war campaigns and the lists of rulers in history since they can not be stretched beyond a certain point, and for "memory gems" in literature, since a single book will contain the "Poems Every Child Should Know."

There are many who do not believe it amounts to much one way or the other what children do in science in the elementary school. I do not agree, for upon the whole, I believe the attitude toward the study of science is, and should be, fixed during the earlier years of life. But in any case, how far does the situation in the secondary schools differ from that just described? Any one who has followed the discussions of college faculties for the last twenty-five years concerning entrance requirements in science, will be able to testify that the situation has been one of highly unstable equilibrium between the claims of a little of a great many sciences, a good deal (comparatively) of one, a combination of one biological and one exact science, and the arbitrary option of the pupil of one, two or three out of a list of six or seven specified sciences. The only safe generalization possible is that whatever course a given institution pursues, it changes that course at least as often as the human organism proverbially renews its tissues. The movement has probably tended in the direction of reduction, but every one who has followed the history of pedagogical discussion will admit that every alteration of opinion as to what subjects should be taught has been paralleled by a modification of opinion as to the portions of any subject to be selected and emphasized.

All this change is to some extent a symptom of healthy activity, change being especially needed in any group of studies so new that they have to blaze their own trail, since they have no body of traditions upon which to fall back as is the case with study of language and literature. But this principle hardly covers the whole field of change. A considerable part of it has been due not to intelligent experimentation and exploration, but to blind action and reaction, or to the urgency of some strenuous soul who has propagated some emphatic doctrine.

Imagine a history of the teaching of the languages which should read like this: "The later seventies and early eighties of the nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable growth in the attention given in high schools to the languages. Hundreds of schools adopted an extensive and elaborate scheme by means of which almost the entire linguistic ground was covered. Each of the three terms of the year was devoted to a language. In the first year, Latin and Greek and Sanskrit were covered; in the next, French, German and Italian; while the last year was given to review and to Hebrew and Spanish as optional studies."

This piece of historic parallelism raises the question as to the real source of the educational value of, say, Latin. How much is due to its being a "humanity," its giving insight into the best the world has thought and said, and how much to its being pursued continuously for at least four years? How much to the graded and orderly arrangement that this long period both permitted and compelled? How much to the cumulative effort of constant recourse to what had earlier been learned, not by way of mere monotonous repetition, but as a necessary instrument of later achievement? Are we not entitled to conclude that the method demanded by the study is the source of its efficacy rather than anything inhering in its content?

Thus we come around again to the primary contention of the paper: that science teaching has suffered because science has been so frequently presented just as so much ready-made knowledge, so much subject-matter of fact and law, rather than as the effective method of inquiry into any subject-matter.

Science might well take a leaf from the book of the actual, as distinct from the supposititious, pursuit of the classics in the schools. The claim for their worth has professedly rested upon their cultural value; but imaginative insight into human affairs has perhaps been the last thing, save *per accidens*, that the average student has got from his pursuit of the classics. His time has gone of necessity to the mastering of a language, not to appreciation of humanity. To some extent just because of this enforced simplification (not to say meagerness) the student acquires, if he acquires anything, a certain habitual method. Confused, however, by the tradition that the subject-matter is the efficacious factor, the defender of the sciences has thought that he could make good his case only on analogous grounds, and hence has been misled into resting his claim upon the superior significance of his special subject-matter; even into efforts to increase still further the scope of scientific subject-matter in education. The procedure of Spencer is typical. To urge the prerogative of science, he raised the question what knowledge, what facts, are of most utility for life, and, answering the question by this criterion of the value of subject-matter, decided in favor of the sciences. Having thus identified education with the amassing of information, it is not a matter of surprise that for the rest of his life he taught that comparatively little is to be expected from education in the way of moral training and social reform, since the motives of conduct lie in the affections and the aversions, not in the bare recognition of matters of fact.

Surely if there is any knowledge which is of most worth it is knowledge of the ways by which anything is entitled to be called knowledge instead of being mere opinion or guesswork or dogma.

Such knowledge never can be learned by itself; it is not information, but a mode of intelligent practise, an habitual disposition of mind. Only by taking a hand in the making of knowledge, by transferring guess and opinion into belief authorized by inquiry, does one ever get a knowledge of the method of knowing. Because participation in the making of knowledge has been scant, because reliance on the efficacy of acquaintance with certain kinds of facts has been current, science has not accomplished in education what was predicted for it.

We define science as systematized knowledge, but the definition is wholly ambiguous. Does it mean the body of facts, the subject-matter? Or does it mean the processes by which something fit to be called knowledge is brought into existence, and order introduced into the flux of experience? That science means both of these things will doubtless be the reply, and rightly. But in the order both of time and of importance, science as method precedes science as subject-matter. Systematized knowledge is science only because of the care and thoroughness with which it has been sought for, selected and arranged. Only by pressing the courtesy of language beyond what is decent can we term such information as is acquired ready-made, without active experimenting and testing, science.

The force of this assertion is not quite identical with the commonplace of scientific instruction that text-book and lecture are not enough; that the student must have laboratory exercises. A student may acquire laboratory methods as so much isolated and final stuff, just as he may so acquire material from a text-book. One's mental attitude is not necessarily changed just because he engages in certain physical manipulations and handles certain tools and materials. Many a student has acquired dexterity and skill in laboratory methods without its ever occurring to him that they have anything to do with constructing beliefs that are alone worthy of the title of knowledge. To do certain things, to learn certain modes of procedure, are to him just a part of the subject-matter to be acquired; they belong, say, to chemistry, just as do the symbols H_2SO_4 or the atomic theory. They are part of the arcana in process of revelation to him. In order to proceed in the mystery one has, of course, to master its ritual. And how easily the laboratory becomes liturgical! In short, it is a problem and a difficult problem to conduct matters so that the technical methods employed in a subject shall become conscious instrumentalities of realizing the meaning of knowledge—what is required in the way of thinking and of search for evidence before anything passes from the realm of opinion, guess work and dogma into that of knowledge. Yet unless this perception accrues, we can hardly claim that an individual has been instructed in science. This problem of turning laboratory technique to intellectual account is even more pressing than that of utilization of information derived from books. Almost every teacher has had drummed into him the inadequacy of mere book instruction, but the conscience of most is quite at peace if only pupils are put through some laboratory exercises. Is not this the path of experiment and induction by which science develops?

I hope it will not be supposed that, in dwelling upon the relative defect and backwardness of science teaching I deny its absolute achievements and improvements, if I go on to point out to what a comparatively slight extent the teaching of science has succeeded in protecting the so-called educated public against recrudescences of all sorts of corporate superstitions and silliness. Nay, one can go even farther and say that science teaching not only has not protected men and women who have been to school from the revival of all kinds of occultism, but to some extent has paved the way for this revival. Has not science revealed many wonders? If radioactivity is a proved fact, why is not telepathy highly probable? Shall we, as a literary idealist recently pathetically inquired, admit that mere brute matter has such capacities and deny them to mind? When all allowance is made for the unscrupulous willingness of newspapers and magazines to publish any marvel of so-called scientific discovery that may give a momentary thrill of sensation to any jaded reader, there is still, I think, a large residuum of published matter to be accounted for only on the ground of densely honest ignorance. So many things have been vouched for by science; so many things that one would have thought absurd have been substantiated, why not one more, and why not *this* one more? Communication of science as subject-matter has so far outrun in education the construction of a scientific habit of mind that to some extent the natural common sense of mankind has been interfered with to its detriment.

Something of the current flippancy of belief and quasi-scepticism must also be charged to the state of science teaching. The man of even ordinary culture is aware of the rapid changes of subject-matter, and taught so that he believes subject-matter, not method, constitutes science, he remarks to himself that if this is science, then science is in constant change, and there is no certainty anywhere. If the emphasis had been put upon method of attack and mastery, from this change he would have learned the lesson of curiosity, flexibility and patient search; as it is, the result too often is a blasé society.

I do not mean that our schools should be expected to send forth their students equipped as judges of truth and falsity in specialized scientific matters. But that the great majority of those who leave school should have some idea of the kind of evidence required to substantiate given types of belief does not seem unreasonable. Nor is it absurd to expect that they should go forth with a lively interest in the ways in which knowledge is improved and a marked distaste for all conclusions reached in disharmony with the methods of scientific inquiry. It would be absurd, for example, to expect any large number to master the technical methods of determining distance, direction and position in the arctic regions; it would perhaps be possible to develop a state of mind with American people in general in which the supposedly keen American sense of humor would react when it is proposed to settle the question of reaching the pole by aldermanic resolutions and straw votes in railway trains or even by newspaper editorials.

If in the foregoing remarks I have touched superficially upon some aspects of science teaching rather than sounded its depths, I can not plead as my excuse failure to realize the importance of the topic. One of the only two articles that remain in my creed of life is that the future of our civilization depends upon the widening spread and deepening hold of the scientific habit of mind; and that the problem of problems in our education is therefore to discover how to mature and make effective this scientific habit. Mankind so far has been ruled by things and by words, not by thought, for till the last few moments of history, humanity has not been in possession of the conditions of secure and effective thinking. Without ignoring in the least the consolation that has come to men from their literary education, I would even go so far as to say that only the gradual replacing of a literary by a scientific education can assure to man the progressive amelioration of his lot. Unless we master things, we shall continue to be mastered by them; the magic that words cast upon things may indeed disguise our subjection or render us less dissatisfied with it, but after all science, not words, casts the only compelling spell upon things.

Scientific method is not just a method which it has been found profitable to pursue in this or that abstruse subject for purely technical reasons. It represents the only method of thinking that has proved fruitful in any subject—that is what we mean when we call it scientific. It is not a peculiar development of thinking for highly specialized ends; it *is* thinking so far as thought has become conscious of its proper ends and of the equipment indispensable for success in their pursuit.

The modern warship seems symbolic of the present position of science in life and education. The warship could not exist were it not for science: mathematics, mechanics, chemistry, electricity supply the technique of its construction and management. But the aims, the ideals in whose service this marvelous technique is displayed are survivals of a pre-scientific age, that is, of barbarism. Science has as yet had next to nothing to do with forming the social and moral ideals for the sake of which she is used. Even where science has received its most attentive recognition, it has remained a servant of ends imposed from alien traditions. If ever we are to be governed by intelligence, not by things and by words, science must have something to say about *what* we do, and not merely about *how* we may do it most easily and economically. And if this consummation is achieved, the transformation must occur through education, by bringing home to men's habitual inclination and attitude the significance of genuine knowledge, and the full import of the conditions requisite for its attainment. Actively to participate in the making of knowledge is the highest prerogative of man and the only warrant of his freedom. When our schools truly become laboratories of knowledge-making, not mills fitted out with information-hoppers, there will no longer be need to discuss the place of science in education.

9. EDUCATION AS POLITICS[1]

Matthew Arnold somewheres quotes with approval the saying of a French writer that the chief advantage of education is the assurance it gives of not being duped. A more positive statement is that the profit of education is the ability it gives to discriminate, to make distinctions that penetrate below the surface. One may not be able to lay hold of the realities beneath the froth and foam, but at least one who is educated does not take the latter to be the realities; one knows that there is a difference between sound and sense, between what is emphatic and what is distinctive, between what is conspicuous and what is important.

Judged by this criterion education is not only backward but it is retrograding. This is the era of bunk and hokum—there is more of it in quantity, its circulation is more rapid and ceaseless, it is swallowed more eagerly and more indiscriminately than ever before. The reasons, of course, for the present reign of bunkum in human affairs are external rather than in any inherent deterioration of intellect and character. Until the last generation or so, the mass of men have been interested for the most part only in local matters, in things and people right about them. For the most part their convictions and thinking had to do with affairs of which they had some direct experience. Their range might be limited, but within it they had shrewdness and employed judgment. They were undoubtedly as gullible about remoter things as people are to-day. But these remoter things did not come within their scope of action. It made little difference what notions they entertained about them; they were hardly more than material for yarns.

The railway, telegraph, telephone and cheap printing press have changed all that. Rapid transportation and communication have compelled men to live as members of an extensive and mainly unseen society. The self-centred locality has been invaded and largely destroyed. Men have to act in view of remote economic and political conditions, and they have to have some notions about the latter upon which to base their actions. Since their notions influence conduct, beliefs are now something more than fancies and entertainments; their correctness is a matter of moment. At the same time, it has become an object for some men to influence the beliefs the masses hold; control has become less a matter of established habits and more a matter of opinions. Control opinion and you control, for the time being at least, the direction of social action. Cheap printing and cheap distribution afford the opportunity to put the control of opinion into effect. Given the new curiosity and the new need of knowing about distant affairs on the one hand and the interest in controlling their exercise on the other, and the era of bunk, of being systematically duped, of undiscriminating sentiment and belief, is ushered in.

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[1] From *The New Republic*, Oct. 4, 1922.

Carlyle was no lover of democracy. But in a lucid moment he once declared that when the printing press was invented democracy was inevitable. Cheap printing made it necessary to take the public into partnership in governmental affairs; it extended the number as well as the geographical area included in a particular political society. It converted the theory of government by consent of the governed into a reality. But the conversion did not guarantee the sort of thing to which consent is given; it did not guarantee—as Walter Lippmann has so ably pointed out—that the policies to which consent was given should be in fact what they are in form or that they should correspond with the realities of the situation.

The industrial revolution made necessary the forms of consulting the "voice of the people." But printing and circulation also made it easier to induce the people to speak loudly on unreal issues, and by very multitude of clamor to conceal facts and divert attention. It is as idle therefore to attack democracy at large as it is to eulogize it at large. As a current form of government it does not spring from personal desire or from opinion: it came about through external forces that changed the conditions of contact and intercourse among men. What needs consideration and criticism is the quality of popular government, not the fact of its existence. Its quality is inseparably bound up with the quality of the ideas and information which are circulated and to which belief adheres.

Doubtless the régime of propaganda brought on by the war has had much to do with forcing upon us recognition of the dominant rôle in social control of material put in circulation by the press. The bulk and the careful organization of propaganda are testimony to two outstanding facts: the new necessity governments are under of enlisting popular interest and sentiment; and the possibility of exciting and directing that interest by a judiciously selected supply of "news." But the vogue of propaganda is more significant in calling attention to the basic fact than it is in constituting that fact. As against one item in circulation that represents deliberately invented or consciously colored fact there are a dozen items that represent prejudice and ignorance due to laziness, inertia of custom and prior mental habits caused by bad education.

Human psychology is such that we attribute to conscious design and set purpose most of the bad consequences to which attention is suddenly called. That is one chief reason why reformers so frequently fail. Real causes of the evils against which they contend usually lie much deeper than the conscious intentions and voluntary plans of the individuals against whom they direct their efforts. Consequently they are dealing with symptoms rather than with forces. What Mr. Lippmann has so well called stereotypes are more responsible for confusion and error in the public mind than is consciously invented and distorted news. Those who are most concerned in setting in social movement or circulation the material which blinds and misleads the public, themselves more than half believe the tenor of what is given out; they share the intellectual confusion and ignorance which they propagate. Acting upon the belief that the end justifies the means, it is easy to add the spice, the emphasis, the exaggeration, the suggestions which will convey to the mass what they themselves conceive to be fundamentally true.

Back of the education supplied by print and news is, in short, the earlier and deeper education which influences equally those who give out the news and those who subscribe to what is given out. We are brought back to our original statement. Our schooling does not educate, if by education be meant a trained habit of discriminating inquiry and discriminating belief, the ability to look beneath a floating surface to detect the conditions that fix the contour of the surface, and the forces which create its waves and drifts. We dupe ourselves and others because we have not that inward protection against sensation, excitement, credulity and conventionally stereotyped opinion which is found only in a trained mind.

This fact determines the fundamental criticism to be levelled against current schooling, against what passes as an educational system. It not only does little to make discriminating intelligence a safeguard against surrender to the invasion of bunk, especially in its most dangerous form—social and political bunk—but it does much to favor susceptibility to a welcoming reception of it. There appear to be two chief causes for this ineptitude. One is the persistence, in the body of what is taught, of traditional material which is irrelevant to present conditions—subject-matter of instruction which though valuable in some past period is so remote from the perplexities and issues of present life that its mastery, even if fairly adequate, affords no resource for discriminating insight, no protection against being duped in facing the emergencies of to-day. From the standpoint of this criterion of education, a large portion of current material of instruction is simply aside from the mark. The specialist in any one of the traditional lines is as likely to fall for social bunk even in its extreme forms of economic and nationalistic propaganda as the unschooled person; in fact his credulity is the more dangerous because he is so much more vociferous in its proclamation and so much more dogmatic in its assertion. Our schools send out men meeting the exigencies of contemporary life clothed in the chain-armor of antiquity, and priding themselves on the awkwardness of their movements as evidences of deep-wrought, time-tested convictions.

The other way in which schooling fosters an undiscriminating gulping mental habit, eager to be duped, is positive. It consists in a systematic, almost deliberate, avoidance of the spirit of criticism in dealing with history, politics and economics. There is an implicit belief that this avoidance is the only way by which to produce good citizens. The more undiscriminatingly the history and institutions of one's own nation are idealized, the greater is the likelihood, so it is assumed, that the school product will be a loyal patriot, a well equipped good citizen. If the average boy and girl could be walled off from all ideas and information about social affairs save those acquired in school, they would enter upon the responsibilities of social membership in complete ignorance that there are any social problems, any political evils, any industrial defects. They would go forth with a supreme confidence that the way lies open to all, and that the sole cause of failure in business, family life or citizenship lies in some personal deficiency in character. The school is even more indurated from a frank acknowledgment of social ills than the pulpit—which is saying a good deal. And like the pulpit it compensates for its avoidance of discussion of social difficulties by a sentimental dwelling upon personal vices.

The effect is to send students out into actual life in a condition of acquired and artificial innocence. Such perceptions as they may have of the realities of social struggles and problems they have derived incidentally, by the way, and without the safeguards of intelligent acquaintance with facts and impartially conducted discussion. It is no wonder that they are ripe to be gulled, or that their attitude is one which merely perpetuates existing confusion, ignorance, prejudice and credulity. Reaction from this impossibly naïve idealization of institutions as they are produces indifference and cynicism. It is astonishing that the professed conservative moulders of public opinion take so little notice of the widespread cynicism of the mass at the present time. They are even more credulous than those whom they appear, superficially, to dupe. This attitude of indifference and opposition is now passive and unorganized. But it exists as a direct result of the disillusionment caused by the contrast between things as they are actually found to be and things as they had been taught in the schools. Some day some more or less accidental event will crystallize the scattered indifference and discontent into an active form, and all the carefully built up bulwarks of social reactions will be washed out. But unfortunately there is little likelihood that the reaction against reaction will be more discriminating than the previous state of things. It too will be blind, credulous, fatalistic, confused.

It seems almost hopeless to name the remedy, for it is only a greater confidence in intelligence, in scientific method. But the "only" marks something infinitely difficult of realization. What will happen if teachers become sufficiently courageous and emancipated to insist that education means the creation of a discriminating mind, a mind that prefers not to dupe itself or to be the dupe of others? Clearly they will have to cultivate the habit of suspended judgment, of scepticism, of desire for evidence, of appeal to observation rather than sentiment, discussion rather than bias, inquiry rather than conventional idealizations. When this happens schools will be the dangerous outposts of a humane civilization. But they will also begin to be supremely interesting places. For it will then have come about that education and politics are one and the same thing because politics will have to be in fact what it now pretends to be, the intelligent management of social affairs.

10. FORCE AND COERCION [1]

The empirical perplexities which attend the question of the relationship of force and law are many and genuine. The war brings home to us the question not only of the relation of force to international law, but the place of force in the economy of human life and progress. To what extent is organization of force in the multitude of ways required for the successful conduct of modern war a fair test of the work of a social organization? From another angle, the reform of our criminal law and our penal methods compels us to consider the significance of force. Are the Tolstoians right in holding that the state itself sets the great example of violence and furnishes the proof of the evils which result from violence? Or, from the other side, is not the essence of all law coercion? In the industrial domain, direct actionists lead us to inquire whether manifestation of force, threatened and veiled if not overt, is not, after all, the only efficacious method of bringing about any social change which is of serious import. Do not the usual phenomena attending strikes show us that the ordinary legal forms are just a kind of curtain drawn politely over the conflicts of force which alone are decisive? Are our effective legislative enactments anything more than registrations of results of battles previously fought out on the field of human endurance? In many social fields, reformers are now struggling for an extension of governmental activity by way of supervision and regulation. Does not such action always amount to an effort to extend the exercise of force on the part of some section of society, with a corresponding restriction of the forces employed by others? In spite of the fact that the political thinking of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is out of date, were not the thinkers of that period clearer headed than we are in acknowledging that all political questions are simply questions of the extension and restriction of exercise of power on the part of specific groups in the community? Has the recent introduction of an idealistic terminology about moral and common will, about juridical and moral personalities, done anything but muddle our minds about the hard fact that all our social questions at bottom concern the possession and use of force; and the equally hard fact that our political and legal arrangements are but dispositions of force to make more secure the other forms of its daily use?

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[1] From *The International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1916.

In taking up the writings of the theorists it is not easy to persuade oneself that they are marked by much consistency. With a few notable exceptions, the doctrine that the state rests upon or is common will seems to turn out but a piece of phraseology to justify the uses actually made of force. Practices of coercion and constraint which would be intolerable if frankly labelled "Force" seem to become laudable when baptized with the name of "Will," although they otherwise remain the same. Or, if this statement is extreme, there seems to be little doubt that the actual capacity of the state to bring force to bear is what has most impressed theorists, and that what they are after is some theoretical principle which will justify the exercise of force; so that in a great many cases such terms as common will, supreme will, supreme moral or juridical personality, are eulogistic phrases resorted to in behalf of such justification. The one thing that clearly stands out is that the use of force is felt to require explanation and sanction. To make force itself the ultimate principle is felt to be all one with proclaiming anarchy and issuing an invitation to men to settle all their difficulties by recourse to fighting it out to see which is the stronger. And yet what every political student is profoundly convinced of, is, I suppose, that at bottom every political struggle is a struggle for control, for power.

Although I have raised large questions, it is not my ambition to answer them. I have but outlined a large stage upon which to move about some quite minor figures. In the first place, something can be done, I think, by clarifying certain of the ideas which enter into the discussion. We may I think profitably discriminate the three conceptions of power or energy, coercive force, and violence. Power or energy is either a neutral or an eulogistic term. It denotes effective means of operation; ability or capacity to execute, to realize ends. Granted an end which is worth while, and power or energy becomes an eulogistic term. It means nothing but the sum of conditions available for bringing the desirable end into existence. Any political or legal theory which will have nothing to do with power on the ground that all power is force and all force brutal and non-moral is obviously condemned to a purely sentimental, dreamy morals. It is force by which we excavate subways and build bridges and travel and manufacture; it is force which is utilized in spoken argument or published book. Not to depend upon and utilize force is simply to be without a foothold in the real world.

Energy becomes violence when it defeats or frustrates purpose instead of executing or realizing it. When the dynamite charge blows up human beings instead of rocks, when its outcome is waste instead of production, destruction instead of construction, we call it not energy or power but violence. Coercive force occupies, we may fairly say, a middle place between power as energy and power as violence. To turn to the right as an incident of locomotion is a case of power: of means deployed in behalf of an end. To run amuck in the street is a case of violence. To use energy to make a man observe the rule of the road is a case of coercive force. Immediately, or with respect to his activities, it is a case of violence; indirectly, when it is exercised to assure the means which are needed for the successful realization of ends, it is a case of constructive use of power. Constraint or coercion, in other words, is an incident of a situation under certain conditions—namely, where the means for the realization of an end are not naturally at hand, so that energy has to be spent in order to make some power into a means for the end in hand.

If we formulate the result, we have something of this kind. Law is a statement of the conditions of the organization of energies which, when unorganized, conflict and result in violence—that is, destruction or waste. We cannot substitute reason for force, but force becomes rational when it is an organized factor in an activity instead of operating in an isolated way or on its own hook. For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to the organization of force hereafter as efficiency, but I beg to remind you that the use of the term always implies an actual or potential conflict and resulting waste in the absence of some scheme for distributing the energies involved.

These generalities are, it will be objected, innocuous and meaningless. So they are in the abstract. Let us take the question of the justification of force in a strike. I do not claim, of course, that what has been said tells us whether the use of force is justified or not. But I hold that it suggests the way of finding out in a given case whether it is justifiable or not. It is, in substance, a question of efficiency (including economy) of means in the accomplishing of ends. If the social ends at stake can be more effectively subserved by the existing legal and economic machinery, resort to physical action of a more direct kind has no standing. If, however, they represent an ineffective organization of means for the ends in question, then recourse to extra-legal means may be indicated; provided it really serves the ends in question—a very large qualification be it noted. A recourse to direct force is a supplementation of existent deficient resources in effective energy under some circumstances.

Such a doctrine is doubtless unwelcome. It is easily interpreted so as to give encouragement to resorting to violence and threats of violence in industrial struggles. But there is a very large "if" involved—the "if" of greater relative economy and efficiency. And when so regarded, it at once occurs to mind that experience in the past has shown that it is not usually efficient for parties to be judges in their own cause: that an impartial umpire is an energy saver. It occurs to mind, also, that the existing legal machinery, whatever its defects, represents a contrivance which has been built up at great cost, and that the tendency to ignore its operation upon special provocation would so reduce the efficiency of the machinery in other situations that the local gain would easily be more than offset by widespread losses in energy available for other ends. In the third place, experience shows that there is general presumption on the side of indirect and refined agencies as against coarse and strikingly obvious methods of utilizing power. The fine mechanism which runs a watch is more efficient than the grosser one which heaves a brick. Thus the bias against any doctrine which seems under any circumstances to sanction resort to personal and primitive methods of using force against the more impersonal juridical contrivances of society turns out to be *prima facie* justified on the principle of efficiency in use of means.

Over and above this bare presumption, it must be admitted that our organized contrivances are still so ineffective that it is a delicate matter to tell how far a standing menace to resort to crude methods may be a necessary stimulus to the better working of the more refined methods. There is a general presumption in politics against doing anything till it is clearly necessary; and indication of potential force operates as a sign of necessity. In other words social reorganization is usually a response to a threatened conflict—witness the present "preparedness" agitation.

This conclusion that violence means recourse to means which are relatively wasteful may be strengthened by considering penal measures. Upon the whole, the opinion seems to be current that in such matters force is hallowed by the mere fact that it is the State which employs it, or by the fact that it is exercised in the interests of "justice"—retribution in the abstract, or what is politely called "vindicating the law." When the justification of force is sought in some kind of abstract consideration of this sort, no questions are to be raised about the efficiency of the force used, for it is not conceived as a specific means to a specific end. It is the sacrosanct character thus attributed to the State's use of force which gives pungency to the Tolstoian charge that the State is the arch-criminal, the person who has recourse to violence on the largest scale. I see no way out except to say that all depends upon the efficient adaptation of means to ends. The serious charge against the State is not that it uses force—nothing was ever accomplished without using force—but that it does not use it wisely or effectively. Our penal measures are still largely upon the level which would convince a man by knocking him down instead of by instructing him.

My treatment is of course very summary. But I hope that it suggests my main point. No ends are accomplished without the use of force. It is consequently no presumption against a measure, political, international, jural, economic, that it involves a use of force. Squeamishness about force is the mark not of idealistic but of moonstruck morals. But antecedent and abstract principles can not be assigned to justify the use of force. The criterion of value lies in the relative efficiency and economy of the expenditure of force as a means to an end. With advance of knowledge, refined, subtle and indirect use of force is always displacing coarse, obvious and direct methods of applying it. This is the explanation to the ordinary feeling against the use of force. What is thought of as brutal, violent, immoral, is a use of physical agencies which are gross, sensational and evident on their own account, in cases where it is possible to employ with greater economy and less waste means which are comparatively imperceptible and refined.

It follows from what has been said that the so-called problem of "moralizing" force is in reality a problem of *intellectualizing* its use: a problem of employing so to say neural instead of gross muscular force as a means to accomplish ends. An immoral use of force is a stupid use. I sometimes hear apologies for war which proceed by pointing out how largely all social life is a disguised contest of hostile powers. Our economic life, so it is said, is but a struggle for bread where the endurance and even the lives of laborers are pitted against the resources of employers. Only lack of imagination fails to see the economic war, the industrial battlefield with its ammunition trains and human carnage. Let the point be admitted. What still remains true is that the decisive question is the level of efficiency and economy upon which the deploying of forces goes on. Our present economic methods may be so wasteful, so destructive, as compared with others which are humanly possible, as to be barbarous. Yet competitive commercial methods may represent an advance in the utilization of human and natural resources over methods of war. In so far as they involve greater indirection and complexity of means, the presumption is that they are an advance. Take, however, on the other extreme the gospel of non-resistance. Except upon a doctrine of quiescence more thorough-going than any St. Simon Stylites has ever adopted, the non-resistance doctrine can mean only that given certain conditions, passive resistance is a more *effective* means of resistance than overt resistance would be. Sarcasm may be more effective than a blow in subduing an adversary; a look more effective than sarcasm. Only upon such a principle of expediency can the doctrine of non-resistance be urged, without committing ourselves to the notion that all exercise of energy is inherently wrong—a sort of oriental absolutism which makes the world intrinsically evil. I can but think that if pacifists in war and in penal matters would change their tune from the intrinsic immorality of the use of coercive force to the comparative inefficiency and stupidity of existing methods of using force, their good intentions would be more fruitful.

As my object is rather to make a point clear than to convince any one, let me take another example. In the labor struggle we sometimes hear a right of free labor and free choice appealed to as against the movement for a closed shop. Men like President Eliot are sincerely convinced that they are continuing the fight for human freedom. Perhaps they are. I do not pretend to pass upon the merits of the question. But *perhaps* they are only fighting in behalf of the retention of methods of waste against those of efficient organization. There was a time when our ancestors had the personal right of inflicting punishment upon offenders. When the movement set in to restrict this office to a limited number of designated officers and thereby to deprive the mass of their prior right, one wonders whether the spiritual ancestors of President Eliot did not protest against this invasion of sacred personal liberties. It is now clear enough that the surrender of the power was an incident of organization absolutely necessary to secure an efficient utilization of the resources entering into it. It may turn out in the future that the movement for the closed shop is an incident of an organization of labor which is itself in turn an incident in accomplishing a more efficient organization of human forces.

In other words, the question of the limits of individual powers, or liberties, or rights, is finally a question of the most efficient use of means for ends. That at a certain period liberty should have been set up as something antecedently sacred *per se* is natural enough. Such liberty represented an important factor which had been overlooked. But it is as an efficiency factor that its value must ultimately be assessed. Experience justifies the contention that liberty forms such a central element in efficiency that, for example, our present methods of capitalistic production are highly inefficient because, as respects the great body of laborers, they are so coercive. Efficiency requires methods which will enlist greater individual interest and attention, greater emotional and intellectual liberty. With respect to such a liberation of energies, older and coarser forms of liberty may be obstructive; efficiency may then require the use of coercive power to abrogate *their* exercise.

The propositions of this paper may then be summed up as follows: First, since the attainment of ends requires the use of means, law is essentially a formulation of the use of force. Secondly, the only question which can be raised about the justification of force is that of comparative efficiency and economy in its use. Thirdly, what is justly objected to as violence or undue coercion is a reliance upon wasteful and destructful means of accomplishing results. Fourthly, there is always a possibility that what passes as [illegible] legitimate use of force may be so wasteful as to be really a use of violence; and *per contra* that measures condemned as recourse to mere violence may, under the given circumstances, represent an intelligent utilization of energy. In no case, can antecedent or *a priori* principles be appealed to as more than presumptive: the point at issue is concrete utilization of means for ends.

11. NATURE AND REASON IN LAW[1]

In Pollock's *Expansion of the Common Law,* there is found the following interesting passage from St. German, written early in the sixteenth century: "It is not used among them that be learned in the laws of England, to reason what thing is commanded or prohibited by the Law of Nature and what not, but all the reasoning in that behalf is under this manner. As when anything is grounded upon the Law of Nature, they say that Reason will that such a thing be done; and if it be prohibited by the Law of Nature they say it is against Reason, or that Reason will not suffer that to be done." It is a commonplace to the student of the history of law that this identification of natural and rational, and the equating of both with the morally right, has been at various times a source of great improvements in law. Professor Pound has recently designated the stage in the development of law that follows upon and corrects many of the abuses of the stage of strict law as that of equity or natural law. He says: "The capital ideas of the stage of equity or natural law are the identification of law with morals; the conception of duty and the attempt to make moral duties into legal duties, and reliance upon reason rather than upon arbitrary rule to keep down caprice and eliminate the personal element in the administration of justice." Aside from the introduction of equity, the abolition of technicalities which obstructed rather than furthered justice, the adoption by the courts of usages that were more reasonable than those perpetuated in older law, the idea of the subordination of government to social ends, and the furtherance of humane international relations are a few of the many services rendered by the identification of the natural with the reasonable. Looking back and taking the intellectual temper and equipment of the times into account, it is hard to see what other intellectual instrumentality could have done the work effected by the concept of natural reason in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In view of such facts the title given by Pollock to the Law of Nature, "a living embodiment of the collective reason of civilized mankind," is not so much out of the way as it seems to the philosopher who has been trained to look with suspicion upon any reference to Nature as a norm; and who is conscious of the seemingly individualistic, if not anti-social connotation of the term in political philosophy. But even in Locke, careful analysis shows that the limitation of governmental action to the protection of pre-existent natural rights is much more an assertion of the subordination of governmental action to ends that are reasonable, or moral, than appears from a hasty reading. Restricting the action of government by moral considerations, that is to say considerations of reason, is what Locke is chiefly concerned with.

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[1] From *The International Journal of Ethics,* October, 1914.

But, unfortunately, nature and reason are ambiguous terms; hence their use as equivalents of what is morally desirable is subject to diverse interpretations. Nature also means the existent, the given, the antecedent state of things; or the present state of things so far as that is connected with the antecedent condition by causal laws. Appeal to nature may, therefore, signify the reverse of an appeal to what is desirable in the way of consequences; it may denote an attempt to settle what is desirable among consequences by reference to an antecedent and hence fixed and immutable rule.

Accordingly, while at one time or with some people, or with some persons part of the time, natural justice meant that which commends itself to the best judgment of the most experienced or to the collective common sense of the race, as over against the conventional and technical justice of inherited legal rules; at other times it meant acceptance of the given state of distribution of advantages and disadvantages. Such a view of natural justice finds, for example, a typical representative in Herbert Spencer. It is, so to speak, purely accidental that such philosophies have been what we lately call individualistic as against collectivistic or socialistic. The essential thing in them is the subordination of the human, whether several or conjoint, to the given, to the physical. The central feature of the *laissez-faire* doctrine is that human reason is confined to discovering what antecedently exists, the pre-existent system of advantages and disadvantages, resources and obstacles, and then to conforming action strictly to the given scheme. It is the abnegation of human intelligence save as a bare reporter of things as they are and as a power conforming to them. It is a kind of epistemological realism in politics. That such a doctrine should work out, no matter how personally benevolent its holders, in the direction of *Beati possidentes*, is inevitable.

This mode of interpretation affected the idea of Reason as well as of Nature, not merely because of the historic equating of Reason and Nature in judicial philosophy, but for special reasons. To the century that felt the influence of Newtonian science, Nature was more Reason than human reason itself. Human reason was reason only as a faculty of retracing the wisdom, harmony, the uniform and comprehensive laws, embodied in Nature—that is, in the physically given world. The Lockean and Deistic identification of Reason with God, the benevolent ordainer and arranger of things, flavored even the most free-thinking speculation of the times. Those who prided themselves that they had no fear of God attributed to Nature the same optimistic benevolence that had characterized the God of natural religion. In order to be really reasonable and moral in action, that is, to act in behalf of good consequences, one had but to get his own interfering intelligence out of the way, and permit Nature, true Reason, to execute her own harmonious and benevolent designs. With respect to Reason as to Nature, the emphasis upon individualism was extraneous and secondary; the intrinsic and primary thing was the denial of a characteristic, a unique function, to human intelligence. Nature, not human thought, determined the formation of true purposes.

If I trace an analogous movement in the decisions of the courts relative to due diligence and undue negligence, it is not for the sake of demonstrating the influence of this type of philosophy upon the minds of judges; that would be somewhat absurd. But there *is* demonstrable, in my opinion, a parity of logic; and in addition there was probably some indirect influence in so far as this mode of thought was in the air. Reason is appealed to as a standard of action. A man's liability depends upon whether he uses the proper degree of reasonable care and prudence. But what measures this? Obviously ordinary prudence is a vague and relative matter—relative in the sense of varying with the circumstances of the situations, as the courts have pointed out. But this very vagueness and variability make the more necessary some principle for detecting the meaning of reasonable in special cases. It is obvious at a glance that the reference to what reasonable and prudent men do or would do in similar cases, has exactly the ambiguity we have been dealing with. It may mean reasonable in the sense of involving the kind of foresight that *would* in similar situations, conduce to desirable consequences; or it may mean the amount and kind of foresight that, as a matter of fact, are customary among men in like pursuits, even though it be demonstrable that, upon the whole, the customs involve deplorable consequences.

That this ambiguity is not merely a theoretical possibility is evidenced by the course of court decisions in the matter of the due diligence of employers in the last half century. While, in some cases, the courts have taken the position which identifies reason with foresight of specific consequences, the general tendency for a long time was to identify reasonable prudence with the ruling customs of the trade, no matter how unreasonable those customs themselves were when looked at from the standpoint of the sort of consequences they tend to produce. For a long time the Supreme Court was almost alone in saying: "Ordinary care on the part of a railway company implies, as between it and its employees, not simply that degree of diligence which is *customary* among those intrusted with the management of railroad property, but such as having respect to the exigencies of the particular service, *ought* reasonably to be observed . . . such watchfulness, caution, and foresight as, under all the circumstances of the particular service, a corporation controlled by careful, prudent men *ought* to exercise." . . . The court "cannot give their assent to the doctrine that ordinary care in such cases means only the degree of diligence which is customary, or is sanctioned by the general practice and usage which obtains." Such a quotation, on the contrary side, as the following, from a federal court, shows well the different interpretations of reasonable care put upon the obligations of the corporation to the general public it served and to those for whose services it paid: "As respects travel on steam railways many of the courts of this country hold the carrier bound to keep pace with new inventions in the direction of safety. But this rule is an exceptional one, established upon grounds of public policy, and for the safety of human life. It has never been applied to the relation of master and servant."

When we consider the implications of the law of contract from the side of the employee, as these have been developed through court decisions with respect to the assumption of risks, we find yet another aspect of the same matter. No Kantian philosopher ever went further in ascribing a ready-made antecedent faculty of reason to man than the courts, in endowing the laborers of this country with unbounded foresight of the consequences implied in taking a job; and no transcendentalist ever went further in assuming that this antecedently possessed reason was in a position to make itself effective in action. As far as the workmen were concerned the courts were committed to the idealistic assumption: *Mens agitat molem.* In its application, this meant, that risks which the laborer ran as matter of fact in the performance of his habitual duties were assumed to have been deliberately or intentionally undertaken by him. The whole doctrine of the assumption of risk was, in pragmatic effect, a rendering of brute physical situations in terms of purpose or reason.

In short, in substance although not in form, the reasonable or "natural" was identified with the antecedently given, with the state of affairs that customarily obtained, not with the exercise of intelligence to correct defects and to bring about better consequences. From the side of the employer, it meant *Beati possidentes,* To him that hath shall be given; from the side of the employee, *Vœ victis,* From him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have.

It would not be difficult to trace the same logic in the denial of the principle of liability without fault. Under certain conditions, the doctrine is doubtless reasonable, in the sense in which reasonable means due foresight of consequences. Under other conditions, where industrial pursuits bring about different consequences, the doctrine that in pure accident of misadventure it is reasonable for the loss to lie where it falls, is, when laid down as a dogma, the deliberate identification of the reasonable with the physically existent, and wilful refusal to use intelligence in such a way as to ameliorate the impact of disadvantages.

Fortunately, many of the specific things dealt with in this paper are now by way of becoming historic reminiscences. But for this very reason they may the better illustrate the main thesis of this paper. The principle of natural law and justice in the sense that technical and official legal rules need to be adapted to secure desirable results in practice, may well be accepted. But we also find that one of the chief offices of the idea of nature in political and judicial practice has been to consecrate the existent state of affairs, whatever its distribution of advantages and disadvantages, of benefits and losses; and to idealize, rationalize, moralize, the physically given—for customs from a philosophical point of view are part of the physical state of affairs. By reading between the lines, moreover, we find that the chief working difference between moral philosophies in their application to law is that some of them seek for an antecedent principle by which to decide; while others recommend the consideration of the specific consequences that flow from treating a specific situation this way or that, using the antecedent material and rules as guides of intellectual analysis but not as norms of decision.

My point is practically made. But, in concluding, I will say that I see nothing new in principle in the recent attempt to rehabilitate the principle of natural rights by connecting it with the nature of consciousness.[1] The problem is the same whether we use the older word "reason" or the newer word "consciousness." Is consciousness taken as a possessed fact, something given in some men, and relatively lacking in others? Then we have still a physical morals—a worship of consciousness or intelligence in name; a denial, an abdication of it in fact, since what already exists is taken as the norm of action, in spite of the fact that intelligence is concerned with what the given may lead to. But if by "consciousness" we mean interest in desirable consequences and if we include in its attribution to a person the perception that similar intelligence is desirable in others (a man being stupid or unconscious so far as he does not effectively recognize this fact), then we have a situation where reference to individualism is irrelevant and misleading,[2] and where the significant thing is the need of the exercise of intelligence to bring about conditions that will develop more intelligence—a version of natural law to which I heartily subscribe.

I would suggest that the question of the moral right of the employer to exploit (as by means of the doctrine of the assumption of risk) the inferior intelligence of the employee affords an admirable opportunity for removing the ambiguity that still, to my own mind, affects the doctrine of natural rights as developed in chapter four of Fite's *Individualism.* The author seems, especially in his criticism of other views, to be falling back upon intelligence as a physical fact, that is, as a given thing. But when he is as anxious to show that his theory is "generous" as another school is to show that its views are "social," he appears to shift to the view that identifies intelligence with effective foresight of impartially and comprehensively distributed consequences. If he means the latter, the difference between it and what other people call a social view of intelligence is verbal; if he means the former, the difference is, pragmatically, fundamental and insurmountable. And, I repeat, while we hear much about intelligence, the effect of any theory that identifies intelligence with the given, instead of with the foresight of better and worse, is denial of the function of intelligence.

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[1] *Individualism.* Warner Fite.

[2] What would one think of a physiologist who to-day in describing the digestion of food lugged in the "individual," or the fact that all circulation is "individual" as an enlightening and explanatory fact? To dwell upon a conception of consciousness that identifies it with impartial and comprehensive foresight, and then to insist that "consciousness is individual" in a way that qualifies or denies the natural implications of the prior conceptions, seems to be on a par with the procedure of the physiologist, who, after telling us that circulation is a matter of specific fact, thinks to add or change something by hitching the facts on to an "individual." Either Professor Fite's individual, as stated in his *Individualism, is* the intelligence over again, or it is something assumed ready-made, never analyzed or described, and yet used to negate the essential traits of intelligence.—J. D.

12. NATIONALISM AND ITS FRUITS[1]

Like most things in this world which are effective, even for evil, Nationalism is a tangled mixture of good and bad. And it is not possible to diagnose its undesirable results, much less to consider ways of counteracting them, unless the desirable traits are fully acknowledged. For they furnish the ammunition and the armor which are utilized as means of offense and defense by sinister interests to make Nationalism a power for evil.

Its beneficent qualities are connected with its historical origin. Nationalism was at least a movement away from obnoxious conditions—parochialism on one hand and dynastic despotism on the other. To be interested in a nation is at least better than to restrict one's horizon to the bounds of a parish and province. Historically, Nationalism is also connected with the decay of personal absolutism and dynastic rule. Loyalty to a nation is surely an advance over loyalty to a hereditary family endued in common belief with divine sanctions and covered with sacrosanct robes. Much of superstitious awe and foolish sentiment has indeed passed over into Nationalism, but nevertheless the people of a country as a whole are surely a better object of devotion than a ruling family. Except where national spirit has grown up, public spirit is practically nonexistent. In addition to these two historical changes, Nationalism is associated with the revolt of oppressed peoples against external imperial domination. If one wants to see one of the most potent motive forces in creating Nationalism, one has only to consider the Greece of fifty years ago, the Ireland of yesterday and the China and India of to-day.

It is not to the present purpose to consider these gains; but it is to the point that without them Nationalism could not be perverted to base ends. The passionate loyalties which have been produced by struggle for liberation from foreign yokes, by the sense of unity with others over a stretch of territory wider than the parish and village, by some degree of participation in the government of one's own country, furnish the material which, upon occasion, make the spirit of a nation aggressive, suspicious, envious, fearful, acutely antagonistic. If a nation did not mean something positively valuable to the mass of its citizens, Nationalism could not be exploited as it is in the interest of economic imperialism and of war, latent and overt. Carlton Hayes has convincingly pointed out that Nationalism has become the religion of multitudes, perhaps the most influential religion of the present epoch. This emotion of supreme loyalty to which other loyalties are unhesitatingly sacrificed in a crisis could hardly have grown to its high pitch of ardor unless men thought they had found in it the blessings for which they have always resorted to religious faith: protection of what is deemed of high value, defense against whatever menaces this value, in short an ever-present refuge in time of trouble.

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[1] From *The World Tomorrow,* November, 1927; published under the title *The Fruits of Nationalism.*

But institutionalized religion is something more than a personal emotion. To say it is institutionalized is to say that it involves a tough body of customs, ingrained habits of action, organized and authorized standards and methods of procedure. The habits which form institutions are so basal that for the most part they lie far below conscious recognition. But they are always ready to shape conduct, and when they are disturbed a violent emotional eruption ensues. Practices, after they are adopted, have to be accounted for and explained to be reasonable and desirable; they have to be justified. Hence, along with the emotions and habits, there develops a creed, a system of ideas, a theology in order to "rationalize" the activities in which men are engaged. Faith in these ideas, or at least in the catch-words which express them, becomes obligatory, necessary for social salvation; disbelief or indifference is heresy. Thus Nationalism starting as an unquestioned emotional loyalty, so supreme as to be religious in quality, has invaded the whole of life. It denotes organized ways of behavior and a whole system of justificatory beliefs and notions appealed to in order to defend every act labelled "national" from criticism or inquiry. By constant reiteration, by shaming heretics and intimidating dissidents, by glowing admiration if not adoration of the faithful, by all agencies of education and propaganda (now, alas, so hard to distinguish) the phrases in which these defenses and appeals are couched become substitutes for thought. They are axiomatic; only a traitor or an evilly disposed man doubts them. In the end, these rationalizations signify a complete abdication of reason. Bias, prejudice, blind and routine habit reign supreme. But they reign under the guise of idealistic standards and noble sentiments.

Any one who reads the laudations of patriotism which issue from one source and the disparagements which proceed from another group must have been struck by the way in which the same word can cover meanings as far apart as the poles. The word is used to signify public spirit as opposed to narrow selfish interests. When so employed patriotism is a synonym for intense loyalty to the good of the community of which one is a member; for willingness to sacrifice, even to the uttermost, in its behalf. So taken, it surely deserves all the eulogies and reverence bestowed upon it. But because of nationalistic religions and its rationalization, the test and mark of public spirit becomes intolerant disregard of all other nations. Patriotism degenerates into a hateful conviction of intrinsic superiority. Another nation by the mere fact that it is other is suspect; it is a potential if not an actual foe. I doubt whether there is one person in a hundred who does not associate a large measure of exclusiveness with patriotism; and all exclusiveness is latent contempt for everything beyond its range. The rabies that exultantly sent Sacco and Vanzetti to death is proof of how deeply such patriotism may canker. It extends not only to foreign nations as such, but to foreigners in our own country who manifest anything but the most uncritical "loyalty" to our institutions. Thousands upon thousands of the most respectable element in the community believed they were exhibiting patriotism to the nation or to Massachusetts when they urged the death of men who were guilty of the double crime of being aliens and contemners of our form of government.

Were it not for facts in evidence it would be hard to conceive that any sane man could parade the motto: "My country right or wrong." But, alas, one cannot doubt that the slogan conveyed the feeling which generally attaches to patriotism. That public spirit, an active interest in whatever promotes the good of one's country, is debased and prostituted to such a use, is chargeable to Nationalism; and this fact stands first in its indictment.

It is a trait of unreasoning emotion to take things in a mass and thereby to create unities which have no existence outside of passion. Men who pride themselves upon being "practical" and "concrete" would be incensed beyond measure if they were told that the Nation to which they yield such unquestioning loyalty is an abstraction, a fiction. I do not mean by this statement that there is no such thing as a nation. In the sense of an enduring historic community of traditions and outlook in which the members of a given territory share, it is a reality. But the Nation by which millions swear and for which they demand the sacrifice of all other loyalties is a myth; it has no being outside of emotion and fantasy. The notion of National Honor and the rôle which it plays is a sign of what is meant. Individual persons may be insulted and may feel their honor to be at stake. But the erection of a national territorial State into a Person who has a touchy and testy Honor to be defended and avenged at the cost of death and destruction is as sheer a case of animism as is found in the records of any savage tribe. Yet he would be a thoughtless optimist who is sure that the United States will not sometimes wage a war to protect its National Honor.

As things now stand and as they are likely long to remain there is really such a thing as national interest. It is to the interest of a nation that its citizens be protected from pestilence, from unnecessary infection; that they enjoy a reasonable degree of economic comfort and independence; that they be protected from crime, from external invasion, etc. But Nationalism has created a purely fictitious notion of national interests. If a large gold field were located just over the border of Alaska, thousands of American breasts would swell with pride, as thousands would be depressed if it happened to lie in British territory. They would feel as if somehow they were personal gainers, as if the Nation to which they belong had somehow integrally promoted its interests. The illustration is somewhat trivial. But the spirit which it indicates is responsible for the acquiescence, if not the active approval, with which the new Coolidge version of international law with respect to property rights of American citizens in foreign countries has been received. For the gist of his revolutionary edition of international law (if he says what he means and knows what he means) is that any property right or property interest of any private citizen or any corporation in a foreign country (doubtless with the tacit understanding that it is not one of the Great Powers) is a National Interest to be protected when necessary by national force.

The culmination of Nationalism is the doctrine of national sovereignty. Sovereignty was originally strictly personal or at least dynastic. A monarch held supreme power; the country was his proper domain or property. The doctrine is historically explicable as part of the transition out of feudalism and the weakening of the power of feudal nobles in the growth of a centralized kingdom. The doctrine was also bound up with the struggle of State against Church and the assertion of the political independence of the secular ruler from the authority of ecclesiastics. As historians have clearly shown, the doctrine of the divine right of kings originally meant that secular monarchs had at least the same kind of divine commission as had Pope or Archbishop. But with the rise of modern territorial states the idea and attributes of Sovereignty passed over from the ruler to the politically organized aggregate called the Nation.

In so doing, it retained all the evils that inhered in the notion of absolute and irresponsible personal power (or power responsible only to God and not to any earthly power or tribunal) and took on new potencies for harm.

For disguise it as one may, the doctrine of national sovereignty is simply the denial on the part of a political state of either legal or moral responsibility. It is a direct proclamation of the unlimited and unquestionable right of a political state to do what it wants to do in respect to other nations and to do it as and when it pleases. It is a doctrine of international anarchy; and as a rule those who are most energetic in condemning anarchy as a domestic and internal principle are foremost in asserting anarchic irresponsibility in relations between nations. Internationalism is a word to which they attach accursed significance, an idea to which by all the great means at their disposal they attach a sinister and baleful significance, ignoring the fact that it but portends that subjection of relations between nations to responsible law which is taken for granted in relations between citizens. The doctrine is not of course carried to its logical extreme in ordinary times; it is mitigated by all sorts of concessions and compromises. But resort to war as the final arbiter of serious disputes between nations, and the glorification of War through identification with patriotism is proof that irresponsible sovereignty is still the basic notion. Hence I spoke in terms of the popular fallacy when I referred to the "right" of a state to do as it pleases when it pleases. For *right* is here only a polite way of saying power. It was usual during the World War to accuse Germany of acting upon the notion that Might makes Right. But every state that cultivates and acts upon the notion of National Sovereignty is guilty of the same crime. And the case is not improved by the fact that the judges of what National Sovereignty requires are not actually the citizens who compose a nation but a group of diplomats and politicians.

Patriotism, National Honor, National Interests and National Sovereignty are the four foundation stones upon which the structure of the National State is erected. It is no wonder that the windows of such a building are closed to the light of heaven; that its inmates are fear, jealousy, suspicion, and that War issues regularly from its portals.

13. ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS[1]

The situation that exists among nations in their relations to one another is such that it tempts even those who ordinarily come far short of cynicism to say that there is no connection between ethics and international relations. The title is also a temptation to indulge in a drastic attack upon present international relations as inherently immoral. One might make out a case for the proposition that they are ruled by force, fraud and secret intrigue, and that whenever moral considerations come into conflict with national ambitions and nationalistic ideas they go by the board. Or, identifying the moral with that which ought to be, whether it is or not, one might appeal to some ideal of what ought to be and point out the discrepancies that are found between this ideal of what should be and what actually is. The latter method naturally terminates in exhortation, in appeal to the moral consciousness of mankind.

These considerations are not adduced in order to develop them, but to suggest the extraordinary confusion that is found in current moral ideas as they are reflected in the ethics of international relations. I do not intend, then, to discuss international relations from the moral point of view, but rather to discuss the uncertain estate, the almost chaotic condition, of moral conceptions and beliefs as that condition bears upon the international situation. Why is it that men's morals have so little effect in regulating the attitude of nations to one another? Even the most cynical would hesitate to declare that the habits, to say nothing of the ideals, of the average decent man and woman in their ordinary affairs were adequately embodied in the existing reign of hatred, suspicion, fear and secrecy in international politics. The truth seems to be rather that man's morals are paralyzed when it comes to international conduct; that they are swept away and rendered impotent by larger forces that go their own way irrespective of the morals that are employed in everyday matters.

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[1] From *Foreign Affairs,* March 15, 1923.

The problems suggested by this state of affairs may be approached from two angles. We may ask what are the actual forces that have grown so powerful that they have escaped from moral control? What are the factors that prevent moral habits and ideas from operation? This opens a large and extremely complex field to be attacked only by cooperative efforts of historians, publicists, lawyers, and economists. There is open, however, a less pretentious method of approach. One may make the inquiry from the side of moral conceptions and doctrines, and ask whether they are intellectually competent to meet the needs of the situation. Some of the trouble may be due to the lack of coherent and generally accepted moral ideas; not of ideas in a vague and abstract sense but of ideas sufficiently concrete to be operative. This intellectual factor may not be in itself very large or powerful, and yet it may represent a factor that, although small in itself, is an indispensable condition of straightening out objective political and economic forces that are much more energetic and active.

In such an appraisal the historic conditions under which the laws applicable to international relations were formulated furnish a natural starting point. There can be no doubt that the intellectual work of Grotius and his successors had great practical influence. It was not academic and professorial, nor was it conceived primarily in the interests of the claims and ambitions of some particular state. These men were genuinely international, and for a time they had great effect in appeasing international strife and moralizing actual international relations. These basic contributions all sprang from a common moral source. They all expressed the idea of laws of nature which are moral laws of universal validity. The conception of laws of nature that are the fundamental moral laws of all human conduct of every kind and at all times and places was not a new one. Roman moralists had worked out the idea in connection with Roman jurisprudence; it was familiar to every civilian and canonist, and indeed to every educated man. The Catholic church had made the notion fundamental to its whole doctrine of secular ethics, that is of all obligations not springing from divine revelation. And even these obligations only expressed a higher and more ultimate nature of things not accessible to man's unaided reason. The Protestant moralists and theologians equally built upon the conception; at most they only put a greater emphasis upon an inner light in the conscience of individuals which revealed and acknowledged the laws of nature as the supreme standards of human behavior.

There was thus a principle and method of morals which was universally recognized throughout Christendom; there was also general agreement as to the contents of the code of obligations defined by the principle. The great achievement of Grotius and his followers consisted in studying existing international customs and in criticizing and organizing them by the help of the commonly accepted standard of laws of nature. More than one living authority in jurisprudence—like Pollock—has pointed out the service rendered by the conception of laws of nature in the development of various branches of law, private as well as public, and in equity practice. They all agree that its use in formulating the rules governing international conduct was its first and most conspicuous service. Now I do not mean to intimate that without responsive factors in the actual political and economic situation the intellectual application of the concept of natural laws to international relations would have exercised the moderating and humane influence which followed upon the labors of the school of Grotius. But it is meant that the general unquestioning and pervasive acknowledgment of the law of nature as the supreme ethical standard enabled the moral sentiments and ideals of Christendom to be concentrated upon problems of international conduct, so that whatever moral ideas *can* accomplish in practical regulation of human behavior *was* effectually accomplished.

During the nineteenth century, the notion of natural law in morals fell largely into discredit and disuse outside the orthodox moralists of the Catholic church. Of recent years there has been an increasing recognition that in principle all that is meant by a law of nature is a moral law to be applied to the criticism and construction of positive law, legislative and judicial. It has been pointed out that either we must surrender the notion that moral principles have anything to do with positive laws, international and municipal, or else admit the idea of natural law in some shape or form. But there is a wide difference between admitting the general notion of moral laws over against custom and positive law, and imputing to the law of nature the character and content which was attributed to it by seventeenth century moralists. While Grotius asserted that the law of nature would still be binding even if there were no revelation and no God as supreme lawgiver and judge, yet in the popular mind and in his mind the idea still had a theological background and a religious force. The laws of nature still represented the purposes of God and his injunctions concerning the ways in which his purposes as governing the life of man were to be realized. The secular science as well as the secular morals of the period only substituted "secondary" causes and laws for the primary and direct action of God.

But as men's minds gradually got away from the habit of connecting secular things with theological and religious matters, primary or secondary, the enormous force of the religious associations and sanctions of the law of nature gradually ceased. And among Protestants at least, even among those in whom religious ideas retained their old force in morality, most men got out of the habit of associating the religious factor in morals with laws of nature and indeed, to a large extent, with law at all. Divine love and desire for man replaced the concept of divine commands, injunctions and prohibitions. Thus in international relations, as elsewhere, the notion of a definite and universal moral norm in the shape of laws of nature weakened and died out. Even when retained, as in some texts, it was in perfunctory deference to tradition rather than as a living intellectual force. But its decay has not been accompanied by the development of any other moral principle of equal generality and equally wide current acceptance. In its stead we have a multiplicity of moral doctrines, more or less opposed to one another, and none of them held with any great assurance except by a small band of ardent partisans.

Moreover, aside from the question of religious reinforcement, other factors have rendered the old concept of natural law uncongenial. It was always associated with the idea of reason as a force or faculty in things as well as a force and faculty in minds. The laws of nature signified that certain rational principles are actually embodied in the nature of man in his connection with the rest of nature. To obey the law of nature was all one with obeying the dictates of reason. And reason was thought of not just as a psychological possession of the individual mind but as the bond of unity in society. Even the physical laws of nature, since they were universal and "governed" particular empirical phenomena, were rational. Animals had laws of reason embodied in their structure and instincts which they followed without knowing them. The superiority of man is simply that he can be aware of the rational principles which physical things and animals unconsciously obey. It is not possible, I think, for any one to-day to estimate the power added to the concept of laws of nature by their implicit and unquestioned association with reason and with the common ends and interests that hold men together in society.

It is hardly necessary to note the various influences that undermined this association and, in undermining it, weakened also the working influence of moral ideas on custom and law. Even among those who might give a formal allegiance to similar ideas, if they were presented already formulated, the ideas have little vital power. Modern science has familiarized even the man in the street with a radically different notion about laws of nature. In writing these pages I have felt almost bound to use the term "law of nature" instead of the words "natural law," so different are the familiar connotations of the latter term. Natural law in the popular conception is physical rather than rational; it is associated with energies—heat, light, gravitation, electricity—not with rationality. And it would be difficult to-day to get even a serious hearing in most circles for the idea that reason is what holds men together in society. Economists, sociologists, historians, psychologists have worked together to displace this idea, to make it seem unreal and faded, even when they disagree radically among themselves as to just what is the nature of the social tie. When we ask what has taken the place of the old law of nature, of reason in nature and society, we are confronted with a scene of contention, confusion and uncertainty. Where is the moral idea capable of exercising the crystallizing, concentrating and directing force upon positive law and custom once exercised by the idea of laws of nature? Few of those who insist that it is necessary to revive the concept in order to have a basis of criticism and constructive effort would revive the idea in its older shape. And they are divided when asked what we should put in its place. This division among intellectuals would not be of any great importance were it not that it reflects division, confusion and uncertainty in the popular mind.

Of course there have been many attempts to fill the void created by the gradual disappearance from the practical scene of the idea of laws of nature, and some of the attempts have been successful in forming not only schools of thought but in exerting considerable practical influence upon affairs. From among these schools we may select the utilitarian and what for convenience may be called the Hegelian for special consideration. The utilitarian school cannot be charged with lack of definiteness and assurance of conviction. And no candid student of English legal, political and social reforms of the last century can assert that it lacked great practical influence. Ignoring technical details that are connected mainly with a psychology of feelings and pleasures and pains which has been largely outgrown by the advance of mental inquiry, we may say that the formula of the greatest good for the greatest number, every individual to count as one and only one in the enumeration, has been translated into the conviction that social welfare is the last and the legitimate moral standard. Regard for the general welfare is the proper source of all moral rules and moral obligations. Instead of considering antecedent ready-made laws, we should search social *consequences* to find principles of criticism of positive laws and current customs and of plans for legislation and new social arrangements.

Great as was the efficacy of this idea in domestic affairs, where shall we look to find traces of its influence upon international morality? Even admitting that it presents to us a sound view of the moral standard and the source of moral laws, has it been applied with any effectiveness to the conduct of international affairs? As a moral standard it puts upon an equal footing the happiness of citizens of foreign lands and of the home land. Where has this principle determined an important branch of international law? What has it done, I will not say to prevent war, but to mitigate its horrors? To most people, I suppose, the idea of its general application to international relations would seem as Utopian as the literal application of the teachings of Jesus. It is sometimes said that utilitarianism supplies us with a low and somewhat sordid moral principle. But in this respect, at least, it would seem to be too high, too far above and beyond present attainment.

More concretely, various attempts to show that war in particular and methods relying upon force and intrigue in general do not pay, may be said to represent examples of the attempt to apply the utilitarian theory in international affairs. The demonstration that war does not pay even the nations that win is probably sufficiently convincing to most persons since the Great War. But the demonstration and the conviction do not appear to have much practical influence. It is too rationalistic; it assumes in too exclusive a way that men are governed by considerations of advantage, of profit and loss. Not only critics of utilitarianism but a great utilitarian, John Stuart Mill, criticized the earlier Benthamite version, on the ground that it leaned too heavily on the material interests of man without enough regard for the motives that may, according to one's bias, be termed sentimental, ideal or spiritual. And it might almost be said that the very existence of war with its willingness to sacrifice life and property for a cause is proof of the soundness of the criticism. War is as stupid as you please but it does not *persist* because of wrong calculations of profit, even though wrong estimates of national advantage may sometimes play a part in the minds of statesmen in starting a war.

The reasons for the practical failure of utilitarianism in international morality can be found within the doctrine itself. It is a theory not only of the moral standard but also of the moral motive, namely, concern for the general happiness. Now the utilitarians themselves recognized that after consideration for the standard has shown what should be done, the question remains of linking up the moral end with the motives that will make it prevail in conduct. They listed the motives that may be relied upon: natural sympathy with others; education into social ways of looking at conduct; mutual advantage through industrial interdependence, division of labor and exchange; and the penal sanction—personal suffering when anti-social motives are given sway.

Now it is obvious that under existing conditions these motives have little chance to operate in international affairs. The extent of sympathy is conditioned in the concrete among the mass of persons by habitual contact and familiar association. It may work strongly where these conditions are found and be very weak when there are barriers of language, custom, and political affiliation. Sympathy with one's immediate fellows is easily turned into antipathy to the outsider and stranger. Education is limited also by range of contract and intercourse, and at present the forces that educate into nationalistic patriotism are powerful and those that educate into equal regard and esteem for aliens are weak. The economic motive works both ways. As already stated, war almost undoubtedly entails loss for a nation as a whole; the risk of loss through defeat is great. But there are also profiteers, those who stand to gain for themselves, and there is no guarantee that they will not occupy places of power and influence. Aside from profiteering, the existence of protective tariffs shows how far men are from believing that free exchange is of necessity a mutual advantage.

As for the legal penal sanction, that is manifestly totally lacking, since there is no common political superior that makes laws with penalties attached for violation. In short, all the conditions that made utilitarianism domestically and internally effective are either absent or much enfeebled in international relations. It will be understood that these remarks are no more an attack upon utilitarianism than they are a defense of it. They are made not for the sake of making any assessment of utilitarianism but because they throw light upon the present lack of a coherent body of moral ideas that may be efficaciously applied in international matters. The evidence is the more striking in the case of utilitarian moral beliefs, because although not universally accepted—in fact although bitterly attacked—they were none the less effective within a nation.

The type of moral doctrine that for convenience in having a single name was called Hegelian is in fact much wider than any one school of philosophy. It goes back in its cruder form to Machiavelli and Hobbes. Both of these writers were attacked in their own day and ever since that day as immoralists rather than moralists. But nevertheless they represent a distinct type of moral ideas. Their underlying principle, when we eliminate idiosyncrasies of personality and surroundings, is that institutions having authority, especially that institution we call the state, are a necessary precondition of the morality of individuals. Hence, the social organization has a privileged, indeed, a unique moral position. Being the condition without which morality in the concrete is impossible, it is also above morals in the ordinary sense, in the sense in which private persons and voluntary communities are required to be moral. The idea came into later German philosophy not from Machiavelli and Hobbes direct but by a revival of Greek (especially Aristotelian) political ethics interpreted by the teaching of Spinoza. The latter, living in a period of almost universal war, external and civil, with all its attendant insecurity of existence, immensely deepened the teaching of Hobbes. He taught expressly that the authority of the state is a necessary pre-condition of stability of social and personal life and of any widespread freedom and rationality of life. Even the most rational of beings cannot put his rationality into effect and achieve freedom except as he has the external support as well as the positive assistance of others. Without political power most men will be governed by their passions, and the wisest of men will be constantly at the mercy of his environment and of appetite and passion.

The political condition of Germany, internal and external, after the Napoleonic wars created a situation favorable to the revival of these ideas. It also furnished a situation in which these ideas were important intellectual weapons in regenerating and unifying under the hegemony of Prussia the separate and particularistic states of Germany. These ideas, first taught in the universities, were so congenial to the needs of political Germany that they soon bore practical fruit. If they were not active forces in bringing about the centralization of previously scattered political authority they at least formulated the end and gave it intellectual justification.

It is not necessary to spend much time showing that this type of ethical thought, a type which insisted upon certainty, unity and stability of institutions, as utilitarians insisted upon the spread of general personal happiness, did not and could not favorably affect international morality. Its whole tendency was toward an intellectual glorification of the national state. Struggle between states was a necessary incident of history; more than this, it operated to strengthen and consolidate the authority of institutions. Success in war was objective evidence of a superior social organization, and hence of superior morality. If a single peaceful international order is ever attainable it is only by means of a *Pax Romana;* some one state must become so powerful as to be able to enforce its will upon all other communities.

I do not mean to intimate that these two types of moral doctrine exhaust the ethical conceptions that have developed in the void left by the subsidence of the theory of natural law.

There are others of considerable importance. But the career of the two selected types may serve to illustrate our main thesis: one important factor in the present problem of ethics and international relations is found on the side of ethical beliefs themselves in their confused and contending divergencies. The trouble does not reside wholly on the practical side. It is not my intent to propose any set of moral beliefs which might in my opinion remedy this state of affairs. I content myself with pointing out that since we are still in a very early period of anything which may be called the modern world there is no ground for despair as to the future. Every condition of life as it moves toward coherent organization develops its own *ethos*, its own standards and codes. In spite of the wide extent and internal complexity of the present situation, so much greater than anything in previous history, there is sufficient ground for believing that we are working toward a more coherent condition of life, and that a unified moral code will grow up when social relations are better adjusted. It is trite to say that we live in a time of immense transitions; we do not sufficiently note that ethical confusion always attends such epochs.

14. HOW REACTION HELPS[1]

Is freedom possible only in periods of transition from one economic era to another? Does it flourish only because of the relaxation of old economic ties and endure only as long as the new economic régime is not consolidated? Was the democratic movement, the liberal movement—or whatever name it should go by—not a general and inherently steady development but merely a temporary episode attending the shifting of control from agrarian feudalism to privileged capitalism?

Five years ago such questions seemed absurd to the vast majority of people, especially to middle class people. To-day these same questions, though of course in a much less abstract form, are entertained by a steadily increasing number of these same people. The thinking among them have always recognized in a way that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. But they thought this vigilance should be exercised in keeping the ways open, in preventing and removing the obstacles by which losing interests strove to slow down on moving progress. To-day they are asking whether the vigilance that secures freedom must not be exercised in altering the conditions which determine the direction of social forces. They are solicitous not about obstructions to democratic progress but about its foundations.

Consideration of the growing change of temper will throw some light on the question of the relation of reactionaryism to social progress. There is a general belief, supposedly justified by history, that in the long run every exhibition of reactionary conservatism (such as we have experienced in America since the 11th of November, 1918) ends by strengthening the cause of progress. But the means by which the reactionary helps do not seem to have received analysis. If the technique of the process were known possibly it would cease to be true that nothing is ever learned from history. Certainly it is not instructive to say that a social movement to one extreme always ends by calling out a swing of the pendulum in the other direction, that there are radical as well as conservative reactions. The question is one of specific fact. How does the reactionary release progressive forces?

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[1] From *The New Republic,* Sept. 1, 1920.

The question can be answered only by careful historic study guided by knowledge of human psychology. But a hypothesis may be ventured. The reactionary helps by clarifying the issue, by revealing obscure facts, uncovering hidden forces. History itself gives the lie to the idea that oppression by itself arouses an effective love of liberty. The worst thing about any form of enslavement is that it tends to make the oppressed content in their enslavement. It dulls perception of the possibility of another state of affairs and it destroys the energy which is required to effect change.

To apply to the relation of oppression and freedom in politics the physical law of equal action and reaction is to delude ourselves with foolish magical formulæ. Reactionaryism helps only when it awakens men's minds, only when it makes them see things they didn't see before, only when it focusses attention. The cause of the reactionary depends upon the immense inertia of human stupidity. But the stupidity of the reactionary is that at critical junctures he strives to entrench himself by doing things which force attention to facts that he has every interest in keeping concealed; by doing things which crystallize forces that work in his behalf only as long as they remain diffused and obscure.

The madness with which the gods afflict those whom they would destroy is precisely the temptation to use a temporary possession of strategic power so as to make that power permanent. In this effort they necessarily exaggerate evils that had existed previously but that were tolerated in part because they were not perceptible and in part because they had not as yet become intolerable. The excess, the exaggeration, makes the evil obvious, conspicuous, and it adds force to old and neglected criticism by leading men to believe that the evil had always been there in the same intense form which it assumes under the exaggeration of the moment.

The terms of the peace settlement, for example, are such as to emphasize the desire of Great Britain to obtain a monopoly of oil, and of France to keep Germany in permanent industrial subjection. Such things lie so obviously upon the surface as to convince multitudes of what they never had believed—that the main if not the sole cause of the war was greed for economic supremacy, and that most of the talk about justice and self-determination was bunk. The multitude is in no condition to discriminate. It does not reflect that the outcome of the war exaggerated the significance of certain economic factors, and put a few men in a position where they could make an excessive unrelieved assertion of this exaggeration. The outcome is read back into the antecedent state of things, and it is concluded that these forces were working in the same intensified fashion all the time.

They were indeed working and working powerfully. But it was a condition of their continued working that they should not be intense and concentrated, but diffused and thus bound up with many genuinely idealistic factors. Their exaggeration condenses, concentrates, crystallizes them, and in so doing strips them bare of all the humane associations which were indispensable to their smooth working. At the same time millions are induced to believe the worst that radical extremists had ever said about the economic determination of society. The reactionary, not the socialistic critic, has supplied the object lesson in the alliance of politics with privileged control of land and its natural resources.

Another way in which the reactionary helps is by the advertising he gratuitously gives radicalism. This enables us to understand why terms given in objurgation and scorn become the honored names of parties and movements. It is not the fault of American reactionaries that an actual Bolshevism has not been created by them. If conditions had been at all propitious the myth of the extraordinary power and unceasing activity of extreme Reds would have ended in a fact. Where there is such fear, it is only proper that there should be something to be afraid of. As it is, the effort to render everything that departs from laudatory acceptance of existing capitalism into a dangerous and sinister radicalism can only terminate in making radicalism respectable and honorable. Men of honesty and spirit who are at all dissatisfied with the existing régime will be ashamed of calling themselves anything else.

Already there are signs that liberalism will be eschewed as a milk and water term. At the close of every vehement reactionary movement in history, the commonplaces of thought and discussion which form the plane of action have moved to the left. Vice is not the only thing that becomes tolerable through familiarity. If the reactionary were wise he would show confidence in his strength by leaving the ideas he dislikes in a region of vague and unmentionable mystery. Too much ghost talk creates a desire to see ghosts, until finally the men are willing to pay good money to see the spirits which had once been the source of panicky terrors.

The reactionary also serves by forcing the radical to abandon the cloudland of dreams and come to closer grip with realities. As long as "scientific" socialism lived upon the revolutionary formulæ of '48 it was either seventy-five years behind or ahead of the times. It certainly was not in touch with them in America. But when the Hessians of reactionary capitalism discovered these rhetorical flourishes and took them seriously enough to send men to jail for indulging in them, it was a signal that it was no longer necessary to take refuge in millennial dreams. The current facts of particular economic transformation were substituted for prophetic hopes of a universal transformation. Dream psychology is always evidence of impotence. But the dreamer who is prodded into wakefulness faces the facts that enter into action.

For the violence of the reactionary shows prescience of actual tendencies. It reveals the movement of actual forces. As long as socialism accepted the Marxian doctrine of a sudden revolution which was to be the result of the universal misery, poverty and weakness of the laborer, it was practically negligible. Every such doctrine expresses a compensatory psychology. It is the proof of weakness. Any real "revolution" will proceed from strength, from increased strength of capacity and position. The war gave labor precisely this access of strength. Yet it might, in the United States at least, have remained largely unconscious and unconcentrated, ready to be dissipated with the inevitable oncoming of hard times and unemployment, if the reactionary had not forced its recognition. His irrational violence of fear revealed the strength that was there.

Labor can never entirely forget the instruction it has received as to its potential power. It is the reactionary who has turned prophet, and his prophecy is based on a frightened perception of the actual movement of forces. Thus he helps. He spreads enlightenment by his endeavors to establish obscurantism.

There is just one passing period in which the reactionary succeeds. There is a stage of development in which a vague and mysterious feeling of uncertain terror seizes the populace. During this time he has things all his own way. Deceived by this success, his movements become noisy; his intentions obvious. He attracts attention away from the terror to himself. The twilight clears and objects are again seen in their natural proportions. Discussion and free speech are suppressed. But the means taken to suppress them become more enlightening than normal discussion and free speech would have been. Timid souls have been cowed into a permanent acquiescence; but they never counted anyway except as a passive weight. Suppression of truth and circulation of lies permanently twisted some facts. But the loss as far as progress is concerned is more than made up for by the revelation of motives and objects through which the reactionary permanently weakened his power. Thus he helps.

15. PROGRESS[1]

Some persons will see only irony in a discussion of progress at the present time. Never was pessimism easier. Others will recognize in it a fine exhibition of courage and faith, and find the manifestation heartening. There is indeed every cause for discouragement. But discouragement affords just the occasion for a more intelligent courage. If our optimism was too complacent, it is because it was too thoughtless, too sentimental. Never was there a time when it was more necessary to search for the conditions upon which progress depends, until we can reaffirm our faith in its possibility upon grounds better than those upon which we have too blindly relied.

If we have been living in a fools' paradise, in a dream of automatic uninterrupted progress, it is well to be awakened. If we have been putting our trust in false gods, it is a good thing to have our confidence shaken, even rudely. We may be moved to find truer gods. If the reeds upon which we relied have broken, it is well for us to have discovered their frailty. If we have been looking in the wrong direction, we now have a sufficiently strong stimulus to direct our attention elsewhere. We can hardly welcome the war merely because it has made us think, and has made us realize how many of the things we called thoughts were asylums for laziness. But since the war has come, we may welcome whatever revelations of our stupidity and carelessness it brings with it; and set about the institution of a more manly and more responsible faith in progress than that in which we have indulged in the past.

For there can be no blinking the fact that much of that faith was childish and irresponsible. We confused rapidity of change with advance, and we took certain gains in our own comfort and ease as signs that cosmic forces were working inevitably to improve the whole state of human affairs. Having reaped where we had not sown, our undisciplined imaginations installed in the heart of history forces which were to carry on progress whether or no, and whose advantages we were progressively to enjoy. It is easy to understand why our minds were taken captive by the spectacle of change, and why we should have confused progress with change. It is not necessary to rehearse an account of the barriers which for thousands of years kept human society static. Nor is it necessary to do more than allude to the various inventions which by facilitating migration and travel, communication and circulation of ideas and reciprocal criticism, and the production and distribution of goods in a world-wide market, have broken down those barriers. The release of energies has gone on for a century and a half to a degree which we are still impotent to realize. Persons and things have been endlessly redistributed and mingled. The fixed has given way to the mobile; the settled to the free. It was doubtless inevitable that, in its contrast with static conditions and ideals, this mobility and freedom should be taken for progress. Such it doubtless is in some respects. But the present crisis is in vain, so far as our intelligence is concerned, if it does not make us see that in the main this rapid change of conditions affords an *opportunity* for progress, but is not itself progress.

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[1] From *The International Journal of Ethics,* April, 1916.

We have confused, I repeat, rapidity of change with progress. We have confused the breaking down of barriers by which advance is made possible with advance itself. Except with respect to the conservatives who have continuously bemoaned all change as destructive, these statements seem to me to sum up fairly well the intellectual history of the epoch that is closing. The economic situation, the problem of poverty by the side of great wealth, of ignorance and absence of a fair chance in life by the side of culture and unlimited opportunity, have, indeed, always served to remind us that after all we were dealing with an opportunity for progress rather than with an accomplished fact. It reminded us that the forces which were revolutionizing society might be turned in two ways: that they actually were employed for two diverse and opposed ends. But the display was not dramatic enough, not sensational enough, to force the lesson home. The war stages the lesson in a sufficiently striking way.

We had been told that the development of industry and commerce had brought about such an interdependence of peoples that war was henceforth out of the question—at least upon a vast scale. There are men now fighting who had written and lectured to that effect. But it is now clear that commerce also creates jealousies and rivalries and suspicions which are potent for war. We were told that nations could not long finance a war under modern conditions: economists had demonstrated that to the satisfaction of themselves and others. We see now that they had underrated both the production of wealth and the extent to which it could be mobilized for destructive purposes. We were told that the advance of science had made war practically impossible. We now know that science has not only rendered the enginery of war more deadly, but has also increased the powers of resistance and endurance when war comes. If all this does not demonstrate that the forces which have brought about complicated and extensive changes in the fabric of society do not of themselves generate progress I do not know what a demonstration would be. Has man subjugated physical nature only to release forces beyond his control?

Two things are apparent. First, progress depends not on the existence of social change but on the direction which human beings deliberately give that change. Secondly, ease of social change is a condition of progress. Side by side with the fact that the mere substitution of a dynamic or readily changing social structure for a static society does not accomplish progress, stands the fact that this substitution furnishes the opportunity for progress. We cannot too much insist upon the fact that until men got control of natural forces civilization was a local accident. It depended upon the ability of a small number of men to command, with assurance, the labor and services of other men. Any civilization based mainly upon ability to exploit the energies of men is precarious; it is at the mercy of internal revolt and external overflow. By exploring the heaps of rubbish scattered over the face of the earth, we are just beginning to learn how many civilizations have arisen in the past only to sink into rubbish heaps. The dominion of man over the labor of other men is a shaky basis for civilization. And civilization never attained stability upon such a basis. The scientific conquest of nature has at least given us another basis. We have now a sure method. Wholesale permanent decays of civilization are impossible. As long as there exists a group of men who understand the methods of physical science and are expert in their use, recovery, under the worst of circumstances, of the material basis of culture is sure and relatively speedy. While the modern man was deceived about the amount of progress he had made, and especially deceived about the automatic certainty of progress, he was right in thinking that for the first time in history mankind is in command of the possibility of progress. The rest is for us to say.

I might almost as well stop here. For it seems to me that about all that I can say about the future of progress at the present time is that it depends upon man to say whether he wants it or not. If we want it, we can have it—if we are willing to pay the price in effort, especially in effort of intelligence. The conditions are at hand. We do not of course wholly control the energies of nature; we shall never wholly do so. But we are in possession of a method which enables us to forecast desirable physical changes and to set about securing them. So much is the secure result of the scientific revolution of the last three hundred years. We also know that it is not possible to bring about these physical changes without effecting at the same time vast social changes. The men who invented the stationary and locomotive steam engine, and the men who have since then harnessed both steam and electricity to all sorts of ends, have produced social changes by the side of which those produced by Alexander, Cæsar and Napoleon are insignificant. And the same process is going on as long as applied science goes on, whatever we may think about its worth. But, I repeat, while social change, thus brought about, represents an indispensable condition of progress, it does not present a guarantee for progress. The latter depends upon deliberate human foresight and socially constructive work. Hence we have first of all to change our attitude. Instead of congratulating ourselves upon its presence and certainty as a gift of the gods, as we have been wont to do, we have to recognize that it is a human and intentional product—as much so in principle as a telephone or irrigation or a self-binding reaper, and as much more so in fact as the factors upon which it depends are more complex and more elusive.

The doctrine of evolution has been popularly used to give a kind of cosmic sanction to the notion of an automatic and wholesale progress in human affairs. Our part, the human part, was simply to enjoy the usufruct. Evolution inherited all the goods of Divine Providence and had the advantage of being in fashion. Even a great and devastating war is not too great a price to pay for an awakening from such an infantile and selfish dream. Progress is not automatic; it depends upon human intent and aim and upon acceptance of responsibility for its production. It is not a wholesale matter, but a retail job, to be contracted for and executed in sections. I doubt if the whole history of mankind shows any more vicious and demoralizing ethic than the recent widespread belief that each of us, as individuals and as classes, might safely and complacently devote ourselves to increasing our own possessions, material, intellectual, and artistic, because progress is inevitable anyhow.

In dwelling upon the need of conceiving progress as a responsibility and not as an endowment, I put primary emphasis upon responsibility for intelligence, for the power which foresees, plans and constructs in advance. We are so overweighted by nature with impulse, sentiment and emotion, that we are always tempted to rely unduly upon the efficacy of these things. Especially do we like to entrust our destiny to them when they go by eulogistic names—like altruism, kindliness, peaceful feelings. But spite of the dogma which measures progress by increase in these sentiments, there is no reason that I know of to suppose that the basic fund of these emotions has increased appreciably in thousands and thousands of years. Man is equipped with these feelings at birth as well as with emotions of fear, anger, emulation and resentment. What appears to be an increase in one set and a decrease in the other set is, in reality, a change in their social occasions and social channels. Civilized man has not a better endowment of ear and eye than savage man; but his social surroundings give him more important things to see and hear than the savage has, and he has the wit to devise instruments to reinforce his eye and ear—the telegraph and telephone, the microscope and telescope. But there is no reason for thinking that he has less natural aggressiveness or more natural altruism—or will ever have—than the barbarian. But he may live in social conditions that create a relatively greater demand for the display of kindliness and which turn his aggressive instincts into less destructive channels. There is at any time a sufficient amount of kindly impulses possessed by man to enable him to live in amicable peace with all his fellows; and there is at any time a sufficient equipment of bellicose impulses to keep him in trouble with his fellows. An intensification of the exhibition of one may accompany an intensification of the display of the other, the only difference being that social arrangements cause the kindly feelings to be displayed toward one set of fellows and the hostile impulses toward another set. Thus, as everybody knows, the hatred toward the foreigner characterizing peoples now at war is attended by an unusual manifestation of mutual affection and love within each warring group. So characteristic is this fact that that man was a good psychologist who said that he wished that this planet might get into war with another planet, as that was the only effective way he saw of developing a world-wide community of interest in this globe's population.

I am not saying this to intimate that all impulses are equally good or that no effective control of any of them is possible. My purpose is, in lesser part, to suggest the futility of trying to secure progress by immediate or direct appeal to even the best feelings in our makeup. In the main, there is an adequate fund of such feelings. What is lacking is adequate social stimulation for their exercise as compared with the social occasions which evoke less desirable emotions. In greater part, my purpose is to indicate that since the variable factor, the factor which may be altered indefinitely, is the social conditions which call out and direct the impulses and sentiments, the positive means of progress lie in the application of intelligence to the construction of proper social devices. Theoretically, it is possible to have social arrangements which will favor the friendly tendencies of human nature at the expense of the bellicose and predatory ones, and which will direct the latter into channels where they will do the least harm or even become means of good. Practically this is a matter of the persistent use of reflection in the study of social conditions and the devising of social contrivances.

I have already said that the indispensable preliminary condition of progress has been supplied by the conversion of scientific discoveries into inventions which turn physical energy, the energy of sun, coal and iron, to account. Neither the discoveries nor the inventions were the product of unconscious physical nature. They were the product of human devotion and application, of human desire, patience, ingenuity and mother wit. The problem which now confronts us, the problem of progress, is the same in kind, differing in subject-matter. It is a problem of discovering the needs and capacities of collective human nature as we find it aggregated in racial or national groups on the surface of the globe, and of inventing the social machinery which will set available powers operating for the satisfaction of those needs.

This is a large order. But it is not, with reasonable limits, one hopeless to undertake. It is much more within the bounds of legitimate imagination than would have been, five centuries ago, the subjugation of physical nature which has since been achieved. The chief difficulty lies in the primary step: it consists in getting a sufficiently large number of persons to believe in its desirability and practicability. In spite of its discipline by the achievements of physical science our imagination is cowardly and irresponsible. We do not believe that study, foresight and planning will do for the human relations of human beings what they have done for our relationship to physical nature.

We are living still under the dominion of a *laissez-faire* philosophy. I do *not* mean by this an individualistic as against a socialistic philosophy. I mean by it a philosophy which trusts the direction of human affairs to nature, or Providence, or evolution, or manifest destiny—that is to say, to accident—rather than to a contriving and constructive intelligence. To put our faith in the collective state instead of in individual activity is quite as *laissez-faire* a proceeding as to put it in the results of voluntary private enterprise. The only genuine opposite to a go-as-you-please let-alone philosophy is a philosophy which studies specific social needs and evils with a view to constructing the special social machinery for which they call.

So far I have avoided any contrast of the so-called progressive attitude with the so-called conservative attitude. I cannot maintain that reserve any longer. While in general, the opposite of the progressive attitude is not so much conservatism as it is disbelief in the possibility of constructive social engineering, the conservative mind is a large factor in propagating this disbelief. The hard and fast conservative is the man who cannot conceive that existing constitutions, institutions and social arrangements are mechanisms for achieving social results. To him, *they* are the results; they are final. If he could once cure himself of this illusion, he would be willing to admit that they grew up at haphazard and cross purposes, and mainly at periods quite unlike the present. Admitting this, he would be ready to conceive the possibility that they are as poor mechanisms for accomplishing needed social results as were the physical tools which preceded the mastery of nature by mind. He would then be free: Not freed just to get emotionally excited about something called progress in general, but to consider what improved social mechanisms or contrivances are demanded at the present day.

All this, you will say (and quite justly), is very general, very vague. Permit me, in concluding, to give a few illustrations suggested by the present international situation, which may make my conception a little less vague. A friend was in Japan at the time when the war broke out. He remarked to an acquaintance who happened to be the United States consul in the town where he was, that he supposed he would have no difficulty in getting an American draft cashed. His friend replied: On the contrary; he himself had had to spend almost two days in getting even a government draft cashed. My friend proceeded to generalize from this incident. He said in effect that in commerce we are proceeding upon an international basis; commerce depends upon a system of international credit. But politically we are doing business upon the basis of ideas that were formed before the rise of modern commerce—upon the basis of isolated national sovereignty. The deadlock due to this conflict could not continue, he surmised; either we must internationalize our antiquated political machinery or we must make our commercial ideas and practices conform to our political. Personally I agree with his account of the needed remedy; it makes little difference, however, for purposes of my illustration whether any one else agrees or not. The situation is one which is real; and it calls for some kind of constructive social planning. Our existing human intercourse requires some kind of a mechanism which it has not got. We may drift along till the evil gets intolerable, and then take some accidental way out, or we may plan in advance.

Another similar illustration is the condition in which neutral countries find themselves at the present time. They are in the position of the public when there is a strike on the part of street-railway employees. The corporation and the employees fight it out between themselves and the public suffers and has nothing to say. Now it ought to be clear that, as against contending nations, the nations not at war have the superior right in every case—not by any merit of theirs, usually only by accident. But nevertheless in the existing situation they are the representatives of the normal interests of mankind, and so are in the right against even the contending party that with respect to other contenders is most nearly in the right. But if the present situation makes anything clear, it is that there is almost a total lack of any machinery by which the factors which continue to represent civilization may make their claims effective. We are quite right in prizing such beggarly elements of international law as exist; but it is evidence of the conservative or *laissez-faire* mind that we cling so desperately to the established tradition and wait for new law to be struck out by the accident of clash and victory, instead of setting ourselves in deliberate consultation to institute the needed laws of the intercourse of nations.

The illustration may be made more specific. It was comparatively easy to unify the sentiment of the nation when previous international custom was violated by the sinking of the *Lusitania*. It would not be very difficult to inflame that sentiment, in the name of a combination of defence of national honor and defence of international custom, to the point of war. But it is always defence, mind you; every war is *ipso facto* defensive on the part of everybody nowadays. And defence is always retrospective and conservative, even when most offensive. A proposition to call for a conference of nations which would formulate what their rights are henceforth to be, whatever they may have been in the past, would be a constructive use of intelligence. But it would hardly call forth at present the enthusiastic acclaim of the populace and consequently makes no great appeal to the political authorities who are dependent upon the support of the populace.

One more illustration from the international situation. The relative failure of international socialism in the present crisis has been sufficiently noted, with grief by some, with ill-disguised glee by others. But the simple fact of the case is that at present workingmen have more to gain from their own national state in the way of legislative and administrative concessions than they have from some other state, or from any international organization. That they should make use of war to strengthen their claims for concessions from the only power which can make these concessions is but to be human. When the day dawns when the workingmen have more to gain in the way of justice from an international organization than from a purely national one, that day war will become an impossibility. But it is easier to try to do away with war by appeal to personal sentiment than it is to strive to institute even the first steps of any such organization—futile in comparison as the former method must prove.

I hope these remarks at least illustrate what is meant by the dependence of progress upon a foreseeing and contriving intelligence as well as what is meant by saying that it is a retail job. I can only point out the need, so far as they coincide in the further interests of peace with the interest of progress, of an international commerce commission; of an international tariff board; of an international board for colonies and one for the supervision of relations with those backward races which have not as yet been benevolently, or otherwise, assimilated by the economically advanced peoples. Such things are not counsels of perfection. They are practical possibilities as soon as it is genuinely recognized that the guarantee of progress lies in the perfecting of social mechanisms corresponding to specific needs.

16. PHILOSOPHY AND INTERNATIONALISM [1]

I

Modern European philosophy has been affected by two great forces making for internationalism in thought; that is to say, for ways of conceiving life and its problems which transcend national boundaries. One of these influences comes from antiquity. All modern nations have depended upon culture and institutions inherited from Hellenic and Roman civilizations. All (save Russia) have emerged from the genuinely international Europe of the middle ages with its single Church, its single organization of intellectual life and belief, its common language. In spite of all subsequent divisions and distractions, the traditions of unity and the reminiscence of a consensus have powerfully influenced European thought. Independently of this unity of origin and background, all modern States have been subjected to like influences which have compelled the recognition of common problems and have created similar aspirations, while the commerce of goods and of ideas existing between all States has rendered each nation more or less permeable to the modes of thought developed in other countries. Transfusion has added its power to the similarity in intellectual response which has been called out by an environment shared by all nations.

However, the characteristic differences of thought in England, France, and Germany exact some attention to the forces which invaded and broke up the unity of the Holy Roman Church and the Holy Roman Empire. Two of these divisive forces especially require notice. One is the Protestant Reformation. Since the sixteenth century great masses of men have felt differently and thought differently on fundamental matters in Catholic and in Protestant countries. It was impossible that this should not profoundly affect philosophic formulations. The difference was accentuated by the fact that, roughly speaking, it was the Germanic peoples which became Protestant while the Latin and Celtic remained Catholic. The difference has deeply dyed even the non-Catholic philosophies of Catholic countries. They have been more than protesting; they have been aggressively anti-supernatural. The cleft between nature and the supernatural, between spirit and matter, between appetite and reason, has been felt much more keenly in Latin and Catholic countries than among Protestant peoples. In the latter, the tendency has been to smooth over the contrast, to blur the distinction, and to find refuge in some principle of unity and conciliation. A more extensive account than is here permissible would call attention to another effect of religious difference upon philosophic thought. Northern Germany, while reformed, never underwent Puritanism. Moreover, although it was associated with a political struggle against Catholic politics, Protestantism in Germany was never allied with a struggle for political liberties as was the case with the Calvinists and the sectaries in Great Britain. The German Protestantism developed only a struggle for freedom of feeling and thought; British, in connection with a battle for political and economic freedom. This fact, together with the difference made in England by Puritanism, can never be lost from view in understanding the difference between the philosophies of Protestant England and Protestant Germany.

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[1] Published under the title *The International Character of Modern Philosophy.*

The other great divisive influence in destroying the older consensus of philosophy was, of course, the rise of nationalism as the dominant consideration in political organization. The decay of feudalism everywhere coincided with the rise of the national State. Since the middle of the last century this tendency has been both more acute and more widespread. More than one historian has remarked that the nineteenth century was likely to be known as the century of the triumph of nationalism. It is not easy to recognize the full force of the impact of this dominant political fact upon even abstract thought; it is impossible to exaggerate its importance in dealing with the limitations which have been put upon internationalism in recent philosophy. One comment must serve. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the "enlightened" men in every country were cosmopolitan, aggressively and consciously so. National boundaries were looked upon as artificial, as maintained solely in the interests of dynastic families. It was assumed that the growth of knowledge—or rather the bare dispelling of ignorance—and of republicanism would do away with such factitious walls. The great word "humanity" was upon the lips of all. By 1830 this sentiment was almost as if it had never been. Almost everywhere philosophy was enlisted in behalf of national unification and national expansion—the realization of the "legitimate aspirations of our nationality." While the philosophies of history and of the State and society were most profoundly touched by this change, it affected more or less even the more abstruse and recondite phases of philosophy. For the first time, in the history of thought, such terms as "English philosophy," "French philosophy," "German philosophy" took on a militant ring. They were consciously put forward as rival theories of life. They were tinged with the common competitive strife of modern nations for supremacy, while in the eighteenth century it had been a commonplace that cultured men among all the nations thought essentially alike, and were all alike superior to popular and provincial prejudices in favor of their own country.

It might seem from the foregoing as if a chapter on internationalism in recent philosophy would be like the famous chapter on snakes in Ireland. But this side of the situation has been emphasized only for the purpose of suggesting what has happened during the disintegration of the older spiritual unity of Europe, the unity represented by the medieval Church. It suggests the immediate scene of division upon which the forces making for a new consensus have been operating. For as the forces made headway which disintegrated the older unity, that is the unity of a common origin, new forces have come into operation which have worked, in spite of all odds, toward a new internationalism of life and in the formulation of its aspirations. These are still inchoate; nowhere do their results stand out unambiguously. Yet they are at work. They have already left such traces of themselves that a historical survey reveals in outline what they are and what are their possibilities.

II

It is obvious that modern philosophy is international so far as it has been influenced by science, and also obvious that further advance in science, especially in its social prestige and authority, is bound to promote much greater unity. For it is a commonplace that recourse to the methods of science, as contrasted with those of opinion, tends to substitute agreement for barren disagreement and controversy. Science might almost be defined as a method for assuring agreement of opinion on a given topic. That this force has not been more effective than it has is a fact which can be considered only in connection with the recentness of the scientific point of view. The scientific point of view dates only from the seventeenth century; its application to the subject-matter of living beings and of society and conduct is much more recent. Probably the great mass still look upon science as something which deals with technical and recondite out-of-the-way matters, rather than as something which presents the way to settle every doubtful question for which a solution is humanly possible. The prestige of science as a method of reaching conclusions in the entanglements of life fags behind its technical achievements. It is still too new to have affected the fundamental habits of thought of a very considerable body of persons. Yet history shows that it has already been a powerful influence in bringing internationalism into philosophy.

Italians, Englishmen, and Frenchmen may all set up a claim to be the initiators of the modern movement in philosophy. The first may point to Bruno and Galileo; the second to Bacon; the third to Descartes. Owing to the continuity of events such a question can not profitably be raised. The French claim that

Bruno and Bacon were not strictly in the modern movement, that they were its precursors and heralds rather than its initiators. It is a matter of words, unless it is an attempt to make a sharp division where none exists in fact. The significant fact is the growing influence of a new science upon philosophical thought and the fact that this influence was exercised not nationally but all over Europe. Although the traditional visitor from Mars would be able to decide after study to what nation each of the writers mentioned belongs, yet they all witness to a force which is human rather than national, to a force which of necessity transcends geographical boundaries. The fact thus evidenced early in the history of modern thought is substantiated at every crucial epoch of subsequent science.

Consider, for example, the fortunes of the doctrine of evolution. Only the most nationalistically prejudiced would be likely to deny the claims to preeminence of an Englishman, Darwin. But the previously established facts and methods which made his generalizations possible are not claimable by any nationality. They are a European, an international, product. And if one looks into the influences which favored a popularization of the idea of development, together with its extension from more or less technical biological matters to use as general tools of thought, one finds himself distinctively in the European scene. The doctrine of progress played a large part. That idea we owe particularly to the French Enlightenment, with its enthusiastically optimistic faith in the indefinite perfectibility of man. Certain generalizations about the order of development of individual organisms from the embryo to the matured form played a part. These came from German thought, as did the notion of a law of development exemplified in the continuous history of humanity. And it was an Englishman, Spencer, who combined these various points of view into what has been undoubtedly the most popularly influential of the philosophies of evolution—no matter what is to be said concerning its enduring worth. In short, the generation of many of the leading tendencies in modern philosophy has been international because thinkers in different countries have been confronted by the same mass of material which has grown out of scientific work and have learned to employ like methods of inquiry and reflection which are cooperatively built up.

III

All of Europe has been subjected to a common impulse in the direction of democracy—a movement which has combined in itself two diverse factors of giving greater scope to individuality and of rendering the common or general good the aim and object of social organization and political activity. These two movements, though diverse, have been intimately connected throughout the whole struggle for democracy in modern life, one uppermost at one time, the other at another time; one dominant, upon the whole, in one country, the other in another country, yet both everywhere associated. In England—as in this country—it has been assumed that the relief of the individual from all artificial burdens and impositions would result almost automatically in social harmony and in a government maintained in the equitable interests of all. In Germany, the assumption has been rather of the necessity of control of political organizations to secure the common good as a preliminary means for securing effective individual freedom. France has aimed more consciously at a balance of the two conceptions of liberty and fraternity. Political freedom is most advanced in Great Britain and America, social equality in France, economic security in Germany. The differences are great enough when we compare national types, but it is only too easy to exaggerate the difference and thereby overlook the common problems and the common forces at work.

When we look at the history of either of the two phases of the common democratic impulse we find international dependencies and cross-fertilizations. The Lutheran origin of Protestantism testifies to the part played by Germany in the development of the spiritual and internal phase of individual freedom. That the Germans have over-idealized the importance of their possession of this sort of inner and emotional freedom as a compensation for their lack of political and overt freedom of action is incontestable. But equally certain is the fact that the force set in motion by them was propagated throughout Europe and stimulated, in other countries, the zeal for individual emancipation. The struggle in England in the seventeenth century of the Established Church with Presbyterian Calvinism, on one side, and with Independency, on the other, was united with the struggle for popular rights against the Stuarts. This fact has given English thought a stamp as yet indelible. It secured representative government and political freedom, but it checked the movement toward any comprehensive unity of belief and left England the classic land of intellectual compromise combining personal dogmatism with external toleration of divergent dogmas on the part of others.

This force also transcended national bounds. The liberal and radical thought of France in the later eighteenth century is inconceivable without the stimulus coming from England. Voltaire introduces Locke into France, and along with him impresses into service Newton as a fighter in the cause of intellectual liberty. The "free-thinking" movement in France can not be understood without the stimulus of English Deism. It was consonant with French genius to carry this movement much further than it had been developed on its native soil. The interest in logical unity and system eliminated every trace of that compromise which is so marked a trait of Locke and produced from him a thoroughgoing sensationalism and individualism, as it produced from Newton a thoroughgoing materialism. But the more systematic and thoroughgoing individualism of France passed in turn beyond France. All of the radical philosophy of the nineteenth century in every country had its roots in the revolutionary school of France, just as most of the conservative and reactionary systems were called out in protest against the excesses of the French Revolution.

Turn for a moment to the other side of the democratic movement—its interest in the common good, the good of the masses as against that of the classes—as the end and standard of all social organization. Externally viewed, the movement has often seemed to be antithetical to that toward individualism. It has emphasized the need of social control and has usually had a collectivistic color. Here we find France and Germany, partly in cooperation, partly in competition, playing the leading rôles. Rousseau is generally held up to view as the ultimate exponent of pure individualism, if not as the arch-anarch. This ignores the fact that his most lasting influence depends upon his theory of the general will as the essence of the State and with his bringing the economic problem to the foreground as the central political problem. Post-revolutionary thought in France shows a brood of communistic and socialistic schemes more or less loosely connected with these germinal ideas of Rousseau—schemes now generally disposed of under the depreciatory titles of Utopian as distinct from scientific socialism. But the philosophies of St. Simon and August Comte are a phase of the same movement; they represent the demand for a collective organization which, while respecting individual freedom, shall subordinate egoistic individualism to the collective welfare.

It is hardly possible to speak too strongly concerning the reverberation of these tendencies outside of France. Even England, the stronghold of political individualism, was affected by them. John Stuart Mill, in continuing the ideas of his eighteenth-century forbears, transformed them in this direction. Wordsworth, in his early period, Godwin, and Shelley draw their inspiration direct from this source. Utilitarianism, which began its career with the *laissez-faire* tendencies of the older liberalism, became, in the hands of the new radicalism, an instrument for appealing to the agencies of organized society in behalf of the common good. A tendency variously termed collectivistic, socialistic (in the broadest sense of that ambiguous term), and organic internationalizes a large part of nineteenth-century thought.

The place of German philosophy in this international movement is of especial interest. Rousseau's notion of the superiority of nature to culture and the atomic individualism of the French Enlightenment were the most important factors in evoking nineteenth-century German idealism. In the last half of the nineteenth century when German idealism definitely returned to Kant (and to a somewhat positivistic Kant), German transcendental idealism, introduced in an earlier generation by Coleridge and Carlyle, took on a new lease of life in England by means of the Scottish universities and Oxford. This was one of the chief influences in turning cultivated Englishmen away from traditional *laissez-faire* individualism. More than once in the modern history of thought, movements which have seemingly had their day in their own country have flourished in some other nation. For the movements which have been common to all the nations have not gone on four abreast; the rate of advance has been different in their different phases. It is not too late, historically speaking, for Germany to discover the factors of good in that French philosophy of humanity and of progress through freedom which they seem so far to have missed.

In this account I have deliberately ignored many important factors in the internationalism of modern thought. The most obvious is the free circulation of learning and ideas through books, periodicals, and personal intercourse. It is doubtless true that each nation in its methods of instruction puts most emphasis upon its own cultural leaders—save in America where we perforce follow foreign traditions. Yet any significant figure in any country soon has his ideas known beyond territorial boundaries and may even have ardent followers in other lands. Books of importance are quickly translated. And this peaceful permeation has long been going on.

I find, for example, in our own library at Columbia, translations of Kant's *Essay on Enduring Peace* into French and English, both printed within two years of the appearance of the original in Germany. But although this process of distribution and exchange is the indispensable mechanism of international thought, I have preferred to dwell upon the movements of science and those fundamental forces making toward democracy and toward a general consensus of beliefs. For slow as is this advance, it is impossible to conceive of any obstacles permanently arresting it. At a time like the present it is incalculably grateful to lay hold of rational grounds for clinging to faith in a steadily growing unity of ideas and ideals which may sometime be a real factor in achieving practical international cooperation.

17. PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY[1]

Why such a title as Philosophy and Democracy? Why Philosophy and Democracy, any more than Chemistry and Oligarchy, Mathematics and Aristocracy, Astronomy and Monarchy? Is not the concern of philosophy with truth, and can truth vary with political and social institutions any more than with degrees of latitude and meridians of longitude? Is there one ultimate reality for men who live where suffrage is universal and another and different reality where limited suffrage prevails? If we should become a socialistic republic next week would that modify the nature of the ultimates and absolutes with which philosophy deals any more than it would affect the principles of arithmetic or the laws of physics?

Such questions, I fancy, lurk in your minds when they are confronted by a title like that which is chosen. It is well that these questions should not be allowed to lurk in subconscious recesses, but should be brought out into the open. For they have to do with what is the first and last problem for a student of philosophy: The problem of what after all is the business and province of philosophy itself. What is it about? What is it after? What would it have to be possessed of in order to be satisfied? To such questions as these must the remarks be chiefly addressed, leaving the nominal and explicit subject of the relation of democracy to philosophy to figure for the most part as a corollary or even as a postscript.

If then we return to the imaginary interrogations with which we set out we shall find that a certain assumption underlies them—or rather two assumptions. One is that philosophy ranks as a science, that its business is with a certain body of fixed and finished facts and principles. Philosophy is viewed not as its etymology would lead us to expect as a form of love or desire, but as a form of knowledge, of apprehension and acknowledgment of a system of truths comparable in its independence of human wish and effort with the truths of physics. Such, I take it, is the first assumption. The second is that since the realities or truths to be known must be marked off from those of physics and mathematics in order that philosophy may be itself a distinctive form of knowledge, philosophy somehow knows reality more *ultimately* than do the other sciences. It approaches truth with an effort at a more comprehensive, a more completely total vision, and takes reality at a deeper and more fundamental level than do those subjects which orthodox philosophers have loved to call the *special* sciences. What they take piecemeal and therefore more or less erroneously (since a fragment arbitrarily torn from the organic whole is not truly a truth) philosophy takes *teres et rotundus*. What they take superficially, in, so to say, its appearance, philosophy takes at that deeper level where connections and relations within the whole are found.

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[1] From *University of California Chronicle;* an address delivered at a meeting of the Philosophical Union of the University of California, Nov. 29, 1918.

Some such suppositions as these have, I think, been fostered by many philosophers. They are in the back of the minds of many students when they come to the study of philosophy. They are equally in the minds of many foes of philosophy who also compare philosophy with science, but only to contrast them—at the expense of philosophy. Philosophy, they say, is circular and disputatious; it settles nothing, for its schools are still divided much as they were in the times of the Greeks, engaged in arguing the same questions. Science is progressive; it settles some things and moves on to others. Philosophy moreover is sterile. Where are its works? Where are its concrete applications and living fruits? Hence they conclude that while philosophy is a form of knowledge or science, it is a pretentious and pseudo-form, an effort at a kind of knowledge which is impossible—impossible at all events to human minds.

Yet every generation, no matter how great the advance of positive knowledge, nor how great the triumphs of the special sciences, shows in its day discontent with all these proved and ascertained results and turns afresh and with infinite hope to philosophy, as to a deeper, more complete and more final revelation. Something is lacking in even the most demonstrated of scientific truths which breeds dissatisfaction, and a yearning for something more conclusive and more mind-filling.

In the face of such perplexities as these there is, I think, another alternative, another way out. Put baldly, it is to deny that philosophy is in any sense whatever a form of knowledge. It is to say that we should return to the original and etymological sense of the word, and recognize that philosophy is a form of desire, of effort at action—a love, namely, of wisdom; but with the thorough proviso, not attached to the Platonic use of the word, that wisdom, whatever it is, is not a mode of science or knowledge. A philosophy which was conscious of its own business and province would then perceive that it is an intellectualized wish, an aspiration subjected to rational discriminations and tests, a social hope reduced to a working program of action, a prophecy of the future, but one disciplined by serious thought and knowledge.

These are statements at once sweeping and vague. Let us recur to the question of whether there is such a thing as a philosophy which is distinctively that of a social order, a distinctive type appropriate to a democracy or to a feudalism. Let us consider the matter not theoretically but historically. In point of fact, nobody would deny that there has been a German, a French, an English philosophy in a sense in which there have not been national chemistries or astronomies. Even in science there is not the complete impersonal detachment which some views of it would lead us to expect. There is difference in color and temper, in emphasis and preferred method characteristic of each people. But these differences are inconsiderable in comparison with those which we find in philosophy. There the differences have been differences in standpoint, outlook and ideal. They manifest not diversities of intellectual emphasis so much as incompatabilities of temperament and expectation. They are different ways of construing life. They indicate different practical ethics of life, not mere variations of intellectual assent. In reading Bacon, Locke, Descartes, Comte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, one says to oneself this could have proceeded only from England, or France, or Germany, as the case may be. The parallelisms with political history and social needs are obvious and explicit.

Take the larger divisions of thought. The conventional main division of philosophy is into ancient, medieval and modern. We may make a similar division in the history of science. But there the meaning is very different. We either mean merely to refer to the stage of ignorance and of knowledge found in certain periods, or we mean not science at all but certain phases of philosophy. When we take science proper, astronomy or geometry, we do not find Euclid especially Greek in his demonstrations. No, ancient, medieval, modern, express in philosophy differences of interest and of purpose characteristic of great civilizations, great social epochs, differences of religious and social desire and belief. They are applicable to philosophy only because economic, political and religious differences manifest themselves in philosophy in fundamentally the same ways that they are shown in other institutions. The philosophies embodied not colorless intellectual readings of reality, but men's most passionate desires and hopes, their basic beliefs about the sort of life to be lived. They started not from science, not from ascertained knowledge, but from moral convictions, and then resorted to the best knowledge and the best intellectual methods available in their day to give the form of demonstration to what was essentially an attitude of will, or a moral resolution to prize one mode of life more highly than another, and the wish to persuade other men that this was the wise way of living.

And this explains what is meant by saying that love of wisdom is not after all the same thing as eagerness for scientific knowledge. By wisdom we mean not systematic and proved knowledge of fact and truth, but a conviction about moral values, a sense for the better kind of life to be led. Wisdom is a moral term, and like every moral term refers not to the constitution of things already in existence, not even if that constitution be magnified into eternity and absoluteness. As a moral term it refers to a choice about something to be done, a preference for living this sort of life rather than that. It refers not to accomplished reality but to a desired future which our desires, when translated into articulate conviction, may help bring into existence.

There are those who think that such statements give away the whole case for philosophy. Many critics and foes of philosophy coming from the camp of science would doubtless claim they were admissions of the claims that philosophy has always been a false light, a pretentious ambition; and that the lesson is that philosophers should sit down in humility and accept the ascertainments of the special sciences, and not go beyond the task of weaving these statements into a more coherent fabric of expression. Others would go further and find in such statements a virtual confession of the futility of all philosophizing.

But there is another way of taking the matter. One might rather say that the fact that the collective purpose and desire of a given generation and people dominates its philosophy is evidence of the sincerity and vitality of that philosophy; that failure to employ the known facts of the period in support of a certain estimate of the proper life to lead would show lack of any holding and directing force in the current social ideal. Even wresting facts to a purpose, obnoxious as it is, testifies to a certain ardency in the vigor with which a belief about the right life to be led is held. It argues moral debility if the slave Epictetus and the Emperor Aurelius entertain just the same philosophy of life, even though both belong to the same Stoic school. "A community devoted to industrial pursuits, active in business and commerce, is not likely to see the needs and possibilities of life in the same way as a country with high esthetic culture and little enterprise in turning the energies of nature to mechanical account. A social group with a fairly continuous history will respond mentally to a crisis in a very different way from one which has felt the shock of distinct breaks." Different hues of philosophic thought are bound to result. Women have as yet made little contribution to philosophy. But when women who are not mere students of other persons' philosophy set out to write it, we cannot conceive that it will be the same in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the different masculine experience of things. Institutions, customs of life, breed certain systematized predilections and aversions. The wise man reads historic philosophies to detect in them intellectual formulations of men's habitual purposes and cultivated wants, not to gain insight into the ultimate nature of things or information about the make-up of reality. As far as what is loosely called reality figures in philosophies, we may be sure that it signifies those selected aspects of the world which are chosen because they lend themselves to the support of men's judgment of the worth-while life, and hence are most highly prized. In philosophy, "reality" is a term of value or choice.

To deny however that philosophy is in any essential sense a form of science or of knowledge, is not to say that philosophy is a mere arbitrary expression of wish or feeling or a vague suspiration after something, nobody knows what. All philosophy bears an intellectual impress because it is an effort to convince some one, perhaps the writer himself, of the reasonableness of some course of life which has been adopted from custom or instinct. Since it is addressed to man's intelligence, it must employ knowledge and established beliefs, and it must proceed in an orderly way, logically. The art of literature catches men unaware and employs a charm to bring them to a spot whence they see vividly and intimately some picture which embodies life in a meaning. But magic and immediate vision are denied the philosopher. He proceeds prosaically along the highway, pointing out recognizable landmarks, mapping the course, and labeling with explicit logic the stations reached. This means of course that philosophy must depend upon the best science of its day. It can intellectually recommend its judgments of value only as it can select relevant material from that which is recognized to be established truth, and can persuasively use current knowledge to drive home the reasonableness of its conception of life. It is this dependence upon the method of logical presentation and upon scientific subject matter which confers upon philosophy the garb, though not the form, of knowledge.

Scientific form is a vehicle for conveying a non-scientific conviction, but the carriage is necessary, for philosophy is not mere passion but a passion that would exhibit itself as a reasonable persuasion. Philosophy is therefore always in a delicate position, and gives the heathen and Philistine an opportunity to rage. It is always balancing between sophistry, or pretended and illegitimate knowledge, and vague, incoherent mysticism—not of necessity mysticism in its technical definition, but in that sense of the mysterious and misty which affects the popular meaning of the word. When the stress is too much on intellectual form, when the original moral purpose has lost its vitality, philosophy becomes learned and dialectical. When there is cloudy desire, unclarified and unsustained by the logical exhibition of attained science, philosophy becomes hortatory, edifying, sentimental, or fantastic and semi-magical. The perfect balance may hardly be attained by man, and there are few indeed who can, like Plato, even rhythmically alternate with artistic grace from one emphasis to the other. But what makes philosophy hard work and also makes its cultivation worth while, is precisely the fact that it assumes the responsibility for setting forth some ideal of a collective good life by the methods which the best science of the day employs in its quite different task, and with the use of the characteristic knowledge of its day. The philosopher fails when he avoids sophistry, or the conceit of knowledge, only to pose as a prophet of miraculous intuition or mystic revelation or a preacher of pious nobilities of sentiment.

Perhaps we can now see why it is that philosophers have so often been led astray into making claims for philosophy which when taken literally are practically insane in their inordinate scope, such as the claim that philosophy deals with some supreme and total reality beyond that with which the special sciences and arts have to do. Stated sincerely and moderately, the claim would take the form of pointing out that no knowledge as long as it remains just knowledge, just apprehension of fact and truth, is complete or satisfying. Human nature is such that it is impossible that merely finding out that things are thus and so can long content it. There is an instinctive uneasiness which forces men to go beyond any intellectual grasp or recognition, no matter how extensive. Even if a man had seen the whole existent world and gained insight into its hidden and complicated structure, he would after a few moments of ecstasy at the marvel thus revealed to him become dissatisfied to remain at that point. He would begin to ask himself what of it? What is it all about? What does it all mean? And by these questions he would not signify the absurd search for a knowledge greater than all knowledge, but would indicate the need for projecting even the completest knowledge upon a realm of another dimension—namely, the dimension of action. He would mean: What am I to do about it? What course of activity does this state of things require of me? What possibilities to be achieved by my own thought turned over into deed does it open up to me? What new responsibilities does this knowledge impose? To what new adventures does it invite? All knowledge in short makes a difference. It opens new perspectives and releases energy to new tasks. This happens anyway and continuously, philosophy or no philosophy. But philosophy tries to gather up the threads into a central stream of tendency, to inquire what more fundamental and general attitudes of response the trend of knowledge exacts of us, to what new fields of action it calls us. It is in this sense, a practical and moral sense, that philosophy can lay claim to the epithets of universal, basic and superior. Knowledge *is* partial and incomplete, any and all knowledge, till we have placed it in the context of a future which cannot be known, but only speculated about and resolved upon. It is, to use in another sense a favorite philosophical term, a matter of *appearance,* for it is not self-enclosed, but an indication of something to be done.

As was intimated at the outset, considerable has been said about philosophy, but nothing as yet about democracy. Yet, I hope, certain implications are fairly obvious. There has been, roughly speaking, a coincidence in the development of modern experimental science and of democracy. Philosophy has no more important question than a consideration of how far this may be mere coincidence, and how far it marks a genuine correspondence. Is democracy a comparatively superficial human expedient, a device of petty manipulation, or does nature itself, as that is uncovered and understood by our best contemporaneous knowledge, sustain and support our democratic hopes and aspirations? Or, if we choose to begin arbitrarily at the other end, if to construct democratic institutions is our aim, how then shall we construe and interpret the natural environment and natural history of humanity in order to get an intellectual warrant for our endeavors, a reasonable persuasion that our undertaking is not contradicted by what science authorizes us to say about the structure of the world? How shall we read what we call reality (that is to say the world of existence accessible to verifiable inquiry) so that we may essay our deepest political and social problems with a conviction that they are to a reasonable extent sanctioned and sustained by the nature of things? Is the world as an object of knowledge at odds with our purposes and efforts? Is it merely neutral and indifferent? Does it lend itself equally to all our social ideals, which means that it gives itself to none, but stays aloof, ridiculing as it were the ardor and earnestness with which we take our trivial and transitory hopes and plans? Or is its nature such that it is at least willing to coöperate, that it not only does not say us nay, but gives us an encouraging nod?

Is not this, you may ask, taking democracy too seriously? Why not ask the question about say presbyterianism or free verse? Well, I would not wholly deny the pertinency of similar questions about such movements. All deliberate action of mind is in a way an experiment with the world to see what it will stand for, what it will promote and what frustrate. The world is tolerant and fairly hospitable. It permits and even encourages all sorts of experiments. But in the long run some are more welcomed and assimilated than others. Hence there can be no difference save one of depth and scope between the questions of the relation of the world to a scheme of conduct in the form of church government or a form of art and that of its relation to democracy. If there be a difference, it is only because democracy is a form of desire and endeavor which reaches further and condenses into itself more issues.

This statement implies a matter of definition. What is meant by democracy? It can certainly be defined in a way which limits the issue to matters which if they bear upon philosophy at all affect it only in limited and technical aspects. Anything that can be said in the way of definition in the remaining space must be, and confessedly is, arbitrary. The arbitrariness may however, be mitigated by linking up the conception with the historic formula of the greatest liberal movement of history—the formula of liberty, equality and fraternity. In referring to this, we only exchange arbitrariness for vagueness. It would be hard indeed to arrive at any consensus of judgment about the meaning of any one of the three terms inscribed on the democratic banner. Men did not agree in the eighteenth century and subsequent events have done much to accentuate their differences. Do they apply purely politically, or do they have an economic meaning?—to refer to one great cleavage which in the nineteenth century broke the liberal movement into two factions, now opposed to one another as liberal and conservative were once opposed.

Let us then take frank advantage of the vagueness and employ the terms with a certain generosity and breadth. What does the demand for liberty imply for philosophy, when we take the idea of liberty as conveying something of decided moral significance? Roughly speaking, there are two typical ideas of liberty. One of them says that freedom is action in accord with the consciousness of fixed law; that men are free when they are rational, and they are rational when they recognize and consciously conform to the necessities which the universe exemplified. As Tolstoi says, even the ox would be free if it recognized the yoke about its neck and took the yoke for the law of its own action instead of engaging in a vain task of revolt which escapes no necessity but only turns it in the direction of misery and destruction. This is a noble idea of freedom embodied, both openly and disguisedly, in classic philosophies. It is the only view consistent with any form of absolutism whether materialistic or idealistic, whether it considers the necessary relations which form the universe to be physical in character or spiritual. It holds of any view which says that reality exists under the form of eternity, that it is, to use a technical term, a *simul totum*, an all at once and forever affair, no matter whether the all at once be of mathematical-physical laws and structures, or a comprehensive and exhaustive divine consciousness. Of such a conception one can only say that however noble, it is not one which is spontaneously congenial to the idea of liberty in a society which has set its heart on democracy.

A philosophy animated, be it unconsciously or consciously, by the strivings of men to achieve democracy will construe liberty as meaning a universe in which there is real uncertainty and contingency, a world which is not all in, and never will be, a world which in some respect is incomplete and in the making, and which in these respects may be made this way or that according as men judge, prize, love and labor. To such a philosophy any notion of a perfect or complete reality, finished, existing always the same without regard to the vicissitudes of time, will be abhorrent. It will think of time not as that part of reality which for some strange reason has not yet been traversed, but as a genuine field of novelty, of real and unpredictable increments to existence, a field for experimentation and invention. It will indeed recognize that there is in things a grain against which we cannot successfully go, but it will also insist that we cannot even discover what that grain is except as we make this new experiment and that fresh effort, and that consequently the mistake, the effort which is frustrated in direct execution, is as true a constituent of the world as is the act which most carefully observes law. For it is the grain which is rubbed the wrong way which more clearly stands out. It will recognize that in a world where discovery is genuine, error is an inevitable ingredient of reality, and that man's business is not to avoid it—or to cultivate the illusion that it is mere appearance—but to turn it to account, to make it fruitful. Nor will such a philosophy be mealy-mouthed in admitting that where contingency is real and experiment is required, good fortune and bad fortune are facts. It will not construe all accomplishment in terms of merit and virtue, and all loss and frustration in terms of demerit and just punishment. Because it recognizes that contingency coöperates with intelligence in the realization of every plan, even the one most carefully and wisely thought out, it will avoid conceit and intellectual arrogance. It will not fall into the delusion that consciousness is or can be everything as a determiner of events. Hence it will be humbly grateful that a world in which the most extensive and accurate thought and reason can only take advantage of events is also a world which gives room to move about in, and which offers the delights of consummations that are new revelations, as well as those defeats that are admonishments to conceit.

The evident contrast of equality is inequality. Perhaps it is not so evident that inequality means practically inferiority and superiority. And that this relation works out practically in support of a régime of authority or feudal hierarchy in which each lower or inferior element depends upon, holds from, one superior from which it gets direction and to which it is responsible. Let one bear this idea fully in mind and he will see how largely philosophy has been committed to a metaphysics of feudalism. By this I mean it has thought of things in the world as occupying certain grades of value, or as having fixed degrees of truth, ranks of reality.

The traditional conception of philosophy to which I referred at the outset, which identifies it with insight into supreme reality or ultimate and comprehensive truth, shows how thoroughly philosophy has been committed to a notion that inherently some realities are superior to others, are better than others. Now any such philosophy inevitably works in behalf of a régime of authority, for it is only right that the superior should lord it over the inferior. The result is that much of philosophy has gone to justifying the particular scheme of authority in religion or social order which happened to exist at a given time. It has become unconsciously an apologetic for the established order, because it has tried to show the rationality of this or that existent hierarchical grading of values and schemes of life. Or when it has questioned the established order it has been a revolutionary search for some rival principle of authority.

How largely indeed has historic philosophy been a search for an indefeasible seat of authority! Greek philosophy began when men doubted the authority of custom as a regulator of life; it sought in universal reason or in the immediate particular, in being or in flux, a rival source of authority, but one which as a rival was to be as certain and definite as ever custom had been. Medieval philosophy was frankly an attempt to reconcile authority with reason, and modern philosophy began when man doubting the authority of revelation began a search for some authority which should have all the weight, certainty and inerrancy previously ascribed to the will of God embodied in the divinely instituted church.

Thus for the most part the democratic practice of life has been at an immense intellectual disadvantage. Prevailing philosophies have unconsciously discountenanced it. They have failed to furnish it with articulation, with reasonableness, for they have at bottom been committed to the principle of a single, final and unalterable authority from which all lesser authorities are derived. The men who questioned the divine right of kings did so in the name of another absolute. The voice of the people was mythologized into the voice of God. Now a halo may be preserved about the monarch. Because of his distance, he can be rendered transcendentally without easy detection. But the people are too close at hand, too obviously empirical, to be lent to deification. Hence democracy has ranked for the most part as an intellectual anomaly, lacking philosophical basis and logical coherency, but upon the whole to be accepted because somehow or other it works better than other schemes and seems to develop a more kindly and humane set of social institutions. For when it has tried to achieve a philosophy it has clothed itself in an atomistic individualism, as full of defects and inconsistencies in theory as it was charged with obnoxious consequences when an attempt was made to act upon it.

Now whatever the idea of equality means for democracy, it means, I take it, that the world is not to be construed as a fixed order of species, grades or degrees. It means that every existence deserving the name of existence has something unique and irreplaceable about it, that it does not exist to illustrate a principle, to realize a universal or to embody a kind or class. As philosophy it denies the basic principle of atomistic individualism as truly as that of rigid feudalism. For the individualism traditionally associated with democracy makes equality quantitative, and hence individuality something external and mechanical rather than qualitative and unique.

In social and moral matters, equality does not mean mathematical equivalence. It means rather the inapplicability of considerations of greater and less, superior and inferior. It means that no matter how great the quantitative differences of ability, strength, position, wealth, such differences are negligible in comparison with something else—the fact of individuality, the manifestation of something irreplaceable. It means, in short, a world in which an existence must be reckoned with on its own account, not as something capable of equation with and transformation into something else. It implies, so to speak, a metaphysical mathematics of the incommensurable in which each speaks for itself and demands consideration on its own behalf.

If democratic equality may be construed as individuality, there is nothing forced in understanding fraternity as continuity, that is to say, as association and interaction without limit. Equality, individuality, tends to isolation and independence. It is centrifugal. To say that what is specific and unique can be exhibited and become forceful or actual only in relationship with other like beings is merely, I take it, to give a metaphysical version to the fact that democracy is concerned not with freaks or geniuses or heroes or divine leaders but with associated individuals in which each by intercourse with others somehow makes the life of each more distinctive.

All this, of course, is but by way of intimation. In spite of its form it is not really a plea for a certain kind of philosophizing. For if democracy be a serious, important choice and predilection it must in time justify itself by generating its own child of wisdom, to be justified in turn by its children, better institutions of life. It is not so much a question as to whether there will be a philosophy of this kind as it is of just who will be the philosophers associated with it. And I cannot conclude without mentioning the name of one through whom this vision of a new mode of life has already spoken with beauty and power—William James.

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